HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA ,
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORT A BLE: y,¢/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES:)'j½/NO
(3) REVISED '.,f<-"1 -,
ti;!l,1.c£ ~
In the application between:
ISABELLE CATHERINA BEUKES
And
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
LEAVE TO APPEAL JUDGMENT
Case No : 8066/2014
APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
1

BAQWAJ :
Introduction
1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the SCA alternatively to the Full Court
of this Division against an order of this court handed down on 15 February 2022,
awarding the respondent's loss of earnings in the amount of R6 345 112.00
2. The applicant also applies for condonation of the late filing of the application for
leave to appeal.
3. Both applications are being opposed by the respondent, who submits in opposition
that both applications are fatally defective, lack merit, and should be dismissed
with costs on an attorney-and-client scale.
The Facts
4. The R AF did not take any steps within the prescribed period under Rule 49 of the
Uniform Rules of Court, which provides for a request for reasons within 10 days
and an application for leave to appeal within 15 days thereafter.
5. 800 days after on, 10 May 2024 , or more than two years later, RAF filed an
application for leave to appeal as stated above.
6. It is not disputed that the RAF 's delay has seriously prejudiced the respondent in
that it has failed to pay the amount ordered by this court and instead paid the
respondent a paltry R250 000.00 of the awarded amount.
2

Points in Limine
7. The respondent challenges the lack of authority of the deponent to applicant's
founding affidavit, Nomadlozi Sihlali who , as the respondent submits failed to
provide any resolution or mandate proving authority to institute these proceedings
or depose to the affidavit.
8. The applicant omitted to do so despite the provisions of the Rules of Court, which
require that an applicant should demonstrate proper authority to act on behalf of a
juristic person.
9. Further, In Mall (Cape) (Pty) Ltd V Merino Ko-operasie Bpk1 it was held by the
court that failure to prove authority justified dismissal of an application.
Hearsay Evidence
10. A further point limine by the respondent is that the applicants founding affidavit
should be regarded pro non scripto as the deponent Sihlali has no personal
knowledge of the facts to which she deposed having not been involved at the trial
and not having been copied w ith the relevant communi cations.
11 . Further in this regard, no confirmatory affidavits from individuals with firsthand
knowledge accompanied the affidavit rendering the contents hearsay and
inadmissible.
1 1957 (2) SA 347 (C).
3

Con donation
12. Condonation is not simply there for the taking and a full and satisfactory
explanation for the entire period of delay is required. This was held in Mulaudzi v
Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa) Limitecf2
13. The respondent submits and I accept that Raf's delay of over 300 days is
egregious in that it far exceeds the 25-day period prescribed in Rule 49. It is trite
that in numerous decisions of this court a delay of nine months was deemed
unacceptable.
14. In the present case this is made worse by the proffering of a glib explanation that
the delay was due to internal processes including a memorandum and head office
instructions received in April 2024. Notably no documentary evidence supports
these claims and there is no explanation covering the period February 2022 to
April 2024.
15. In Uitenhage Transitional Local Council v South African Revenue Services3 the
court held that condonation is not merely a formality and is not to be had merely
for the asking.
2 2017 (6) SA 90 (SCA) at para 26.
3 2004 (1) SA 292 (SCA) at para 6.
4

Prospects of success
16. Raf's only ground of appeal is that this court erred in awarding R6 345 112.00.
This glib assertion fails to specify or identify errors of fact or law.
17. Unsurprisingly this flows from Raf's failure to request reason for judgment in terms
of Rule 49 (1) curtailing its ability to articulate grounds of appeal.
18. The award by this court was based on expert reports and actuarial calculations
which remain unchallenged by Raf's own experts at trial. Therefore, there exists
absolutely no basis to suggest that another court would come to a different
conclusion.
19. Equa lly there are no compelling reasons to grant leave as there are no novel legal
questions or public interests issues.
20. Notably in both its founding affidavit and in its Heads of Argument, there is a patent
attempt by Raf to re-litigate the issues. I consider this to be an unacceptable
approach amounting to an abuse of process.
21. In S v Smith 4 Plasket AJA pronounced as follows regarding 'a reasonable
prospect of success' "what the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates
is a dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law, that a court of appeal
could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court. In order
to succeed, the appellant must convince this court on proper grounds that he has
prospects of success on appeal and that these prospects are not remote but have
4 2012 (1) SACR 5E7 (SCA) at para 7.
5

a realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established than that there
is mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on appeal or that the case
cannot be categorised as hopeless. There must in other words, be a sound,
rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal."
22. The respondent seeks costs on an attorney-and-client scale due to Raf's mala fide
conduct in
22.1 a delay of more than two years
22.2 A withdrawn application for stay, tendering wasted costs
22.3 Failure to appoint experts or engage meaningfully since 2019
22.4 Causing prejudice by withholding payment of the bulk of the award.
23. I find that Raf's conduct is not only recalcitrant and designed to delay justice but
that it justifies a punitive costs order to defer future abuse.
24. In the result I make the following order:
24. 1 The application for condonation is dismissed.
24. 2 The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
24. 3 The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of both applications on an attorney
and client scale, including costs of counsel on B scale.
6

/
I// Sr;J.f?,J BAQWA J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Date of Hearing: Application for Leave to Appeal heard on papers filed
Judgment delivered: August 2025
APPEARANCES:
7