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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA


Case Number: 2025-086260








In the matter between:


COLLINS PHUTJANE LETSOALO Applicant


and

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND First Respondent

THE BOARD OF THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Second Respondent

Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal
representatives by e -mail and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
Caselines. The date and for hand-down is deemed to be 01 August 2025.

Summary: Application for leave to appeal. Leave to appeal regime serves a
significant purpose in the administration of justice sphere. It remains unhelpful
for an applicant for leave to appeal to set out an array of grounds without any of
one them demonstrating that a Court has committed a factual and legal error in
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
______________ ________
DATE SIGNATURE
1 August 2025

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its order . As required by rule 49(1) , the statement of grounds must be
constituted by factual and legal errors and not what may appear as vitriolic
attack on a judicial officer. The regime does not avail an opportunity to re-argue
a dismissed matter. The grounds must demonstrate that the appeal would have
reasonable prospects of success or that some other compelling reason exist for
the appeal to be heard. In the opinion of this Court , the appeal lacks prospects
of success and fail to demonstrate compelling reasons. Additionally, this Court
is of the opinion that the decision on the relief sought by the applicant would
not have practical effect or results and leave to appeal cannot be given only for
the appeal to be dismissed in terms of the provisions of section 16(2)(a)(i) of the
Superior Courts Act. Held: (1) The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
Held: (2) The applicant must pay the costs of this application on a party and
party scale to be settled or taxed at scale B.


JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA, J

Introduction
[1] An application for leave to appeal regime serves as an important mechanism in
the administration of justice. It is not purposed to afford an applicant a golden
opportunity to be vitriolic to judicial officers. It also does not serve as a platform
to re-argue a dismissed matter. That said, this is an application seeking to obtain
leave to appeal against the whole judgment and order of this Court handed down
on 26 June 2025, w hich order dismissed the applicant’s application with costs.
The application is oppo sed by the cited respondents. An attempt was made,
which attempt was wisely jettisoned, to prevent the cited respondents to oppose
the present application. Since the attempt was not pursued further, it is obsolete
for this judgment to say anything further about the atte mpt, save to commend
counsel for the applicant for the presence of mind to jettis on it. Rule 49(1)(a) of

counsel for the applicant for the presence of mind to jettis on it. Rule 49(1)(a) of
the Uniform Rules requires the present application to be supported by statement
of grounds. Those grounds must demonstrate an error of facts and law. The

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present application prides itself o f a massive 38 grounds of appeal. It is not the
intention of this judgment to deal with each of the 38 grounds. It suffices to
mention that the bulk of those grounds are not valid grounds contemplated in rule
49(1)(a). If anything, t hey are, with respect a vitriol against the judicial officer.
Vitriolic stance remains unhelpful to an applicant for leave to appeal. If the
requirements as legislated in section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act are not
met, an application for leave to appeal falls to be dismissed.
Analysis
[2] As indicated at the dawn of this judgment, the present application is predicated
on a massive 38 grounds. The majority of the grounds are nothing but a refined
re-argument of the dismissed application. One of the startling ground is that at
the hearing of the application the applicant observed a reasonable apprehension
of bias on the part of the judicial officer. This is considered to be startling in that
having observed the actual bias, the applicant chose to remain silent and not
seek an order to have the bias judicial officer recused. He waited for the outcome
and only thereafter conjured up this ground. During oral submissions, counsel for
the applicant in response to the question from the bench submitted that had the
applicant succeeded, this allegation would not have seen the light of a day. As a
matter of principle, judicial impartiality and neutrality does not mean that a judge
must have no prior conceptions or sensibilities. 1 Generally, in motion
proceedings, a judge before hearing a matter would have had an opportunity to
study the relevant affidavits and heads of argument if furnished in preparation of
hearing oral submissions. Such may rightfully propel a judge to hold a preliminary
view on certain of the relevant legal principles. If that view is expressed at the
hearing in order to enable the legal representatives to deal with, it cannot be that

hearing in order to enable the legal representatives to deal with, it cannot be that
a judge is biased. It is trite that interlocutory rulings do not render a judicial officer
to be biased and disqualified. Regarding a point of law, a judicial officer is entitled
to raise it mero motu and afford the parties and opportunity to deal with it.

1 See Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area # 23 v Yukon (Attorney General) [2015] 2
SCR 282.

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[3] As confirmed in Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd (Bernert)2, given the oath of office of a
judicial officers a presumption of impartiality is implicit. In the present instance,
the applicant kept his ace up his sleeve, as it were, and failed to challenge the
alleged impartiality at the hearing of the application. The Constitutional Court had
an occasion to deal with a similar situation in Mbana v Shepstone & Wylie
(Mbana)3. Instructively, the Court with such perspicacity expressed itself in the
following terms:
“[44] Had Ms Mbana apprehended bias in the Labour Court, as she asserts,
she did, she would ordinarily have raised these allegations at the trial stage or
in her initial application for leave to appeal. This Court in Bernert noted that a
litigant who did not raise an allegation timeously does not display conduct
consistent with reasonable apprehension of bias. It is not in the interests of
justice to permit a litigant who had full knowledge upon which the claim
of actual bias is made to wait until an adverse judgment is pronounced
before raising these allegations. To do so woul d undermine the
administration of justice.
[45] In Bernert we emphasised that “litigation must be brought to finality as
speedily as possible”. That applies with equal force in this case. It is not
desirable for a litigant, after a trial has been completed and she has
already sought leave to appeal on other grounds, to amend her grounds
for leave to appeal by including new facts alleging actual bias.
[46] For these reasons, we find that it is not in the interests of justice, at this
late stage, to permit Ms Mbana to raise a complaint of actual bias.
[4] Equally instructive, the Court in Bernert expressed itself in the following terms:
“The conduct of the applicant is simply inconsistent with a reasonable
apprehension of bias. If he had any apprehension, it must have been of the
kind that he thought could be cured by a judgment in his favour. But that

kind that he thought could be cured by a judgment in his favour. But that
can hardly be said to be a reasonable apprehension of bias that is reasonably
entertained. The applicant wanted to have the best of both worlds.”

2 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC).
3 [2015] ZACC 11.

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[5] Similarly, in the present application, the applicant wants to have the best of both
worlds. He simply cannot do so. As he apparently observed the body language4
of the judge and developed an apprehension of bias, as he now seeks to
contend, he should have asked the bias judge to recuse himself. It is worth
mentioning that at the hearing of the application, the applicant was adeptly
represented by two counsel, one of whom a senior counsel. Surely with such
sufficient dexterity, the appl icant ought to have acted swiftly to protect his
constitutionally guaranteed rights protected in section 34 of the Constitution. His
legal team must h ave been armoured with the requisite sagacity to have
observed the blatant breach of his section 34 rights.
[6] For all the above reasons, this Court is not of an opinion that the applicant is
possessed with reasonable prospects of success on appeal based on this newly
conjured up ground of reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias.
[7] The remainder of the grounds not specifically mentioned herein amount to
nothing, but a refined re-argument of the legal principles already rejected in the
impugned judgment. For those, having considered them against the reasons
advanced in the impugned judgment, they all fail to meet the requirements of
section 17(1)(a) of the Act. It suffices to mention that it is by now trite that an
appeal lies against the order and not the reasons of the order. There is simply no
merit in a submission that in order to precautionary suspend, there must be a
strong suspicion of a misconduct having be en committed. This Court is in full
agreement with the sentiments recently expressed by the Labour Court in
Bombela Operating Company (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others (Bombela)5. The
Court said:
“[43] … In short, Long established that a precautionary suspension is justified
simply if the employer wishes to impose one while an investigation takes place.
Long has curtailed the scope of challenging whether a precautionary

Long has curtailed the scope of challenging whether a precautionary
suspension is reasonably necessary for a proper investigation to take place…”

4 It is unclear what this would mean for a Court of appeal should leave be granted.
5 (JR 589/2021) [2025] ZALCJHB 297 (11 July 2025).

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[8] Accordingly, in the opinion of this Court, the applicant failed to demonstrate that
(a) the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success and (b) some
compelling reason exists for the appeal to be heard.
[9] During oral submissions, this Court raised with both counsel the question
whether the appeal would have practical benefit at the time of its hearing should
this Court grant leave. The applicant’s counsel forcefully submitted that the
appeal will not be moot. The respondents’ counsel submitted otherwise. It is
common cause that after 6 August 2025, the Fixed Term Contract of employment
between the applicant and the Road Accident Fund would expire. Accepting that
the rights which the applicant is seeking to protect and enforce are contractual in
nature, once the contract expires , those rights would be unenforceable in law.
Regard being had to the relief that the applicant sought, even if the appeal
succeeds, those reliefs will not yield practical results to him . He cannot be
returned to his position, in the circumstances where his employment contract had
expired. Interdicting the alleged advertisement of the position in order to protect
his alleged re-appointment by the disestablished board will not yield any practical
results for him.
[10] Section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Act is explicit. At the hearing of the appeal when the
issues are of such a nature that the decision sought will have no practical effect
or result, the appeal may be dismissed on this ground alone. It is inappropriate
for a judge to give lea ve to appeal in an instance where it is perspicuous that a
Court of appeal may dismiss the appeal on the basis that the decision sought will
have no practical effect. Setting aside a precautionary suspension effected in
terms of an expired con tract of employment will not yield practical results. An
argument that the applicant’s name shall be cleared thereby is with respect lame.
In the dismissed application, the applicant did not seek a relief to clear his name,

In the dismissed application, the applicant did not seek a relief to clear his name,
instead he sought an order allowing him to resume his duties. This resumption
of duties will not be possible in an instance where the employment contract has
expired. Similarly, interdicting an advertisement in an instance where the
employment contract h as expired would not yield any pra ctical results for the
applicant.

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[11] At the conclusion of the oral submissions, counsel for the applicant sought to be
indulged by submitting authorities of the Constitutional Court dealing with the
principle of mootness. This Court indulged him. Th e two uploaded authorities,
one from the Constitutional Court and the other from the SCA do not alter the
letter, spirit and purport of section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Act. Simply put, the decision
sought will not yield practical results for the applicant.
[12] Because of all the above reasons, I make the following order:
Order
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of this application on a scale of
party and party to be settled or taxed at scale B.



__________ ______
GN MOSHOANA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA



APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Mr H Molotsi SC and Mr P Moshoadiba.
Instructed by: Motalane Inc, Pretoria.
For the Respondents: Mr ESJ Van Graan SC
Instructed by: Renqe FY Inc, Pretoria
Date of Hearing 31 July 2025
Date of judgment: 01 August 2025