REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number : 2024 -123072
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED : YES
1 August 2025
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
PASSENGER RAIL AGENCY OF SOUTH AFRICA Excipient / Defendant
and
MATSOBANE MASENYA Respondent / Plaintiff
JUDGMENT
J Vorster, AJ.
[1] This is an opposed exception against the plaintiff's particulars of claim on the
basis that it discloses no cause of action. As a result, when I refer to facts, I
refer to the pleaded allegations appearing in the plaintiff's amended particulars
of claim. To simplify this judgment, I refer to the excipient as "the defendant"
and to the respondent as "the plaintiff'.
1

2


[2] The plaintiff issued summons against the defendant during October 2024.
During April 2025, the plaintiff amended its particulars of claim. The defendant
did not object to the amendment, but soon thereafter, on 17 April 2025,
delivered an exception claiming that the amended particulars of claim does not
disclose a cause of action. It is this exception that serves before me.

[3] The plaintiff’s pleaded case can be summarised as follows:

[3.1] He commenced employment with the defendant in August 2009;
[3.2] From mid-2022 to 2024, the defendant experienced cybercrime
breaches on its SAP vendor management system, which resulted in the
interception of payment files and replacement of legitimate vendor
details with fraudulent bank accounts, resulting in “ fraudulent financial
losses to PRASA”;
[3.3] The defendant appointed an external company, Shield Technology , to
investigate the causes of the breaches. The investigator produced a
report declaring the plaintiff a “prime suspect”;
[3.4] The plaintiff was subsequently suspended and ultimately charged with
committing various wrongs, including: (i.) failing to protect his employer’s
interest; (ii.) defeating PRASA’s interest; (iii.) unauthorised or unlawful
invasion of computers belonging to other employees; and (iv.) acting in
contravention of section 86 of the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act, 25 of 2002;
[3.5] The plaintiff was submitted to an internal disciplinary process. The
outcome was that the independent chairperson, a certain Adv Baloyi,
ruled that the defendant’s evidence was based on conjecture and
speculation, and found the plaintiff not guilty;
[3.6] The plaintiff, who is a senior system administrator, claims that the
publication of allegations suggesting involvement in untoward conduct in
the form of cyber breaches are defamatory, and were published to at
least the witnesses and chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry.

3

[4] The defendant alleges that the plaintiff has failed to disclose a cause of action.
In its exception it contends that there are four reasons why the amended
particulars of claim do not disclose a cause of action. They are: (i.) no
publication; (ii.) no wrongfulness; (iii.) failure to comply with uniform rule 18; and
(iv.) the findings in the report compiled by the internal investigator cannot be
attributed to the defendant (during argument, defendant’s counsel explained
that this ground of exception should be understood to refer to a lack of intent to
defame).

[5] I will deal with each of the proposed grounds of exceptions separately. Before
doing so, it is appropriate to make some pointed remarks concerning the correct
approach to an exception on the basis that no cause of action is disclosed.

[6] The purpose of an exception alleging that a pleading is bad in law is to dispose
of the leading of evidence at trial. The exception must go to the root of the claim
or defence.

[7] An exception sets out why the excipient says that the facts pleaded by a plaintiff
or defendant are insufficient , and can succeed only if the facts pleaded by a
plaintiff could not, on any basis, as a matter of law, result in a judgment against
the defendant. Only those facts alleged in the pleading excepted to and any
other facts agreed to by the parties may be considered in disposing of the
exception.
1

[8] I now turn to the four grounds of complaint.

[9] No publication

[9.1] In paragraph 2.5 of the amended particulars of claim the following is
pleaded:


1 Pretorius and Another v Transport Pension Fund and Another 2019 (2) SA 37 (CC) at [15].

4

“2.5 The Defendant published these defamatory statements not only
through its Witnesses, Madlopha and Thenga Attorneys, Ningiza
Horner Attorneys and their respective staff members as well as the
Chairperson of the Internal Disciplinary Hearing, in actual fact t he
publication was not only limited to the parties involved in the Internal
Disciplinary Hearing, however there are also other people within the
Organisations whether seniors or subordinates who were made aware
of these defamatory statements. There were several newspaper articles
that were published regarding the defamatory statements made by the
Defendant, it is only fortunate that the Plaintiff’s name was not
mentioned, however those who already knew what the articles were
referring to could easily link a nd identify the newspaper articles to the
Plaintiff’s name. It is has also come to the Plaintiff’s attention that the
Defendant has lodged a criminal case with South African Police Service
(SAPS) against him. This therefore means that the publication by th e
Defendant continues
.”

[9.2] Publication must be to a person other than the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s
spouse. It is not necessary to state the names of everyone in whose
presence the defamatory statement was made, but only those whose
identities have been pleaded may be called as witnesses to prove
publication.
2

[9.3] Quoted paragraph 2.5 clearly identifies at least three individuals to who
publication was made. As such, the particulars of claim contain sufficient
allegations in respect of publication.


2 International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Co (South) Ltd (4) 1955 (2) SA 40 (W); and
Crots v Pretorius 2010 (6) SA 512 (SCA) at [15].

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[10] Wrongfulness

[10.1] A statement is defamatory if it is likely to undermine the status, good
name or reputation of the plaintiff. Publication of a defamatory statement
is prima facie wrongful.3

[10.2] It is a question of law whether the words complained of are reasonably
capable of conveying to the reasonable reader a meaning which
defames the plaintiff.4

[10.3] If the words complained of can have a defamatory meaning in their
ordinary sense, a cause of action is disclosed which does not cease to
be disclosed when the pleader, in paraphrasing the words, adds
something more than their ordinary meaning.
5

[10.4] Although the defendant’s counsel, Mr Zwane, urged me to find that the
charges raised against the plaintiff, as they are pleaded in paragraph 2.4
of the amended particulars of claim, when read by an objective person,
do not have a defamatory meaning in the ordinary sense, the difficulty
with his approach lies in the fact that the pleading must be read as a
whole. In my judgment, when reading paragraph 2.4 with paragraphs
2.2, 2.3 and 2.5, it reveals that the plaintiff was accused of defrauding
his employer. Fraud is a serious matter and being incorrectly accused of
fraud could, in my judgment, be wrongful.

[10.5] To the extent that my finding in respect of wrongfulness may be
incorrect, I align myself with the finding in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a
Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority of SA,
6

3 Le Roux and others v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) at [85] and [91].
4 Le Roux at [89] – [90].
5 Le Roux at [88].
6 2006 (1) SA 461 (SCA) at [14] – [16]. I

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where it was found that it is often inappropriate to decide issues of
wrongfulness on exception because such issues are often fact-bound.

[10.6] I therefore conclude that on a contextual reading of the amended
particulars of claim, it contains sufficient allegations to establish
wrongfulness.

[11] Failure to comply with uniform rule 18(6)

[11.1] Uniform rule 18 requires a litigant who’s claim is based on a contract to
plead whether the contract is written or oral, where it was concluded,
and who represented the parties when the contract was concluded. This
rule is, however, only applicable if the contract is the cause of action on
which the plaintiff relies. In casu, the cause of action is defamation, and
it was not required of the plaintiff to comply with uniform rule 18 when
referring to the contract of employment concluded between him and the
defendant in 2009.

[11.2] I therefore find that this ground of exception must fail.

[12] Intent not established

[12.1] Although a plaintiff must allege animus iniurandi in the sense of intent to
defame, it is presumed that the publication of a defamatory statement
was animo iniurandi.
7

[12.2] This approach was recently again confirmed in Economic Freedom
Fighters v Manual,
8 where the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked as
follows:


7 Le Roux and Others v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) at [85].
8 2021 (3) SA 425 (SCA) at [36].

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“Once the publication of defamatory matter has been proved, it is
presumed that the publication was wrongful and intentional, that is,
published with the intention to injure (the animus iniuriandi).”

[12.3] In light of the aforesaid, and the fact that I have already found that the
plaintiff’s pleading contains sufficient allegations to establish publication
and wrongfulness, intent is presumed. Consequently, this ground of
exception must also fail.

[13] As a result, the defendant’s exception must fail. What remains to consider is
the question of liability for costs. In my opinion, costs should be awarded to the
successful party, being the plaintiff. The matter is relatively uncomplicated and
I therefore conclude that it would be appropriate to direct that the costs be taxed
on scale A.

[14] The following order is made:

[14.1] The exception dated 17 April 2025, is dismissed.
[14.2] The defendant/excipient is directed to pay the costs of the exception,
such costs to be taxed on scale A.

J VORSTER, AJ.
Acting Judge of the High Court

Date heard: 29 July 2025.
Judgment date: 1 August 2025.

Appearances:
For the excipient (defendant):
Counsel: Mr Zwane.
Instructed by: Ningiza Horner Attorneys

For the respondent (plaintiff):
Counsel: Mr Khoza.
Instructed by: Snail Attorneys @ Law Inc.