IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELE TE WHI CHEVER IS NOT AP PLIC AB LE
(1) REPORTABLE ¥E8JNO
(2) OF INTERES T TO OTHER JUDG ES· ~O
(3) REV ISED
SIGNATURE ·
1
Case No . 005245/2025
In the matter between:
THABO MVUYELWA MBEKI
BRIGITTE SYLVIA MABANDLA
And
LUKHANYO BRUCE MATTHEWS CALATA
ALEGRIA KUTSAKA NYOKA
BONAKELE JACOBS
FATIEMA HARON-MASOET
TRYPHINA NOMANDLOVU MOKGATLE
KARL ANDREW WEBER
1st Applicant
2nd App licant
1st Responden t
2nd Respondent
3rd Respondent
4th Respondent
5th Respondent
6th Resp ondent

KIM TURNER
LYNDENE PAGE
MBUSO KHOZA
NEVILLE SELING
NOMBUYISELO MHLAULI
SARAH BIBI LALL
SIZAKELE ERNESTINA SIMELANE
SINDISWA ELIZABETH MKONTO
STEPHENS MBUTI MABELANE
THULi KUBHEKA
HLEKANI EDITH RIKHOTOSO
TSHIDISO MOTASI
NOMALI RITA GALELA
PHUMEZA MANDISA HASHE
MKHONTOWESIZWE GODOLOZI
MOGAPI SOLOMON TLHAPI
FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
MINISTER OF POLICE
NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
2
7th Respondent
8th Respondent
9th Respondent
10th Respondent
11th Respondent
12th Respondent
13th Responden t
14th Respondent
15th Respondent
16th Respondent
17th Respondent
18th Respondent
19th Respondent
20th Respondent
21st Respondent
22nd Respondent
23rd Respondent
24th Respondent
25th Respondent
26th Respondent
27th Respondent
28th Respondent
29th Respondent

In re:
LUKHANYO BRUCE MATTHEWS CALATA
ALEGRIA KUTSAKA NYOKA
BONAKELEJACOBS
FATIEMA HARON-MASOET
TRYPHINA NOMANDLOVU MOKGATLE
KARL ANDREW WEBER
KIM TURNER
LYNDENE PAGE
MBUSO KHOZA
NEVILLE BELING
NOMBUYISELO MHLAULI
SARAH BIBI LALL
SIZAKELE ERNESTINA SIMELANE
SINDISWA ELIZABETH MKONTO
STEPHENS MBUTI MABELANE
THULi KUBHEKA
HLEKANI EDITH RIKHOTOSO
TSHIDISO MOTASI
3
1st Applicant
2nd Applicant
3rd Applicant
4th Applicant
5th Applicant
5th Applicant
7th Applicant
81h Applicant
91h Applicant
10th Applicant
11th Applicant
12th Applicant
13th Applicant
14th Applicant
15th Applicant
15th Applicant
17th Applicant
18th Applicant

NOMALI RITA GALELA
PHUMEZA MANDISA HASHE
MKHONTOWESIZWE GODOLOZI
MOGAPI SOLOMON TLHAPI
FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
And
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
MINISTER OF POLICE
NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
Co ram: MillarJ
Heard on: 28 July 2025
4
1 gth Applicant
20th Applicant
21st Applicant
22nd Applicant
23rd Applicant
1st Respondent
2nd Respondent
3rd Respondent
4th Respondent
5th Respondent
6th Respondent
Delivered: 1 August 2025 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The

Summary:
It is Ordered :
5
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H00 on 1 August
2025.
Application to intervene - a declarator and constitutional damages
sought in the main application - applicants named in founding papers
- applicants not directly implicated - implication by inference through
reference to books published in 2009 and 2019 - no specific finding
sought against applicants - no direct and substantial legal interest in
the declaratory order sought or in any award for damages that would
be made - application dismissed - circumstances of the matter are
such that the application while unsuccessful was understandable and
for that reason no order as to costs.
ORDER
[1] The application is dismissed.
[2] There is no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
MILLARJ
[1] This is an application in which the applicants, (Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla), seek
leave to intervene as respondents1 in an application (main application) brought
1 The y seek leave to intervene as the 7u, and Bu, respondents in the main application.

6
by various applicants (the Calata applicants) against various respondents (the
government respondents) for inter alia the establishment of a Commission of
Enquiry and constitutional damages.
[2] The main application is predicated upon the failure by the government
respondents to either investigate or prosecute specific cases referred for this
purpose by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
[3] All these cases are serious in nature and the Calata applicants are all either
victims or family of victims who , besides having an interest in specific cases, were
themselves victims of apartheid -a crime against humanity. 2
[4] In the main application, the Calata applicants allege that between 1998 and 2017,
the government respondents,3 suppressed and prevented the investigation and
prosecution of apartheid-era cases that were referred to the National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA) by the TRC for prosecution.
[5] In the main application, there were initially two categories of orders sought. The
first was for a declaratory order as to the unlawfulness and wrongfulness of the
failure to prosecute apartheid era TRC cases and for the payment of
constitutional damages and the establishment of a trust to administer those
damages. The second was for an order setting aside the failure to establish a
commission of enquiry into the failure to investigate and prosecute the TRC
cases.
2 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid G.A.res 3068
(XXVIII), 28 U .N GAOR Supp . (No. 30) at 75, U .N.Doc. N9030 (1974), 1015 U .N.T.S. 243, entered into
force July 18, 1976. In article 1 it is stated "The State's Parties to the present Convention declare that
apartheid is a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of
apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article

II of this Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to international
peace and security." [My underlining).
3 They are the 1st to 6th respondents in the main application and the 24th to 29th respondents in the present
application.
------

7
(6] Before this application was heard, the government respondents, and particularly
the current President of the Republic, acquiesced to the order for the
establishment of a commission of enquiry. Accordingly, all that remains for
determination and decision by the court in the main application, is the declaratory
order and the claim for damages.
[7] The nub of the main application against the government respondents is that: "In
fact, the TRC cases were deliberately supressed following a plan or arrangement
hatched at the highest levels of government and across multiple departments. This is
the real explanation for the delay." It is this conduct and its consequences which the
Calata applicants contend militate in favour of an award of constitutional
damages.
(8] It was common cause between the parties in argument that both Mr. Mbeki and
Ms. Mabandla are likely to make themselves available to testify before the
commission. However, they seek leave to intervene in the main application
ostensibly on the basis that they face the spectre of findings being made against
them and their conduct (while in office) being declared wrongful as a precursor to
the award of damages .
[9] The course of the main application is not without peculiarity. Initially the
government respondents opposed the application but after the decision to
establish a commission of enquiry, the government respondents (except for the
NPA) withdrew their notices of opposition. This is still the position at the time that
the application to intervene was heard. It was also the position when this
application was launched.
(1 OJ After the launch of this application, those government respondents that withdrew
their notices of intention to oppose have since apparently indicated that they
intend to apply to have them re-instated. There is also an extant application for
a stay of the residue of the relief sought in the main application pending the
outcome of the Commission of Enquiry. These issues will all be decided by

outcome of the Commission of Enquiry. These issues will all be decided by
another Court.

8
[11] It suffices to state that for Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla, they "stand alone" in
these motion proceedings in that the only way that they would be able to assert
any legal interest or vindicate any right arising from any order that would be
granted is for them to intervene.
[12] So , what is the basis for intervention?
[13] Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla are named in the founding affidavit. It is their case
that serious allegations are preferred against them.
[14] The main application consists of some 1077 pages. Of this, the founding affidavit
makes up 259 pages together with 677 pages of annexures and 241 pages of
supporting affidavits.
[15] In the founding affidavit, there are 21 references to Mr. Mbeki. Of these 21
references:
[15.1] ten relate to matters that are simply recordals of statements made or
official acts performed by him while he was the Deputy President and
President.
[15.2] four relate to the possible prosecution of Mr. Mbeki and other ANC
leaders for acts alleged to have been committed by them.
[15.3] seven refer to -
[15.3.1] The first of the seven references is in the index to the founding
affidavit and records pertinently "Former President Mbeki denies
involvement in political interference."
[15.3.2] The remaining six are all quotes from two books, extracts of
which form part of the annexures. The two books conc~rned
-------

9
are "Post - TRC Prosecutions in South Africa" authored by 0
Bubenzer and published in 20094 and "Death Flight" authored
by Michael Schmidt and published in 2019.5
[16] There are six references to Ms. Mabandla. Of these six references:
[16.1] five relate to official acts performed by her or references to her in a
professional capacity.
[16.2] one reference in which her failure to respond to a memorandum sent to
her was called into question.
[17] Regarding Mr. Mbeki, besides the books, the contents of which are both hearsay,
and which set out a narrative indicative of a conspiracy to defeat the investigation
and prosecution of TRC cases, there are no direct allegations made by the Calata
applicants against him. There are also no direct allegations made against Ms.
Mabandla.
[18] It is important to note that besides the fact that there are no direct allegations, the
founding affidavit references the fact that the allegations of political interference,
the subject of the aforesaid books, are denied by Mr. Mbeki.
[19] Neither Mr. Mbeki nor Ms. Mabandla are specifically named as having directly
acted in any way to subvert or prevent the TRC investigations or prosecutions.
References to them are by virtue of the offices that they held and by way of
inference. In this regard, for example, it is stated:
"17 4. It is not known who authorised the halting of investigations, but since it
involved suspending work on a large number of serious crimes, mostly
involving murder, it is highly likely that the authority must have come from
the very top. In addition, the heads of the NPA , OSO and SAPS must all
4 ISBN: 978-90-47-43047-6 published on 31 October 2009.
5 ISBN: 978-06-24-08860-8 published in 2019.

10
have acquiesced in this decision, together with the cabinet ministers
overseeing those departments."
[20] No matter how compelling the narrative may be, any direct references that appear
from the extracts from the two books, are hearsay. It was argued for the Calata
applicants that any Court before which the main application would seNe for
decision, would be astute to this, particularly regarding the declaratory order
sought. The submission in this regard was that:
"As far as the families are concerned, for purposes of their declaratory relief and
claim for constitutional damages , while they allege that their cases were subject to
interference, they are not concerned with individual culpability in this application.
They do not seek relief pertaining to personal culpability.
For purposes of their families' claim for constitutional damages , it does not matter
which personalities were involved and what roles they played. What matters is
whether their cases were stopped through political or other pressure brought to
bear on the NPA , and if so, whether this entitles them to an award of constitutional
damages ".
[21] The Calata applicants oppose this inteNention application, contending that the
relief sought in the main application is only against the government parties who
are the current state functionaries in their official capacities and not against either
Mr. Mbeki or Ms Mabandla personally. They make the point that no order is
sought against either of them and for that reason, the application for inteNention
ought to be refused.
[22] Applications for inteNention such as in the present instance, are brought, in terms
of rule 12 of the Uniform Rules of Court:
"Any person entitled to join as a plaintiff [an applicant] or liable to be joined as a
defendant [respondent} in any action [application] may , on notice to all parties, at
any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff [an applicant]

any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff [an applicant]
or a defendant [respondent]. The court may , upon such application, make such

11
order, including any order as to costs, and give such directions as to further
procedure in the action as to it may seem meet."
[23] In deciding whether an order is to be granted in terms of rule 12, the Court must
determine whether:
[23.1] the applicant has a direct and substantial interest in the right that is the
subject matter of the main application.
[23.2] the allegations made by the intervening applicant constitute a prima facie
case or defence and
[23.3] the application is made seriously and is not frivolous.6
[24] Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla submit that they have a direct and substantial
interest sufficient to justify intervention. They argue that the damaging allegations
against them "would necessarily be in issue between the parties to the litigation". This
argument is predicated on the basis that the allegations, such as they are, would
be admissible to the extent that a finding could be made against them. Such a
finding, so it was argued, is necessary for the award of damages and that if such
a finding were not made , this would have, even if the finding sought was made
on another basis, an impact on the damages to be awarded. It was argued that
because of this, even though the declaratory order is not sought against them, a
finding against them would implicate them in that order.
[25] The Calata applicants contend that the main application will not be decided
specifically on whether Mr. Mbeki or Ms . Mabandla themselves interfered in TRC
cases. That question, they say, will be resolved by the Commission of Inquiry
that has been established. There, Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla will have an
6 Peermont Global (KZN ) (Pty) Ltd v Afrisun KZN (Pty) Ltd tla Sibaya Casino and Entertainment Kingdom
(2020) 4 All SA 226 (KZP ).

12
opportunity to address the allegations that the Calata applicants make against
them, including those that are of a hearsay nature.
(26] In their view, the application to intervene is made solely to address reputational
concerns and "set the record straight" regarding allegations which if established,
would tarnish their reputation but not because there is any legal interest in the
relief sought.
(27] In SA Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims
Commissioner, 7 the Constitutional Court stated the position with regards to
intervention applications as follows:
"[9] It is now settled that an applicant for intervention must meet the direct and
substantial interest test in order to succeed. What constitutes a direct and
substantial interest is the legal interest in the subject-matter of the case
which could be prejudicially affected by the order of the Court. This means
that the applicant must show that it has a right adversely affected or likely
to be affected by the order sought. But the applicant does not have to
satisfy the court at the stage of intervention that it will succeed. It is
sufficient for such applicant to make allegations which, if proved, would
entitle it to relief.
[1 OJ If the applicant shows that it has some right which is affected by the order
issued, permission to intervene must be granted. For it is a basic principle
of our law that no order should be granted against a party without affording
such party a pre decision hearing. This is so fundamental that an order is
generally taken to be binding only on parties to the litigation.
[11) Once the applicant for intervention shows a direct and substantial interest
in the subject matter of the case, the court ought to grant leave to
intervene. In Greyvenouw CC this principle was formulated in these terms:
7 2017 (5) SA 1 (CC ). Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Greyvenouw CC 2004 (2) SA 81 (SE)
at 89B-C . See also Snyders and Others v De Jager (Joinder) 2017 (5) BCLR 604 (CC ).

13
'In addition, when , as in this matter, the applicants base their claim
to intervene on a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter
of the dispute, the Court has no discretion: it must allow them to
intervene because it should not proceed in the absence of parties
having such legally recognised interests." (footnotes omitted.)
[28] In Lebea v Menye, 8 the Constitutional Court held that:
"direct and substantial interest is a direct and substantial interest in the order that
a court is asked to make in a matter. It is not enough if a person has an interest in
a finding or in certain reasons for an order. The interest must be in the order or the
outcome of the litigation."
[29] The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) took a similar approach in National Director
of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, 9 where the first applicant in this case similarly
brought an application to intervene. The SCA refused his intervention and stated
that:
"[84] It ought to be apparent by now that Mr Mbeki and other members of
Government had ample reason to be upset by the reasons in the judgment
which cast aspersions on them without regard to their basic rights to be
treated fairly. It is not necessary to revisit those issues since they have
been dealt with in sufficient detail. However, they make the applicants'
desire to intervene at the appeal stage understandable.
[85] Nevertheless, to be able to intervene in proceedings a party must have a
direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, whether in
the court of first instance or on appeal. The basic problem with the
application is that the applicants have no interest in the order but only in
the reasoning. They are in the position of a witness whose evidence has
been rejected or on whose demeanour an unfavourable finding has been
expressed. Such a person has no ready remedy, especially not by means
of intervention. To be able to intervene in an appeal, which is by its nature
8 2023 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) at para [30].

8 2023 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) at para [30].
9 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA).

14
directed at a wrong order and not at incorrect reasoning, an applicant must
have an interest in the order under appeal.
11
[30] In Wynne v Divisional Commissioner of Police and Others, 10 it was held that:
"Assuming, without deciding, that the above decisions are correct, it seems obvious
that in each case the reason for granting leave to intervene was that the damaging
a/legations against the third party would necessarily be in issue between the parties
to the litigation. It would have been impossible for the Court to give iudgment in
those cases without deciding whether the third party had or had not committed
adultery and the effect of the iudgment would therefore have been to decide the
correctness or otherwise of the attack on the third party's reputation. The same
position arose in Vawda v Budrea (1908) 29 NLR 539, where the defendant alleged
fraud and collusion on the part of a third person who was not a party to the action.
In principle the Full Court accepted the proposition that, 'a man 's character being
beyond all price', the third party should be entitled to intervene, but this again was
a case where the allegations made against the third party were directly in issue
between the litigating parties and would necessarily have to be decided in the
course of the iudgment on the merits.
11
[My underlining].
[31] It was argued for Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla that for the granting of the orders
sought, a finding as to their personal conduct would have to be made . It was this
possible finding that that they asserted grounded their "direct and substantial "and
"legal interest".
[32] However , in Rodrigues v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, 11
the Full Court of this Division held:
"(Ill) The period 2003 - 2017.
10
1973 (2) SA 770 (E) at 774F-H. See also SA Commercial Catering and Allied W orkers Union v Lehapa
NO (Mostert NO intervening) 2005 (6) SA 354 (W).
11 2019 (2) SACR 251 (GJ ).

15
[55] This is the period characterised by the political interference to which
[56]
reference has already been made. There can be little argument that the
political interference resulted in TRC cases (and one must assume the
Timol case) not receiving the necessary attention by virtue of investigation
that could have led to a decision to prosecute.
(i) TH E NATUR E OF THE INTERFERENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
PROSECUTING AUTHORITY
[57] Whilst it is manifestly clear that the political interference materially affected
the ability of the National Prosecuting Authority (the NPA) to properly deal
with the TRC cases, in that the resources that were necessary to conduct
proper investigations were not forthcoming, the NPA cannot, as it seeks
to do, portray itself purely as a victim of the political machinations of the
time. Whatever form the political interference took, the NPA was enjoined
in terms of both its constitutional and legal responsibilities to act on behalf
of society and to protect the public interest."
[33] Thereafter, in Rodrigues v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, 12
the Supreme Court of Appeal in dealing with the same issue, held:
"The period 2003 to 2017
[26] It was during this 14-year period that the executive adopted a policy
position conceded by the state parties that TRC cases would not be
prosecuted. It is perplexing and inexplicable why such a stance was taken
both in the light of the work and report of the TRC advocating a bold
prosecutions policy, the guarantee of the prosecutorial independence of
the NPA , its constitutional obligation to prosecute crimes, and the interests
of the victims and survivors of those crimes.
[27] All these considerations, either viewed individually or collectively, should
have stood in the way of any such moratorium on the prosecution of TRC
12 2021 (2) SACR 333 (SCA).

16
- era cases. That it happened, despite the constitutional, legal and other
considerations, suggests disdain for those important considerations and
interests".
[34] Accordingly, it cannot be in issue that there was political interference in the
prosecution of the TRC cases. Our Courts have found this to be so, and those
findings stand and are binding. For this reason, the argument advanced for the
Calata applicants that there would be no need for a specific finding against either
Mr. Mbeki or Ms Mabandla, is to my mind entirely sound. The issue has been
decided.
[35] The finding that has already been made is a general finding. The Calata
applicants have recorded in their papers that Mr. Mbeki places in issue any
imputation of wrongdoing on his part. Intervention by Mr. Mbeki in these
proceedings is not "where the allegations made against the third party were directly in
issue between the litigating parties and would necessarily have to be decided in the
Judgment of the merits. "13 That issue has already been decided insofar as the
government respondents, the very parties against whom the main application has
been instituted, are concerned.
[36] Since a specific finding is not required in the main application, the argument that
consequent upon the necessity for such a finding that leave to intervene ought to
be granted, is unsustainable. That this is so, is further demonstrated by the
absence of any direct evidence presented against Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla.
[37] The evidence such as it is, arising out of extracts from the two books has been
overtaken by the findings of firstly the Full Court and then the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Rodrigues v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others.
13 Ibid Wynne v Divisional Commissioner of Police and Others at 774E-H .

17
[38] It is not insignificant that the book of 0 . Bubenzer has been within the public
domain since 2009 and that of M Schmidt since 2019. Insofar as Mr. Mbeki and
Ms Mabandla may take issue with anything contained in those books, they have
other remedies available to challenge the veracity of what is contained therein.
[39] While it is alleged in general terms in the main application by the Calata
applicants, that the government respondents are responsible for the failure to
prosecute TRC cases, the proverbial ship to challenge that has sailed.
[40] Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla have no direct and substantial interest in the granting
of any declaratory order against the government respondents and would have no
obligation in respect of the granting of that order or any damages awarded in
consequence thereof.14 The appropriate forum for them to "tell their side of the
story" is at the Commission of Enquiry.
[41] For the reasons I have set out above, the application for intervention fails.
[42] This brings me to the question of costs. It was argued for the Calata respondents
that a punitive costs order was merited, should the Court refuse the application
to intervene. The argument was predicated on the fact that Mr. Mbek i had
previously tried to intervene in legal proceedings for substantially similar reasons
but had been unsuccessful. He had done so in the Supreme Court of Appeal no
less some 16 years ago. Knowing this, he had, even though there had already
been a decision to establish a Commission of Enquiry, persisted.
[43] While a party may embark upon a particular course of action, even on more than
one occasion, and it proves to be unsuccessful, this does not to my mind (on its
14 See C ordiant Trading CC v D aimler Chrysler Financial Services (P ty) Ltd 2005 (6) SA 205 (SCA) at para
[17].

18
own) establish any basis for the award of a punitive costs order. It is trite that
each case must be decided on its own facts and that the award of costs is a
discretionary matter.
(44) The facts in the present matter, make it unique. The subject matter concerns a
failure to address the fundamental right to justice and closure. Every person
implicated, no matter how remotely, is acutely aware of its importance to our
society at large. While Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla are unsuccessful, given the
importance of the matter, it cannot be said that the application was brought for an
improper motive.
(45) In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma , 15 the Court found that the
desire to intervene was "understandable" and even though the application to
intervene was dismissed, there was no order made in respect of costs.
(46] Mr. Mbeki and Ms Mabandla sought leave to intervene in their personal capacities
and although unsuccessful, given the fact that the main application is
constitutional in nature, I am of the view that no order of costs should be made .
(47) Accordingly, it is ordered -
(48.1) The application is dismissed.
(48.2) There is no order as to costs.
15 Ibid.
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

HEARD ON :
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON :
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS :
19
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETOR IA
28 JULY 2025
1 AUGUST 2025
ADV. N MAENETJE SC
ADV. N MUVANGUA
ADV. P SOKHELA
INSTRUCTED BY : BOQWANA BURNS INC
REFERENCE : MR. I ARMOED
COUNSEL FOR THE 1st to 23rd RESPONDENTS : ADV . M CHASKALSON SC
ADV . H VARNE Y
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE :
ADV. M MUSANDIWA
ADV. L BRIGHTON
WEBBER WENTZEL
MSATHAKOR