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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA


Case Number: 20135/2022








In the matter between:


BURGERBRUG BELEGGINGS (PTY) LTD Applicant

and

CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Respondent



JUDGMENT
MODIBA, J

[1] In an amended notice of motion, Burgerbrug Beleggings (Pty) Ltd
(Burgerbrug) seeks a suite of relief. It seeks a review and setting aside of
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
(3) REVISED: NO
21 JULY 2025
DATE SIGNATURE

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contravention notices (the notices) the City of Tshwane (the City) issued to it in
terms of section 14(4) of the National Building Regulations and Building
Standards Act 103 of 1977 (the Act), and regulation A25(10) of the National
Building Regulations promulgated in terms of the Act (the regulations), the City’s
Town Planning Scheme (TPS) read with the Spatial Planning and Land Use
Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA), the Land Use Management By -Law
(the by -law) and the Town Planning and Towns hips Ordinance 15 of 1986
(Ordinance). The City issued the notices in respect of portion R/32 of the Farm
Klipfontein 268 – JR (the property). Burgerbrug also seeks an order declaring
certain statutory and regulatory provisions in respect of planning and building
regulations (the impugned provisions) to be unconstitutional on the basis that they
are incompatible with the right to freedom and security of the person, human
dignity and just administrative action. Consequent upon the declaration of
constitutional invalidity, Burgerbrug seeks remedial relief which I will describe
shortly. The City opposes the application.
[2] In the event that it obtains the review and declaratory relief, Burgerbrug
seeks a reading down of the impugned provisions to absolve it from criminal
liability as the development activities which occurred on the property in
contravention of the applicable planning and building prescripts, were allegedly
undertaken without its will and knowledge. It also seeks an order compelling the
municipality to enforce the applicable planning and building prescripts against
the unlawful occupiers of the property; and payment by the City to Burgerbrug,
of compensation or expropriation in the public interest.
[3] The background facts are largely undisputed. Middemeer Beleggings, an
entity associated with Burgerbrug, acquired the property in 1965 as an
investment, with a view to developing it for industrial purposes in the future. That

investment, with a view to developing it for industrial purposes in the future. That
plan never materialized. When the circumstances that gave rise to this application
occurred, the property was registered to Burgerbrug as its owner.

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[4] Burgerbrug is a private entity with limited liability, incorporated in terms
of South Africa’s company laws. Its main business is the ownership and letting
of immovable property. The City is a metropolitan municipality established in
terms of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (Structures
Act) as provided for in s 155(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is cited as the authority
responsible for implementing and enforcing the statutory and regulatory scheme
set out in the Act, regulations, and TPS in its area of jurisdiction. It does so
through criminal prosecution or civil interdictory proceedings.
[5] The property is situated near Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University
(previously known as MEDUNSA); Rosslyn, best known for its automotive
industries, and Soshanguve, a township whose residents were resettled from
Mamelodi and Atteridgeville. The property is zoned for agricultural use in terms
of the TPS. In terms of s 26 of SPLUMA, TPS is an adopted and approved land
use scheme, has the force of law, and is binding upon all landowners and users.
This means that the property may only be used for agricul tural purposes. Any
alternative use will only be permitted if an application for the intended use was
successfully made to the City in terms of its by-laws. Such alternative use could
include content use, granting development rights without changing the fo rmal
zoning of the property. An application for alternative use of the property has not
been made.
[6] The property is located near an urban edge as designated in the City’s
Regional Spatial Development Framework (SDF) , with no access to water or
sewerage reticulation. An urban edge is a virtual development boundary which
serves to control urban sprawl by mandating that the area inside the boundary be
used for high density urban development, and the area outside for lower density
and/or future development, and/or green open spaces. Over time, the surrounding

and/or future development, and/or green open spaces. Over time, the surrounding
areas became densely populated by informal housing developments and light and
heavy industry. Crime, including theft, became rampant. As a result, when the

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property was still registered to it, Middemeer Beleggings could not use the
property or find a tenant.
[7] Ms Karien van Niekerk (Ms Van Niekerk) was Middemeer Beleggings’
General Manager. Mr Kalla Krebs (Mr Krebs) was its Buildings and Facilities
Manager. The two visited and inspected the property twice or thrice a year. When
they did so in 2019, there was no incident. The property was still vacant.
Burgerbrug and Middemeer Beleggings embar ked on an amalgamation
transaction in 2019. As part of that process, Ms Van Niekerk instructed Mr Jaco
Goosen (Mr Goosen) to do a property valuation. This required him to vis it the
property. It is unclear when ownership of the property was passed to Burgerbrug.
Burgerbrug alleges that it has not developed the property due to its location. Since
the property had not been developed when the circumstances that led to this
application occurred, the City only levied municipal rates and taxes on the
property, calculated based on its permitted use.
[8] Ms Van Niekerk and Mr Krebs could not visit the property for almost two
years, purportedly due to the Covid -19 pandemic. In early 2021, Mr Goosen
visited the property for a purpose unrelated to the evaluation that he had
conducted in 2019, and found that the property had been unlawfully occupied. He
addressed an email to Ms Van Niekerk on 2 February 2021 to enquire if she was
aware of the development on the property. When Ms Van Niekerk visited the
property with Mr Krebs on 5 February 2021, they found that a township with
brick-and-mortar houses and what appeared to be municipal offices had been
established on the property.
[9] As advised by the Chairperson in the office of the Mayor, Counsellor Gert
Pretorius, Ms Van Niekerk laid trespassing charges against the occupiers of the
property with the police. When no response was forthcoming from the police, Mr
Krebs visited the police station in April 2021 and was provided with a case

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number. He unsuccessfully followed up with the police for several months
thereafter.
[10] On 21 September 2021, Burgerbrug’s Ms Nadia Wiedeman reported the
land invasion to the City’s land contraventions department, requesting assistance.
Notwithstanding all these efforts, the City served notices on Burgerbrug,
reflecting incorrect erf numbers. In response to the notice s, on 30 September
2021, Burgerbrug wrote a letter to the City, explaining the circumstances
surrounding the development on its property, the efforts it made to address it, lack
of response by the police and the City; and pleading its innocence.
[11] On 1 October 2021, the City responded that it has a statutory duty to use
its resources in the best interests of the local community. Assisting with evictions
on private property falls outside its mandate. It urged Burgerbrug to evict the
occupiers at its expense and secure its property. On 12 October 2021, the City
issued Burgerbrug with fresh contravention notices reflecting correct erf
numbers. It is these corrected notices, and not the ones containing the incorrect
erf numbers, that Burgerbrug impugns in this application.
[12] On 17 November 2021, Ms Van Viekerk, Burgerbrug’s attorney, who is
also its director and its legal counsel, visited the property and found 150 -170
houses and buildings erected thereon. The occupiers were hostile towards them
and threatened to kill them. They were provided with the occupiers’ version of
the circumstances under which they allegedly gained occupation of the property
by a person who identified himself as a community leader.
[13] The City correctly impugns the occupiers’ version as hearsay.
Confirmatory affidavits by persons with personal knowledge of the alleged facts
are not attached. It seeks the relevant paragraphs struck out from Burgerbrug’s
founding affidavit. I am satisfied that the City is entitled to such an order. The
remainder of paragraph 8.8 starting with the words ‘He told us that they all bought

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stands on the property from …’ as well as paragraph 8.9 of Burgerbrug’s founding
affidavit, are accordingly struck out.
[14] Against this background, Burgerbrug contends that:
14.1 the occupiers unlawfully invaded its land. The City and specifically,
its land invasion department and the police, have failed to
proactively respond to this occurrence, despite its request for their
assistance to prevent the unlawful land invasion. This constitutes
wanting conduct which brings the criminal justice system into
disrepute;
14.2 the police inaction was probably based on the National Instruction 7
of 2017 - Unlawful Occupation of Land and Evictions (the SAPS
national instruction) which regards occupiers as persons who enjoy
legal protection in terms of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3
of 1996 (the LTA), the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of
1997 (ESTA) or the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (the PIE Act). These
statutes prohibit their eviction without a court order. By giving
occupiers under these circumstances immunity from prosecution for
trespassing, the author of the SAPS national instruction acted ultra -
vires. It is as a result of the ultra-vires SAPS national instruction and
wrong interpretation of the legislation on which it is based that a
person who init ially trespasses onto land, who is guilty of all
elements of the crime of trespassing, undergoes a metamorphoses
from a perpetrator of trespassing, to a person who, by taking the
further step of unlawfully erecti ng a structure on someone else’s
property, is constitutionally protected and immune from prosecution.
The SAPS national instruction wrongly absolves the police from any
responsibility to protect private property, and effectively removes the

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deterring effect that the crime of trespassing is required and intended
to have on land invasions;
14.3 it is irrational to threaten Burgerbrug with civil and criminal
sanctions when the invasion of its land was caused by the culpable
neglect of the City under circumstances where it has the statutory
authority to address the consequences of land invasion in terms of
the impugned legislation and its building control and management
and control of informal settlements regulations and by-laws;
14.4 to enforce the notices against Burgerbrug and its directors who had
no criminal intent , and who took active steps to prevent the
contraventions from occurring , is unconstitutional and renders the
notices subject to judicial review.

[15] Burgerbrug seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the impugned
provisions for the following reasons:
15.1 they render it criminally liable for offenses committed regarding the
development activities carried out on the property, despite the
activities being conducted without its knowledge and against its will;
15.2 they compel it to correct the alleged contraventions by obtaining
written approvals, demolishing or removing temporary structures,
containers, and dwellings, as well as clearing any other materials or
debris from the property, even if the contraventions were not caused
by it.
[16] Burgerbrug submits that the impugned provisions are unconstitutional and
incompatible with the rights to freedom and security, human dignity, and just
administrative action. Hence, it requests this Court to read them down to restrict
the property owner’s legal liability to cases where they intentionally performed

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an act or omission that directly cause d a contravention of the impugned
provisions on its property.
[17] The City opposes the legality review for the following reasons:
17.1 the establishment of a township without the property being rezoned
constitutes a contravention of clause 14(4), read with clause 14(3),
of the TPS. In terms of clause 36 of the TPS, read with s 40(2) of the
Ordinance, any person who commits, or knowingly p ermits a
contravention of any of the provisions of the TPS or of the
requirements of any order or notice issued, or conditions imposed in
terms of the TPS, shall be guilty of an offence. Section 4 of the Act
makes provision for approval by local authorities of applications for
the erection of buildings. In terms of s 4(1), no person shall, without
the prior approval in writing of the local authority in question, erect
any building in respect of which plans and specifications are to be
drawn and submitted in terms of the Act. The buildings which were
erected on the property contravene s 14(4) of the Act as they are
occupied without a certificate of occupancy issued in terms of s 14(1)
of the Act, read with the regulations. In terms of s 14(4)(a)(i) of the
Act, it is an offence to occupy a building without a certificate of
occupancy being issued by the City. The buildings erected have been
erected on Burgerbrug’s property, it is therefore its responsibility to
evict and demolish the buildings, lest it holds it criminally liable for
the alleged contraventions;
17.2 when it issued the notices, it acted within the scope of its powers in
terms of the impugned provisions. It is the owner’s responsibility to
ensure that its property complies with the applicable planning and
building regulation prescripts. It has the duty to exercise the
municipality’s executive and legislative authority and use the

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resources of the municipality in the best interests of the local
community at large, not in the best interests of a private juristic
person;
17.3 from the date Burgerbrug was made aware of the invasion, to date,
it has done nothing to correct the contraventions. Bringing this
application, does not suspend its duty to comply with the applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions. Therefore, B urgerbrug remains
in wilful default.

[18] The City further contends that Burgerbrug had two effective alternative
relief options, but has failed to pursue them:
18.1 instead of brin ging an application to review the City’s decision to
issue notices, it should have sought an eviction order against the
occupiers;
18.2 it could have applied to the City for the rezoning of the occupied
portion of its property.
[19] The City also disputes that the notices are reviewable in terms of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). With reference to the
definition of administrati ve action in PAJA, the City contends that issuing the
notices does not constitute a decision, alternatively, administrative action , and
thus are not reviewable under PAJA. It also contends that Burgerbrug has failed
to set out grounds of review as required in terms of section 6 of PAJA. Therefore,
the City further contends, Burgerbrug has failed to make out a case for the relief
it seeks in terms of PAJA.
[20] Burgerbrug insists that issuing notices constitutes administrative action in
terms of PAJA, susceptible to judicial review in terms of that Act. In any event,

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in terms of s 172 of the Constitution, the relief it seeks is competent in the event
this Court declares that the impugned provisions are unconstitutional.
[21] Therefore, the following issues are to be determined:
21.1 whether the municipality’s decision to issue contravention notices to
Burgerbrug is reviewable under PAJA or the principle of legality;
21.2 whether the impugned provisions are unlawful and constitutionally
invalid;
21.3 whether the decision should be reviewed and set aside;
21.4 whether the municipality has a duty to enforce the impugned
provisions against the unlawful occupiers.
[22] Section 1 of PAJA defines administrative action as:
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by-
(a) an organ of state, when-
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial
constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms
of any legislation; or
(b) …
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct,
external legal effect, …”

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[23] In Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public
Works and Others,1 the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that:
“Administrative action is rather, in general terms, the conduct of the
bureaucracy (whoever the bureaucratic functionary might be) in carrying
out the daily functions of the state which necessarily involves the
application of policy, usually after its translation into law, with direct and
immediate consequences for individuals or groups of individuals. ”
(footnotes omitted)
[24] On a contextual and purposeful reading of the definition of administrative
action, read with the definition of a decision in s 1 of PAJA , which includes,
making a demand or requirement, the issuing of notices constitutes an
administrative action in terms of that provision. Acting in terms of the impugned
provisions, the City decided to issue the notices to Burgerbrug. The notices
constitute a demand by the City that B urgerbrug correct the alleged breaches of
the impugned provisions. The City’s reliance on Minister of Defence and Military
veterans v Motau and Others2 is misplaced. When it issued the notices, the City
was not performing an executive function in terms of the impugned provisions. It
did so in the conduct of its daily functions, applying the impugned statutory and
regulatory provisions.
[25] The City’s contention that Burgerbrug has failed to set out how the issuing
of notices adversely affects its rights and ha s an external legal effect is without
merit. I find that Burgerbrug has done so. Since the notices expose Burgerbrug to
criminal prosecution under circumstances where its constitutional rights are
allegedly infringed, it ought to be able to impugn the City’s decision to issue the
notices under PAJA. PAJA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional right

1 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) at para 24.
2 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC).

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to just administrative action to, amongst others, create a culture of accountability,
openness and transparency in the public administration or in the exercise of a
public power or the performance of a public function. It empowers parties
adversely affected by administrative action to call organs of state to account for
and display openness and transparency in their exercise of public power. This is
the purpose Burgerbrug is pursuing in this application.
[26] However, the fact that the City has taken an administrative action that has
an adverse effect on Burgerbrug’s rights or has an external legal effect , per se,
does not entitle the latter to relief in terms of PAJA. As contended on behalf of
the City, Burgerbrug has not established any grounds of review in terms of PAJA.
It is not Burgerbrug’s case that the City acted in breach of the impugned
provisions when it issued the notices. On B urgerbrug’s version, the City is
empowered by the impugned provisions to issue the notices. As I find below, its
allegation that by issuing the notices under circumstances where it ha d no
knowledge of the developments on its property constitutes breach of its right to
freedom and security, human dignity and just administrative action , is bluntly
made. The City’s power to enforce building and planning regulations against
owners and occupiers has been consistently affirmed by our courts. So is the duty
of an owner to secure its property against private invasion. Failure by an owner
to secure its property does not impute a duty on a municipality to protect it or to
remedy the consequences of the owner’s failures.
[27] In terms of s 3(1) of PAJA , administrative action which materially and
adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be
procedurally fair. In terms of s 3(2)(a), whether administrative procedure is fair
depends on the circumstances of each case. The City’s contention that the issuing

depends on the circumstances of each case. The City’s contention that the issuing
of the notices meets the requirements of procedural fairness as provided for in s
3(2)(b)(i) is unassailable. The notices constitute adequate notice of the action the
City intends to take against Burgerbrug if it fails to meet its demand.

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[28] To the extent that Burgerbrug alleges breach of its right to administrative
action in terms of s 33 of the Constitution, it conflates judicial review in terms of
PAJA and the principle of legality in terms of s 172 of the Constitution. In Bato
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and
Others,3 citing with approval Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA
and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and
Others,4 the Constitutional Court clarified the position as follows:
“…the question of the relationship between the common -law grounds of
review and the Constitution was considered by this Court. A unanimous
Court held that under our new constitutional order the control of public
power is always a constitutional matter. There are not two systems of law
regulating administrative action - the common law and the Constitution -
but only one system of law grounded in the Constitution. The Courts' power
to review administrative action no longer flows directly from the common
law b ut from PAJA and the Constitution itself. The grundnorm of
administrative law is now to be found in the first place not in the doctrine
of ultra vires, nor in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, nor in the
common law itself, but in the principles of our Constitution. The common
law informs the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution; and derives its
force from the latter. The extent to which the common law remains relevant
to administrative review will have to be developed on a case-by-case basis
as the Courts interpret and apply the provisions of PAJA and the
Constitution.” (footnotes omitted)
[29] Therefore, on the above authorities, since PAJA gives effect to s 33 of the
Constitution, it codifies the grounds of judicial review of administrative action.
The cause of action for the judicial review of administrative action now ordinarily

3 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 22.
4 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).

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arises from PAJA. It no longer resides in the common law. Therefore, Brugerbrug
is not entitled to the review of the alleged breach of s 33 of the Constitution in
terms of s 172 of the Constitution. For the reasons stated above, B urgerbrug’s
review of the issuing of the notice in terms of PAJA stands to fail.
[30] Burgerbrug contends for a legality review for breach of its rights to human
dignity and freedom and security of the person, but fails to plead a proper case in
that regard. It has not set out the content of these rights and conduct by the City
that traverses the content of these rights. It is not its case that the City unlawfully
issued the notices. In terms of s 2 of the Constitution, the Constitution is the
supreme law of the Republic. Law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
Constitution is invalid, and the ob ligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.
Section 172 empowers courts, when deciding a constitutional matter within its
power, to declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution
is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and may make any order that is just
and equitable.
[31] Burgerbrug’s contention that it is irrational to threaten it with civil and
criminal sanctions when the situation was caused by the neglect of the COT and
the SAPS is inconsistent with Burgerbrug’s case as initially pleaded. When Mr
Goosen went to the property in 2021, he found that a township has been
developed on the property and it had been occupied. Therefore, it is incorrect that
the City and the SAPS caused the invasion through their lack of response to
Burgerbrug’s calls for assistance. The invasion occurred within the two year
period when Burgerbrug did not inspect the property due to the Covid -19
pandemic. It may be that the invasion continued after Burgerbrug had become
aware of it and that is what Burgerburg had called on the City and the SAPS to
halt. However, it downplays its neglect of its own property. Between 2019 when

halt. However, it downplays its neglect of its own property. Between 2019 when
its officials last visited the property and 2021 when it became aware that a
township had developed on the property, on its own version, it was an absent

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owner. The Covid -19 hard lockdown , when movement was severely restricted ,
only endured for a few months in 2020. Although Covid-19 regulations were only
lifted in June 2022, the regulations that restricted movement were gradually lifted
from the end of April 2020. Only those prohibiting evictions endured until the
declaration o f a period of national disaster was ended in June 2022. Nothing
prevented Burgerbrug from taking measur es to interdict the further invasion of
the property and to protect the property from further invasion during this period.
This is its duty as an owner, which it clearly failed to fulfil.
[32] Although Burgerbrug acknowledges that the restriction to the police
intervention in matters where property is allegedly unlawfully occupied in terms
of the SAPS national instructions is grounded on the PIE Act, ESTA and the LTA,
it complains of unfair and irrational protection of unlawful occupiers, yet it does
not impugn the constitutionality of the relevant legislation. Therefore, there is no
basis to find that the SAPS response to Burgerbrug’s calls for intervention is
unlawful. It makes out no case for a finding that the City’s invasion unit’s failure
to intervene in its case is also unlawful.
[33] As already stated, t he City is empowered by the impugned regulatory
provisions to issue the notices to Burgerbrug as an owner. Burgerbrug’s
rationality contention is poorly formulated and lacks substance. The City’s
conduct in issuing the notices, even under the circumstances alleged by
Burgerbrug, is not unlawful or irrational. The allegation that its right to security,
freedom and human dignity were infringed by the City lacks merit. It is unclear
on what basis Burgerbrug is seeking this court to find that the City infringed these
rights when it lacks the corresponding obligation to protect them under these
circumstances.
[34] The impugned provisions provide for the liability of owners for breach of

circumstances.
[34] The impugned provisions provide for the liability of owners for breach of
the impugned provisions on their properties. They impute a duty on owners to

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ensure that any development on their properties complies with the impugned
provisions. Burgerbrug clearly failed in that duty by failing to secure its property
and not inspecting it for a period of almost two years. When it was made aware
of the alleged unlawful development, rather than fulf illing its duty as a property
owner to secure it to halt further invasion, it regarded what had clearly become
occupiers of its property as trespassers and opted to la y criminal charges. When
alerted of the police lack of authority to act against occupiers, it sought to impute
responsibility on the municipality to prevent land invasion. The municipalit y’s
duty to maintain order does not extend to securing private property or addressing
the difficulty B urgerbrug finds itself in. It provides no authority for the duty it
seeks to ascribe to the City. It unduly burdened this Court by copiously citing
authorities in its supplementary heads of argument that do not support its case ,
either because the cases are distinguishable or the principles applied in those cases
do not apply to the present facts. Dealing specifically with the cited authorities
will only render this judgment unnecessarily prolix. This probably explains why
the City, in its supplementary heads of argument, did not specifically respond to
the cases Burgerbrug relies on.
[35] There is no basis for a finding that the City acted irrationally or
unreasonably by issuing the notices to B urgerbrug and not to the occupiers. As
argued on behalf of the City, while courts can compel municipalities to act against
transgressors, it does not lie in their province to prescribe specific enforcement
methods. Municipalities retain the discretion to evaluate contraventions and
determine appropriate remedies. It issued the notices within its statutory authority
and cannot be faulted.
[36] As argued on behalf of the City, Burgerbrug’s prayer for an order to compel
the City to proceed against the unlawful occupiers is fatal to this application. The

the City to proceed against the unlawful occupiers is fatal to this application. The
alleged unlawful occupiers have a direct and substantial interest in the matter. I f

granted in their absence; such an order would affect them prejudicially.
Therefore, their non-joinder is material.
[37] Burgerbrug seeks an order striking out, w ith costs, paragraphs 6-53 of the
City's answering affidavit because they lack probative value, they deal with
advice Burgerbrug obtained from its legal representative, they constitute
argumentative material and legal opinions that should not be included in an
affidavit. Save for setting out the basis on which it raises the P AJA point in limine
which consists mainly of legal submissions, there is no merit to this complaint.
The PAJA point in limine, being a point of law, the City is well within its rights
to set out the legal basis for its case so that Burgerbrug is aware of the case it is
required to meet. The rest of the City's answering affidavit sets out the basis on
which it opposes the application on the merits.
[38] In the premises, Burgerbrug's legality review also stands to fail. It is not
entitled to the remedial relief that it has prayed for. Therefore, the follow ing order
is made:
Order
[39] The application is dismissed with costs.
L.T.MODIBA
JUDGE OF THE IDGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
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Appearances

For the Applicant: A Vorster
Instructed by Johan Nysschens Attorneys
For the Respondent: T Makola
Instructed by Kutumela Sithole Attorneys
Date of hearing: 19 November 2024
Date of judgment: 21 July 2025

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