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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION: PRETORIA)

Date: 18 July 2025
Case number: 097988-2025
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 18 July 2025
SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

SABLE PLACE PROPERTIES 106 (PTY) LTD First Applicant

REDEFINE PROPERTIES LTD Second Applicant

TADVEST COMMERCIAL (PTY) LTD Third Applicant

And

VISA SECURITY GROUP (PTY) LTD First Respondent

MINISTER OF POLICE Second Respondent
~ . ~~

(REGISTRATION NUMBER: 2015/224619/07)


JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

MINNAAR AJ,

[1] On 17 June 2025 , and under case number 081761-2025, the first
respondent lodged an application for leave to appeal . This was in response to
an order I had granted earlier that day in the urgent court (‘the urgent
application’).

[2] The granted order was in accordance with a draft order that the
applicants’ couns el handed up in court. The following relief, relevant to the
first respondent, was granted:

a. That the first respondent, and any other persons, entities or
bodies, and employees, as the case may be, acting through the first
respondent, is hereby ordered to f orthwith vacate the applicants’
property at H[...] Office Park, 9 [...] B[...] Road, Vorna Valley, Sandton,
Gauteng.
b. That the first respondent, and any other persons, entities or
bodies, as the case may be, acting through, or under the first
respondent, are h ereby restrained, and interdicted, from attending
upon the applicants’ property at H[...] Office Park, 9 [...] B[...] Road,
Vorna Valley, Sandton, Gauteng, with the aim and sole, or other
purpose of:
i.Demanding that the applicants employ them as security servi ce
providers, at the applicants’ property at H[...] Office Park, 9 [...]
B[...] Road, Vorna Valley, Sandton, Gauteng; and
ii.Frustrating, and interfering with, the applicants’ business
thereat; and

iii.Harassing and intimidating tenants, employees and security
service providers of the applicants; and
iv.Interfering with, harassing or intimidating the applicants’
managers, and/or security service providers; and
v.Without limiting the generality of the aforesaid, prohibited from
doing anything whatsoever related to or in connection with the
harassment, intimidation and assault of the applicant’s
employees, its security or other contractors, tenants and security
service provider and preventing the applicants’ security and
other contractors from performing their daily duties and
functions.
c. That the first respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this
application on scale C in terms of Rule 67, read with Rule 69.

[3] Together with the application for leave to appeal, the first respondent
also sought written reasons for the order. These were provided on 24 June
2025. The first respondent’s application for leave to appeal was not
supplemented on receipt of the written reasons.

[4] On 25 June 2025, the applicants lodged this application in terms of
section 18(1) and 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act, 10 of 2013 (‘the Section
18 application’).

[5] Section 18 applications are by their very nature urgent. 1 As such, I
directed that both the application for leave to appeal and the Section 18
application were to be heard on 1 July 2025. F or reasons that will be dealt
with later in this judgment, the applications were not argued on 1 July 2025.
Both applications were postponed to 9 July 2025 for argument.

[6] In terms of the Section 18 application, the applicants are seeking
urgent relief that the order of 17 June 2025 and the judgment of 24 June 2025

1 Caterpillar Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Zero Azania (Pty) Ltd (57252/2021)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1117 (2 October 2023) at para 14; Downer v Zuma and Another
(12770/22P; 13062/22P) [2023] ZAKZPHC 75 (3 August 2023) at para 10.

shall operate pending the outcome of the appeal process, including the
application for leave to appeal and any appeal noted, if any.

[7] The first respondent delivered an answering affidavit, and th e
applicants delivered their replying affidavit.

[8] Section 18(1) to (3) reads:

“18 Suspension of decision pending appeal
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under
exceptional circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and
execution of a decision which is the subject of an application for leave
to appeal or of an appeal, is suspended pending the decision of the
application or appeal.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders other wise, the operation and execution of a
decision that is an interlocutory order not having the effect of a final
judgment, which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or
of an appeal, is not suspended pending the decision of the application
or appeal.
(3) A court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1)
or (2), if the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, in
addition proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she will suffer
irreparable harm if the court doe s not so order and that the other party
will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so orders.”

[9] From the wording of section 18(3), read with section 18(2), it is evident
that a party who seeks a departure from the ordinary rule that a final order is
suspended pending an appeal, need to prove three things, namely:

a. The existence of exceptional circumstances;
b. Proof, on a balance of probabilities, that he or she will suffer
irreparable harm if the interim order is not suspended; and

c. Proof, on a balance of probabilities, that the respondent (i.e. the
party in whose favour the interim interdict was granted) will not suffer
irreparable harm if the interim order is suspended.

[10] In Tyte Security Services CC v Western Cape Provincial Government
and Others 2024 (6) SA 175 (SCA) at paragraph 9 it is stated that t he
Supreme Court of Appeal has examined the requirements for the
implementation of an execution order pending an appeal in University of the
Free State v AfriForum (AfriForum);2 Ntlemeza v Helen Suzman Foundation;3
Premier of Gauteng v Democratic Alliance; 4 Knoop v Gupta (Knoop);5 and, in
Zuma v Downer and Another.6

[11] In paragraph 10 of Tyte, the Supreme Court of Appeal states:

“Whilst there are indeed statements in those judgments that would
appear to support counsel's fundamental hypothesis, they seem to
have been made in passing. They thus call for closer examination in
this matter. An important point of departure, so it seems to me, is that
consideration of each of the so -called three requirements is not a
hermetically sealed enquiry and can hardly be approached in a
compartmentalised fashion.”

[12] In Afriforum the Supreme Court of Appeal has explained that section
18 “places a heavy onus on the applican t” and does not seek merely to codify
the common law but to “introduce more onerous requirements”.7

[13] The existence of ‘exceptional circumstances ' is a necessary
prerequisite for the exercise of the court’s discretion under section 18. If the
circumstances are not truly exceptional, that is the end of the matter. The

2 University of the Free State v AfriForum and Another 2018 (3) SA 428 (SCA)
3 Ntlemeza v Helen Suzman Foundation and Another 2017 (5) SA 402 (SCA)
4 Premier for the Province of Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others [2021] 1
ALL SA 60 (SCA)
5 Knoop NO and Another v Gupta (Execution) 2021 (3) SA 135 (SCA)
6 Zuma v Downer and Another 2024 (2) SA 356 (SCA)
7 Afriforum at para 11

application must fail and falls to be dismissed. If, however, exceptional
circumstances are found to be present, it would not follow, without more, that
the application must succeed.8

[14] In paragraph 12 of Tyte it is stated:

“It has long been accepted that it is 'undesirable to attempt to lay down
any general rule' in respect of 'exceptional circumstances' and that
each case must be considered upon its own facts. 9 In MV Ais Mamas
Thring J summarised the approach to be followed. He said that '(w)hat
is ordinarily contemplated by the words "exceptional circumstances" is
something out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature; something
which is excepted in the sense that the general rule does not apply to
it; something uncommon, rare or different . . .'.”10

[15] In paragraph 13 of Tyte, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated:

“What constitutes irreparable harm is always dependent upon the
factual situation in which the dispute arises, and upon the leg al
principles that govern the rights and obligations of the parties in the
context of that dispute. It was accepted in Knoop that '(t)he need to
establish exceptional circumstances is likely to be closely linked to the
applicant establishing that they will suffer irreparable harm if the . . .
order is not implemented immediately'. 11 The same, I dare say, can be
said of its counterpart, the absence of irreparable harm to the
respondent. In that sense, the presence or absence of irreparable
harm, as the case may be, can hardly be entirely divorced from the
exceptional circumstances enquiry. It would perhaps be logically
incoherent for a court to conclude, on the one hand, in favour of an

8 Tyte at para 11
9 Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Dobbs 1912 AD 395 at 399.
10 MV Ais Mamas: Seatrans Maritime v Owners, MV Ais Mamas, and Another 2002 (6) SA
150 (C) at 156H – J.
11 Knoop at para 47

applicant that exceptional circumstances subsist, but, on the other,
against an applicant on either leg of the irreparable harm enquiry.”

[16] Referring to paragraph 17 of Tyte, counsel for the first respondent
submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal held that any irreparable harm
(or even the potentiality of irreparable harm) to a respondent, no matter how
slight, would irredeemably tip the scales against an applicant. It is further
submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal, in addition, stated that unless
there was no or zero irreparable harm to a respondent , the Section 18
application had to fail.12

[17] Paragraph 17 of Tyte does not contain such a finding. If regard is had
to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of Tyte, it is clear that the Supreme Court of
Appeal noted submissions made by counsel and that the finding of the
Supreme Court of Appeal was made in paragraph 18 thereof. Paragraph 18 of
Tyte reads:

“Counsel did not shrink from the logical consequence of the contention,
namely that such a mechanistic approach, which rested on the
supposition that the second and third had to be approached as
isolated enquiries, may well strip a court of any discretion that it
may possess or that it could give rise to a manifestly inequitable
conclusion, which could serve to undermine the rule of law. This
approach, if it is to be favoured, would disregard entirely the
rationality, reasonableness and proportionality yardsticks that
have become important touchstones in our jurisprudence. It likely
would also, to all intents and purposes, set the bar so high as to
render the remedy i llusory. Counsel was, however, willing to accept
that there must always remain a residual discretion. What exactly was
meant by a residual discretion, or when precisely it was to be
exercised, remained opaque. However, on the acceptance of a
discretion, even a residual one, the argument against a weighing -

up evaporates. If the argument were correct, the court would have
no discretion to grant relief under s 18, whatever the
consequences or however irreparably disastrous to an applicant. ”
(my emphasis).

[18] It is thus evident from Tyte that the second and third requirements are
not to be approached as isolated enquiries as this would strip a court of any
discretion that it may posess or that it could give rise to a manifestly
inequitable conclusion, which could serve to undermine the ru le of law. The
court has the discretion to grant the relief under Section 18.

[19] In paragraphs 19 to 21 of Tyte, the Supreme Court of Appeal
discussed ‘irreparable harm’ and stated:

[19] Irreparable harm, it has been said in a somewhat different context,
is more than a rationale — it is a critical factor in testing the claim for
an interlocutory injunction.13 The nature of irreparable harm is not easy
to define. RJ Sharpe points out:
'The rationale for requiring the plaintiff to show irreparable harm is
readily understood. If damages will provide adequate compensation,
and the defendant is in a position to pay them, then ordinarily there will
be no justification in running the risk of an injunction pending the trial.
While it is easy to see why this requireme nt should be imposed, it is
difficult to define exactly what is meant by irreparable harm.'14

[20] Over a century ago Innes JA, after referring to Van der Linden's
Institutes, where the essentials for an interdict application had been
enumerated, had this to say:
'That element [the injury feared must be irreparable] is only introduced
by him in cases where the right asserted by the applicant, though prima
facie established, is open to some doubt. In such cases he says the

13 PM Perell 'The Interlocutory Injunction and Irreparable Harm' (1989) 68 The Canadian Bar
Review 538 at 540.
14 RJ Sharpe Injunctions and Specific Performance (1983) at 77. Cited in PM Perell id.

test must be a pplied whether the continuance of the thing against
which an interdict is sought would cause irreparable injury to the
applicant. If so, the better course is to grant the relief if the
discontinuance of the act complained of would not cause irreparable
injury to the other party.'15

Interim interdicts (akin to interlocutory injunctions) are regular fare in
our courts. They provide a flexible and most useful tool in the aid of
justice. Our courts have accordingly come to accept that the remedy
should not be granted if there is a danger that it may work an injustice.

[21] In F Hoffmann -La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry Lord Wilberforce expressed the view that:
'The object of [an interim injunction] is to prevent a litigant, who must
necessarily suffer the law's delay, from losing by the delay the fruit of
his litigation; this is called "irreparable" damage, meaning that money
obtained at trial may not compensate him.'16

Albeit said in the context of the consideration of a wholly discretionary
remedy, and thus not perfectly analogous, the sentiment expressed is
not entirely without value here, inasmuch as it echoes precisely the
position in which Royal finds itself.”

[20] In the urgent application , the applicants alleged that there was no
agreement between the applicants and the first respondent. The first
respondent placed reliance on a partly written , partly oral, alternatively tacit
agreement between the first respondent and Abreal Property Manag ement
(‘Abreal’) (which is now Strive) and/or Keypoint Intelligence (Pty) Ltd
(‘Keypoint’). It is the first respondent’s case that the purported agreement was
concluded in February 2021.


15 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227.
16 F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG and Others v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
[1975] AC 295 ([1974] 12 All ER 1128) at 355 (AC) and at 1146 (All ER).

[21] In the urgent application , I found that the first respondent failed t o
prove that a contract, spanning 5 (five) years, was concluded back in 2021. I
further found that there is no objective evidence to support the first
respondent's contention . For instance, the first respondent’s participation in
the tender process is furt her indicative that there was no existing agreement
as relied on by the first respondent. My conclusion was that there was no
nexus between the applicants and the first respondent. On the same date as
this judgment, I will deliver the judgment in the appli cation for leave to appeal:
this application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

[22] The first respondent did not wait for any time to pass before lodging its
application for leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was filed
within hours of the urgent order being granted. Effectively, this resulted in the
suspension of the urgent order's execution. On receipt of the written reasons,
the first respondent did not supplement its grounds for leave to appeal. The
application for leave to appeal w as couched in a broad sense to include
allegations that I erred in entertaining the application as an urgent application
and that I erred in granting costs on Scale C. It was only in the first
respondent’s supplementary heads of argument and submissions th at the
grounds of appeal on costs and urgency were abandoned. The aspects of
urgency and costs are both discretionary issues in which a Court of Appeal
would not easily interfere; yet the first respondent included them and persisted
therewith. The first re spondent will take all steps it deems necessary to
remain in occupation of the premises despite my order.

[23] I am satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist herein. Fidelity was
awarded the security contract after its successful participation in the ten der
process, and as such, the applicants should be allowed to implement the
contract they have with Fidelity.

contract they have with Fidelity.

[24] On the requirements of irreparable harm to the parties, the following is
stated in paragraph 15 of Tyte:

‘Although it has been postulated that t he second and third are distinct
and discrete enquiries, they are perhaps more accurately to be
understood as being two sides of the same coin. The same facts and
circumstances, which by that stage ought largely to be either common
cause or undisputed, wil l inform both enquiries. The logical corollary of
an applicant suffering irreparable harm will invariably — but not always
— be that the other party has not. The enquiry into each can thus
hardly be mutually exclusive, particularly because, as far as the t hird is
concerned, unlike the second, the onus cast upon an applicant would
be to prove a negative, in accordance with the usual civil standard.
This suggests that, as with the exceptional circumstances enquiry, a
court considering both the second and thir d must have regard to all of
the facts and circumstances in any particular case. Insofar as the third
goes, although s 18(3) casts the onus (which does not shift) upon an
applicant, a respondent may well attract something in the nature of an
evidentiary bu rden.17 This would be especially so where the facts
relevant to the third are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
respondent. In that event it will perhaps fall to the respondent to raise
those facts in an answering affidavit to the s 18 application, wh ich may
invite a response from the applicant by way of a replying affidavit.’

[25] I am satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, the applicants stand to
suffer irreparable harm if the order is not granted . Absent an agreement with
the first respondent, the applicants have no control over the first respondent
and the applicants and their tenants will be left at the mercy of the first
respondent.

[26] The submission that the application should fail if the applicants have
not been able to prove that the first respondent will not suffer irreparable harm
has been dispelled by the finding in Tyte. I have considered the irreparable

has been dispelled by the finding in Tyte. I have considered the irreparable
harm the first respondent contends it will suffer (reputational harm in the
security industry and rendering services without payment). These alleged

17 MV Tarik 3: Credit Europe Bank NV v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the
MV Tarik 3 and Others [2022] 4 All SA 621 (SCA) ([2022] ZASCA 136) paras 24 – 34.

harm can be fully addressed in a damages claim if the first respondent so
elects. The harm relied on by the first respondent is not sufficient to prevent
the Section 18 relief from being granted.

[27] Should the first respondent elect to pursue its appeal further by way of
special leave to the Supreme Court of Appeal, I am not convinced that it
would have prospects of success.18

[28] In the premises, it follows that the Section 18 application should be
granted.

Wasted costs: 1 July 2025:

[29] In terms of the applicants’ notice of motion, it was stated: ‘... that the
applicants intend to make application on 1 July 2025 at 08h30, or as soon
after that as counsel for the applicants may be heard and, after the application
for leave to appeal brought by the first respondent against the applicants
before the Honourable Mr Justice Minnaar AJ.’

[30] In the confirmatory affidavit by Mr Manentsa, the first respondent’s
attorney, it is confirmed that the Section 18 application was served
electronically on their offices at 10h23 on 26 June 2025.

[31] In terms of the application, the first respondent was required to deliver
an answering affidavit by 27 June 2025 at 12:00. The first respondent only
delivered its answering affidavit on 4 July 2025.

[32] On 27 June 2025, the applicants’ attorney made a widely shared note
on Caselines stating: “Please take notice that the matter has been removed
from the Roll by notice – Notice of Removal appears on 020 -1 to 020 -3 as
same is before Honourable Minnaar AJ as per correspondence which appeas
at 074-1 to 074-4’

18 Afriforum at para 14 and 15

[33] There are conflicting versions of what was understood by this widely
shared note. Suffice it to state that the words ‘ the application is withdrawn’ do
not appear in this note; I do not deem it necessary to elaborate on the
conflicting versions.

[34] When the Section 18 application was called on 1 July 2025, there was
no answering affidavit by the first respondent. This , despite the service of the
application on 26 June 2025 and the request to deliver an answering affidavit
by 27 June 2025 at 12:00.

[35] In the confirmatory affidavit by Mr Manentse, no explanation is
provided as to why the answering affidavit was only delivered on 4 July 2025.

[36] The absence of an answering affidavit and heads of argument by the
first respondent in the Section 18 application caused both the application and
the application for leave to appeal to be postponed to 9 July 2025 for
argument.

[37] I can see no reason why the applicants should be out of pocket for the
wasted costs of 1 July 2025 , and it follows that the first respondent will be
liable for these costs.

Costs:

[38] There is no reason why costs should not follow the outcome.

[39] The applicants are seeking costs on the scale as between attorney and
client, alternatively, that costs be awarded on Scale C.

[40] There is no justification for punitive costs. Both sides employed senior
counsel, and as such, I deem it appropriate to award costs on Scale C.

[41] Consequently, I make the following order:

1. The application is regarded as urgent in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. The operation and execution of the order granted on 17 June 2025,
under case number 081761-2025 by this Court against the first
respondent is not suspended pending the finalisation of any
subsequent appeal(s), or the expiry of the period for the launching
of any subsequent appeal(s).
3. The first respondent to pay the costs of this application, inclusive of
the wasted costs occasioned on 1 July 2025, such costs to be
taxed on Scale C.


_____________________
Minnaar AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria


For the applicants: Adv G T Avvakoumides SC
Instructed by Mark Efstratiou Inc

For the first respondent: Adv P G Cilliers SC with Adv T Ngakane
Instructed by Adams & Adams

Heard on: 9 July 2025
Date of judgment: 18 July 2025