HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO 84985/17
(1) REPORTABLE: YES.
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED.
DATE: 1 JULY 2025
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
ZUNGANE, YOLISWA ZINHLE Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
CASE NO 80916/15
In the matter between:
MONEGI, LEHUMO RICHARD Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
CASE NO 63951/21
In the matter between:
MBELE, NTLAKANIPHO Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
CASE NO 18482/22
In the matter between:
MKHABELA, NURSE LEKINAH Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
CASE NO 9321/22
In the matter between:
HLONGWANA, MARGARET SIBONGILE Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
CASE NO 33973/22
In the matter between:
DUBE, NAMUKHONO JOHANNA Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
CASE NO 39494/21
In the matter between:
KGATLE MXOLISI BENSON Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant
Summary: Until recently, the result of the extraordinary large demand for trial
dates without actual triable issues being identified resulted in trial dates
extending for some years into the future. A consequence of this is that,
in order to attempt to obtain earlier finality of matters in which there
was no re al defence offered by the RAF, practitioners who represent
plaintiffs resort to measures to “convert” their trials to default judgment
applications. This object ive is generally achieved by obtaining the
striking out of the RAF's defence in those matters in which notices of
intention to defend and pleas have been delivered. This judgment
concerns a number of applications in which attempts have been made
to contrive a default judgment situation, often by impermissible means.
ORDERS
___________________________________________________________________
1. In the matter of Zungane v the RAF (Case No 84985/2017) the
applications to compel the making of discovery and the furnishing of
further particulars are dismissed with costs.
2. In the matter of Monegi v the RAF (Case No 80916/2015) the applications
to compel the making of discovery and the furnishing of further particulars
are dismissed with costs.
3. In the matter of Mbele v RAF (Case No 63951/2022) the application to
compel the furnishing of further and better discovery is dismissed with
costs.
4. In the matter of Mkhabela v RAF (Case No 18482/2022) the application to
compel the f urnishing of further and better discovery is dismissed with
costs.
5. In the matter of Hlongwana v RAF (Case No 9321/2022) the application
to strike out the defence is dismissed with costs.
6. In the matter of Dube v RAF (Case No 33973/2022) the application to
strike out the defence is dismissed with costs.
7. In the matter of Kgatle v RAF (Case No 39494/2021) the application to
strike out the defence is dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
DAVIS, ADJP
Introduction
[1] It is by now well documented in this Division that the number of cases in
which the Road Accident Fund (the RAF) features as a litigant , has reached such
proportions that it causes a congestion which threatens the effective operation of the
civil trial rolls in the Division.
[2] Until recently , the result of the extraordinary large demand for trial dates
without actual triable issues being identified resulted in trial dates extending for some
years into the future. A consequence of this i s that, in order to attempt to obtain
earlier finality of matters in which there was no real defence offered by the RAF,
practitioners who represent plaintiffs resort to measures to “convert” their trials to
default judgment applications. This objective is generally achieved by obtaining the
striking out of the RAF's defence in those matters in which notices of intention to
defend and pleas have been delivered.
[3] This judgment concerns a number of applications in which attempts have
been made to contrive a default judgment situation, often by impermissible means.
The applications in question
[4] In order to manage the number of interlocutory applications which have been
spawned by the RAF litigation scenario set out above and to cater for genuine
interlocutory trial procedures , the Division operates a trials interlocutory court (TIC),
interchangeably also referred to as the special interlocutory court (SIC) in each of its
seats. In Pretoria on average 35 such applications are heard per day for each trial
day in a term. During the course of a week in which I presided in one of these courts,
a number of matters caused such debate s with the practitioners who moved them ,
that those matters needed to be made examples of and which necessitated a
judgment which may assist in the future running of the interlocutory court.
[5] The matters in question are Zungane v RAF (Case No 84985/2017)
(Zungane); Monegi v RAF (Case N0 80916/2015) (Monegi); Mbhele v RAF (Case No
6395/2021) (Mbele); Mkhabela v RAF (Case No 18482/2022) (Mkhabela);
Hlongwana v RAF (Case No 9321/2022) (Hlongwana); Dube v RAF (Case No
33973/2022) (Dube) and Kgatle v RAF (Case No 39494/2021) (Kgatle).
[6] In the first four of these matters, compelling orders were sought against the
[6] In the first four of these matters, compelling orders were sought against the
RAF. In Hlongwane, Dube and Kgatle actual striking out of the defences were
sought, based on the RAF’s non -compliance with previously granted compelling
orders.
[7] The v arious applications launched in each of the se matters ranged from
applications to obtain orders to compel the RAF to make a decision in respect of the
seriousness of the respective plaintiffs’ injuries for purposes of claiming general
damages, to orders claiming compliance with procedural requests having been made
upon the RAF. These included requests for the furtherance of particulars in terms of
Rule 21, compliance with notices calling for discovery in terms of Rule 35(1) and the
furnishing of further and better discovery as contemplated in Rule 35(3).
[8] On the face of it, all the applications appeared to be procedurally in order, but
deeper scrutiny revealed that the plaintiffs were not actually interested in the
compliance with the compelling orders sought or obtained, and consequently a
strong suspicion emerged that the plaintiffs were actually after something else.
Incidentally, they were all represented by the same attorney and many aspects of the
various applications, including the affidavits delivered in support thereof, bore a
striking resemblance to each other. I fact, they displayed a proverbial “cut-and-paste”
exercise. In addition to individual supplementary affidavits and initial heads of
argument, a composite set of supplementary heads of argument was delivered in
respect of all seven matters jointly on 14 April 2025.
Abuse of process
[9] It is trite that when a procedural rule of court is used for a purpose other than
its intended use, that amounts to an abuse of process. In Nathram v RAF 1
(Nathram), this court referred to the following extract s from Beinash v Wixley 2 and
De Klerk v Scheepers3 respectively: an abuse occurs where the procedures
permitted by the rules of the court to facilitate the pursuit of the truth are used for a
purpose extraneous to that object ” or “when an attempt is made to use for ulterior
purposes machinery designed for the better administration of justice
1 (46876/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 440 (26 April 2024).
1 (46876/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 440 (26 April 2024).
2 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) at 734F-G.
3 2005 (5) SA 244 (T) at 246C-D.
[10] In South African Human Rights Commission v Standard Bank of South Africa
Ltd and Others4 the Constitutional Court even held that, in the exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction, a High Court may refuse to he ar entire proceedings which amount to an
abuse of its process.
[11] In the above matter, the Constitutional Court referred to Standard Credit
Corporation Ltd v Bester 5 where at 820 A -B the court held that an abuse of process
can occur when a court process “ … is used by a litigant for a purpose for which it
was not designed or intended, to the prejudice or potential prejudice to the other
party to the proceedings …”.
[12] A collection of authorities on and examples of what constitutes an abuse of
process are to be fo und in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc and Others v National
Potato Co-operative Ltd.6
The Rules in question
[13] The first Rule which featured in the matters under consideration is Rule 21. Its
material parts provide as follows: “ (1) After the close of pleadings any party may, not
less than 20 days before trial, deliver a notice requesting only such further particulars
as are strictly necessary to enable him or her to prepare for trial..(4) if the party
requested to furnish any particulars as aforesaid fails to deliver them timeously or
sufficiently, the party requesting the same may apply to court for an order for their
delivery or for the dismissal of the action or the striking out of the defence
whereupon the court may make such order as to it seems meet”.
[14] The second Rule which featured prominently in these matters was Rule 35. Its
relevant parts provide as follows: “(1) Any party to any action may require any other
party theret o, by notice in writing, to make discovery on oath within 20 days of all
documents and tape recordings relating to any matter in question in such action…
which are or have at any time been in the possession or control of such other
4 2023 (3) SA 36 (CC) at [31].
5 1987 (1) SA 812 (W).
4 2023 (3) SA 36 (CC) at [31].
5 1987 (1) SA 812 (W).
6 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) at par [50] per Southwood AJA.
party...(3) If any party believes that there are, in addition to documents or tape
recordings disclosed as aforesaid, other documents… which may be relevant to any
matter in question in possession of any party thereto, the former may give notice to
the latter requiring such party to make the same available for inspection…(7) If any
party fails to give discovery as a foresaid… the party desiring discovery or inspection
may apply to a court which may order compliance with this rule and, failing such
compliance, may dismiss the claim or strike out the defence”.
The PAJA issue
[15] Section 17 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the RAF Act) provides
that, in order for a party to be entitled to claim non -patrimonial (general) damages
against the RAF , that part y’s injuries must have been determined to be “serious".
This is done by way of an election by the RAF to either accept or reject the plaintiff’s
serious injury assessment submitted by way of a prescribed RAF-4 form.
[16] Depending on the RAF's election , further procedures as prescribed in
regulation 3 of the Road Accident Fund Regulations 2008 (the Regulations) may
follow.
[17] In the event that the RAF fails to exercise an election within the prescribed 90
day period, s uch failure would constitute reviewable administrative action as
contemplated in section 6(2)(g) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 (PAJA). This would entitle the innocent party to apply to court for an
appropriate order.
[18] I shall hereunder refer to the most pertinent aspects of each of the
applications in the matters referred to above and thereafter consider whet her those
applications pa ss muster or whether they constitute abuses of process, in which
case I shall indicate the consequences thereof.
The Zungane matter
[19] As indicated in the practice note filed in this matter , it concerned two
applications. T he first was for an order to compel the RAF to make discovery in
terms of rule 35 (1) and the second was for an order to compel the R AF to answer a
request for further particulars . In both instances the applications were supported by
an affidavit by the plaintiff's current attorney Ms Salomѐ le Roux.
[20] In the affidavit delivered in support of the application to compel discovery, the
sum total of the prejudice which the attorney alleged the plaintiff was suffering as a
result of the RAF having failed to make discovery was formulated as follows ”
Discovery is with respect to the cornerstone of any civil suit. If discovery is not made
the case can effectively not go forward. The plaintiff is accordingly, with respect,
clearly prejudiced in his preparation for trial by reason of the defendant ’s failure to
file its discovery affidavit”.
[21] In heads of argument delivered on behalf of the plaintiff after I had directed
that the matters stand down for purposes of such argument, the plaintiff ’s counsel,
advocate L J Visser (who was not the coun sel who had initially appeared in these
matters) referred to an extensive list of authorities w herein the importance of
discovery has been confirmed . These were inter alia, Ferreira v Endley 1966 (3) SA
618 (E), Prinsloo v Simon 1984 (2) SA 56 (O), BST Kombuise (Edms) Bpk v Abrams
1978 (4) SA 182 (T) and Leapman and another v Barrow 1971(4) SA 403 (R).
[22] In addition it was argued that the failure to make discovery would result in an
unfair trial as th ere “would not be an equality of arms ” (as referred to in Qozeleni v
Minister of Law and Order and another 1994 (3) SA 625 (E).
[23] Despite the above lofty sentiment s, counsel for the plaintiff could not indicate
any real, practical or indeed actual prejudice suffered in this matter due to the RAF's
non-compliance. The plaintiff had already readied its matter for trial and after
non-compliance. The plaintiff had already readied its matter for trial and after
pleadings have been closed the plaintiff had obtained and produced an expert report
and had prepared extensive trial bundles on both merits and quantum . There was
absolutely nothing indicating that the plaintiff has been unable to prepare to prove its
case, both in respect of merits and in respect of quantum . The fact that both parties
had previously been represented by other attorneys did not d etract from this fact and
attempts made in the h eads of argument to elevate th e issue of prior representation
to one which merited serious consid eration, failed. The plaintiff’s current attorneys
have already been appointed as long ago as on 21 August 2023.
[24] The application to compel discovery was clearly a precursor to a subsequent
application to have the RAF’s defence struck out upon non- compliance with such an
order. This much is evinced by the last three of the seven matters referred to above,
all by the same attorney and all based on similar applications supported by similar ly
worded founding affidavits, which all followed the exact same route.
[25] I therefore find that the application to compel discovery was not used in order
to obtain actual discovery but in order to obtain something else , namely a default
judgement situation. Although the lengthy lead times for trial dates at the time that
this application had been launched may have created an understandable desire to
rather proceed against the RAF by way of default than by way of trial , it still means
that the Rule was used for a purpose other than that for which it was designed. As
such it constituted an abuse of process. A court, exercising its discretion judicially, is
entitled to decline to grant an order in such circumstances.
[26] Experience in this Division, of which judicial notice may be taken, has shown
that only in the rarest instances would discovery by the RAF had made any impact
on the plaintiff ’s claim or the trial readiness thereof . The plaintiff has not indicated
that this matter is one of those rare instances . W hen o ne has to weigh up the
negligible benefit of discovery in these circumstances against the very real and
serious consequences of striking a defen ce, the first pales in comparison to the
latter.
[27] In a last -ditch attempt to obtain relief , the plaintiff’s attorney in a
supplementary affidavit referred to the practice directives in this court requiring
supplementary affidavit referred to the practice directives in this court requiring
discovery to be complete before a trial date is allocated . The attorney alleged that
since the RAF has failed to make discovery, discovery is therefore not “complete”
and the plaintiff suffers prejudice by not being able to apply for a trial date . I have
made enquiries from the Registrar during the course of the hearing and standing
down of th is matter and the position stated by the plaintiff ’s attorney is simply
factually incorrect. Trial dates are issued by the Registrar after a plaintiff has made
discovery and plaintiffs are not denied trial dates in instances where the defendant
has failed to do so . This is done in accordance with par 8.1 of ann exure 5.1 to the
Practice Directive. I put this factual position to the plaintiff’s counsel and received
no adverse answer. The supplementary heads of argument delivered on 14 April
2025 ineffectually attempted to rely on historical directives of 2014 and 2019.
[28] In other heads of argument filed on behalf of the plaintiff in respect of the
application to compel the furnishing of further particulars, much was made of the fact
that there might be a possibility of a duplicate claim having been filed on behalf of
the plaintiff and that there might be a possibility that suppliers of medical services
rendered to the plaintiff might have been paid by the RA F. Particulars were
requested in respect of these possibilities. Whilst such possibilities might exist , they
remain no more than notional possibilities. No facts have been indicated which may
have converted those possibilities to probabilities.
[29] In my view fishing expeditions such as those evinced by the request for
further particulars are nothing more than that and clearly cannot satisfy the
requirements of Rule 21(1) which require that only p articulars which were “strictly
necessary” in order to enable the plaintiff to prepare for trial , may be sought. The
extent of the plaintiff’s trial readiness referred to above sufficiently indicate that the
plaintiff had been able to prepare for trial in the absence of such particulars.
[30] In the above premises I find that the application to compel the furnishing of
the particulars requested was being used in the same manner as the application to
compel discovery. In other words, the application to compel the furnishing of further
particulars was not resorted to with a view to actually obtain ing the particular s
particulars was not resorted to with a view to actually obtain ing the particular s
sought, but with a view to utilize the non -furnishing thereof as a precursor for an
application to strike the RAF's defence. I therefore find, in the exercise of the court’s
discretion, that that application should suffer the same fate as the application to
compel discovery.
The Monegi matter
[31] In this matter similar applications were made for the furnishing of particulars
and the making of discovery as in the Zungane matter. In fact the affidavits and the
nature of relief are so similar that , joint heads of argument had been filed in respect
of both these applications in both matters (in addition to the supplementary heads of
argument referred to earlier) . Again, the arguments relating to discovery were very
little more than a generic treatise of general principles regarding discovery.
[32] In respect of the application for the furnishing of particulars , similar
speculative issues have been raised as in the previous matter . The possibilities of a
suppliers claim, a duplicate claim and the possibility of the appointment of an
assessor by the RAF again feature. T hese are not particulars strictly necessary in
order to enable the plaintiff to prepare for trial and can at best be interrogatories
which could have been and should have been addressed at a pretrial conference ,
had they really been necessary.
[33] One should also bear in mind that the plaintiff had already on 2 May 2017
obtained an order by agreement for the payment of loss of earnings and the
furnishing of the customary undertaking for future medical treatment. The fates of the
applications to compel the f urnishing of further particulars and making discovery
should therefore be the same as in the previous matter.
[34] The only feature which distinguished this matter from the previous one, was
an application to demand an election from the RAF in respect of the acceptance or
rejection of the report indicating the seriousness of the plaintiff ’s injuries. That
application was, however not proceeded with as the RAF has indeed made an
election after service of the application. I therefore proceeded to re move that
application and made a costs order in terms of a draft order presented at the hearing
of the matters.
The Mbele matter
of the matters.
The Mbele matter
[35] The only difference in the discovery sought in this matter and the discovery
sought in the previous two matters is that the RAF had indeed made discovery . The
plaintiff then, in terms of rule 35 (3) sought further and better discovery . It is clear
from the wording of the applicable sub-rule that the documents requested in terms of
this sub-rule must be described in the notice with sufficient accuracy to enable them
to be identified.
[36] In her affidavit delivered in support of this application , the plaintiff’s attorney
explained that the RAF allocates claim numbers to claims lodged with it. Claims that
relate to one accident are usually grouped together and at the end of the claim
number the RAF, almost as a suffix , indicate by way of a number the sequence
wherein claims relevant to one accident had been lodged, starting from zero
upwards. The attorney used this proposition to indicate that there might be related or
duplicate claims and submitted that the only effective way to commit the RAF to
whether there are such claims was to request further documents.
[37] The contentions relating to related claims did not feature in the Rule 35(3)
notice and is therefore nothing more than a red herring. In any event , to the
knowledge of the plaintiff and her attorney , related claims indeed existed as the
attorney had uploaded court orders in no less than four related matters where the
RAF had agreed to 100% liability orders, these were in Case Nos 6397/21 on 17
May 2022, 27165/21 on 13 March 2023, 6396/21 on 17 May 2023 and 6394/21 on
18 May 2023.
[38] In addition , the speculative argument regarding the possibility of suppliers ’
claims w as again mooted . The plaintiff’s attorney , however could not and did not
allege that sp ecific documents existed or that suppliers ’ claims existed. The
speculative nature of the interrogatory directed by way of the Rule 35 (3) notice is
apparent from the formulation of the documents requested . The notice simply
requests the following: “the complete file contents of the Road Accident Fund kept in
respect of the suppliers claims handed in with the road accident fund and which has
bearing on any hospital treatment that the plaintiff received in pursuance to the
bearing on any hospital treatment that the plaintiff received in pursuance to the
accident in question and the cost thereof and which pertains to the accident which is
the subject of the above mentioned action and instituted under the above mentioned
case number ´. The date indicated for these documents is similarly described as
“unknown”.
[39] I find it an abuse that a fishing expedition in this fashion should be elevated to
a step which is to be used as a precursor to the striking out of a defence upon non -
compliance. There is nothing preventing the plaintiff from proceeding with her claim
and the contents of the file indicated that she had been able to do so without any
such discovery.
[40] In the similar fashion as in the Monegi matter, the plaintiff has previously
launched a PAJA application, but the RAF has made an election before the hearing
thereof. That application had then been removed on 5 August 2024 already,
together with a costs order. The plaintiff had also already obtained a merits order in
her favour, by agreement, on 25 October 2023.
The Mkhabela matter
[41] In this matter the plaintiff similarly sought an application to compel the making
of further and better discovery . A gain, apart from generalized and generic
allegations and speculations, no case specific facts have been disclosed. The
application in this matter should suffer the same fate as those referred to above. In
similar fashion as above, the plaintiff had already obtained a merits order in its
favour, on 23 May 2023.
The Hlongwana matter
[42] In this matter the plaintiff has, in similar circumstances as those above,
applied for a mandamus in respect of her PAJA application. The RAF has, as before,
made the required election and that application had been removed on 24 April 2024
already. The plaintiff had also obtained a merits order in her favour as long ago as
12 October 2023.
[43] Despite this however, the plaintiff sought an order for the striking out of the
RAF’s defence. This was claimed on the following basis : on 24 April 2024 an order
was obtained compelling the RAF to make discovery. The discovery contemplated in
that order was the general discove ry referred to above and claimed by the plaintiff in
terms of Rule 35(1). Upon non -compliance, t he plaintiff ’s attorney in the affidavit
delivered in support of the application for striking ou t simply stated that “The
defendant’s conduct leaves the applica nt with no other option to apply for the relief
set out in the accompanying notice of motion.…the re spondent’s non -compliance
makes it impossible for the applicant to litigate against it ...”. Punitive costs were then
also sought.
[44] It is settled law that Rules 35(7) and rule 30A (2) of the Rules, providing for
circumstances in which a defence may be struck out, confers a discretion on the
court which must be exercised judicially on a proper consideration of all the relevant
circumstances. Striking out a defence is a drastic remedy which should normally only
be resorted to as a last resort. Thi s is because it deprives a litigant of an entrenched
right to a fair trial and a Constitutional right to access to a court where its defence
can be heard7.
[45] Despite the fact that the plaintiff in this matter may, upon a pure formalistic
application of the Rules, be entitled to a striking out order, I find there to be a
disparity between the negligible alleged prejudice to the plaintiff following upon non -
compliance with an order compelling discovery against the RAF and the serious
consequences that follow upon a striking out order. Accordingly, and in the exercise
of this court's discretion, I decline to grant such an order.
[46] The further factors that I took into account w ere that the plaintiff had already
obtained a merits order in her favour on 12 Oc tober 2023 and, at the time that the
compelling order had been granted, her PAJA application had been removed due to
the RAF’s compliance with that application, allowing her to proceed with her claim for
non-patrimonial damages. It was not alleged that, without discovery being made, she
was unable to do so.
The Dube matter
7 MEC, Department of Public Works and others v Ikama Architects and others 2022 (6) SA 276 (ECB)
at paras [18] to [19]; Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC) at
para [79]; SA Scottish Finance Corporation Ltd v Smith 1966 (3) SA 629 (T) at 634; Evander caterers
(Pty) Ltd v Potgieter 1970 (3) SA 312 (T) at 317; Thornhill v Gerhardt 1979 (2) SA 1092 (T) at 096-7;
Smith NO v Brummer NO 1954 (3) SA 352 (O) at 357 and Putco Ltd v TV & Radio Guarantee
Company (Pty) Ltd 1984 (1) SA 443 (W).
[47] In similar fashion as in the matter of Hlongwana the plaintiff sought the striking
out of the RAF’s defence on the basis of its non -compliance to make discovery as
ordered on 10 March 2024. I hold the same view as above and decline to grant such
an order.
The Kgatle matter
[48] In this matter, yet again, the plaintiff sought a striking of the RAF’s defence for
non-compliance with a previous compelling order issued on 27 May 2024. The only
difference between this matter and the preceding two matters is that the compelling
order was for one making further and better discovery as contemplated in Rule
35(3). The documents contemplated in that order , were however again the
speculative generic documents relating to possible suppliers’ claims. In the exercise
of the court's discretion, I again decline to grant a striking out order.
Costs
Generally, costs should follow the event and there are no reasons why that should
not be the positio n, despite the R AF hav ing not formally opposed any of these
applications.
Orders
[49] In the premises, orders are granted in the following terms:
1. In the matter of Zungane v the RAF (Case No 84985/2017) the
applications to compel the making of discovery and the furnishing of
further particulars are dismissed with costs.
2. In the matter of Monegi v the RAF (Case No 80916/2015) the applications
to compel the making of discovery and the furnishing of further particulars
are dismissed with costs.
3. In the matter of Mbele v RAF (Case No 63951/21) the application to
compel the furnishing of further and better discovery is dismissed with
costs.
4. In the matter of Mkhabela v RAF (Case No 18482/22) the application to
compel the f urnishing of further and better discovery is dismissed with
costs.
5. In the matter of Hlongwana v RAF (Case No 9321/22) the application to
strike out the defence is dismissed with costs.
6. In the matter of Dube v RAF (Case N o 33973/2022) the application to
strike out the defence is dismissed with costs.
7. In the matter of Kgatle v RAF (Case No 39494/2021) the application to
strike out the defence is dismissed with costs.
______________________
N DAVIS
Acting Deputy Judge president
of the High Court Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date of Hearing: 11 & 12 February 2025
Supplementary Heads of Argument: 14 April 2025
Judgment delivered: 1 July 2025
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiffs: Adv H Marais (Supplementary Heads of Argument
by Adv L J Visser)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs: Salomѐ le Roux Attorneys, Pretoria
For the Defendants: No appearance.