IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

CASE NO: 2023-097427,
2023-097292, 2023-097111,
2023-097076, 2023-100081,
and 2023-100526






In the matter between:
DEGEFA SUGEBO LEMBORE First Applicant
TEKETEL TUMIRE HAJISO Second Applicant
ADEN AHMED OSMAN Third Applicant
ABI OSMAN YUSUF Fourth Applicant
TEMESGEN MATIWOS Fifth Applicant
THOMAS GODISO Sixth Applicant
and
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS First Respondent
DIRECTOR GENERAL: HOME AFFAIRS Second Respondent
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Third Respondent

(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED: NO

13 AUGUST 2025 ___________________
DATE SIGNATURE

MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES Fourth Respondent
HEAD: BOKSBURG CORRECTIONAL SERVICE
CENTRE, BENONI Fifth Respondent
HEAD: MODDERBEE CORRECTIONAL SERVICE
CENTRE, BENONI Sixth Respondent

Coram: Mlambo JP, Twala J and Collis J

Delivered: This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email and by uploading onto Case Lines/
CourtOnline. The date and time for hand down is deemed to be 10:00 am on 13
August 2025.


Summary: This Judgment concerns a leave to appeal application by the applicants,
Mr Manamela and Advocate Vobi . They sought leave to appeal this Court ’s Costs
Judgment and Order. The Costs Judgment followed the Court ’s Main Judgment and
Order in which the Court, dissatisfied with the way the applicants handled the main
application, made an order postponing the issue of costs until representations were
made in terms of the Court’s directive. In the Main Judgment, the Court found that the
applicants’ abused Court processes by using a “cut and paste” method in their papers.
The Court directed the applicants to address the Court on this issue; however, they
failed to comply with this directive. As a result, the Court handed down the Costs
Judgment in which the Court fo und that the applicants ’ behaviour warranted a Costs
order de bonis propriis on scale A.

The applicants sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the Court erred by handing
down the Costs Judgment as section 18 of the Superior Courts Act was applicable and
that the audi alteram partem was not extended to them.

The Court dismissed their application on the grounds that audi alteram partem was
extended to them, but they failed to comply with the directive to address the Court
before the Judgment was handed down. Furthermore, the Court dismissed their
submission that section 18 was applicable based on the principle of judicial finality.

The Court was further of the view that there were no prospects of success at the
Supreme Court of Appeal. Due to these reasons, their application was dismissed.




ORDER


The application for leave to appeal is dismissed, with costs on scale A.





JUDGMENT (ON COSTS)
[LEAVE TO APPEAL]

MLAMBO JP (concurring Twala and Collis JJ)
Introduction
[1] Before this court is an application for leave to appeal brought in terms of section
17 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 .1 The applicants , Mr Manamela of MA
Manamela Attorneys and Advocate Vobi, seek leave to appeal against this Court’s
Judgment and Order of 29 July 2024. For convenience they will be referred to as the
applicants in this Judgment.
[2] The genesis of this application stems from this Court’s Judgment of 8 February
2024 (the Main Judgment )2 in which this court dismissed the applicants’ clients’
application. In that Judgment, this Court ordered that the issue of costs be postponed
and be dealt with separately, that is, after the parties and the applicants , have filed
representations on the issues mentioned in paragraphs 92 to 94 of the Main Judgment.
[3] In th ose paragraphs, t his Court expressed concerns regarding the way the
litigation had been conducted. The Main Judgment details the basis for these
concerns, and it is not necessary to traverse those in this Judgment. Suffice to mention
that this Court had formed the vi ew that separate applications had initially been

1 Superior Courts Act.
2 Lembore v Minister of Home Affairs (2023-097427, 2023-097292, 2023-097111, 2023-097076,2023-
100081, 2023-100526) [2024] ZAGPJHC 102; [2024] 2 All SA 113 (GJ); 2024 (5) SA 251 (GJ) .

initiated which were identical save for names and some minor personal details of the
applicants’ clients. We decided that this issue required further consideration and
directed the applicants and their clients to file affidavits to explain why a finding should
not be made that their conduct amounted to an abuse of the judicial process and
further why a punitive order as to costs should not be made against them. We directed
the applicants and/or their lawyers to file these representations within fourteen days
from the date of the Judgment and the respondents within fourteen days thereafter.
[4] Subsequent to the handing down of the Main Judgment, an application for leave
to appeal was filed by the applicants on behalf of their clients. This Court dismissed it
on grounds that there were no reasonable prospects that the Supreme Court of Appeal
would reach a different conclusion to this Court ’s reasoning and findings. 3 The
applicants leave to appeal put the process in paragraph four above on hold.
[5] The leave to appeal Judgment was handed down on 21 May 2024, but neither
the applicants and/or the respondents filed any representations thereafter in
compliance with the invitation to file representations specified in the Main Judgment.
[6] On 29 July 2024, we handed down our Judgment on the issue of costs as
specified in the order in the Main Judgment. We refer to this Judgment as the “Costs
Judgment.” In that Judgment we ordered that Mr Manamela and Advocate Vobi pay
the costs of the main application de bonis propriis on scale A and directed the Registrar
of this Court to send a copy of this Judgment to the Legal Practice Council, the Minister
of Justice a nd Constitutional Development and to the National Director of Public
Prosecutions, for their information and consideration.
[7] The Costs Judgment is a fully reasoned Judgment with an elaborate exposition
of the factual matrix in this matter and other matters in which the applicants were

of the factual matrix in this matter and other matters in which the applicants were
involved in this Court. In sum, we made a finding that the applica nts had involved
themselves in what is colloquially called a cottage industry practice. This in our view
amounted to an abuse of the judicial process , hence the decision to order the
applicants to pay costs de bonis propriis.

3 Lembore and Others v Minister of Home Affairs (Leave to Appeal) [2024] ZAGPJHC 502.

The applicants’ submissions
[8] The applicants have filed separate heads of argument, but central to their
submissions is that leave to appeal should be granted as this Court erred in its findings
and that there are prospects of success that a different court w ill arrive at a different
conclusion. I deal with their submissions separately.
[9] Advocate Vobi submits that th is court erred on several grounds. First, he
submits that the co urt erred in ordering him to pay costs de bonis propriis . This
submission is based on the premise that paragraphs 92 to 94 of the Main Judgment
did not name or invite him to file an affidavit but rather only invited the parties (their
clients) and not him. He additionally submits that this court was compelled to apply
the audi alteram partem rule and invite him to make those submissions. The further
submission is that as they had lodged an application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal, this Court was barred from doing anything until that leave
process was concluded.
[10] Manamela MA Attorneys makes four submissions for their leave to appeal.
These submissions are divided on the following: the powers of a court to meri motu
review pending cases, t he importance of the applicants ’ right to the audi alteram
partem rule, the importance of the Biowatch4 principle and the effect of a pending
appeal on a Judgment.
[11] On the first ground, the applicants submits that this Court failed to provide them
with the right to audi alteram partem as the court did not afford them the opportunity
to submit affidavits as to why an adverse cost s order should not be granted against
them. The submission is that this failure breached this fundamental principle of natural
justice. It is further submitted that in light of the Biowatch principle, when dealing with
the issue of costs, Courts are required to consider the conduct of the parties and legal
representatives, the presence or abs ence of technical success and the nature of

representatives, the presence or abs ence of technical success and the nature of
litigants and the proceedings which this court did not. The submi ssion is that the
general rule in the award ing of costs is that parties seeking to assert constitutional
rights should not be burdened with costs w hether successful or not. Lastly, the

4 Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10)
BCLR 1014 (CC).

submission is that section 18 of the Superior Courts Act suspends the operation of a
Court order when there is an application for leave to appeal . Thus, the filing of the
application for leave to appeal to the S upreme Court of Appeal suspended the
operation of the Main Judgment, so the argument goes.
Analysis
[12] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act governs leave to appeal applications.
In the leave to appeal Judgment dealing with the Main Judgment, we exhaustively
dealt with the full ambit of section 17. We do not deem it necessary to cover the same
ground in this Judgment. Our view is that this is essentially a separate aspect of the
same matter.
[13] In so far as the law is concerned regarding these applications, we refer to MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha,5 where it was stated that:
“An applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper grounds that
there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of success on appeal. A mere
possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not hopeless, is not enough.
There must be a sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a reasonable
prospect of success on appeal.”
[14] Therefore, to prevail in an application for leave to appeal, the applicants must
demonstrate a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of success on appeal. To reach
that determination, this Court must first examine two crucial issues. First, whether this
court neglected to provide the applicants with audi, and whether section 18 of the
Superior Courts Act was applicable.
[15] The audi alteram partem principle is an important principle in our constitutional
dispensation. It serves as the foundation for natural justice and ensures that fair
processes take place.
[16] The applicants’ submission is that this court did not give them an opportunity to
make submissions before adverse findings were made against them. This is patently

5 [2016] ZASCA 176.

incorrect. In the Main Judgment, this court recognising and giving effect to the audi
alteram partem principle, directed the applicants and the respondents to address this
Court on the issue of costs and the concerns it raised. In paragraph 94 of the judgment
this Court said the following:
“We have therefore decided to suspend making an order as to costs and direct
that the parties file further affidavits addressing this matter. The applicants are
directed to file an affidavit to explain why a finding shouldn ’t be made that their
conduct amounted to an abuse of the judicial process and further why a punitive
order as to costs shouldn ’t be made against them and/or their lawyers. The
applicants and/or their lawyers are to file these further representations within
fourteen days from the date of this Judgment and the respondents must file their
representations within fourteen days thereafter.”
[17] However, instead of complying with this invitation, they filed an application for
leave to appeal. As already pointed out, that application was dismissed by this Court
and instead of complying with the invitation to file representations regarding the costs
aspect, the applic ants decided to petition the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to
appeal. The simple truth of the matter is that the applican ts, ignored the invitation to
make representations regarding the costs aspect which was still pending.
[18] Furthermore, t he submission made by Advocate Vobi that this court did not
name him or specified who is supposed to file the affidavits or representations is also
incorrect. In the Main Judgment this court made it clear that:
“The applicants and/or their lawyers are to file these further representations within
fourteen days from the date of this Judgment and the respondents must file their
representations within fourteen days thereafter.”
[19] Coming back to the second issue. Section 18 of the Superior Court Act which

[19] Coming back to the second issue. Section 18 of the Superior Court Act which
governs the suspension of court decisions pending appeal states in section 18(1) read
with subsection 5 that:
“(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision which

is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is suspended
pending the decision of the application or appeal.”
“(5) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), a decision becomes the subject
of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, as soon as an application for
leave to appeal or a notice of appeal is lodged with the registrar in terms of the
rules.”
[20] The Supreme Court of Appeal outlined the purpose of this section and
acknowledged that it exists to protect litigants. The Court, in Ntlemeza v Helen
Suzman Foundation6 explained that:
“The primary purpose of s 18(1) is to reiterate the common-law position in relation
to the ordinary effect of appeal processes — the suspension of the order being
appealed, not to nullify it. It was designed to protect the rights of litigants who find
themselves in the position of General Ntlemeza, by ensuring that, in the or dinary
course, the orders granted against them are suspended while they are in the
process of attempting, by way of the appeal process, to have them overturned.
The suspension contemplated in s 18(1) would thus continue to operate in the
event of a further application for leave to appeal to this court and, in the event of
that being successful, in relation to the outcome of a decision by this court in
respect of the principal order. Section 18(1) also sets the basis for when the power
to depart from the de fault position comes into play, namely, exceptional
circumstances which must be read in conjunction with the further requirements set
by s 18(3). As already stated and as will become clear later, the legislature has
set the bar fairly high.”7
[21] Our view is t hat this Court was not barred from issuing the Costs Judgment
when it did. The application for leave to the Supreme Court of Appeal was in relation
to the merits part of the matter and the costs part remained pending. That being the
case, after finalising the leave to appeal Judgment of the merits (Main Judgment), this

case, after finalising the leave to appeal Judgment of the merits (Main Judgment), this
Court was duty bound to finalise the matter and issue the Costs Judgment. That aspect

6 [2017] ZASCA 93; [2017] 3 All SA 589 (SCA); 2017 (5) SA 402 (SCA).
7 Id at para 28.

could not be left in abeyance indefinitely. The principle of finality of matters is
foundational.
[22] This Court is therefore of the view that this application lacks merit and must be
dismissed.
[23] In the circumstances the following order is made –
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed, with costs on scale A.

______________
D MLAMBO
Deputy Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa
(Formerly the Judge President of the Gauteng Division of the High Court)

Hearing: (Dealt with on the Papers)
Judgment: 13 August 2025

Appearances

For Mr Moribolla Andrew Manamela: Manamela MA Attorneys, Pretoria

For Mr Sinethemba Isaac Vobi: Oni & Company Inc.

For First to Third Respondents: Hephzibah Rajah
instructed by State Attorney, Pretoria