THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFR
ICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case 2025-081458
In the matter between:
ZA ONLINE STORE (PTY) LTD T/A ISTORE Applicant
and
TOTHILL DEREK First Respondent
BLACK ENTREPRENEURS ALLIANCE NPC Second Respondent
NEWS NEXUS CITY Third Respondent
Headnote:
Urgent a
pplication – interdict – false information and reputational harm –
applicant targeted in coordinated social media and protest campaign to compel
payment in subcontractor dispute – no contractual nexus – Rule 6(12) urgency
established – defamatory statements on online platforms – content creators not
subject to press code – constitutional rights to dignity (s 10), freedom of
expression (s 16), and protest (s 17) considered – distinction drawn between
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
(3) REVISED: Yes
Date: 09 June 2025 ____ ______

2
media freedom and general expression – unlawful co ercion and falsehoods
interdicted – final interdict granted.


JUDGMENT


DU PLESSIS J

Introduction
[1] This is an urgent application seeking interdictory relief restraining the
respondents from publishing or disseminating certain statements alleged by the
applicants to be false, misleading, and defamatory , from harassing , threaten ing or
intimidating the applicant's staff, not to obstruct entrance to the applicant's retail stores
and to not attempt to induce or coerce the applicant to make any payment to the first
respondent. They also added a prayer that some of the posts on the respondents'
social media be removed relating to the allegation that the applicant is indebted to the
first respondent or has failed to pay its contractors.

[2] The applicants contend that, if not restrained, the respondents' statements will
cause them imminent and irreparable harm. The respondents oppose the application,
raising both procedural objections , including a denial of urgency , and substantive
concerns, asserting that the relief sought infringes their constitutional rights to freedom
of assembly, protest, and media expression.

[3] In this matter, urgency and the merits are closely intertwined and depen d
heavily on the factual matrix that gave rise to the application. These facts will be
presented in some detail before turning to the legal framework and the appropriate
remedy.

Factual background
[4] The applicant contracted with Teqture to renovate some of its stores. Teqture,
in turn, subcontracted with Muneris, and Muneris, in turn, concluded a sub-sub
contractual agreement with the first respondent, Mr Tothill. Mr Tothill did not provide
the scope of the works, the remuneration or the manner in which the work was

3
performed, nor any particulars regarding his contract with Muneris. Very little is known
about the subsequent dispute between Muneris and Mr Tothill.

[5] On 29 January 2025, Mr Tothill's attorney addressed a letter of demand to
Muneris, alleging that Mr Tothill had performed sub contrac tual work and that the
balance of R239 266,47 was due and payable to Mr Tothill. In the letter, the attorney
stated that he was representing Mr Tothill. The letter referenced a reconciliation sent
by Muneris and demanded proof of all expenditures deducted from the account as per
the reconciliation.

[6] On 7 May 2025, Mr Tothill sent an email to the applicant's C hief Executive
Officer (“CEO”) requesting payment. The email stated that he would go to social media
and Carte Blanche to expose his story if he did not get his money. He then admitted
that he was a sub-subcontractor under the Teqture group, whom he claimed to have
tried to meet in private but received death threats, so he would appreciate a meeting
at the applicant's head office to resolve the matter. He ends the letter with:

“Urgent assistance is needed. Or it leaves me with no choice but to get Apple
headquarters of America involved to recovery (sic) money owed to me.

TEQTURE needs to pay there (sic) contractors.”

[7] The applicants view this communication as an attempt to pressure them into
intervening in a dispute to which they are not a party. They reasonably interpreted the
reference to social media, Carte Blanche, and Apple's international headquarters as
an effort to escalate public pressure should they decline to assist Mr Tothill in pursuing
payment from Teqture.

[8] On 14 May 2025, the applicant informed Mr Tothill that it had paid Teqture in
full and stated that it is thus no longer involved in the dispute. It requested not to be
included in further correspondence and not to be drawn into further disputes that it is
not a party to.

[9] Mr Tothill replied to this by stating:

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[….] my next step is to take this to the public. Apple istore brand will be affected and
hopefully Apple core and texture come forward and explain when am I getting paid.

[…]

I will be contacting Apple headquarters in America and laying complaints. Shanil Bruce
and Anton has had multiple meetings with me and delivered empty promises…

I hope you all understand the next step ill do is take this to the media.”

[10] On 20 May 2025, Teqture responded that it had paid the subcontractor, Muneris
Construction, in full, and that Teqture had never employed Mr Tothill.

[11] On 20 May 2025, Mr Tothill approached the B lack Entrepreneurs Alliance
(“BEA”) for support. In their letter to the CEO of the applicant, they state that they
"champion ethical business practices, corporate accountability, and equitable
economic participation for black-owned enterprises."

[12] They are concerned about the applicant's failure to ensure fair payment
practices within its iStore-linked supply chain. They support Mr Tothill's efforts to obtain
payment. They state that " this is not an isolated incident " and that multiple
subcontractors had raised similar concerns , without specifying which subcontractors.

[13] The letter lists several demands and states that failure to act will lead to various
escalations, including "[m]edia exposure via News Nexus City, which has already
begun investigating this story."

[14] On 21 May 2025, the applicant requests that the respondents engage directly
with Teqture for proof of payment, as this will be reflected in their banking systems.
News Nexus replied to this email (jointly signed by News Nexus and BEA), informing
the applicant that the claim tha t payment has been effected is proven to be false, as
there is no proof of payment from their contractor sent to Mr Tothill. They express ed
dissatisfaction with the fact that neither iStore nor Teqture are cooperating and that

5
they would then publish the story. They also inform ed the applicant of a planned
protest action at the iStore offices, which w ould continue until iStore t ook appropriate
and public action against the contractors.

[15] On 21 May 2025, the applicant nonetheless undertook to investigate and
engage with Mr Tothill. The applicant informed Mr Tothill that Teqture had confirmed
its account with Muneris was fully settled, and that the applicant would work with Mr
Tothill to resolve the issue and clarify the alleged non-payment to him. Mr Tothill stated
that his invoices had still not been settled.

[16] During this process, the applicant sent another email to Mr Tothill to
acknowledge his concerns and to inform him that they were investigating the matter.
They asked Mr Tothill to supply them with copies of quotations, payment reconciliation
statements, invoices, and any other document relevant to the respondent's complaint,
to help them conduct a thorough investigation. No such information or documentation
was provided, which hampered the applicant's ability to act meaningfully.

[17] On 25 May 2025, a day before the public protest, Mr Tothill sent a demand to
Teqture, Muneris, and the applicant , stating that he would fly from Cape Town to
Johannesburg and that the applicant must refund his ticket as they had not provided
timely feedback nor sent him proof of payment. He requested their presence to engage
with him and the media.

[18] On 26 May 2025, a public protest took place outside the applicant's head office
in Sandton. The respondents coordinated the protest . The protesters stated that the
applicant mistreats contractors and withholds payments. News Nexus distributed the
information on their platform, creating the narrative that the applicant mistreats
contractors and withholds payments.

[19] The applicant's CEO engaged Mr Tothill during the protest action in a private
meeting, where Mr Tothill admitted that his actions should not be directed at the

meeting, where Mr Tothill admitted that his actions should not be directed at the
applicant. However, he stated that he is using the applicant's brand name to put
pressure on Muneris, with whom he has a dispute.

6
[20] On the same day, Ms Byron from the legal department of the applicant
indicated that:

“As discussed between Chris Dodd [CEO] and Derek Tothill this morning, we confirm
that all amounts owing by iStore to Teqture, in respect of the services rendered to
iStore, have been paid in full.

In the interest of resolving any remaining matters, we propose that the related parties
– Bruce (Teqture), Shimel (EvolutionOne), Anton (Muneris) , and Dere k (Rapid
Construction) meet to discuss and clarify any amounts owed between the parties.
Bruce has confirmed that he has reached out to Derek to set up a virtual meeting later
today.

Should this not result in a resolution between the parties, we will arr ange for an
independent contractor mediator to facilitate a further meeting at the earliest
opportunity.”

[21] In response, Mr Tothill acknowledged the reputational impact of his campaign
but justified it on the basis that iStore allegedly had sufficient oppor tunity to assist. He
stated, in part (quoted directly):

“I do apologise to Istore for taking the reputation damage but istore had sufficient time
to intervene. [Teqture/EvolutoinOne] must just pay me and walk away from this. I
approach this matter with integrity and honesty, unlike your supplier…

This is going to escalate to a point none of us can control due to
TEQTURE/EvolutionOne skelm business ethics.”

[22] Later in the afternoon, News Nexus and BEA sent another email stating that
there had not been a resolution, that the virtual meeting was not held, and that if the
matter is not resolved by close of business the next day, further action will follow,
including (quoting from the email):

• “ A larger protest at your head office,
• Protests at the residence of your CEO

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• Escalation to the Department of Trade and Industry
• Engagement with relevant Portfolio Committees in National Parliament
• A public boycott of iStore and all associated products
• Pickets at iStore locations renovated by Derek Tothill.

We expect payment to be made without further delay.”

[23] In the days to follow, Mr Tothill phoned various employees of the applicant, who
stated that the tone was allegedly threatening and that alarmed the employees. None
of these employees were in a position to address Mr Tothill's demands.

[24] On 27 May 2025, the applicant's attorneys sent a letter to the respondents
asserting that the conduct complained of was unlawful and request ed a written
undertaking that it would cease . They requested that the respondents cease their
actions and they were given until 28 May 2025 to provide a written undertaking
confirming that they would comply.

[25] Mr Tothill replied to this request, stating that the protest was peaceful and lawful
and conducted in accordance with his constitutional right to freedom of expression and
peaceful assembly. He denied threatening any person. He request ed an investigation
and answers regarding iStores' subcontracting policies and practices. He did not give
a written undertaking.

[26] To summarise: the applicant contracted with Teqture, who subcontracted to
Muneris, who in turn sub-subcontracted Mr Tothill. The applicant paid Teqture in full;
Teqture states it has paid Muneris in full. Mr Tothill asserts that Muneris has not paid
him, but Muneris's version is not before the Court. A letter from Mr Tothill's attorneys
in January 2025 suggests that a reconciliation was provided, but that he disputed
deductions. The reconciliation was not attached to any affidavit.
[27] On the evidence before this Court, the applicant has no contractual relationship
with Mr Tothill. Whether a moral or ethical obligation exists to ensure subcontractor

with Mr Tothill. Whether a moral or ethical obligation exists to ensure subcontractor
payment in its value chain is not a matter this Court can determine. The sole question

8
before the Court is whether, on the legal facts as presented, the relief sought is
competent.

[28] The applicants submit that Mr Tothill's campaign is calculated to apply
reputational pressure on them to intervene in a dispute involving a third party, despite
having no direct contractual obligation t o him. They contend that his actions are
deliberate and intended to compel their involvement.

[29] The applicant is also of the view that it made bona fide attempts to assist Mr
Tothill, which he rejected, and that he furthermore refused to provide documents to
assist the applicant to come to a bona fide resolution.

[30] The respondents disagree. They state that they are exercising their lawful rights
of freedom of expression, and that the actions of News Nexus City are protected in
terms of section 16(1)(a) of the Constitution (media freedom). They state that the
protest was peaceful and that it was an ordinary protest captured by bystanders on
cell phones.

[31] Mr Tothill remains unpaid, and even though there is no legal nexus between
iStore and Mr Tothill, they assert that iStore assert that iStore bears some
responsibility to ensure that subcontractors and sub-subcontractors are paid. Mr
Tothill's case is that the applicants benefit unfairly from his work while he remains
unpaid, and that he is homeless and his workers remain unpaid.

Procedural questions
[32] The respondents also raised procedural objections , stating that they had not
had sufficient time to respond, as they had only received the papers on Friday, 29 May
2025, instead of Thursday at noon . They objected to the truncated timeframes and
stated that it d oes not make s ense to launch the urgent application if the protest had
already taken place the previous week. No future protest has been confirmed or
announced; therefore, the claim of prospective harm is entirely speculative.

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[33] As the respondents had not provided a writ ten undertaking, the applicants
initiated this urgent application. The papers were served on the first respondent at
18:00 on Friday, 29 May 2025, but without a case number due to technical difficulties
with CourtOnline. A version with a case number was served on Monday afternoon, 2
June 2025. The matter was initially set down for hearing on Tuesday 3 June 2025, but
after representations from the respondents, I agreed to postpone the hearing to Friday
6 June 2025 morning via MicrosoftTeams.

[34] The respondents state that the matter is not genuinely urgent as contemplated
in Rule 6(12). This is because the protest occurred on 26 May 2025 and was peaceful.
There was no evidence of harm, violence or disruption to public order. They further
asserted that there was a delay in bringing this application, as the applicant had to act
before or immediately after 26 May 2025, but instead delayed in doing so .

[35] The respondents also objected to the manner in which the application was
brought. They submit that it did not comply with the Practice Directive, including the
"Thursday for Tuesday " rule. The unissued notice of motion was served on Friday,
after the roll had closed, and only an issued and filed version was served on Monday
afternoon. They submit that t his timing undermined the procedural safeguards that
ensure both parties have a fair opportunity to prepare.

Urgency

[36] However, this must be considered in light of Rule 6(12)(b), which provides:

"In every affidavit filed in support of any application under paragraph (a) of this subrule,
the applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances which it is averred render the
matter urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims that the applicant could not be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course." (my underlining)

[37] The notion of "substantial redress at a hearing in due course", as contemplated

[37] The notion of "substantial redress at a hearing in due course", as contemplated
in Rule 6(12)(b), requires that the remedy be not merely available, but also effective
and meaningful in the circumstances. The question of harm is not the pivotal question,

10
but an absence of substantial redress in due course. 1 This was set out in East Rock
Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd :2

"[6] The import thereof is that the procedure set out in rule 6(12) is not there for
taking. An applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render
the matter urgent. More importantly, the applicant must state the reasons why they
claim that they cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. The
question of whether a matter is sufficiently urgent to be enrolled and heard as an urgent
application is underpinned by the issue of the absence of substantial redress in an
application in due course. The rules allow the court to come to the assistance of a
litigant because if the latter were to wait for the normal course laid down by the rules it
will not obtain substantial redress.

[7] It is important to note that the rules require the absence of substantial redress. This
is not equivalent to the irreparable harm required for the granting of interim relief. It is
something less. He may still obtain redress in an application in due course but it may
not be substantial. Whether an applicant will not be able obtain substantial redress in
an application in due course will be determined by the facts of each case."

[38] In other words, the essence of the test for urgency lies in whether the applicant
can obtain substantial redress in due course. A matter is urgent if the applicant
demonstrates, through facts, that immediate judicial intervention is necessary, and that
waiting for a hearing in the ordinary course would render any later order ineffective or
meaningless in protecting the applicant's rights. When a court is satisfied that there
will be no substantial redress in due course, then and only then does the court enrol
the matter to consider the merits of the case.

[39] The primary question the court must ask is whether the applicant can obtain

[39] The primary question the court must ask is whether the applicant can obtain
substantial redress in due course. If the answer is no, the matter may be enrolled on
the urgent roll. Only once that threshold is crossed do secondary considerations arise.
These include whether the applicant unduly delayed launching the appli cation,
whether the procedural timeframes were unreasonably truncated, whether there was

1 V de Wit ‘The correct approach to determining urgency’ (2021) 21(2) Without Prejudice 13.
2 [2011] ZAGPJHC 196.

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non-compliance with the court’s practice directives, whether notice to affected parties
was adequate, and broader considerations of the administration of justice. While these
factors are relevant, they cannot displace the core requirement under Rule 6(12)(b).
Procedural imperfections should not bar urgent relief where warranted, unless they
show that the matter is not genuinely urgent or that the non-compliance is so severe
that it undermines the orderly administration of justice.
3
[40] During argument, Mr Mafu submitted that the application was premature and
that the issues could be addressed through less intrusive measures, such as
continued engagement between the parties, particularly now that all are legally
represented. He further submitted that, insofar as reputational harm is alleged, the
applicant retains the ability to rebut or clarify the contested statements in the public
domain.

[41] The central question is not merely whether alternative remedies exist in law,
but whether they would adequately mitigate or reverse the harm that the applicant
seeks to avoid. While engagement and public clarification may have value in specific
contexts, they are not legal remedies in the strict sense. In the present matter, and on
the facts before this Court, I am not convinced that such alternatives would constitute
substantial or effective redress.

[42] While alternative remedies, such as damages or a final interdict, may be
available, they are not effective in these circumstances. As the oft -used metaphor
goes, a plate once broken and glued may still resemble a plate, but it will never be
whole. The same is true of reputation. The applicant seeks protection against future
infringement, not redress for past harm. What is sought is not an interdict against lawful
protest, but against false claims regarding a legal obligation that does not exist. Should
the public campaign be based on misinformation, the applicant will not have
substantial redress in due course.

substantial redress in due course.

[43] I am satisfied that the applicant has made a case for a targeted campaign that
includes threats of protest action at both its business premises and, of particular
concern, the private residence of its CEO. The correspondence demonstrates an

3 V de Wit ‘The correct approach to determining urgency’ (2021) 21(2) Without Prejudice 14.

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intention on the part of the respondents to escalate the campaign until they achieve
the desired outcome. The volatility of the situation and the respondents' refusal to
provide an undertaking to cease and desist from spreading false information that is
detrimental to the applicant’s reputation justify the approach taken by the applicants
to the urgent court.

[44] Of particular concern is the ongoing publication of false claims about the
applicant’s contractual liability, disseminated on a platform that does not appear to
subscribe to any recognised journalistic standards or formal editorial accountability. If
these posts are not removed, the harm already suffered by the applicant will continue,
as the publication may indefinitely perpetuate reputational damage. In the absence of
a remedial order, the injury becomes ongoing, rather than confined to a single act of
defamation.

[45] In a world where it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between facts and
falsehoods, it is essential to uphold the obligation to ensure accurate reporting on
social media pages with large followings that present themselves as media outlets .
The dangers of such platforms are that, regardless of any engagement users may
have with the platform, they are not guaranteed accurate and fai r reporting, as they
would be if News Nexus adhered to the Press Code. Once such a narrative takes hold,
based on demonstrably false information, it can spread like wildfire. This situation
cannot be meaningfully remedied in due course by any ordinary legal means.

[46] That then leaves the court to consider the secondary factors and whether the
secondary factors preclude the court from enrolling the matter on the urgent roll. Luna
Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin
4 allows for three degrees of urgency ,
placing the issue of urgency on a spectrum. These degrees determine the level of
relaxation of court rules. The standard rule is that papers must be filed by noon on

relaxation of court rules. The standard rule is that papers must be filed by noon on
Thursday for a hearing on the following Tuesday at 10:00. In more urgent cases, but
not extreme urgent cases, there may be a deviation from filing on Thursday, but the
hearing is still set for the following Tuesday. In extreme urgent cases that require

4 1977(4) SA 135(W).

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immediate action, papers can be filed for a next -day or even same -day hearing. This
is also provided for in the Practice Manual.

[47] While I appreciate Mr Mafu's concern regarding the deviation from the standard
practice of filing before Thursday noon, it is not entirely accurate to say that a party
cannot file on any other date, as indicated above.

[48] The applicant did not provide detailed reasons for its inability to comply with the
Thursday-for-Tuesday filing convention. The facts show it was already evident by
Wednesday that the respondents would not furnish a written undertaking. The
founding papers were served on Friday afternoon, although they had not been issued.
This is common practice to alert the other side that an urgent application is imminent,
affording them extra time to respond while awaiting a case number.

[49] The respondents only secured legal representation on Monday. At the first
hearing on Tuesday, I stood the matter down to Friday, giving the respondents
maximum time to file their papers.
[50] I am satisfied that, in these circumstances, the deviation from the Thursday -
forTuesday timeline does not displace the applicant's entitlement to relief. The matter
is accordingly enrolled as an urgent matter.

Merits
[51] Before addressing the competing constituti onal rights involved in this matter, it
is essential to outline the legal requirements for the relief sought. The applicants are
requesting final interdictory relief. The well-established criteria for a final interdict are:
5
a. a clear right;
b. a continuing injury or an injury reasonably apprehended; and
c. the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.

[52] The applicants primarily rely on a clear right not to be defamed and not to be
coerced into acting on a legal dispute to which they are not a part y, asserting that the

5 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227.

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respondents' conduct infringes this right. The applicant contends that its right to
reputation is violated by the continued dissemination of false information and the threat
of coercive conduct. Whether the interdict should be granted must therefore be
assessed against these requirements, with due consideration given to the
constitutional rights involved.

[53] The constitutional rights involved are the applicants' right to dignity and
reputation (in terms of the common law specifically, bu t also section 10 of the
Constitution), as well as the respondents' right to freedom of expression (section 16)
and their right to peaceful assembly and protest (section 17). Depending on the
context, aspects of privacy (section 14) concerning the CEO's re sidence may also be
indirectly implicated.

[54] The applicant's right to reputation was not seriously contested. The key dispute
lies in whether injury has occurred or is reasonably apprehended.

[55] Section 16(1) of the Constitution provides explicit protection for freedom of
expression, which encompasses freedom of the press and other media, the freedom
to receive or impart information or ideas, freedom of artistic creativity, academic
freedom, and freedom of scientific research.

[56] A difficulty that arises in this case concerns the unclear nature of News Nexus
City. In his confirmatory affidavit, Mr Dinesh Haribhai, the Chief Executive Officer of
News Nexus City, neither describes the legal nor the editorial character of the platform,
nor does he clarify whether it subscribes to the Press Code of South Africa. Mr Tothill,
in his answering affidavit, refers to News Nexus as a "media outlet." The applicant, by
contrast, describes it in the founding affidavit as an "o nline content channel." The
applicant could not ascertain that they are subject to the press code.

[57] Such platforms often operate without formal editorial oversight or adherence to

[57] Such platforms often operate without formal editorial oversight or adherence to
recognised journalistic standards. They appear to inhabit a regulatory no-m an's-land,
primarily governed by the platform's terms and conditions, not subject to the same
institutional accountability mechanisms as traditional media. Yet, they assert
protections under media freedom without demonstrating the existence of institutional

15
safeguards. This distinction becomes crucial in assessing whether such platforms and
their contributors fall under section 16(1)(a) of the Constitution, the right to freedom of
the press and other media, or under section 16(1)(b), which guarantees freedom of
expression more generally. While everyone enjoys the latter, traditional media
institutions bear additional responsibilities and may benefit from a distinct level of
protection under the former.

[58] Because the second respondent, in their heads of argument, asserts that News
Nexus City is a media company and therefore enjoys the protections of section
16(1)(a) of the Constitution, which confers specific freedom upon the press and other
media, I will proceed on the assumption that this claim is made seriously. However, I
do not need to decide whether News Nexus City qualifies as a media entity, other than
to state that , while they brand themselves as a news platform, it remains unclear
whether it operates with journalistic accountability or editorial oversi ght that would
distinguish it from general public expression, or whether it relies on “citizen journalism”.
According to the link provided in the supplementary affidavit and practice note, the
content appears to be disseminated through TikTok and Facebook posts by
unaffiliated individuals. Their content is not curated through formal editorial processes,
but rather appears as ad hoc-created content distributed via social media platforms.

[59] Even accepting, for argument's sake, that News Nexus qualifies as “media”, the
conduct at issue in this matter falls outside the bounds of constitutionally protected
reporting. Section 16(1)(a) does not immunise reckless or false publication, nor does
it protect reporting intended to exert coercive pressure rather than to inform the public.
What follows, then, is an assessment of whether the relevant statements and conduct
meet the constitutional and common- law standards for lawful publication and
expression.

meet the constitutional and common- law standards for lawful publication and
expression.

[60] S ection 16 not only confers certain rights on the press but also obligations.
6
The content of this obligation has been laid out in various cases. For instance, in
Khumalo v Holomisa,
7 O'Regan stated that "[a]s primary agents of the dissemination

6 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) para 22.
7 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC).

16
of information and ideas, they have a constitutional duty to act with vigour, courage,
integrity and responsibility" (own emphasis). She continues by stating that this requires
the media to be scrupulous and reliable when performing their constitutional
obligations.

[61] Freedom of expression, like all other rights, is not an un limited right. Again, in
Khumalo v Holomisa
8 it was acknowledged that the right to free speech often
intersects with the law of defamation, where people and companies are entitled to
protect their reputation and good name. This requires that a balance be s truck
between the protection of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation and
good name on the other.

[62] The actio iniuriarum protects the personality rights of individuals and juristic
persons, including dignity, privacy, and reputation. In th e context of defamation, it is
the common -law mechanism for pursuing delictual damages or interdictory relief.
Defamatory statements include statements that are aimed at injuring the reputation of
a person (or entity) in its character, trade and business.
9

[63] One of the elements that must be proven in such an action is "unlawfulness".
For a statement to be lawful, it must be substantially true.
10 There are various defences
against unlawfulness, including fair comment and that the publication of the statement,
although false, was reasonable.

[64] The defence requires a factual basis. Commentary must be based on facts that
are either true or clearly stated as assumptions, clearly indicating that it is such, and
deducible from the facts on which it is based.
11


8 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC).
9 Dhlomo NO v Natal Newspapers (Pty.) Ltd 1989 1 SA 945 (A).
10 Lion-Cachet, F. N. (2020). An analysis of press regulation and the proposed Media Appeals
Tribunal in line with the constitutional imperative of a free and independent press (LLM
dissertation, North-West University) p 38.

dissertation, North-West University) p 38.
11 Brand Media Law in South Africa 65.

17
[65] When delving into the question of reasonableness of the fals e comment, the
court in National Media Ltd v Bogoshi ,12 (quoting Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520) states:

"Whether the making of a publication was reasonable must depend upon all the
circumstances of the case. But, as a general rule, a defendant's conduct in publishing
material giving rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable unless the
defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took
proper steps, so far as they were reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the
material and did not believe the imputation to be untrue. Furthermore, the defendant's
conduct will not be reasonable unless the defendant has sought a response from the
person defamed and published the response made (if any) except in cases where the
seeking or publication of a response was not practicable or it was unnecessary to give
the plaintiff an opportunity to respond.”

[66] The court later makes it clear that there can be no justification for publishing
untruths. The press does not have lower standards of care with regard to defamatory
matter published on their platforms. The press occupies a powerful po sition in our
society. The press does not enjoy a relaxed standard of care when publishing
potentially defamatory material. While mistakes may occur, the test is whether
reasonable steps were taken to verify accuracy and whether the publisher believed
the statement to be true at the time.

[67] This is not such a case. News Nexus knew, or ought reasonably to have known,
that the statements were false. Nonetheless, they chose to publish and retain them on
their platform. The continued availability of these statements prolongs the reputational
harm and is not justified by any of the recognised defences to defamation.

[68] I have already stated that the right that the applicants have to their good name

[68] I have already stated that the right that the applicants have to their good name
or reputation is not in dispute. The applicants have a right to prot ect it. The first
requirement for an interdict is thus met.


12 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).

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[69] As for the reasonable apprehension of harm, the following: Based on the
evidence before this Court, the statements complained of are prima facie defamatory
and lack substantiation. The statements suggest that the applicant does not fulfil its
contractual obligations towards small enterprises, which are then left on the streets.
These statements appear intended not to inform, but to damage the reputation of the
applicants and to coerce them into as sisting Mr Tothill in obtaining payment from a
third party with which the applicant has no contractual connection.

[70] The situation escalated swiftly. The respondents themselves described the
matter as potentially spiralling out of control. The correspondence reflects a pattern of
increasingly forceful demands, accompanied by public and reputational pressure, to
compel payment.

[71] Previous attempts to assist Mr Tothill were unsuccessful due to a lack of
documentation that he failed to provide. There is no guarantee that media engagement
will stop the campaign, and any media interaction is likely to only fuel the fire and
escalate the engagement in a binary manner.

[72] The applicant is not seeking to remedy the past harm of the already published
statements. While damages are backwards -looking, an interdict seeks to prevent
future conduct. The order is thus aimed at preventing similar future conduct, which
there is a reasonable cause to apprehend. The ongoing nature of posts left on social
media may also be interdicted, as it is ongoing in nature .
13 As shown above, the
defences raised by the respondents are not valid in this instance.

[73] This leaves the applicants with the only remedy available: an interdict. The
applicant cannot be compelled to wait for the harm to continue and escalate, only to
vindicate their rights through a damages claim. 14


13 Hartland Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v APC Marketing (Pty) Ltd [2023] ZAWCHC 150 para 98.

13 Hartland Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v APC Marketing (Pty) Ltd [2023] ZAWCHC 150 para 98.
14 Heilbron v Blignault 1931 WLD 167 at 169, EFF and Others v Manuel 2021 (3) SA 425
(SCA) at para [111].

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[74] That being said, the court cannot interdict lawful, peaceful protests. Any lawful
concerns that parties may have, based on evidenc e, cannot be suppressed, and the
right to protest based on demonstrable facts and lawful conduct will always remain
protected. What is, however, not protected is the spreading of falsehoods and the
attempt to intimidate and harass the applicant's staff into resolving Mr Tothill's
business issues with a third party, Muneris.

[75] I am mindful of the need not to stifle legitimate criticism or public debate. The
relief will therefore be narrowly tailored, focusing only on the specific false statements
identified in the founding papers. This guarantees that the order is proportionate and
does not inhibit broader expression.

Conclusion
[76] The American legal scholar Stanley Fish famously argued that "there is no such
thing as free speech, and it is a good thing." Prop erly understood, this is not a denial
of the constitutional right to freedom of expression, but rather a reminder that all
speech is subject to legal, institutional, and ethical boundaries. Our Constitution
protects free expression, but not expressions that are false, coercive, or abusive of the
rights of others. The law recognises that speech may be limited to protect other rights,
including dignity, privacy, and reputation. The order granted here carefully balances
those rights without silencing legitimat e criticism.

Order
[77] Accordingly, the following order is made:

1. T he applicant's non-compliance with the forms, time periods and service
requirements provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court is condoned, and the
matter be heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. The respondents are interdicted and restrained from:
2.1. making, publishing or from disseminating false statements that the
applicant is in any way indebted to first respondent;
2.2. harassing, threatening or intimidating the applicant's employees or staff;

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2.3. obstructing or harassing access to the applicant's retail stores by members
of the applicant's staff or members of the public; and
2.4. in any way attempting to induce or coerce the applicant to make any
payment to the first respondent.
3. The respondents, are ordered to, jointly and severally, within 24 hours of
service of this order, remove from all social -media platforms and websites
under their control any video, post or statement alleging that the applicant is
indebted to the first respondent or has failed to pay contractors.
4. The costs of this application are to be paid by the respondents, jointly and
severally, the one paying the others to be absolved, taxed on scale B.


_ ____________
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg


Date of hearing:

6 June 2025
Date of judgment:

9 June 2025
For the applicant:

J Peter SC instructed by David Shapiro &
Associates

For the respondent: P Mafu instructed by Ntozake Attorneys