IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

CASE NO: CC 12/2023

In the matter between:

THE STATE

and

ELDRIDGE AFRICA Accused no 1

DURANTH PRINCE Accused no 2

Coram: Justice J Cloete


JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE DELIVERED ON 21 AUGUST 2025


CLOETE J:

[1] Sentencing is one of the most difficult tasks faced by a court given the
consequences to the accused, which have to be balanced against the nature of their
crimes, the impact thereof on their victim and loved ones, and the interests of society
as a whole.

[2] This involves weighing up each accused’s personal circumstances, the
seriousness of the offences, and the interests of civil society. In so doing, the court is
duty bound not to over -emphasise one factor at the expense of the others, and
should also be mi ndful of the need, if reasonably possible, to blend the sentence to
be imposed with mercy. Accused no 1 (Mr Eldridge Africa) has been convicted on
one count of murder of a 28 year old woman by common purpose. Accused no 1 has
also, together with accused no 2 (Mr Duranth Prince), been convicted on one count
of attempting to defeat or obstruct the administration of justice by transporting the
body of the deceased to an open field, dumping it there, and returning the following
day to set it alight, when they were spotted and fled the scene.

[3] As far as accused no 1 is concerned, this court is obliged to impose what is
commonly referred to as the prescribed minimum sentence for count 1 , unless
satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which j ustify the
imposition of a lesser sentence, in terms of s 51(1) read with Part 1 of Schedule 2
and s 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act ( ‘ CLA’).1 This count attracts a
prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonmen t. In respect of count 2 of whi ch
both accused no 1 and accus ed no 2 have been convicted, there is no prescribed
minimum sentence and this court’s common law sentencing discretion applies.

[4] Accused no 1 did not testify in mitigation or call any witnesses, but Mr
Williams addressed the c ourt ex parte on his behalf. Accused no 1 is currently 39
years old and having been born on 1 October 1985, committed the current offences
when he was 32 years of age. He is unmarried but is the father of an 11 year old son
with special needs who even at the time of the offences did not reside with him . Ms
Merwida Prince, formerly accused no 3 who was acquitted on both counts, is the

Merwida Prince, formerly accused no 3 who was acquitted on both counts, is the
child’s mother, and based on her evidence during the trial she is actively involved in
his care and upbringing , even though he resides in a special needs facility in
Grabouw. There is no indication that accused no 1 ever contrib uted to his child’s
financial or other support. Further, from what could be gleaned from the evidence at

1 No. 105 of 1997.

trial, accused no 1’s mother also vacated her own home to enable him to live there ,
and there is no indication that he had a deprived or difficult childhood.

[5] Mr Williams in his address also informed the court that accused no 1
completed his schooling in Grade 12. He applied for several jobs after he
matriculated and then completed a course in security and obtained his driver’s
licence. In a round 2006 he was employed by G4S Security for about 1 ½ years. It
was not disclosed how that employment came to an en d, but what is known is that
from March 2007 onwards he entered a life of crime. On 20 April 2007 (at the age of
23 years) , he was convicted of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, and
sentenced to 24 months correctional supervision plus six months imprisonment
suspended for four years. On 23 December 2008, he was convicted of possession of
drugs after having paid an admission of guilt fine of R300.

[6] On 25 February 2011 , he was convicted of one count of robbery and one
count of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm . These counts were taken
as one for purposes of sentence and he was sentenced to four years imprisonment
wholly suspended for five years, and declared unfit to possess a firearm . On 22
August 2011, he was convicted of theft and received a fine of R1500 or three months
imprisonment wholly suspended for three years. On 25 October 2011, he was
convicted of theft , and sentenced to committal in a rehabilitation centre plus two
years imprisonment wholly suspended for five years on certain conditions. On 1
December 2012, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment
in terms of s 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2. On 11 November 2014 , he
was convicted of trespassing, and sentenced to 12 months direct imprisonment . On
24 February 2015, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to 30 months direct
imprisonment. According to accused no 1, he was released on parole on 30 August

imprisonment. According to accused no 1, he was released on parole on 30 August
2017, only nine months before the current offences were committed.

[7] Having regard to his nine previous convictions over a period of eight years,
and the sentences that were imposed, it is fair to say that accused no 1 was given
every opportunity to turn his life around and get past his drug addiction. He did not

2 No 51 of 1977

take a single one of those opportunities , but instead escalated to also dealing in
drugs and participating in the brutal and callous murder of the deceased and the
unsuccessful attempt to conceal her body thereafter. One cannot imagine the
emotional pain to which he has subjected his mother for years as a result of his own
choices, something of which he seems to be completely oblivious. One would also
have thought that, since he is the father of a special needs child, he would ha ve had
an added incentive to become a responsible parent and functioning member of
society. Again, this does not appear to concern him in the slightest.

[8] The statist ics released by the South African Police Service in respect of
femicide and other gender based violence for the period January to March 2025
alone – and these are only the cases that are reported to it – reflect the murders of
969 women, over 11 000 rapes, and nearly 15 000 assaults.3 In S v Robertson4 the
court, dealing with femicide, stated as follows:

‘[33] Perhaps the most appropriate expression of femicide , as gleaned from
the authors5, can be summarised as follows . Femicide is the manifestation of
a man’s need to communicate his superiority and dominance over women and
such acts are typically rooted in sexism, sadistic pleasure, superiority, a sense
of ownership and a flagrant disrespect for women as a group…’

[9] For all the reasons contained in my judgment on conviction on this score - and
which are not necessary to repeat - I agree with the submission of Mr Uys that
accused no 1 is the proverbial ‘poster boy’ fitting the description in Robertson. Much
is said in this country about our constitutional rights, and correctly so, but not enough
seems to be said about our concomitant individual and collective responsibility to
move towards a society that is in harmony with the very purpose that our hard fought
for Constitution is designed to achieve. In saying this I fully acknowledge pover ty,

for Constitution is designed to achieve. In saying this I fully acknowledge pover ty,
deprivation and other social evils, many of which are attributable to the ravages of
the apartheid system. However, hundreds of thousands of people who suffered at its
hands have nonetheless been able to overcome these very serious obstacles.

3 As reported in The Citizen on 29 June 2025
4 2023 (2) SACR 156 (WCC)
5 Referred to at paras 32-33 thereof

[10] Very l ittle was placed before the court about the deceased , not for lack of
trying to find information on the part of Mr Uys. All this court knows is that she was
28 years old at the time of her murder and th at she had a child. That does not mean
that she was worthless and deserving of the treatment meted out to her b y accused
no 1 and his accomplice DK. I believe it fair to say that , on the proven facts,
accused no 1 and DK snuffed out her life without a second thought, although
accused no 1 played a lesser ro le than DK in her murder. The deceased must have
suffered a terrifying death and her body was treated as garbage.

[11] As stated in my judgment on conviction, I was able to observe both accused
over the 14 day period during which evidence was adduced in thi s trial. I do not
intend to repeat my findings on accused no 1’s demeanour, but it is necessary to add
the following. Not once throu ghout that entire period, and indeed even during
argument and address on sentence , did I detect a glimmer of compassion in
accused no 1 for the deceased, nor any insight into her suffering. Accused no 1
appears to be completely lacking in remorse. He also appears to believe himself
entitled to do as he pleases irrespective of the rights of, and consequences to,
others.

[12] However, I must also take into account the following factors as submitted by
Mr Williams. Irrespective of the life choices made by accused no 1, the fact of the
matter is that the murder of the deceased occurred when ac cused no 1 was highly
intoxicated on drugs . He has been incarcerated as an awaiting trial prisoner for just
over 7 years , and it is common knowledge that conditions of such prisoners are
unhealthy and overcrowded , to put it mildly. I do not have sufficient information
before me as to the reason(s) for this extraordinarily long period other than what I
alluded to in my judgment on conviction (namely the choice seemingly made by the

alluded to in my judgment on conviction (namely the choice seemingly made by the
National Prosecuting Authority to transfer this case to the High Court with the
attendant lengthy delays instead of finalising it in the Regional Court ) and that the
Covid-19 pandemic intervened in March 2020. The failed s 105A6 proceedings only
resulted in a relatively minor delay shortly before the trial eventually commenced

6 In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act

before me. I must also take into account my finding that his active association in the
murder of the deceased was not premeditated.

[13] Deterrence is extremely important in our increasingly violent society.
Although due weight must be given to the personal circumstances of accused no 1,
due weight must also be given to the gravity of the offences, the prevalence and
wide-spread occurrence of violent crime (including femicide) in this country, and the
demands and expectations of right minded and law -abiding members of society who
live by our constitutional values and who look to the courts for protection.

[14] This is appropriate, as appears from the view expressed by Harms JA in S v
Mhlakaza and Another7 that:

‘Given the current levels of violence and serious crimes in this country, it
seems proper that, in sentencing especially such crimes, the emphasis should
be on retribution and deterrence.’

[15] This was quoted with approval by Nugent JA in S v Swart 8 where he
commented as follows:

‘Serious crimes will usually require that retribution and deterrence should
come to the fore and that the rehabilitation of the offender will consequently
play a relatively smaller role…
I have pointed out that in the case of serious crimes society’s sense of
outrage and the deterrence of the offender and other potential offenders
deserve considerable weight…’

[16] When deciding the question whether “substantial and compelling
circumstances” are present, S v Malgas9 remains the leading authority. The following
principles may be distilled from that judgment. 10 First, the specified prescribed
minimum sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons, and

7 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA) at 519d.
8 2004 (2) SACR 370 (SCA) at paras [12] and [14].
9 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA).
10 Esp. at paras [22] to [25].

speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sympathy and the like are
to be excluded. Second, although the legislature ordained that such sentences are to
be regarded as ‘ordinarily appropriate’ in the absence of weighty justification to the
contrary when crimes of the kind specified are committed, an individualised response
to sentencing a particular offender has not been dispense d with by the CLA.
Accordingly, if a court is sati sfied for objectively convincing reasons that the
circumstances of a particular case render the prescribed minimum sentence unjust,
that is, disproportionate to the crime, the offender and the legitimate n eeds of
society, it is entitled to characterise them as substantial and compelling.

[17] In S v Dodo 11 the Constitutional Court approved the approach set out in
Malgas as ‘undoubtedly correct’ . It confirmed that s 51(1) of the CLA does not
require a court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment when it would be
inconsistent with an offender’s right guaranteed by s 12(1)(e) of the Constitution, that
is, not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. It went on to
say:

‘The test in Malgas must be employed in order to determine when section
51(3) can legitimately be invoked by a sentencing court to pass a lesser
sentence than that prescribed by section 51(1) or (2). The test of gross
disproportionality, on the other hand, must be applied i n order to determine
whether a sentence mandated by law is inconsistent with the offender’s
section 12(1)(e) right…’

[18] What must also be factored in is what was held in S v Vilakazi12, namely that:

‘…In cases of serious crime the personal circumstances of th e offender, by
themselves, will necessarily recede into the background. Once it becomes
clear that the crime is deserving of a substantial period of imprisonment the
questions whether the accused is married or single, whether he has two
children or three, whether or not he is in employment, are in themselves

children or three, whether or not he is in employment, are in themselves
largely immaterial to what that period should be, and those seem to me to be

11 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC) at para [40].
12 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) at para [58].

the kind of “flimsy” grounds that Malgas said should be avoided. But they are
nonetheless relevant in another respect. A material consideration is whether
the accused can be expected to offend again…’’

[19] It is also appropriate to refer to the wise injunction of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in a decision handed down almost 1 5 years ago on 30 September 2010 in S
v Matyityi:13

‘Despite certain limited successes there has been no real let -up in the crime
pandemic that engulfs our country. The situation continues to be alarming. It
follows that, to borrow from Malgas, it still is “no longer business as usual”.
And yet one notices all too frequently a willingness on the part of sentencing
courts to deviate from the minimum sentences prescribed by the legislature
for the flimsiest of reasons – reasons, as here, that do not survive scrutiny.
As Malgas makes plain courts have a duty, despite any personal doubts about
the efficacy of the policy or personal aversion to it, to implement those
sentences. Our courts derive their power from the Constitution and like other
arms of state owe their fealty to it. Our constitutional order can hardly survive
if courts fail to properly patrol the boundaries of their own power by showing
due deference to the legitimate domains of power of the other arms of state.
Here Parliament has spoken. It has ordained minimum sentences for certain
specified offences. Courts are obliged to impose those sentences unless
there are truly convincing reasons for departing from them. Courts are not free
to subvert the will of the legislature by resort to vague, ill -defined concepts
such as “relative youthfulness” or other equally vague and ill -founded
hypotheses that appear to fit the particular sentencing officer’s personal
notion of fairness. Predictable outcomes, not outcomes based on the whim of
an individual judicial officer, is foundational to the rule of la w which lies at the
heart of our constitutional order.’

heart of our constitutional order.’

[20] Turning now to accused no 2. He also did not testify in mitigation or call any
witnesses, but Mr Brand addressed the court ex parte on his behalf. He is currently

13 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) at para [23].

32 years old, and since he was born on 2 November 1992, at the time of commission
of the offence for which he has been convicted he was 25 years old. He is not
married but is the father of 2 young sons, who live with their maternal grandparents.
His highest level of education is an NCV Level 3. At the time of the offence he was
gainfully employed at a motor dealership as a mechanic technician while undergoing
an apprenticeship. He also did part time repair work to vehicles for private customers
to earn extra income. He voluntarily contributed toward the financial support of his
children. As mentioned in my judgment on conviction, a few months prior to the
incident he sustained a head injury in an assault which went largely untreated, and
which also affected his memory recall. He contracted TB while incarcerated and is
still not receiving proper medical attention, despite the earlier efforts of this court, as
well as Mr Brand and Mr Uys.

[21] Accused no 2 has no previous convictions. A few days after the incident he
made a confession as to his invol vement in count 2. He has also been incarcerated
as an awaiting trial prisoner for just over 7 years. The same applies to him as to the
reasons for this lengthy period of pre-trial incarceration. I found i n my judgment on
conviction that he was intimidated and influenced to a degree by accused no 1. He
too was heavily intoxicated on drugs at the time of the deceased’s murder, but the
evidence established that this notwi thstanding, he tried in vain t o protect her from
DK, Ms Carelse and accused no 1. All of these factors taken cumulatively are
mitigating, and there is no indication that he has a propensity for violence or that
there is a high risk of him attempting to defeat the administration of justice again.

[22] Regarding the awaiting trial period of incarceration of accused no 1 , unlike in
Ludidi and Others v S14 where the High Court had found that the period the accused

Ludidi and Others v S14 where the High Court had found that the period the accused
had spent in custody awaiting trial (for 5 years and 8 months ) was largely as a result
of their own making as well as that of their legal representatives , which caused the
Supreme Court of Appeal to reject it as a substantial and compelling circumstance in
terms of the proportionality enquiry , there is no such evidence in the matter before
me. Further, although an appropriate sentence on count 2 for both accused does
not involve an enquiry into the existence of substantial and compelling

14 2025 (1) SACR 225 (SCA)

circumstances, the in ordinately long period of awaiting trial incarceration must be
taken into account in the exercise of this court’s common law discretion.

[23] I have had regard to various decisions of our courts in relation to sentences
imposed for convictions on count 2 (ie. attempting to defeat or obstruct the
administration of justice). All are of course fact specific, but I refer to them for
purposes of guidance as to what would be an appropriate sentence on c ount 2 for
both accused no 1 and accused no 2. In some of them, given the sentences
imposed on other counts, the relevant sentences were ordered to run concurrently. I
will not deal with that part for purposes of the exercise. In S v Mene 15 the two
appellants in question, both police officers, had intentionally damaged a vehicle used
in the commission of a crime and then made a false report . On appeal the court
imposed on each of them a sentence of three years imprisonment of which two years
were suspended for five years on condition that they were not again found guilty o f
such an offence. In Botha v S16, although not clear from the judgment as to what the
circumstances were other than that the counts in general related to child exploitation,
the appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment wholly suspended for five
years on the same condition as in Mene.

[24] In S v Smeddle and Another 17 where the accused had approached a state
witness to attempt to persuade him not to identify them on th e same day they were
released on bail, this court imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment on each
accused. In Oosthuizen and Another v The State 18 where one of the appellants had
set alight a coffin used in a brutal assault on the vi ctim, he was sentenced to 12
months imprisonment. In S v Mshubi and Another 19 where the accused hid the
deceased’s body by burying it, they were each sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.
In S v A L20 where the accused had tried to prevent someone from taking his baby ,

In S v A L20 where the accused had tried to prevent someone from taking his baby ,
whom he had raped, to hospital in order to avoid detection, he was sentenced to 2
years imprisonment. In S v Kgwedi21 the accused was convicted on 2 counts of

15 1988
16 [2015] ZAFSHC 34 (26 February 2015)
17 Unreported decision in this Division, case no CC 38/2015 dated 15 August 2016
18 [2019] ZASCA 182 (2 December 2019)
19 [2022] ZAGPJHC 83 (8 February 2022)
20 [2024] ZAGPPHC 867 (10 May 2024)
21 [2024] ZAGPJHC 511 (14 May 2024)

defeating the ends of justice. On the first count, he had assisted in transporting the
body of one of the deceased to another part of town after it was wrapped in a blanket
and placed in a trolley bin . On the second count, i n respect of another deceased,
the accused followed instruc tions to bury the body in a hole and cover it with
furniture. The accused reported this last incident to the police a few days later. The
counts were taken as one for purposes of sentence, and he received imprisonment
of 10 yea rs, of which three years was suspended for five years on the usual
conditions. Lastly, in Bvuma v S 22 the appeal court confirmed a sentence of 12
months imprisonment where the appellant had told a witness that if the police
approached him, he was to deny any knowledge of the crime.

[25] Having carefully considered the applicable legal principles and the personal
circumstances of accused no 1, as well as all the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances in respect of the murder count, I have come to the conclusion that to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment would be inconsistent with his right
guaranteed by s 12 (1)(e) of the Constitution , and would thus offend against the
principle of proportionality . This allows me to categorise the period he has spent in
custody awaiting trial, and the fact that he was highly intoxicated on drugs when
committing t his offence, as substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence. That being said, there is no doubt
in my mind that he must nonetheless serve a lengthy period of imprisonment.

[26] As far as the count of attempting to defeat or obstruct the administration of
justice is concerned, in the exercise of my discretion I have concluded that was is set
out hereafter in respect of each accused is appropriate.

[27] Accused no 1 is sentenced as follows:

1. Count 1 – Murder with common purpose : TWENTY FOUR (24) years
imprisonment.

1. Count 1 – Murder with common purpose : TWENTY FOUR (24) years
imprisonment.
2. Count 2 - Attempting to defeat or obstruct the administration of justice:
THREE (3) years imprisonment.

22 [2025] ZALMPPHC 121 [20 June 2025]

3. It is further ordered that the sentences imposed on counts 1 and 2 shall
run concurrently in terms of section 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977.

Accused no 2 is sentenced as follows:
1. Count 2 - Attempting to defeat or obstruct the administration of justice:
THREE (3) years imprisonment , wholly suspended for FIVE (5) years on
condition that the accused is not convicted of the offence of defeating or
obstructing the administration of justice , or any attempt to do so,
committed during the period of suspension.
2. It is accordingly ordered that accused no 2 must be released from
custody immedia tely, subject to any internal discharge procedure that
may be required by the prison authorities to be completed, but which is to
occur by no later than 17h00 today, 21 August 2025.


__________________
J I CLOETE
Judge of the High Court


Appearances:

For The State: Adv Kepler Uys
For Accused No 1 Adv Mark WiIlliams
For Accused No 2 Mr Burger Brand (Legal Aid South Africa)