IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

Not Reportable
Case no: 13414/24

In the matters between:

The Rule 30 Application:

UPTOWN TRADING 803 (PTY) LTD t.a.
WATERLOO PLUMBING Applicant

and

ZININGI PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD Respondent

In re:

The Rule 30 Application:

ZININGI PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD Applicant

and

UPTOWN TRADING 803 (PTY) LTD t.a.
WATERLOO PLUMBING Respondent

In re:

Enforcement application:

UPTOWN TRADING 803 (PTY) LTD t.a.
WATERLOO PLUMBING Applicant

and

ZININGI PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD Respondent

Coram: JONKER AJ
Heard: 28 July 2025
Delivered: 7 August 2025


JUDGMENT


JONKER AJ:

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an opposed application to enforce an adjudication award issued in
November 2023 by a duly appointed adjudicator in terms of the Joint Building
Contracts Committee (JBCC) agreement. The parties had entered into the JBCC
agreement in re spect of construction services to be rendered by the a pplicant,
Waterloo, to the respondent, a property developer, Ziningi.

[2] It is common cause that the principal contractor, NMC (Pty) Ltd , was initially
appointed to execute the works, but was subsequently liquidated. Following that
liquidation, Waterloo entered into a separate agreement with Ziningi to complete

certain work s and confirmed by a let ter of appointment dated 23 August 2019.
Disputes arose between the parties . By agreement, Mr Theunis van Zyl was
appointed as adjudicator and both parties participated in the adjudicatio n process,
filing submissions.

[3] The adjudicator carried out his mandate and issued an award in favour of
Waterloo. On 14 March 2024, Ziningi , repr esented by indicated its intention to
request clarity on the award. The parties agreed to extend the time for filing this
request to 3 April 2024. On that date, Ziningi filed its request for clarity, indicating
that, if not upheld, the request would serve as a notice of dissatisfaction. The
adjudicator confirmed that no clarification would be provided. Ziningi considered the
matter to have been referred to arbitration, whereas Waterloo did not share this view.

[4] On 14 June 2024, Waterloo launched this enforcement application. Ziningi
opposed the application and contended that: (i) the adjudicator’s findings were in
dispute; and (ii) by virtue of the notice of dissatisfaction, the matter had been referred
to arbitration.

[5] After Waterloo filed its replyin g affidavit, Ziningi brought an application in
terms of Rule 30 to set that affidavit aside for non-compliance with the Uniform Rules
of Court. On 13 December 2024, Goliath AJP (as she then was) postponed the
matter to 15 May 2025 for hearing together with the enforcement application, issuing
a timetable for the filing of heads of argument.

[6] On 27 February 2025, Ziningi instituted review proceedings seeking to: (i)
review and set aside the adjudication award; (ii) declare that the disputes had been
referred to arbitration; and (iii) direct that the matter be resolved through arbitration.
In the alternative, Ziningi sought a declarator that the matter had been referred to
arbitration and that the enforcement application be stayed pending finalisation of the
arbitration. Waterloo opposed the review in March 2025. The adjudicator filed the

arbitration. Waterloo opposed the review in March 2025. The adjudicator filed the
record, and Ziningi filed an amended notice of motion on 28 March 2025.

[7] On 15 May 2025, before Francis J, an order was taken by agreement
postponing:

“The matters (being the application for the enforcement of the Adjudicator’s
determination, the Rule 30 application and the application for a
postponement, etc.) to 28 July 2025, with costs standing over.”

[8] On 13 June 2025, Ziningi set the review down for hearing on 28 July 2025 ,
although no answering affidavit had yet been filed.

[9] On 23 June 2025, Waterloo filed a Rule 30 notice objecting to the set down on
the basis that the matter was not ripe for hearing. Ziningi did not remove the cause of
complaint.

[10] Waterloo only filed its answering affidavit in the review on 3 July 2025, and
Ziningi replied on 17 July 2025. The practice note was filed on 18 July 2025 and
heads of argument on 21 July 2025. Waterloo had not filed heads of argument in the
review by the time of the present hearing.

[11] The matter was duly allocated the file in accordance with the plaintiff’s
practice note, notwithstanding the state of disarray in the file.

[12] It was common cause that the enforcement application and Ziningi’s Rule 30
application were before this Court. The Court was also required to deal with
Waterloo’s Rule 30 application regarding the set down of the review application and,
failing that, the review itself.

ZININGI’S RULE 30 APPLICATION

[13] Ziningi’s Rule 30 application is premised on the contention that Waterloo’s
replying affidavit failed to comply with Rule 18(5), which requires a “clear and
concise statement of the material facts relied upon” made with “sufficient particularity
to enable the opposite party to reply”.

[14] The essence of Zin ingi’s objection was that: (i) the affidavit was incorrectly
labelled an “answering affidavit”; and (ii) it did not comply with Rule 18. Specifically, it

failed to address the allegations in Ziningi’s answering affidavit succinctly, referred to
incorrect p aragraphs, and contained numerous errors. Ziningi submitted that the
document was so defective that the interests of justice and the standards of the
Court demanded that it be struck from the record.

[15] Ziningi argued that, should th is Court uphold its obje ction, its answering
affidavit would stand as the only version before this Court and should be accepted as
correct in terms of the well-established Plascon-Evans principle1.

[16] In the alternative, Ziningi contended that, even if Rule 18 did not apply, the
Court retained an inherent jurisdiction to regulate its process and to strike out
improper affidavits that might prejudice the opposing party.

[17] Ziningi maintained that Waterloo’ s answering affidavit in the Rule 30
application did not cure the defect. Waterloo had been invited to withdraw and
replace its affidavit but declined to do so. Ziningi submitted that the errors could not
be corrected simply by an answering affidavit in the Rule 30 proceedings.

[18] These submissions were modelled on arguments advanced in Hlophe. 2 The
Full Court in that matter found that Rule 18, which is framed for pleadings in action
proceedings, is not applicable to affidavits in motion proceedings. I agree with that
reasoning. Rule 18 cannot serve as a foundation for the present Rule 30 application.

[19] As the Full Court noted in Hlophe, a court’s inherent jurisdiction cannot be
exercised in a manner that contradicts the law. Its purpose is to fill procedural gaps
in order to avoid injustice, not to import rules designed for actions into motion
proceedings unnecessarily. In motion proceedings, affidavits serve the dual purpose
of placing evidence before the Court and defining the issues between the parties —
as emphasised in Swissborough3.


1 Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd. v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd. (53/84) [1984] ZASCA 51;

1 Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd. v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd. (53/84) [1984] ZASCA 51;
2 Hlophe v Freedom Under Law In re: Freedom Under Law v Hlophe; Moseneke and Others v Hlophe
In re: Hlophe v Judicial Services Commission and Others (2021/43482) [2021] ZAGPJHC 743; [2022]
1 All SA 721 (GJ); 2022 (2) SA 523 (GJ)
3 Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (2) SA
279 (T) at 323G–324C

“the scope to exercise inherent jurisdiction does not ext end to contradicting a
law. What inherent jurisdiction caters for is the elimination of a lacuna in order
to prevent an injustice. It is trite that a court must enjoy dominion over its own
procedure to achieve that outcome. It seems to me that the courts’ inherent
jurisdiction to separate an issue or to allow additional time to file opposition
did not require an application of either rule. That the exercise of that inherent
jurisdiction may have been inspired by an awareness of the rules is a distinct
matter. The notion therefore of an application to motion proceedings of rules
framed to deal with actions is misconceived and unnecessary to achieve the
objectives of orderly litigation or avoid an injustice.

It is trite law that in motion procee dings the affidavits serve not only to place
evidence before the court but also to define the issues between the parties. In
so doing the issues between the parties are identified. This is not only for the
benefit of the Court but also, and primarily, for the parties. The parties must
know the case that must be met and in respect of which they must adduce
evidence in the affidavits. In Hart v Pinetown Drive-Inn Cinema (Pty) Ltd 1972
(1) SA 464 (D) it was stated at 469C--E that 'where proceedings are brought
by way of application, the petition is not the equivalent of the dec laration in
proceedings by way of action. What might be sufficient in a declaration to foil
an exception, would not necessarily, in a petition, be sufficient to resist an
objection that a case has not been adequately made out. The petition takes
the place not only of the declaration but also of the essential evidence which
would be led at a trial and if there are absent from the petition such facts as
would be necessary for determination of the issue in the petitioner's favour, an
objection that it does not support the relief claimed is sound.

objection that it does not support the relief claimed is sound.

An applicant must accordingly raise the issues upon which it would seek to
rely in the founding affidavit. It must do so by defining the relevant issues and
by setting out the evidence upon which it relies to discharg e the onus of proof
resting on it in respect thereof.”

(my underlining)

[20] Although Waterloo’s replying affidavit may not have been perfectly drafted, the
respondent ultimately received clarification through Waterloo’s answering affidavit in
the Rule 30 application.

[21] These later affidavits, made under oath, remedied the earlier defects. There is
no legal basis to disregard them, and nothing in Rule 6 prevents a court from
considering affidavits filed in interlocutory proceedings when deciding the merits. As
Ziningi quite correctly point out, it has the benefit of the well -established Plascon-
Evans principle in that, in motion proceedings, a party is entitled to have disputes of
fact determined on the basis of the facts alleged by the respondent, together with
those facts admitted by the respondent, thereby providing a clear and predictable
method for resolving factual disputes without the need for oral evidence.
Furthermore, as highlighted in the quote from Hlophe: “a party must make out its
case in the founding affidavit.” The impact on Ziningi’s ability to prepare could not
have been substantial.

[22] The Rule 30 application must therefore be dismissed. However, Waterloo is to
bear the costs of the application, as the necessary clarity was only provided
belatedly.

WATERLOO’S RULE 30 APPLICATION

[23] In its interlocutory application, Waterloo seeks: (i) a declaration that Ziningi’s
review application was irregularly set down for hearing; (ii) an order striking the
review from the roll on 28 July 2025; (iii) costs on an attorney -and-client scale; and
(iv) a direction that the enforcement application, Ziningi ’s Rule 30 application, and
the reserved costs on the consolidation application proceed on the allocated hearing
date.

[24] Waterloo’s grounds are that: On 15 May 2025, Francis J did not postpone the
review application, as it was not before the Court; there was non -compliance with
Rule 53, preventing Waterloo from filing heads of argument; Ziningi failed to remove

Rule 53, preventing Waterloo from filing heads of argument; Ziningi failed to remove
the cause of Waterloo’s objection and impr operly insisted that the review was set
down; Ziningi had neither leave from the registrar nor the Court to enrol the matter;

and the improper inclusion of the review prejudices Waterloo by delaying
enforcement and impacting its financial stability, wherea s Ziningi would suffer no
prejudice from pursuing the review in the ordinary course.

[25] Ziningi contends that the use of “ etc.” in Francis J’s order of 15 May 2025
encompassed the review application. It argues that the review was properly enrolled
by virtue of that order and, alternatively, that its consolidation application would have
had the effect of enrolling both matters. Ziningi maintains that its notice of set down
was filed only out of caution.

[26] I am unable to agree with Ziningi’s submissions. As at 15 May 2025, the
review was not ripe for hearing: no answering affidavit had been filed and litis
contestatio had not been reached. At that stage, Ziningi’s proper course was to
compel Waterloo to file its answering affidavit, rather tha n unilaterally enrolling the
matter. Such conduct is at odds with the established practice of this division,
particularly Practice Direction 44(2), which mandates compliance with Practice Note
39 before a date may be secured from the registrar for the opposed motion roll.

[27] Ziningi’s unilateral enrolment of the review in June 2025, before pleadings had
closed and without compliance with the practice directions, is irregular. Allowing
parties to proceed in this manner would disrupt the orderly functioning of the Court.

[28] The review was therefore neither before Francis J nor properly enrolled for
hearing with the enforcement application. No consolidation order had been granted .
What is properly before this Court is the enforcement application. Waterloo’s Rule 30
application is accordingly granted, and the review application is struck from the roll
with costs.

THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY ZININGI

[29] In argument , Ziningi indicated that it seeks an order dismissing the
enforcement application, alternatively, that the Court r eview and set aside the

enforcement application, alternatively, that the Court r eview and set aside the
adjudicator’s award , alternatively, if the Court is of the view that the review is not

properly before it, that the matters be consolidated and then postponed for hearing
with the review application.

[30] Given my finding that the review application is struck from the roll, the review
is not before me for adjudication. The only matters then before me, for determination
is the consolidation and postponement of the enforcement application, failing which
the Court can adjudicate the e nforcement application, and if only granted, the stay
application must then be considered.

CONSOLIDATION AND POSTPONEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT
APPLICATION

[31] In the review, Ziningi seeks an order consolidating the enforcement
application with the review proceedings and postponing the former sine die to be
heard together with the latter. Ziningi relied on the unreported judgment of Opperman
J in Van den Berg 4, which summarises the law applicable to consolidation
applications. It contends that it would be convenient and in the interests of justice for
the matters to be consolidated and heard together.

[32] The enforcement application is a discrete proceeding, seeking to give effect to
an existing order that has not been suspended. Its determination does not depend
upon, nor is it contingent upon, the outcome of the review. The issues in the
enforcement application are narrow, procedural, and largely factual, whereas the
review involves an assessment of the legality and reasonableness of the impugned
award.

[33] The test for consolidation, as set out in Rule 11 of the Uniform Rules of Court 5
and the applicable case law, is whether the matters are so closely connected in fact
or law that it is convenient to dispose of them together. Convenience, in this context,

4 Van Den Berg N.O and Others v Suidwes Landbou (Pty) Ltd and Others; The Land and Agricultural
Development Bank of South Africa and Another v Van Den Berg and Ot hers; Suidwes Landbou (Pty)
Ltd v Steyn Attorneys and Others (1240/2020; 1955/2016; 765/2019) [2021] ZAFSHC 53 (10 March
2021)

2021)
5 Erasmus Superior Court Practice, Volume 2, at D1-133.

is a judicial convenience — not the convenience of one party — and must be
weighed against the potential for delay, prejudice, or procedural complexity.

[34] In City6, the SCA held as follows regarding the test to be applied in
consolidation applications:

“The [Rule 11] procedure is aimed at facilitating the convenience and
expeditious disposal of litigation. The word ‘convenient’ within the context of
the sub-rule conveys not only the notion of facility of ease or expedience, but
also the notion of appropriateness and fairness. It is not the convenience of
any one of the parties or of the court, but the convenience of all concerned
that must be taken into consideration.”

[35] Consolidation here would serve only to defer the enforcement of an existing
order pending the review, thereby frustrating the rights of the successful party in the
enforcement application. It would also unnecessarily prolong the resolution of a
matter capable of prompt determination on its own papers.

[36] A sine die postponement would have the practical effect of granting, by
procedural manoeuvre, a de facto stay of execution which I do deal with later in this
judgment.

[37] The interests of justi ce favour the prompt and separate determination of the
enforcement application. The two matters raise different legal issues, rely on different
evidentiary material, and stand at different procedural stages. To conflate them would
not advance efficiency; rather, it would import the delays inherent in the review into a
matter that is otherwise ripe for hearing.

[38] In these circumstances, the application for consolidation and the sine die
postponement is dismissed, with costs. I turn, then, to the merits of the enforcement
application.


6 City of Tshwane v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) at para 50

ENFORCEMENT OF THE ADJUDICATOR’S AWARD

[39] Waterloo argues that neither a pending review nor a referral to arbitration
suspends compliance with an adjudicator’s award. It is trite that adjudication awards
are binding and enforceable on the “pay now, argue later” principle, pending any
arbitration o r review.7 Ziningi concedes the general correctness of this proposition
but submits that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction, rendering his award
unenforceable. It relies on Framatome8 in support:

“It is trite that, if upon application for enforcement of an adjudication decision,
it is found that the adjudicator did not have the requisite jurisdiction, his
decision will not be binding or enforceable.”9

[40] Ziningi’s case is that the adjudication was conducted under a contract that did
not exis t. It contends that the adjudicator derived jurisdiction from a non -existent
contract and that the award is therefore invalid and unenforceable.

[41] Waterloo disputes this, arguing that none of Ziningi’s defences displaces the
general principle of enforceability.

[42] Ziningi’s main defence is that the wrong contract was placed before the
adjudicator — namely, the JBCC N/S Subcontract — whereas the letter of
appointment referred to the JBCC Minor Works Contract. It says the use of the
wrong agreement led to incorr ect findings on completion dates, snag lists, and other
contractual milestones, and that the entire adjudication was thus jurisdictionally
flawed.

[43] It further alleges that the claim before the adjudicator had prescribed, and that
Waterloo, by instituting separate High Court proceedings in August 2020 for payment
of R346 495.58, waived its right to adjudication. These factors, says Ziningi, meant
the adjudicator exceeded his jurisdiction.

7 Framatome v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2022 (2) SA 395 (SCA) at para 22.
8 Supra.
9 Supra Page 405, para 25,

[44] Ziningi maintains it has an “unassailable” case to set a side the award. That
may or may not be so, but that is a matter for the review court.

[45] Whilst it is so that Ziningi is of the view that the disputes were referred to
arbitration, that still does not relieve a party from the obligation to give prompt effect
to the adjudication award until the award is revised in arbitration.

THE LEGAL POSITION WITH REGARDS TO ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS

[46] Adjudication exists to ensure continuity of construction work and prevent
cash-flow disruption to contractors or subcontractors, thereby avoiding delays and
commercial harm.

[47] In Framatome, the Supreme Court of Appeal reaffirmed that adjudicators’
decisions are binding and enforceable unless and until set aside, and that the
process is intended to be a speedy, interim dispute-resolution mechanism. Mathopo
JA held:

“[23] If the interpretation contended for by Eskom is correct, it will substantially
undermine the effectiveness of the scheme of adjudication. It is plain that the
purpose of adjudication was to intr oduce a speedy mechanism for settling
disputes in construction contracts on a provisional interim basis and requiring
the decisions of adjudicators to be enforced pending the final determination of
disputes by arbitration. As far as the procedure is concer ned, adjudicators are
given a fairly free hand. They are required to act impartially and permitted to
take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law. Sight should not be lost
of the fact that adjudication is merely an intervening, provisional st age in the
dispute resolution process. Parties still have a right of recourse to litigation
and arbitration. Only a tribunal may revise an adjudicator’s decision. As that
decision has not been revised, it remains binding and enforceable…”

[48] The court consid ered Eskom’s contention that the adjudicator had exceeded
his jurisdiction and that the proper contractual procedure had not been observed. It

held that, even on this basis, Eskom was not entitled to disregard the adjudicator’s
award. The adjudicator had f ormulated the dispute with a clear understanding and
appreciation of what the parties had contemplated. It is well established that, where it
is found in enforcement proceedings that an adjudicator lacked the necessary
jurisdiction, such a decision will no t be binding or enforceable. As Mathopo JA
stated:

“A determination of whether or not Framatome’s quotation was valid under the
Contract, and whether the process for the deemed acceptance of that
quotation was correctly followed, entails an analysis of the facts. This is a
matter which the arbitrator will determine in due course. That said, it is evident
that the decision of the adjudicator is binding and enforceable.”

[49] Moreover in paragraph [29] the SCA held as follows:

’In the final analysis, the question to be asked is whether the adjudicator’s
determination is binding on the parties. The answer to that question turns on
whether the adjudicator confined himself to a determination of the issues that
were put before him by the parties. If he did so, then the parties are bound by
his determination, notwithstanding that he may have fallen into an error .…The
adjudicator formulated the dispute as it was referred to him. At no stage did
he depart from the real dispute between the parties. He decided the dispute in
accordance with that what the parties had contemplated and appreciated.”

[50] The SCA held that even if procedural or jurisdictional challenges are raised,
they must be pursued in arbitration or review — parties are not entitled to ignore an
award in the meantime.10

[51] Turning to the present matter, t he question is therefore whether the
adjudicator confined himself to determining the issues submitted by the parties. If he
did, his decision is binding, even if he erred.


10 Framatome, para 23.

[52] Here, both parties conducted the adjudication on the basis of the JBCC N/S
Subcontract Agreement, concluded in 2016, and the related subcontract data. The
adjudicator addressed the contractual identity issue and the contradictions in the
letter of appointment. The parties themselves conferred jurisdiction on the
adjudicator to act under that contract. Having participated fully on that basis, Ziningi
cannot now claim he acted outside his jurisdiction.

[53] As for prescription and waiver, these are merits-based defences that fall within
the adjudicator’s mandate to decide. Even if wrongly decided or overlooked, they do
not vitiate jurisdiction.

[54] It is not this Court’s task to review the award but rather to decide whether it is
binding, pending such review.

[55] Ziningi has chosen not to comply with the award and instead to resist
enforcement. Yet nothing prevents it from pursuing arbitration or review after
payment.

[56] Therefore, there is no merit in the opposition and the enforcement application
must be granted.

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF ORDER

[57] Ziningi seeks an order , in the event that the enforcement application is
granted, the execution be stayed pending the outcome of the review application.

[58] Rule 45A of the Uniform Rules empowers the Court to suspend execution
where justice so requires. The principles are well establis hed: (i) a stay will be
granted where real and substantial justice requires it, or injustice would otherwise
result; (ii) the test is akin to that for interim interdicts; (iii) the applicant must show a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm from e xecution; (iv) irreparable
harm generally exists where the causa for execution may later be removed.

[59] As stated in Stoffberg N.O.11, this rule is a restatement of the Courts' common
law discretionary power to regulate its own process . The guiding principle is that
execution will be suspended where real and substantial justice requires it.

[60] The Court’s discretion to order a stay is also grounded in its inherent
jurisdiction, as recognised in Van Rensburg NO12:

“[51] Apart from the provisions of Uniform rule 45A a court has inherent
jurisdiction, in appropriate circumstances, to order a stay of execution or to
suspend an order. It might, for example, stay a sale in execution or suspend
an ejectment order. Such di scretion must be exercised judicially. As a general
rule, a court will only do so where injustice will otherwise ensue.”

[61] Ziningi’s only claimed prejudice is the financial burden of compliance and a
risk of non-recovery if the award is overturned. However, it has provided no evidence
of Waterloo’s financial incapacity to refund the payment if required.

[62] If Ziningi wished to advance this argument seriously, it could have adduced
audited financial statements, expert affidavits, or other objective proof of Wa terloo’s
alleged inability to repay. Had it done so, it might well have indicated that irreparable
harm exists where the causa for execution — namely, the award — may be reviewed
and set aside. Without such evidence, the argument is speculative and insufficient to
justify a stay of the execution of the order.

CONCLUSION

[63] In summary, Ziningi’s attempt to strike out Waterloo’s replying affidavit under
Rule 30 fails, as Rule 18 has no application to affidavits in motion proceedings, and
any initial def iciencies were remedied in subsequent affidavits , with Waterloo to pay
the costs thereof.


11 Stoffberg N.O and Another v Capital Harvest (Pty) Ltd (2130/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 37
12 Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO (155/09); Naidoo NO v Van Rensburg NO (455/09) [2010] ZASCA
68

[64] Conversely, the Waterloo’s Rule 30 application succeeds, as Ziningi’s
unilateral set down of the review application before litis contestatio and in
contravention of the practice directives was irregular. The review was therefore not
properly before the Court and is struck from the roll , with Ziningi to pay the costs
thereof.

[65] The application for consolidation of the enforcement application with the
review application and a postponement thereof sine die, is refused, with Ziningi to
pay the costs thereof.

[66] On the merits of the enforcement application, the adjudicator’s award rema ins
binding and enforceable pending any competent review or arbitration, and Ziningi’s
jurisdictional and merits-based objections do not justify non-compliance.

[67] The request for a stay of execution is refused for want of evidentiary
foundation that real and substantial justice requires it, or injustice would otherwise
result. The overall outcome is that the enforcement application succeeds, Ziningi is
directed to comply with the adjudicator’s award, and must bear the costs of the
application.

COSTS

[68] Having regard to the complexity of the matter, the importance of the issues in
dispute, the volume of work undertaken by the legal representatives, and the nature
of the relief sought, it is appropriate that the costs , where awarded, shall be on the
High Court scale C.

ORDER

1. The respondent’s Rule 30 applica tion is dismissed, with applicant to pay the
costs occasioned thereby on the High Court scale C.
2. The applicant’s Rule 30 application is granted and the review application is
struck from the roll, with costs on the High Court scale C.

3. The application for consolidation of the enforcement application and the
review application together with a request for a postponement thereof sine
die, is dismissed, with respondent to pay the costs thereof , on the High Court
scale C.
4. The adjudicator’s award dated 11 March 2024 is made an order of court.
5. The respondent is directed to comply with the said award within 1 4 (fourteen)
days of the date of this order.
6. The respondent’s application to stay enforcement of the award is dismissed.
7. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application , on the High
Court scale C.


________________________
E JONKER
Acting Judge of the High Court


Appearances:

Applicant’s counsel: Adv P Tredoux

Respondent’s counsel: Adv J Tredoux