IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

JUDGMENT

Reportable/Not Reportable
Case no: 2025-118740

In the matter between:

UNITING REFORMED CHURCH IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA: CLAN WILLIAM CONGREGATION 1st APPLICANT

WILDEN HECTOR 2nd APPLICANT

and

UNITING REFORMED CHURCH IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA: CLAN WILLIAM PRESBYTERY 1st RESPONDENT

PEDRO ADEN OKTOBER 2nd RESPONDENT

KLAAS KEFFERS 3rd RESPONDENT

KYLE MENDOOR 4th RESPONDENT

NADINE HECTOR 5th RESPONDENT

UBENICIA SIEBRITZ 6th RESPONDENT

JACOB KLAASE 7th RESPONDENT

BILLY CLAASEN 8th RESPONDENT

Coram: Jonker AJ
Heard: 24 July 2025
Delivered: 28 July 2025

JUDGMENT

JONKER AJ:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an urgent application for interdictory relief to restrain the first to fourth
respondents from discussing or dealing with certain items on an agenda of a
meeting scheduled to take place on 29 July 2025 and to restrain the sixth
seventh and eighth respondent from dis seminating and sharing any
information concerning the litigation currently pending between second and
fifth applicant, and, in particular, seek to compel the eighth respondent to
remove all social media posts relating thereto and refrain from further publi c
commentary on the litigation.

2. The application was issued on 21 July 2025 and set down in the urgent court
for 24 July 2025. The notice of motion made provision for service
electronically on the respondents. The applicants sought condonation of this
method of service . In any event the Sheriff effected service on the fifth, sixth
and seventh respondent, late on the eve ning prior to the hearing. The eighth
respondent is the only respondent that opposed the application and appeared
in person.

3. Due to the repetitive and overly broad nature of certain relief initially sought by
the applicants, they abandoned the relief directed at the fifth respondent. A
draft order was handed up to the Court for the sole purpose of refining and
clearly listing the relief the applicants persisted with, as set out above, so that
the Court can consider the relief ultimately sought by the applicants.

THE PARTIES

4. The first applicant is the Clanwilliam Congregation of the United Reformed
Church in Southern Africa (“UR CSA”), a constituent congregation within the
denomination operating under a Church Order. The second applicant,
Reverend Wilden Hector, is a reverend within the first applicant’s
congregation. The first to fourth respondents are members and office bearers
within the URCSA Presbytery structure, also subject to the same Church
Order. The fifth respondent, Ms Nadine Hector, is the estranged spouse of the
second applicant. The sixth to eighth respondents are community members,
with the eighth respondent, Mr Bil ly Claasen, identifying himself as a local
activist.

URGENCY AND CONDONATION

5. Rule 6(12) confers courts with a wide discretion to decide whether or not an
application justifies enrolment on the urgent court roll based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Our courts have explained that the degree of
departure from the modes of service and timeframes in the Uniform Rules
must be commensurate with the particular urgency in each case.

6. An application is urgent when an applicant cannot obtain substantial redress
in due course. Without the urgent intervention of this Court, the applicants will
be unable to obtain substantial redress in respect of the further damage and
harm that will inevitably result from the anticipated conduct by the
respondents.

In Republikeinse Publikasies1 it was stated:

“In my view, in order to persuade the Court that the matter is urgent the
Applicant must in the founding affidavit set out sufficient facts to enable the
Court to decide whether urgent relief should be granted, in addition to making
averments on the urgency the Applicant must set out facts that would support
those averments. In dealing with this issue, the Court will, of course, consider
the substance of the affidavit and not the technical requirements. In other
words the Court will look at the totality of the evidence set out in the founding
affidavit and then from then deduct from a reasonable inference that those
facts support the case for urgency”.

7. The applicants submit that the circumstances set out by the applicants in their
founding affidavit justified this application being launched on an urgent
timeframe, and justified the degree of abridgement of prescribed time periods.
The applicants contend that the matter is urgent for the following reasons: (1)
An extraordinary meeting of the first respondent - at which certain matters
concerning the applicants are to be addressed - has been scheduled for 29
July 2025. Although the applicants sought clarification and undertakings from
the first respondent and its members, no response was forthcoming. This lack
of engagement prompted the launching of the urgent application. (2) The
eighth respondent is currently daily infringing the second applicant’s right to
privacy which harms his reputation and also contra venes Section 12 of the
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (the Act). The eighth respondent disputes the urgency,
alleging that the applicants have created their own urgency; However, he
does not clearly articulate the basis for this contention.

8. The matter is found to be urgent due to the imminency of the scheduled
meeting of the first respondent and the ongoing postings on social media by
the eighth respondent. Accordingly, condonation for non -compliance with the

the eighth respondent. Accordingly, condonation for non -compliance with the
Uniform Rules of Court is granted. Service by electronic means, together with
the sheriff’s return of service, is accepted as sufficient in the circumstances.

1 Republikeinse Publikasies (Edms) Bpk v Afrikaanse Pers Publikasies (Edms) Bpk 1972 (1) SA 773
(AD) at 782 A-G.

THE FACTS

9. The material facts are as follows: The second applicant and the fifth
respondent are married but are currently estranged and engaged in divorce
litigation characterised by allegations of domestic abuse. Criminal
proceedings and applications for protection orders have ensued. The legal
issues between the parties have prompted certain conduct by the
respondents, which is the subject matter that informs these proceedings.

10. A voice recording allegedly depicting a domestic dispute between the second
and fifth respondents in December 2024, forming the basis of allegations of
gender based violence by Reverend Hector against his wife, has found its
way into the public domain. The incident recorded led to v arious court
proceedings initiated and currently pending , namely divorce-, criminal -, and
protection order proceedings. The voice recording was distributed via
Whatsapp groups involving some of the respondents. A media publication,
Rapport, reported on the matter digitally on 13 July 2025. The story , as it
appeared in the online publication, was shared on social media and prompted
many commenters to voice their views.

11. The eighth respondent , a known c ommunity activist in the Clanwilliam area,
where the parties know each other, within the applicants congregation ,
published a statement on 26 June 2025 on Facebook, relating to the
allegations against the second applicant. The statement included reference to
the voice recording and a strong condemnation of the actions of the second
applicant. Mr Claasen denies that any confidential or privileged information
was disclosed, maintaining instead that the material was already publicly
available and that his cond uct was protected under section 16 of the
Constitution.

12. In the first applicant’s founding affidavit, it is stated that the Presb ytery ha d
prior to 12 May 2025 , suspended the applicants, but after receiving a
memorandum from counsel representing the applicants indicating the

unlawfulness of the suspension, withdrew the suspensions . The first
respondent, it is contended, accepted the advice so given on 13 May 2025,
and the applicants were notified as such by the third respondent. That was the
end of this suspension.

13. On 25 June 2025 a letter was sent to the second aby the URSA (legal
matters) suspending the second applicant due to misconduct as at 25 June
2025 and requesting the second applicant to plead to the allegations within 3
weeks thereof. The applicants responded by way of their attorneys dismissing
the suspension based on various grounds of non -compliance of the Church
Order. A demand of withdrawal of the letter and its contents were then made.

14. On 8 July 2025 a notice of an extraordinary meeting was issued for 29 July
2025, listing an agenda with five items: 1. Vakature op die bediening vir
regsake: aanvulling van vakatures (Vacancies) ; 2. Vakature van
Ringsquaestor (Vacancies); 3. Pos: Ringskriba (Post: Presbetery s cribe); 4 .
Konsulentskappe (Consulentships); 5. Sake rakende VGK Clanwilliam
(Matters concerning the first applicant). These items prompted the applicants
to address another letter of demand to the first respondents’ on 11 and 15 July
2025 respectively, requiring information regarding the items and undertakings
that the matters will be removed from the agenda insofar as it relates to
second applicant or matters concerning URCSA Clanwilliam. No response
was received by the applicants.

15. The applicants now approach this Court to interdict the first respondent and its
members to deal with these items and to stop sixth, seventh and eight
respondents to cease disseminating and sharing of information at all until
such time as the litigation (the divorce, protection and criminal proceedings)
between the second and fifth applicant are finalised and to order eight
respondent to remove all postings in social media platforms regarding the
litigation between the second applicant and fifth respondent.

litigation between the second applicant and fifth respondent.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS

16. The requirements for an interim interdict are well -established. A party seeking
such relief must satisfy the following requirements (i) a prima facie right; (ii) a
reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm; (iii) the balance of convenience
favours the granting of the interdict (iv) no other adequate remedy available. If
all these requirements are met, the Court shall grant the interim relief. These
principles have been consistently applied.

17. The applicant is required to establish a prima facie right. 2 This does not entail
proving the right conclusively; rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate its
existence with enough evidence to justify interim protection, even if some
doubt remains. In National Treasury 3, the court highlighted that the
constitutional context introduces an added dimension to this inquiry. Where
the asserted right is derived from the Constitution, it may be unnecessary to
question whether such a right exists at all.

18. The next requirement is that the applicant must establish a well -grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm .4 The harm feared must be of a nature that
cannot be adequately redressed by alternative remedies, such as monetary
compensation, and must be probable if the interdict is not granted. The test is
objective: it considers whether a reasonable person in the applicant’s position,
faced with the same circumstances, would reasonably apprehend the
likelihood of such harm. Furthermore, the harm must be sufficiently serious
that awaiting final relief would render the applicant’s position untenable.

19. The next consideration is the balance of convenience. 5 This entails weighing
the prejudice the applicant is likely to suffer if the interdict is refused against
the prejudice the respondent may incur if it is granted. The court must assess
which party stands to suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of
interim relief.


2 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd 2023 (4) SA 325 (CC)

2 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd 2023 (4) SA 325 (CC)
(“Vaal River Development Association”) at para 253.
3 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA
223 (CC) (‘National Treasury’) para 50.
4 Vaal River Development Association supra para 291.
5 Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC) para 48.

20. The final requirement is whether the applicant has an adequate alternative
remedy. As an interdict is an exceptional remedy, it should only be granted
where no other effective means of relief is available. 6 If an alternative remedy
exists that would sufficiently safeguard the applicant’s rights or interests, the
court ought to decline the interdict . Even where all the requirements for an
interim interdict are met, the court retains a discretion to grant or refuse the
relief. This discre tion must be exercised judicially, with due regard to all
relevant considerations, including the relative strength of the parties’ cases,
any undue delay in bringing the application, and the public interest. Crucially,
however, if any one of the four requi rements is not satisfied, the court lacks
the discretion to grant the interdict.

21. The conduct which the applicants seek to interdict is framed differently in
relation to the various respondents. Accordingly, the court will consider the
requirements for int erim relief separately in respect of the two distinct
categories of respondents.

PRIMA FACIE RIGHT:

22. In relation to the first to fourth respondents, the applicants contend that they
have a prima facie right to lawful treatment in accordance with the provisions
of the Church Order. This right, they argue, encompasses the Church
Council’s entitlement to be consulted on matters that affect the first applicant.

23. Every person has the right to be treated lawfully and in accordance with the
terms of any cont ract concluded between the parties. The court is satisfied
that the applicants meet this requirement.

24. In relation to the sixth, seventh, and eighth respondents, the second applicant
asserts a constitutionally protected right to privacy, which includes the right
not to have his personal affairs disseminated on social media. He further
submits that he is ent itled to the privacy protections afforded by section 12 of

6 Vaal River Development Association supra para 218.

the Act, which imposes a statutory restriction on the disclosure of information
pertaining to divorce proceedings. The second applicant also emphasises that
he has minor children whose rights to pr ivacy likewise warrant protection.
Section 12 states as follows:

“12. Limitation of publication of particulars of divorce action
1. (1) Except for making known or publishing the names of the parties to a
divorce action, or that a divorce action between the parties is pending in
a court of law, or the judgment or order of the court, no person shall
make known in public or publish for the information of the public or any
section of the public any particulars of a divorce action or any
information which comes to light in the course of such an action.
(2)…
(3)…
(4) Any person who in contravention of this section publishes any
particulars or information shall be guilty of an offence and liable on
conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand rand or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine
and such imprisonment.”

25. This Court finds that the second applicant has established a prima facie right
worthy of protection, which is further reinforced by the provisions of section 12
of the Act.

APPREHENSION OF HARM

26. In relation to the items the applicants seek to interdict from being tabled at the
meeting, they assert a real apprehension that their rights will again be
infringed, resulting in irreparable harm. Specifically, they point to the inclusion
of items 3, 4, and 5 on the agenda of the Presbytery meeting, which directly
concern the applicants and, in particular, the potential suspension and
removal of the second applicant as scribe of the Presbytery. The second
applicant contends that he stands to suffer irreparable harm should the first
respondent and its members be permitted to determine his fate. It is further

submitted that the balance of convenience favours the applicants and that
they will have no adequate remedy in due course should the meeting proceed
to deal with these matters adversely.

27. While it is accepted that the applicants have a right to be treated in
accordance with the Church Order, it remains unclear how, and on what
basis, the items liste d on the agenda would infringe those rights. This is
particularly so given the uncertainty as to what will actually be discussed or
resolved at the meeting. On the information currently before the court, the
nature of the alleged irreparable harm has not b een adequately
demonstrated. There is no reasonable apprehension that the second
applicant’s rights in respect of pending criminal or civil proceedings, or the
confidentiality associated with matrimonial matters, will be compromised. It
has not been shown, on the papers, what will specifically be addressed at the
meeting scheduled for 29 July 2025. While there may be a risk that the
Presbytery could act in a manner inconsistent with the Church Order, any
such conclusion at this stage would be purely speculative.

28. Furthermore, should any decisions be taken by the Presbytery, the applicants
will have recourse to approach a court to review and set aside any resolutions
that are found to have been unlawfully adopted. If such conduct is declared
unlawful or contr ary to the Church Order, the applicants will be entitled to
appropriate relief in due course. On the current state of the papers, there is
insufficient information to justify an interdict against the general items listed on
the agenda. Granting such relief would effectively render the second applicant
immune from any form of scrutiny or accountability within the congregations of
the first and second respondents. The applicants have not demonstrated a
reasonable apprehension of harm to support the relief sought.

29. The eighth respondent’s commentary on the divorce proceedings —

29. The eighth respondent’s commentary on the divorce proceedings —
particularly relating to the alleged domestic incident and associated ongoing
criminal matters —exceeds the limitations imposed by section 12 of the Act,
insofar as it involves the disclos ure of information pertaining to the divorce
proceedings. This conduct is unlawful. However, the statutory restriction

applies only to divorce proceedings and does not extend to pending criminal
matters. Although the criminal and protection order proceedings arise from the
marital relationship, section 12 does not prohibit commentary on those
matters.

30. Nonetheless, the eighth respondent’s social media posts infringe upon the
second applicant’s constitutional rights to privacy and dignity. These posts
imply that the second applicant is guilty of assault against the fifth respondent
and of gender -based violence, despite the fact that all related legal
proceedings are ongoing and no finding of guilt has been made. Such
commentary is likely to cause significant and irreversible harm to the second
applicant’s reputation, particularly in his capacity as a minister. The
infringement is not only immediate but also far -reaching: his reputation within
the congregation, his employment, personal relationships, and standi ng in the
broader community are all at risk.

31. The nature of social media further exacerbates this harm, as the amplification
of content ensures widespread and often permanent dissemination. Each
additional post, share, or interaction compounds the reputational damage and,
in effect, extends the violation of the second applicant’s rights —even beyond
the scope of section 12

BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE:

32. The eighth respondent, in turn, asserts his right to freedom of expression. He
maintains that he is an advocate against gender-based violence, a grave and
pervasive issue in South African society, and asserts that he stands in
solidarity with its victims. He contends that he should not be silenced in
expressing these views. However, while both the applicants and the eighth
respondent rely on constitutionally protected rights, none of these rights are
absolute. Where such rights come into conflict, they must be carefully
balanced.

33. In this instance, the second applicant faces potentially irreversible personal
and professional harm, whereas the eighth respondent’s right to freedom of
expression may still be meaningfully exercised by engaging in general
discourse on gender -based violence —without specifically identifying or
referencing the second applicant. The legiti mate public interest in confronting
gender-based violence does not extend to violating the statutory prohibition
contained in section 12 of the Act. That public interest is more appropriately
advanced through broader societal discussion, rather than throug h
commentary that targets individuals involved in pending legal proceedings.

34. Eighth respondent argues that the information was already in the public
domain, having been reported in the media. However, the statement he
published on social media predates the Rapport article concerning the
litigation. The fact that a voice recording may have been info rmally shared or
leaked does not justify its continued dissemination, nor does it entitle eighth
respondent to comment publicly on what he perceives to be the facts.
Moreover, such dissemination does not shield those responsible from legal
consequences. Section 12 of the Act imposes an immediate legal obligation to
cease publication of information relating to divorce proceedings. A statutory
violation of this nature cannot be retrospectively cured by any alternative
remedy.

35. The second applicant’s claim to privacy meets all four requirements for the
granting of interim interdict relief against the eighth respondent. Section 12 of
the Divorce Act provides additional statutory support, reinforcing the existence
of a prima facie right and underscoring the irrep arable nature of the harm
suffered.

NO ALTERNATIVE REMEDY:

36. Adequate alternative remedies are available to the applicants in respect of the
relief sought against the first to fourth respondents. Any decision taken at the

relief sought against the first to fourth respondents. Any decision taken at the
Presbytery meeting may be challenged if it is found to be inconsistent with the
Church Order and the rights afforded to Reverend Hector. Accordingly, an

alternative remedy exists, and the applicants have not satisfied this
requirement. As a result, the relief sought against the first to fou rth
respondents cannot succeed.

37. The second applicant contends that no alternative remedy exists that could
adequately neutralise the harm currently being caused by the eighth
respondent, nor can any remedy retrospectively cure a statutory violation. A
claim for damages would not constitute an effective response to the ongoing
harm. This court agrees. Interim relief is the only means by which to prevent
the continuation of unlawful conduct and the ongoing infringement of the
second applicant’s rights.

CONCLUSION

38. The applicants have failed to satisfy the requirements for interim interdictory
relief in respect of the first, second, third, and fourth respondents.

39. The second applicant has satisfied the requirements for an interim interdict in
respect of the di ssemination and sharing of information concerning the
litigation between himself and the fifth respondent by the eighth respondent.

40. Accordingly, the eighth respondent is directed to remove all social media
posts, on all platforms, that relate to the liti gation between the second
applicant and the fifth respondent.

COSTS

41. The applicants were successful only in obtaining relief against the eighth
respondent. In accordance with the general rule that costs follow the event,
and in the absence of any special circumstances justifying a departure from
this principle, the applicants are entitled to costs. Although they sought a
punitive costs order on an attorney-and-own-client basis in terms of scale C of
the High Court tariff, no sufficient case was mad e out for such an order. The
court therefore awards costs on the ordinary scale C.

ORDER

42. Accordingly, the following order is granted:

(a) The applicants’ non -compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court is
condoned and the matter is heard as one of urgency;
(b) Service of the application via WhatsApp and email is condoned;
(c) The relief sought against the first, second, third and fourth
Respondents are dismissed;
(d) The relief sought against the sixth and seventh respondent is
dismissed;
(e) The eighth respondent is interdicted from disseminating, or
commenting on the litigation pending between the second applicant
and fifth respondent , including criminal, protection order, and divorce
proceedings, whether online, on social media, or through any other
medium;
(f) The eighth respo ndent is ordered to immediately remove all social
media posts and public commentary made by him relating to litigation
between second applicant and the fifth respondent, including Facebook
and other platforms;
(g) The eighth respondent is ordered to pay the co sts of the application on
the ordinary scale C.


___________________________
E JONKER
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT


APPEARANCES:

Counsel for the Applicants: Adv. Kilowan
Instructed by: P Mbabane attorneys

Eighth respondent: In person