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[1993] ZASCA 61
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Basson v Chilwan and Others (332/1991) [1993] ZASCA 61; 1993 (3) SA 742 (AD); [1993] 2 All SA 373 (A) (17 May 1993)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
In the matter
between:
WILLEM BASSON
APPELLANT
AND
FARIED CHILWAN
FIRST RESPONDENT
SEDICK CHILWAN
SECOND RESPONDENT
THABID CHILWAN
THIRD RESPONDENT
ARDIEL CHILWAN
FOURTH RESPONDENT
COACH-TECH CC
FIFTH RESPONDENT
Coram
: BOTHA, VAN HEERDEN, MILNE, EKSTEEN
et
NIENABER, JJ A
Heard
: 8 March 1993
Delivered
: 17 May 1993
J U D G M E N
T
EKSTEEN
, JA
:
This appeal concerns the enforceability
of a restraint of
trade clause in an agreement entered into between the appellant and the first
four respondents. The respondents
brought an application on notice of motion
before the Cape Provincial Division against the appellant to enforce this
clause. The
application succeeded and the present appeal is against that
order.
The appellant failed to file his power of attorney and lodge the record
of the proceedings before the Court a quo timeously, and was
also out of time in
providing security for the
.../ 2
2
respondents' costs of appeal. He was there-fore compelled to bring an
application for the condonation of his failure to comply with
the Rules of this
Court. The respondents oppose
the condonation solely on the basis that the appellant is unable to show
a prospect of succ-ess on the merits of the appeal. This
entails a consideration
of the merits and therefore of the appeal itself.
From the papers-filed it appears that the first four respondents ("the
Chilwans") were the owners of Chilwans' Bus Service "which
at the time operated
approximately 100 buses count-ry wide in South Africa". The appellant
.../ 3
3
("Basson".) was a man with a wealth of experience
in the design and construction of bus and coach bodies. From his answering
affidavit
it appears that he obtained a Technical Matriculation Certi-ficate at
the Technical High School at Oudtshoorn in 1958. He then became
an apprentice
plate metal worker at the factory of African Explosives at Somerset West. On
completion of his app-renticeship in 1961
he entered the employ of a company
called Busaf. They were bus body build- -ers in Port Elizabeth. He seems to have
remain-ed in
their employ for 18 years - at first in Port Elizabeth, then in
Germiston and ultimately in Letaba. He describes Busaf as one of
the
..../ 4
4
largest bus body builders in the country.. While stationed in Germiston
he trained per-sonnel in the construction of bus bodies with
a view to
establishing a bus body construction industry for Busaf in Letaba, and then he
work-ed for them in Letaba for seven years.
He does not say what prompted him to
terminate his employment with Busaf but in 1980 he and "some others" took over a
bus building
company in Randfontein. This venture was not a success, and so in
1982 he went to work for Muller Engin-eering - another bus construction
company
- in Pretoria. He progressed in their employ to the position of production
manager and designer
..../ 5
5
of buses, but in 1986, after a mere four years, he
left. He then went to work for the Sentraal-Suid Kooperasie in Swellendam as
their
workshop manager. This only lasted for a year. In 1987 he joined du Preez
Busdienste in Stellen-bosch where he designed and built
buses for them. While
thus employed, he says, the Chil-wans approached him and asked him to build a
bus for them. He did, and they
were apparently so satisfied with his work that
discussions were set in train with a view to Basson joining the Chilwans in
setting
up a bus construction firm which would build busses on a large scale. In
their replying affidavits the
.../6
6
Chilwans say they met Basson while he was work-ing for a firm called
Neurock Engineering in Paarl and that it was Neurock Engineering
that built a
bus for them. They also attach to their replying affidavits an affidavit by one
Joubert who alleges that during 1970
or 1971 Basson work-ed for a firm called
Gelding Investments in the Strand, and that thereafter he established a firm
called Basson's
Crafts in Mossel Bay where he built boats and made glass-fibre
canopies. These allegations, however, are not contained in the Chilwans'
founding affidavits but have been raised for the first time in their reply-ing
affidavits. Basson did not apply for leave
.../7
7
to file further answering affidavits as he could well have done. In fact,
in the circumstances of this case, where the Chilwans were
simply relying on
Basson's breach of his contractual undertaking for the relief they sought, and
where the onus was on Basson to
justify such breach, one might have expected
Basson to have applied for leave to file further replying affidavits, and such
relief
could hardly have been refused him (cf
Minister van Wet en-Qrde v
Matshoba
1990 (1) SA 280
(A) at 293 B-E). He did not, however, do so and I
am prepared, for the purposes of this judgment, to accept that the matter must
be decided on the three sets of
..../ 8
8
affidavits before us, and that the ordinary rules
of
procedure in such a case will apply. These
rules have been
crystallised in the well-known
dictum by Corbett JA in
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd
v Van Riebeeck Paints (pty)
Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634 H - 635 C where he held that -
"where in proceedings on notice of motion disputes of fact have arisen on
the affi-davits, a final order, whether it be an interdict
or some other form of
relief, may be granted if those facts averred in the applicant's affidavits
which have been admitted by the
respondent, together with the facts alleged by
the respondent, justify such an order. ... In certain instances the denial by
respondent
of a fact alleged by the applicant may not be such as to raise a
real, genuine, or
bona fide
dispute of fact. ... If in such a case the
respond-ent has not availed himself of his right to apply for the deponents
concerned
to be
../9
9
called for cross-examination under Rule 6
(5)(g) of the
Uniform Rules of Court ....
and the Court is satisfied as to the
inher-
ent credibility of the applicant's
factual
averment, it may proceed on the basis of
the
correctness thereof and include this
fact among those upon which it
determines
whether the applicant is entitled to
the
final relief which he seeks "
Applying these principles in the pre-sent matter I shall not have regard
to those allegations to which I have referred and which were
raised for the
first time in the replying affidavits. On Basson's own showing, however, it
appears that in the nine or ten years
imme-diately preceding the conclusion of
the agree-ment presently under consideration, and after he had left the employ
of Busaf,
he had
.../10
10
been associated with four different firms, one of which was not engaged
in bus construction at all.
The negotiations between Basson and the Chilwans aimed at the
establishment of a joint venture to construct buses on a large scale
would seem
to have commenced late in 1988 and to have been concluded early in 1989. From
the agreement itself it appears that du-ring
the negotiations it was
contemplated by the parties that the proposed business would be conducted as a
close corporation in which
the four Chilwans and Basson would have an equal
interest. This close corporation ("Coach-Tech")
.../ 11
11
which is the fifth respondent, was incorporated on 16 January 1989, so
the negotiations must have commenced before this date. The
agree-ment itself was
only concluded after that date. The Chilwans simply aver that it was concluded
"early in 1989" whereas Basson
says to the best of his recollection it was
signed in "about May 1989". Nothing, however, turns on the exact date. Each of
the parties
is referred to in the agreement by his first name - Basson being
referred to as "Willem".
The agreement provided i a that the interest of each member - i e the
four Chilwans and Basson - would be 20%, (clause 3.1) and
.../ 12
12
that each member would pay a nominal contribution
of R20 "to the corporation" (clause 3.3). Each of them was "hereby appointed and
employed by the Cor-poration" as an "Executive" of Coach-Tech (clause 4.1) with
equal rights "to participate in the carrying on of
the business of the
corporation" (clause 4.2.1) and "to manage the business of the corporation"
(clause 4.2.3). It also provided
in clause 4.5.3 that -
"4.5 Each Executive shall for the dura-
tion of each
Executive's employ-
ment -
4.5.3 exercise the utmost good faith to-wards the Corporation and use his
best endeavours to promote its in-terests both in carrying
out its duties
hereunder and also in all his dealings with the Corporation; in this regard he
shall not devote
..../ 13
13
any time or attention to any other concern or
business unless so au-thorised by resolution of Members;"
The restraint clause which gives rise to the cen-tral issue in this case
is Clause 11 which reads as follows:
"CONFIDENTIALITY AND RESTRAINT
11.1 Willem acknowledges that, it is in the interest of the protection
and maintenance of the Corporation's Trade Secrets (which for
the pur-pose
hereof means the Corporation's goodwill, technical and busi-ness know-how, trade
secrets, con-fidential information
and the Cor-poration's intellectual property
in general), to maintain confi-dentiality and therefore Willem undertakes to the
Corporation
that -
11.1.1 he shall not during or at any time
.../14
14
after his employment by the Corpo-ration, either himself utilise and/ or
directly or indirectly divulge and/or disclose to any third
party (except as may
be necessary in accordance with the nature of Wil-lem's employment as executive
with the Corporation ('employment'))any
of the Corporation's Trade
Secrets;
11.1.2 any trade secrets, including those acquired by the Corporation
from a third party or any documents or - records (including
written
in-structions, drawings, notes or memoranda) pertaining to the Trade Secrets of
the Corporation which are made by Willem
or which came into Willem's possession
during the period of Willem's employment with the Corporation, shall be deemed
to be the property
of the Corporation, and shall be surrendered to the
Corporation on demand, and in any event on the termination of Willem's
employment
with the Corporation and Willem will not retain any copies thereof or
extracts therefrom;
../15
15
11.1.3 he shall not, within a period of
5 years of the
Termination Date
(as hereinafter defined) and
within the
Territory (as herein-
after defined), directly or
in-
directly offer employment to or
cause to be employed
any person-
tion:
11.1.3.1
as at the
Termination Date;
or
11.1.3.2
at any time
within 2 years immediately preceding the Termination
Date;
11.1.4 he shall not directly or
indirectly
for a period of 5 years after the
Termination Date either solely or jointly:
11.1.4.1 be employed by;
or
11.1.4.2
carry
on or assist fi-nancially or otherwise be engaged or concerned or interested in;
or
11.1.4.3
act as consultant
or ad-viser to; or
11.1.4.4 act as agent or
repre-
.../16
16
sentative for;
any person or firm or body cor-porate or incorporate which with-in the
Territory carries on:
11.1.4.5 the business of manufactu-
ring and/or
refurbishing
and/or distribution of buses
albeit light,
medium or
heavy duty buses and/or
coaches of whatever
nature.
11.1.4.6 any business which is simi-
lar to or in
competition
with such business as the
Corporation may be
carrying
on at the Termination Date.
11.2 For the purposes of this clause 11:
11.2.1 'the
Termination Date' means the
date upon which-Willem ceases to be an employee of the Corporation for
whatsoever reason;
11.2.2 'the Territory' means the
following
areas as presently constituted, namely the Republic of South Africa,
South West Africa/Namibia, Ciskei, Venda, Transkei, Lesotho,
Swaziland and
Zimbabwe.
.../17
17
11.3
The restraints
imposed upon Willem in terms of this clause 11 shall be deemed in respect of
each part thereof to be separate and separa-tely
enforceable in the widest sense
from the other parts thereof and the invalidity or unenforce-ability of any
clause or part there-of
shall not in any way affect the validity or
enforceability of any other part of the clause or the
agreement.
11.4
Willem:
11.4.1
acknowledges
that he has carefully considered the provisions of this clause 11;
and
11.4.2
agrees that this
clause is, after taking all relevant circumstances into account, reasonable and
that if he should at any time dispute
the reasonableness of this clause, then
the onus of proving such un-reasonableness shall be upon
him.
11.5 The restraints imposed on
Willem
in terms of this clause 11 shall
../18
18
not preclude Willem from holding by way of
bona fide
investments
any shares, stocks, debentures, debenture stock or other securi-ties of any
companies which are quoted and dealt with
on any recog-nised Stock Exchange;
provided that such holding (which shall in-clude any interest in any such
holding), when added
to any hold-ings of any relative of Willem, does not exceed
5% of the total shares, stock, debentures, debenture stock or other securities
in issue of the class in question; provided always that nothing herein
con-tained shall permit Willem from directly or indirectly
being acti-vely
engaged or concerned or inter-ested in any way in the affairs or management of
any such public com-pany."
The parties - i e the Chilwans and
Basson - accepted that the
finance required to
../19
19
set up a factory for the construction of buses,
and for
conducting the business generally would
be provided by the Chilwans.
Basson had no financial responsibility towards the business -even his R20
contribution required by clause
3.3 was paid by the Chilwans. Basson was to be
the production manager responsible for the design and layout of the factory and
for
the design and construction of buses. The fourth respondent .("Ardiel
Chilwan") was appointed ad-ministrative manager.
Basson alleges in his answering affi-davit that despite his one-fifth
interest in Coach-Tech, he received no other benefit from
../20
20
it. He says that he worked for a salary of R2500 a month and that the
Chilwans treated him as a mere employee of the corporation.
This is denied by
the Chilwans in their replying affi-davit. They say that initially he received a
salary of R3000 a month which
was increased to R4000 a month from 1 June 1990.
In addition he received a motor car for his personal use. They also deny that he
was treated as a mere employee, and allege that in addition to attending all
management meetings Basson also played an active part
in the running of the
business. These allegations, as I have pointed out, were made in the Chilwans'
replying affi-
../21
21
davits, but they receive considerable support, in certain respects at any
rate, in other passa-ges of Basson's answering affidavit.
In deal-ing with his
resignation as "director" and his departure from the firm he refers to the
handing over of the keys of the "company
car" that he used, to Coach- Tech's
legal adviser Mark Gordon. One may therefore accept that the use of a motor car
also formed part
of his remuneration toge-ther with whatever salary he received.
Further-more, in dealing with the dispute which arose between himself
and the
Chilwans in September 1990 he alleges that one of Ardiel Chilwan's complaints
was that he (Basson) did not keep
../22
22
Ardiel Chilwan informed of his daily activities and the way in which he
assigned duties to his
workmen.
"Dit is korrek" he goes on "dat ek horn nie
hierin geken het nie. Die rede daarvoor is dat die produksie van die busse
was aan my oorgelaat, en in elk geval was hy voor September
1990 baie selde daar
om geraad-pleeg te word."
In another passage of his
answering affidavit Basson repeats that Ardiel Chilwan's complaint that Basson
did not inform him of his
daily acti-vities in the workshop and the way in which
he assigned duties to his workmen, was to a large extent true, but that it
was
impossible to refer to him because he was seldom there. These alle-
../23
23
gabions are hardly consistent with his earlier assertion that he was
treated as a mere employee. They rather tend to show that Basson
was given a
pretty free hand in running the business, and that he was very much the
production manager and a "director" of the firm,
not only in name but also in
deed. In these circumstances it seems to me that the apparent dispute of fact on
the papers is not a
real or genuine one, and that in the absence of any request
by Basson to file a further set of affidavits, or an application to call
Ardiel
Chilwan for cross-examination, the Chilwans' allegations in these respects may
also be accepted in determining the issue between
.../24
24
the parties.
The rift between the parties came in September
1990. The Chilwans complained of Basson using the firm's employees for "doing
private
work for his own account" more particu-larly for a Mr Johan Fourie, and
for not liasing with Ardiel Chilwan in concluding business
deals on behalf of
Coach-Tech. Basson apparently proffered no explanation for his conduct when
confronted with these complaints on
4 September 1990. He alleges that he was not
given a chance to explain. He does proffer an explanation in his answering
affidavit.
It is not necessary to consider the pros and cons of this
dispute
.../ 25
25
but suffice it to say that it led to Basson re-signing as a director of
Coach-Tech. He agreed, however, to remain on as production
manager un-til he had
completed two coaches which were under construction. He finally left
Coach-Tech's employ on 7 or 8 January
1991. Later that same month he commenced
working for a firm called Engineering Agencies, and when he visited the premises
of Coach-Tech
towards the end of Jan-uary 1991 he told Ardiel Chilwan that he
was working for Engineering Agencies as a supervisor. At that stage
Ardiel did
not consider Engineer-ing Agencies to be a competitor, as they were merely
suppliers of steel and tubing. Very
.../ 26
26
soon thereafter the Chilwans received further intelligence on this score
and when their legal adviser, Mark Gordon, phoned Mr Nick
Rust, a director of
Engineering Agencies, on 13 February Rust told him that Basson had been employed
by Engineering Agencies for
the specific purpose of building a super-luxury
coach. He assured Gordon, however, that this would not be in com-petition with
Coach-Tech
as the coach was intend-ed for the export market. In an answering
affidavit Rust concedes that this was not the truth; that his firm
was
conducting a feasibi-lity study for the building of luxury buses for tour
operators in South Africa, and that he
../27
27
considered Coach-Tech to be a possible competi-tor. That was why he did
not want to tell them what the true position was. Two days
later the same
information which Rust had conveyed to Gordon, was conveyed to Ardiel Chilwan by
one Wehmeyer, a sales manager of
Engineering Agen-cies, who had been sent by
Rust for that very purpose. Ardiel Chilwan immediately realised that this
proposed business
would be in direct competition with Coach-Tech and that Basson
was likely to play a significant role in its estab-lishment. A letter
of demand
dated 21 February 1991, was written to Basson by the Chilwan's attorneys in
which he was reminded of the terms
.../ 28
28
of his agreement with the Chilwans and referred
to his breach
of that agreement by undertaking
the construction of buses for
Engineering Agencies,
and which concluded as follows:
"7 In the circumstances our client demands that not later than 17h00 on
Friday 22 February 1991
-
7.1
you
deliver to our offices the ori-ginals or copies of any documents, records,
instructions, drawings or memoranda belonging to our
client or pertaining to its
trade secrets;
7.2
you resign
your present employment
immediately;
7.3
you furnish
our client with a written undertaking that you will
not:
7.3.1 breach any of the provisions of
the agreement set out above, and in particular, that you will not be
asso-ciated, whether directly
or indirectly, with Engin-eering Agencies or any
other
.../ 29
29
person, firm or body cor-porate which, within the Republic of South
Africa, carries on the business of manufacturing, refur-bishing
or distributing
busses or coaches of what-ever nature or with any business which is similar to
or in competition with, Coach Tech
CC's business, namely the manufacture and
refurbishment of passenger busses; 7.3.2 either directly or indirectly offer
employment
to any person who was employed by Coach Tech CC in January
.1991.
8 Should you fail or refuse to comply with the above timeously, our
client shall, without further notice, apply to Court for immediate
relief and a
costs order against you."
When no such undertaking was forthcoming the
.../ 30
30
present application followed.
In the application the Chilwan
brothers were cited as the first four applicants and the close corporation
Coach-Tech as the fifth
applicant. The restraint clause (clause 11 of the
agreement) however provides that the undertaking not to be associated with any
competitor of Coach-Tech was an undertaking given by Basson to Coach-Tech and it
might, at first blush, appear that only Coach-Tech
could enforce it. If however
one has regard to the whole agreement it would seem that it may well be seen as
an association agree-ment
as provided for in
section 44
of the
Close
Corporations Act No 69 of 1984
("the
Act").
>
.../ 31
31
On this view the agreement would therefore constitute a contract between
the corporation and the members, and between the members
themselves. They might
in effect therefore be seen as co-partners in the under-taking. In such
circumstances it would seem that any
member can hold the corpora-tion and the
other members to the terms of the agreement, and that any member can be held -to
the agreement
by the corporation or by any other member. ("Introduction to the
Close Corporations Act" by
H J Delport and J T Pretorius p 33.) In any event the
effect of the agreement we are considering was to
.../ 32
32
bind Basson not only to Coach-Tech but also to each of the Chilwans. The
four Chilwans and Coach-Tech were therefore properly cited
as applicants before
the Court a
quo
, and as respondents before us.
In his answering affidavit Basson alleges that he was then employed by
Neulux Coaches (Pty) Limited - apparently a subsid-iary of
Engineering Agencies
- and that he was designing super-luxury buses for them,-which were being
produced under his super-vision. These
buses, he contends, are more luxurious
than those he produced for
.../ 33
33
Coach-Tech and he seems to imply that for this reason Neulux would not
really be in competition with Coach- Tech. The buses he built
for Coach-Tech he
describes as "semi-luxury buses". The Chilwans deny this in their replying
affidavits and contend that they too
build and have built super-luxury buses
that are as luxurious as any. In his answering affidavit, however, Basson
attaches a brochure
issued by Coach-Tech in order to show how simple bus
construction really is. This brochure reflects that Coach-Tech undertakes to
build three types
../ 34
34
of buses viz a "utility bus", a "semi-luxury bus", and a "super luxury
bus" or coach. Photographs of the three types of buses and
of their interior
appointments are included in the brochure. Here again it seems to me that there
is no real or genuine dispute of
fact and that Neulux Coaches is in direct
competion with Coach-Tech. In fact, as I have indicated, Rust conceded as
much.
The restraint clause provided i a that Basson would not, after
termination of his association with Coach-Tech, "offer employment to
or cause to
be employed by any person who
..../ 35
35
was employed by the corporation". The Chilwans alleged that shortly after
Basson left Coach-Tech his brother Andries Basson, his son
Leon Basson, and an
auto-electrician called Hayman, all of whom had been employed by Coach-Tech,
left and went to work for Engineering
Agencies. This, it was suggested, was due
to the machinations of Basson. Basson denied any involvement, and the Court a
quo
found that it had not been shown that Basson could be held
responsible for these people leaving. This finding was not contested before
us
and need not be referred to any further.
So too, the Court a
quo
found that it
.../ 36
36
had not been shown that Basson took any documents away with him when he
left Coach-Tech and refused to make an order for the return
of documents. This
aspect need not, therefore, detain us any further.
The order made by the Court a
quo
reads as follows:
"IT IS ORDERED: 1 That the Respondent is interdicted and restrained
from:
1.1 Utilising and/or directly or indirectly divulging and/or disclosing
to any third party, and in particular ENGINEERING AGENCIES,
or NEULUX COACHES
(PTY) LTD, any of the Applicants' trade secrets in the form of designs of buses
built for Fifth Applicant, its
construction methods, the names of its customers
or clients with whom Respondent was in contact and its
.../ 37
37
cost and pricing structure;
1.2 For a period of five years from 7
January 1991 directly
or indirectly
offering employment to or causing to
be
employed, any person who was em
ployed by the Fifth Applicant as
at
7 January 1991 or at any time within two years immediately preceding the
said date;
1.3 Directly or indirectly, for a period
of five years after
7 January 1991
either solely or jointly:
(a)
being employed
by; or
(b)
carrying on or
assisting financially or otherwise be engaged or concerned or interested in;
or
(c)
acting as consultant
or adviser to; or
(d)
acting
as agent or representative for ENGINEERING AGENCIES, NEULUX COACHES (PTY) LTD or
any person or firm or body corporate which,
within the Republic of South Africa,
Namibia, Ciskei, Venda, Transkei, Lesotho, Swaziland or Zimbabwe, carries on the
business of
manufacturing or refurbishing
and/or
..../ 37(a)
37(a)
distributing buses, albeit light,
medium or heavy buses and/or coaches of whatever nature.
2 That the Respondent is forthwith to cease
employment or
association of any kind with
Engineering Agencies or Neulux Coaches
(Pty)
Ltd in respect of their bus building activities.
3 That the Respondent is to pay the Applicants'
costs,
including the costs of two counsel."
It was in essence the Chilwans'
case -and indeed this seems to be common cause - that they relied heavily on the
knowledge, experience,
and skill of Basson in the construction of buses and
coaches, in embarking on this venture. Relying on his good faith and continued
association with Coach-Tech, they were prepared to risk a very considerable
financial investment in the business. It is not contested
that between
the
.../ 38
38
four of them they invested more than R1 million in setting up Coach-Tech
and its business, and, in addition, accepted personal liability
for substantial
debts incurred by it. Despite the fact that Basson made no financial
contribution at all, he became in effect an
equal partner with the Chilwans by
virtue of the skill and experience which he was going to contribute to the
venture. Their case,
already made in much the same way in their founding
affidavit, is summed up in a passage in their replying affidavit. Although it
appears in the replying affidavit, it is, as I have indicated, to a large extent
common cause, or it is
../39
39
not contested by Basson - in fact he does not
join issue with the Chilwans in this respect.
In this passage
they say:
"1.5 It was recognised by all concerned from the outset that the new
business would be heavily dependent on Respondent's
expertise and that, should he leave it, the whole venture would be in
jeopardy. While there was no way of locking Respondent into
the venture
permanently, my brothers and I at least wanted the assurance that if he were to
leave it, we would not be confronted
with him as a competitor in building and
marketing the very vehicles or services such as refurbishment and reconditioning
which we
had joined forces to provide.
1.6 It was against this background that
the restraint clause was incorporated into the contract. My brothers and
I were not willing to go into the venture without such protection.
Respondent,
who is not an unsophisticated
.../ 40
40
man, understood our concern and the implications of the clause in
question and was completely agreeable to the restraint which was
imposed upon
him."
Basson's reply to this case is contained early in his answering affidavit
where he says:
" ... die enigste uitwerking van die beletsel bevat in paragraaf 11 van
Aanhangsel 'A' by Vierde Applikant se Beedigde Verklaring,
is dat ek daardeur
verhoed word dat ek my al-gemene kennis en vaardigheid en ondervind-ing in die
busboubedryf tot my eie voordeel
kan gebruik en my bestaan maak in die ambag
waarin ek reeds ongeveer 30 jaar werk. In-aggenome al die omstandighede waarna
ek hier-onder
verwys, sou dit onredelik en strydig met die openbare belang wees
om voormelde beletsel af te dwing."
In seeking to make their case on the
affidavits the Chilwans sought to rely on
.../ 41
41
Basson's possible misuse of his knowledge of Coach-Tech's trade secrets,
methods of production, pricing structures, and clientele
to their detriment.
Basson denied that there were any such trade secrets. He contended that the
knowledge involved in the construction
of the busses and the methods of
production, was knowledge which he had acquired over the years and which he had
brought with him
to the firm. He had acquired no new knowledge in the form of
trade secrets from Coach-Tech nor had the method of production been
any
different from what he had been accustomed to over the years. As far as the
pricing structure was
../42
42
concerned he alleged that that had been left largely to the Chilwans and
that he did not really concern himself with this aspect of
the business. As
regards his knowledge of Coach-Tech's customers, Basson concedes that he did
have some dealings with them while
designing and constructing their buses, but
says he was not involved in canvassing for customers. His knowledge of
Coach-Tech's customers
was therefore limited and could hardly be used by him to
Coach-Tech's detriment.
The Court a
quo
found that in arguing the matter before it the
Chilwans did not "seek to rely on the protection of any trade secrets
../43
43
in the strict sense of that term" but sought rather to protect a
"proprietary interest", and a "threat" to their goodwill should Basson
"join a
rival firm". It seems to me that the learned Judge's use of the expression
"trade secrets in the strict sense of that term"
was prompted by the extended
definition of "trade secrets" contained in clause 11.1 of the agreement between
the parties. That extended
definition included "goodwill" which would not
ordinarily be regarded as a "trade secret". In the light of Basson's denials to
which
I have referred and the finding of the Court a
quo
, I shall accept
that there are no trade secrets
../44
44
which Basson might misuse. I shall also accept that the methods of
production require no protection, and that Basson's knowledge of
Coach-Tech's
pricing structure and of its customers is so cursory and of such a limited ambit
that it could not be used in practice
to the detriment of Coach-Tech. As I have
indicated, the Chilwans' case was that in embarking on what was for them, a new
and expensive
venture, they relied heavily on the skill and knowledge, and on
the personal reputation of Basson as a coach-builder in order to
promote and
securely establish the new firm. In so doing they looked to the prospect of
establishing a name and a
../45
45
goodwill which would attract customers because of the quality of coaches
they hoped to produce.
They realized that they could not "lock him
into the venture permanently" and that "a claim for damages against Respondent
personally
will be worthless", and so the restraint clause was included so as to
ensure that should he leave the firm he would not compete with
them in the coach
construction market. Basson was fully aware of this state of affairs - as
appears from his own affidavit -and recognized
in clause 11.4.2 of the agreement
that "taking all relevant circumstances into account", the restraint clause was
reasonable.
The English law as to the validity and
../46
46
enforceability of restraint of trade clauses in contracts is reflected in
decisions such as
Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co
Ltd
(1894) A.C. 535
;
Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd
(1913) A.C. 724
and
Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby
(1916) 1 A.C. 688.
In
essence it amounted to this, viz that the public interest demanded that every
person should be allowed to carry on his trade freely,
and that therefore all
agreements in restraint of trade were
prima facie
void. They could only
be justified, and the Courts would only enforce them, if the party seeking to
enforce the restraint could show
that it was reasonable
../47
47
inter partes
and reasonable in the interest of the public.
Although in
Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd
(
supra
)
and
Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby
(
supra
) the Court seemed to hold
that the onus of proving reasonableness
inter partes
rested on the party
seeking to enforce the restraint clause while the onus of proving that the
clause was contrary to public policy
rested on the party alleging it, the
decision in
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Ga-rage.(Stourport) Ltd
[1967] UKHL 1
;
1968
A.C. 269
held that there could be no real separation of these two considerations
and that the onus resting on the party seeking to enforce
the clause required
him
../48
48
to show that it was reasonable not only
inter partes
but also that
it was reasonable in the public interest.
Earlier decisions in our
own Courts tended by and large to follow the English law in this respect to a
greater or lesser extent. In
later years, however, this approach was dissented
from in cases such as
Roffey v Catterall
,
Edwards and Goudre (Pty)
Ltd
1977 (4) SA 494
(N) and
Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie
1981.(4) SA
305 (C). In these cases it was held that agreements in restraint of trade were
not void ab
initio
but binding on the basis of
pacta sunt servanda
unless the party seeking to avoid them could show
../49
49
that they were against public policy. In
Roffey
's case
(
supra
) Didcott J refers to the
dictum
of Jessel M R
in
Printing and Numerical
Registering Co v Sampson
(1875) L R 19
Eq 462
with approval, where the learned Judge said
at
p 465 -
"If there is one thing that more than another public policy requires, it
is that men of full age and competent understanding shall
have the utmost
liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and
shall be enforced by courts of justice.
Therefore you have this para-mount public policy to consider - that you are not
lightly to
interfere with this freedom of contract."
In weighing up the public interest involved in
the principle of freedom of trade against the
.... / 50
50
sanctity of contracts, Didcott J came to the conclusion (at p 505 C-H)
that "South African law prefers the sanctity of contracts"
and he went on to
stress the importance in the public interest that "people should keep their
promises". The principle that
pacta sunt servanda
, particularly where
parties contract on a basis of equality, is generally accepted as an important
part of our Roman-Dutch law and
stems from the basic requirement of good faith.
It is grounded therefore not only in law but also in morality.
In
Magna Alloys and Research (S A
)
(Pty) Ltd v Ellis
[1984] ZASCA 116
;
1984
(4) SA 874
(A) this
../ 51
51
Court held (at p 897 F -898 D) that the approach of the English law that
agreements in restraint of trade were
prima facie
void and that an onus
rested on the person seeking to enforce them to prove their reasonableness
inter partes
and in the public interest, was not part of our law. It was
held that in our law such agreements were
prima facie
enforceable and
that an onus rested on the party seeking to avoid the restraint clause to prove
that its enforcement would be contrary
to the public interest. The public
interest must be the touchstone for deciding whether the Courts will enforce the
restraint clause
or not. The party seeking to
../52
52
avoid the contractual obligation to which he had solemnly agreed, should
therefore be required to prove that the public interest would
be detrimentally
affected by the enforcement of the clause (p 892I - 893D). The mere fact that
the clause may be unreasonable
inter partes
is not normally a ground for
attacking its validity, since the public interest demands that parties to a
contract be held to the terms
of their agreement (p 893 H-I). A second
consideration however is this: that it is also generally accepted that a person
should be
free to engage in useful economic activity and to contribute to the
welfare of society by the
../53
53
exercise of the skills to which he has been trained. Any unreasonable
restriction on such freedom would generally be regarded as contrary
to public
policy. In deciding on the enforceability of a restraint clause the Court would
be required to consider both these aspects
in the light of the circumstances of
each particu-lar case (p 894 B-E). Where public interest is the touchstone, and
where public
interest may change from time to time, there can be no
numerus
clausus
of the circumstances in which a Court would consider a restraint on
the freedom to trade as being unreasonable. There can be no justification,
therefore, in the
../ 54
54
ordinary course, for limiting the concept of reasonableness to cases
where a party has knowledge of trade secrets or trade connections
or the
established customers of a firm. With the public interest as the touchstone the
Court will be called upon to decide whether
in all the circumstances of the case
it has been shown that the restraint clause should properly be regarded as
unreasonable.
The paramount importance of upholding the sanctity of contracts, without
which all trade would be impossible, was again stressed by
this Court in
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes
1989 (1)
SA 1
(A) at p 9 B-C, where
Smalberger JA remarked
.../55
55
i a that -
"the power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should be ....
exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest
uncertainty as to
the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
power."
Where parties to an agreement in restraint of trade contract on a basis
of equality of bargaining power, without one party being inhibited
by what might
be regarded as a position of inferiority as against the other party, Courts,it
has been held, will be less inclined
to find that a clause, which may be
considered to work unreasonably
inter partes
, is contrary to public
policy and
../56
56
therefore unenforceable, than in the case
where
one of the parties may well be considered to
have
contracted from a position of inferiority..
Contracts between an
employer and an employee
may often fall into this latter category
(
New
United Yeast Distributors (Proprietary)
Ltd
v Brooks and Another
1935 W L D 75
at
83-84;
Van der Pol v Silbermann and Another
1952 (2)
SA
561 (A) at 571E - 572A;
Wohlman v Buron
1970
(2) SA 760 (C) at 764;
Malan en Andere v Van
. -
Jaarsveld en 'n Ander
1972 (2) SA 243
(C) at 246
A - 247F).
The difference of approach is often found where the object of the
restraint is to
../ 57
57
eliminate competition
per se
. Where the parties contract on an
equal footing, as was the case in the
New United Yeast Distributors
case,
(
supra
) the restraint has, in the past, normally been upheld. In that
case the object was simply to reduce competition in the yeast trade,
and in
enforcing the clause the learned Judge (Green-berg J) relied heavily on a
judgment of Scrutton L J in
English Hop Growers Limited v Bering
(1928)
at
2 K B 174
in which a clause designed to eliminate competition among hop
growers was upheld. On the other hand clauses in a contract between
an employer
and his employee aimed at achieving the same result i e the avoidance
of
../58
58
competition with the employer, have, in the absence of any other ground
such as the possession of trade secrets, knowledge of trade
connections or
customer contact, not been enforced (cf
Gordon v Van Blerk
1927 T P D
770
;
Aling and Streak v Olivier
1949 (1) SA 215
(T) and
Highlands Park
Football Club Ltd v Viljoen and Another
1978 (3) SA 191
(W)).
An agreement to protect one party from ordinary trade competition by the
other is therefore not an illegitimate aim to pursue (
Forman v Barnett
1941 W L D 54
at 60) and is not per se contrary to public policy. Where parties
contract on a basis of equality of bargaining power
../59
59
the principle of
pacta sunt servanda
will find strong application
in the absence of some other factor of public policy. The other principle of
freedom of trade will not
in every case be sufficient to outweigh the sanctity
of one's contractual undertaking. Whatever the reason for the difference of
approach where the parties do not contract on a footing of equality of
bargaining power in the past may have been or how it will
be affected by the new
approach in the light of the
Magna Alloys
case (
supra
) need not be
considered, since in the present case the parties clearly contracted on a
footing of equality. The Chilwan brothers
with their extensive bus
../ 60
60
service were desirous of starting a bus construction enterprise - not
only to supplement and extend their existing service, but also
to provide busses
and coaches for the South African market. They had become acquainted with Basson
as a result of the bus which he
had built for them through Du Preez Busbou or
Neurock Engineering (whichever it may have been), and were im-pressed by his
ability.
They lacked the expertise required to conduct a bus construction
industry and were particularly keen to persuade Basson to join in
the venture.
His wealth of experience and skill in the bus construction industry would be an
important, if not an
../61
61
indispensable asset in the venture. In order to secure his association
and to provide a viable and secure infrastructure for the undertaking,
they were
prepared to invest a considerable sum of money - in excess of R1 million.
Basson's connection with the firm, would, together
with this investment, be a
significant component in building up a sound reputation for the fledgling firm
in the early years of its
existence. Basson, they realized, was not a man of any
financial means, and, they allege in their founding affidavit, "a claim for
damages against the Respondent (i e Basson) personally
will be worthless." This allegation is not
../62
62
contested by Basson in his answering affidavit. The best they could do in
the circumstances, to discourage Basson from breaching his
contractual
obligations and to protect their investment, they considered, was to include a
restraint of trade clause so as to ensure
that should Basson leave the firm, he
would not go into direct competition with them.
This seems to me to be a reasonable and legitimate consideration. The
geographical ambit of the restraint clause and the period of
its duration have
not been placed in issue and need, therefore not be considered.
Basson was not a servant of Coach-Tech but an
../63
63
executive "director" of the firm. To seek to protect the firm which as I
have indicated was in the nature of a partnership, from competition
by him in
all the circumstances was therefore a legitimate and reasonable claim for the
Chilwans to pursue.
I am not persuaded that Basson has shown that the enforcement of the
solemn undertaking that he gave would be so unreasonable, so
far as he is
concerned, as to be contrary to
../64
64
public policy. It is true that he will be precluded from being employed
or associated with any business involved in the manufacture,
refurbishing or
distribution of busses in southern Africa for a period of five years, but this
does not prevent him from earning
a living or from exercising the construction
skills, which he has acquired over the years, in other channels. As recently as
1986
he was employed for a year as the manager of the workshop of the
Sentraal-Suid Kooperasie at Swellendam. The skills required for
the
comparatively "simple" methods of constructing busses, the making of moulds for
casting glass-
.... / 65
65
fibre panels and the casting of the panels themselves, could, on the face
of it, be used to good advantage in other spheres of the
construction industry.
In addition to managerial skills which he displayed as workshop manager at
Swellendam and in virtually running
the factory for Coach-Tech is also an aspect
which he could profitably and responsibly employ in other fields of activity.
Enforcement
of the clause to which he agreed would therefore not" have the
effect of relegating him to a life of idleness to the detriment of
the public
interest. Enough other spheres of profitable activity would remain open to
him.
.... / 66
66
In these circumstances it seems to me that it has not been shown that it
would be contrary to public policy to hold Basson to the
terms of his agreement
with the Chilwans and to enforce compliance with those terms.
In the light of the view I have taken in respect of the lack of any trade
secrets which Basson might divulge, and of his lack of any
significant customer
contact or knowledge of the pricing structures of Coach-Tech, the first part of
the order of the Court a
quo
would fall away. All that was required would
be to make an order in terms
of paras 2 and 3 of the order of the Court
../67
67
a
quo
.
In the result I would grant the condonation
requested by Basson and order him to pay the costs incurred by that application.
Furthermore
I would dismiss the appeal with costs, such costs to include the
costs of two counsel, but would alter the order made by the Court
a.
quo
to read:
"1. Respondent is ordered forthwith to cease employment or association of
any kind with Engineering Agencies or Neulux Coaches (Pty)
Ltd in respect of
their bus building activities.
.... /
68
68
2. Respondent is ordered to pay Applicants' costs, such costs to include the
costs of two counsel."
J.P.G. EKSTEEN,
JA
NIENABER A
R:
Die uitspraak van Eksteen AR het
ek ter insae gehad. Ongelukkig kan ek my, om redes wat hierna volg, nie met sy
slotsom vereenselwig
nie.
Vir doeleindes van gerief verwys ek, soos
Eksteen AR, na die appellant as Basson, na die eerste tot vierde respondente as
die Chilwans
en na die beslote korporasie as Coach-Tech.
Basson het sy vakleerlingskap as 'n plaatmetaal-werker in 1961 voltooi.
Sedertdien was hy, volgens sy eie relaas, omtrent deurgaans
in die
busbakbou-bedryf doenig, eers in die Oos-Kaap, later in Transvaal, en les bes in
die Mes-Kaap. Aldaar is hy vanweë sy
kundigheid, vaardigheid en algemene
kennis van die busbakbou-bedryf deur die Chilwans genader om vir hulle 'n bus te
bou en dit het
uitgeloop op die ooreenkoms om gesamentlik 'n nuwe onderneming
van stapel te stuur. Coach-Tech is
2
gestig om daaraan gestalte te gee. Die Chilwans en
Basson
word in die ooreenkoms omskryf as "the members".
Na Basson word ook
verwys as "Willem" en na Coach-Tech
wat toe nog nie opgerig was nie
as "the Corporation".
Klousule 4.1 van die ooreenkoms lui soos volg:
"The Members are hereby appointed and employed by the Corporation as
executives from the date of its incorporation."
Klousule
4.3 lees soos volg:
"Each appointment in terms of 4.1 shall be for an indefinite period and may
only be terminated by the Executive himself by giving
the Corporation three
calendar months' notice in writing."
Klousule 11,
getiteld "Confidentiality and Restraint"
begin soos volg:
"Willem acknowledges that, it is in the interest of the protection and
maintenance of the Corporation's Trade Secrets (which for the
purpose hereof
means the Corporation's goodwill, technical and business know-how, trade
secrets, confidential information and the
Corporation's intellectual property in
general), to maintain confidentiality and therefore Willem undertakes to the
Corporation that
..."
Wat hier veral opval, is die volgende:
3
(i) Basson se onderneming word spesifiek
teenoor
Coach-Tech gegee en nie teenoor
die Chilwans
nie;
(ii) die belange wat beskerm staan te word is
dié
van Coach-Tech en nie
dié van die Chilwans
nie;
iii) sodanige belange word spesifiek omskryf
deur
die woorde wat tussen hakies
verskyn;
(iv) geen melding word gemaak van enige belang
van
die Chilwans in hul belegging in
Coach-Tech
nie.
Klousule 11.1.1, saamgelees met klousule
4.1,
voorsien dat Basson in 'n bestuurshoedanigheid
deur
Coach-Tech in diens geneem sou word. Teenoor
Coach-Tech
was Basson dus 'n werknemer en teenoor die Chilwans
'n
vennoot.
Klousule 11.1.4 vervolg:
"he shall not directly or indirectly for a period of 5 years after the
Termination Date either solely or
jointly:
4
11.1.4.1 be employed by;
or
11.1.4.2 carry on or assist financially or
otherwise be engaged
or concerned or
interested in;
or
11.1.4.3 act as consultant or adviser to;
or
11.1.4.4
act
as agent or representative for; any person or firm or body corporate or
incorporate which within the Territory carries
on:
11.1.4.5 the business of manufacturing
and/or
refurbishing and/or distribution of buses
albeit
light, medium or heavy duty buses
and/or coaches of whatever
nature.
11.1.4.6 any business which is similar to or in
competition
with such business as the
Corporation may be carrying on at
the
Termination Date."
Klousule 11.2 bepaal:
" For the
purposes of this clause 11:
11.2.1 "the Termination Date" means the date
upon which Willem
ceases to be an employee of
the Corporation for whatsoever
reason;
11.2.2 "the Territory" means the
following
areas as presently constituted, namely
the
Republic of South Africa, South West
Africa/Namibia,
Ciskei, Venda, Transkei,
Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe."
In sy geheel gesien is die strekking van
die
klousule om Basson vir 'n periode van vyf jaar
na
beëindiging van sy diensverhouding met Coach-Tech
("for
5
whatsoever reason") in suidelike Afrika as 'n moontlike mededinger van
Coach-Tech uit te skakel.
Coach-Tech is opgerig. So ook 'n fabriek
met kapitaal wat deur die Chilwans voorgeskiet is. Die vierde respondent was
verantwoordelik
vir die administrasie. Basson was in beheer van produksie.
Daarvoor het hy 'n salaris en die gebruik van 'n motor ontvang. Volgens
Basson
was hy nie gemoeid met die finansiële sy van sake nie en was hy ook nie
betrokke of geken by besigheidsbesluite wat geneem
is nie. Twaalf nuwe busse is
mettertyd vervaardig, ander is herstel en opgeknap en nog ' n paar was in
aanbou. Algaande het die verhouding
tussen die partye egter versleg.
Beskuldigings is wedersyds gemaak. Alle pogings om op die grondslag van 'n nuwe
indiensnemingsooreenkoms
tot 'n vergelyk te kom, het oplaas misluk en Basson is
na ongeveer twee jaar daar weg sonder om drie maande kennis te gee. Hy het
onmiddellik diens aanvaar by 'n ander
6
firma, Engineering Agencies, 'n verskaffer van staal. Engineering
Agencies was op daardie stadium nie 'n mededinger van Coach-Tech
nie, maar clit
het later geblyk dat Basson juis in diens geneem is om 'n luukse bus te bou.
Volgens Basson is sy werkgewer 'n maatskappy,
Neulux Coaches (Pty) Limited
("Neulux"), wat skynbaar deur Engineering Agencies opgerig is om luukse busse te
vervaardig. Die hof
a
quo
bevind dat Basson se ontkenning dat Neulux met
Coach-Tech sou meeding, nie 'n egte geskil geskep het nie - 'n bevinding wat nie
werklik
in betoog voor hierdie hof aangeveg is nie, en wat vir doeleindes van
die beoordeling van die vraagstukke in hierdie saak geredelik
aanvaar kan
word.
Die vraagstuk of 'n beperkende bepaling van hierdie aard afdwingbaar is,
het, soos bekend, 'n lang aanloop, meestendeels in die Engelse
reg.
Maqna
Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis
[1984] ZASCA 116
;
1984 (4) SA 874
(A) het 'n nuwe
wending aan die verloop van sake gegee: 'n ander
7
uitgangspunt (dat die bepaling, ondanks sy inperkende werking, geag word
afdwingbaar te wees), en dus 'n ander benadering (dat die
bewyslas op die party
rus wat die bepaling in sy geheel of ten dele probeer aanveg). Maar die
oorweginge wat by die beoordeling van
die afdwingbaarheid van die bepaling in ag
geneem word, bly wesenlik dieselfde.
Dit gaan hier, soos in die
Maqna Alloys
-saak,
passim
, herhaaldelik beklemtoon word, om die
afdwingbaarheid van 'n bepaling in 'n ooreenkoms wat andersins geldig is. 'n
Ooreenkoms is
in sy geheel of . ten dele aanvegbaar as dit die openbare belang
skaad en aldus teen die openbare beleid indruis. 'n Bepaling van
hierdie aard
wat 'n werknemer of vennoot na beëindiging van die kontrak aan bande
probeer lê - en dis al geval wat hier
in oënskou geneem moet word -
druis teen die openbare beleid in as die uitwerking van die belemmering
onredelik sou wees. Die
redelikheid al dan nie van die
8
belemmering word beoordeel aan die hand van die breëre belange van
die gemeenskap, enersyds, en van die kontrakterende partye
self, andersyds. Wat
die breëre gemeenskap betref is daar twee botsende oorwegings: ooreenkomste
moet gehandhaaf word (al bevorder
dit ook onproduktiwiteit); onproduktiwiteit
moet ontmoedig word (al verongeluk dit ook 'n ooreenkoms) (vgl.
Sunshine
Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohlinq and others
1990 (4) SA 782
(A) te 794D-E). Wat
die partye self betref, is 'n verbod onredelik as dit die een party verhinder om
hom, na beëindiging van
hul kontraktuele verhouding, vryelik in die
handels- en beroepswêreld te laat geld, sonder dat 'n beskermingswaardige
belang
van die ander party na behore daardeur gedien word. so iets is op sigself
strydig met die openbare beleid. Origens mag 'n beperking
wat
inter
partes
redelik is nietemin, vir 'n rede wat nie aan die partye eie is nie,
die openbare skaad. En besmoontlik ook omgekeerd.
9
Vier vrae moet in dié verband gestel word:
(a)
Is daar 'n
belang van die een party wat na afloop van die ooreenkoms beskerming
verdien?
(b)
Word so 'n
belang deur die ander party in gedrang
gebring?
(c)
Indien wel, weeg
sodanige belang kwalitatief en kwantitatief op teen die belang van die ander
party dat hy ekonomies nie onaktief
en onproduktief moet wees
nie?
(d)
Is daar 'n ander
faset van openbare belang wat met die verhouding tussen die partye niks te make
het nie maar wat verg dat die beperking
gehandhaaf moet
word,
. al dan nie? (Laasgenoemde vraag kom
nie hier ter sprake nie.)
Vir sover die belang in (c) die belang in (a) oortref, is die beperking
in die reël onredelik en gevolglik onafdwingbaar. Dit
is 'n kwessie van
beoordeling wat van geval tot geval kan wissel
(Sibex Enqineerinq Services
(Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk and another
1991
10
(2) SA
1991 (2) SA 482
(T) te 486H).
Die partye se eie
beskouing, soos in die ooreenkoms verwoord, oor wat redelik is, kan nooit
deurslaggewend wees nie. (Die
Magna
-saak
supra
te 488E-F). Ten
eerste word die redelikheid van die verbod eers by nabetragting deur 'n hof
beoordeel aan die hand van faktore en
maatstawwe wat nie noodwendig deur die
partye in oënskou geneem was nie. Ten tweede kan die inhoud van die
ooreenkoms nie self
die uitsluitlike maatstaf wees van wat redelik is nie want
dan word die behoorlikheid van die ooreenkoms aan homself getoets. Dat
dit die .
partye by die aangaan van die ooreenkoms erns was dat so 'n beperking nodig is,
dat hulle die omstrede belange geïdentifiseer
en na waarde geskat en die
beperking self as hoogs redelik beskryf het, kan dus nie beslissend wees nie
(vgl.
David Wuhl (Pty) Ltd and others v Badler and another
1984 (3) SA
427
(T) te 434H-I). Hoogstens kan gesê word dat dit 'n faktor kan wees by
oorweging van wat
11
beskermingswaardig en van wat redelik is. Dieselfde geld vir die
oorweging dat die partye ten tyde van kontraksluiting nie op gelyke
voet verkeer
het nie - dit is 'n faktor, een van vele, wat by die bepaling van die
redelikheid van die beperking 'n rol kan speel.
Maar daar eindig dit. As die
verbodsbepaling ten tyde van die beoordeling daarvan deur die hof onredelik geag
word, is dit onafdwingbaar,
hoe die partye ook al teenoor mekaar gesitueer was
en hoe hulle die bepaling ten tyde van kontraksluiting ook al mag beskou en
beskryf
het. Geen ooreenkoms, hoe noukeurig bewoord, kan 'n andersins onredelike
bepaling verskans nie. Kortom, vir die partye is dit regtens
net nie moontlik om
'n ooreenkoms te sluit waardeur die handelsverkeer op 'n onredelike wyse
gekniehalter word nie.
In sy uitspraak word hierdie twee faktore, outonomie en pariteit, deur
Eksteen AR, met agting gesê, oorbeklemtoon. Die eintlike
ondersoek wentel
om iets
12.
anders: die kompeterende belange van Coach-Tech en/of
die Chilwans en van Basson wat deur klousule 11
onderskeidelik bevorder en lamgelê word.
Dit bring my by die eerste van die norme vir
redelikheid
inter
se wat hierbo genoem is: die
belange, indien enige, wat deur klousule 11 gedien word
en die beskermingswaardigheid daarvan.
Wie se belange? Volgens sy bewoording, is klousule
11, soos reeds opgemerk, slegs ten gunste van Coach-Tech
beding, en nie ten gunste van die Chilwans nie. So is
die saak in die stukke ook aangevoer. In paragraaf 5 van
.
die repliserende verklaring verklaar die vierde
respondent:
"This application is being brought in order to protect the proprietary
interests of the Fifth Applicant and it is only in respect
of the construction
of buses and coaches that it is sought to prevent the Respondent from using his
general knowledge, skill and
experience."
So ook in paragraaf 34:
"Having now invested a great deal of money to establish Fifth Applicant,
this application has been
13
launched to protect Fifth Applicant's goodwill."
En
ten slotte, in paragraaf 36.8:
The trade secrets referred to are Fifth Applicant's clientele, pricing
structure and marketing techniques and the techniques and methods
employed in
designing, building and refurbishing buses."
Op die stukke is die saak dus op die belange
van
Coach-Tech toegespits en nie op die belange van
die
Chilwans nie. Desondanks is ek bereid om, soos Eksteen
AR,
maar, anders as hy, sonder verwysing na artikel 44(4)
van die Wet op Beslote Koporasies, 69 van 1984, ten
gunste van die Chilwans te aanvaar dat klousule 11 bedoel
was om verder te strek as wat sy presiese bewoording
aandui en dat ook die Chilwans hul teenoor Basson daarop
kan beroep, in weerwil van die wyse waarop die saak
aangebied is. (In die verbygaan mag ek meld dat die
gemelde Wet, artikel 44(4) in die besonder, op geen
stadium in die stukke, in die uitspraak van die hof a
quo, of in betoog in hierdie hof, aangeroer is nie; en
ek
vind dit onnodig ommy daaroor uit te spreek of
artikel
14.
44(4) van toepassing is selfs nadat die
samewerkingsooreenkoms tot 'n einde gekom het.)
Watter belange?
Klousule 11 omskryf self, soos reeds gesê, die belange wat volgens die
ooreenkoms as beskermingswaardig geag
word nl. "the Corporation's trade secrets"
soos in klousule 11.1 gedefinieer word. Die belange wat aldus vermeld word,
veral waar
dit daarop gemik is om die vertroulikheid van sekere gegewens te
bewaar, is almal belange wat in beginsel by wyse van 'n beperkende
bepaling
beskermingswaardig sou wees. Desondanks is daar vir die respondente probleme in
dié verband. Eerstens was daar in
Coach-Tech se bedrywighede eintlik niks
wat werklik vertroulik was nie en tweedens het Basson, selfs op die aanvaarding
dat dit wel
die geval was, op die stukke aangetoon het dat hy geen aspek van
vertroulikheid geskend het nie. "Trade secrets", so is geredelik
in die betoog
voor hierdie hof toegegee, kan nie as grondslag dien vir die aangevraagde
regshulp nie.
15
So is dit ook deur die hof a
quo
ingesien. In die
uitspraak word verklaar:
"Applicants, in turn, even if they appeared to do so in their affidavits,
do not, as the case was argued on their behalf, seek to
rely on the protection
of any trade secrets in the strict sense of that term. They look to protect a
proprietary interest."
En weer:
"Although no trade secrets in the strict meaning of that term may be
involved, it is in my view clear that what may be described as
Coach-Tech' s
intellectual property is involved and it is that and their investment in
respondent's participation which the Chilwans
wished to protect by restraining
respondent from, for 5 years, competing alone or in another firm with them in
the bus-building industry."
. Wat die "proprietary interest" en die "intellectual
property" is, is nie duidelik nie. Blykens paragraaf
36.8 hierbo aangehaal bly net "clientele" oor as mens
"trade secrets" weglaat. "Trade connections", naas
"trade secrets", is meermale in die regspraak as
sogenaamde "proprietary interests" vermeld wat as sodanig
beskermingswaardig is (vgl.
Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd
16
v Mohammed and Another
1981 (3) SA 250(SEC)
te 258G-H;
Rawlins
and Another v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd
1993(1) SA 537(A) te
541B-544C).
Die vraag is dus of die beskerming van klandisie die belang is wat hier
ter sake is. Dat so 'n belang beskermingswaardig is en in
'n bepaalde geval
swaarder kan weeg as die teenparty se gedwonge onproduktiwiteit, is in beginsel
onteenseglik so. Maar weereens
is die vraag of Basson in stryd met enige
sodanige belang opgetree het.
Op die feite was daar geen sprake daarvan dat Basson bestaande klante van
die Coach-Tech (of van die Chilwans) weggelok of probeer
afrokkel het nie. Geen
gevalle van daadwerklike afrokkeling deur Basson word deur die respondent
vermeld nie en op die materiaal
wat die hof a
quo
geregtig was om in ag
te neem, was daar ook geen gegronde vrese dat so iets na alle waarskynlikheid in
die toekoms sou gebeur nie.
Basson was nie 'n
17
verkoopsman wie se taak dit was om klante vir Coach-Tech te werf nie. Hy
was gemoeid met produksie, nie met bemarking nie. Op die
gegewens voor die hof
a cruo
het Basson na my mening wel daarin geslaag om aan te toon dat hy
dus nie op enige van die beskermingswaardige belange wat in klousule
11.1 deur
die kontrakspartye self omskryf is, inbreuk gemaak het nie. Wat klousule 11.1
betref is die antwoord op die eerste vraag
wat hierbo gestel is dus: ja; op die
tweede: nee; gevolglik verval die derde vraag.
Nóg "trade secrets" nóg "trade connections" was dus hier in
gedrang. Tradisioneel word dit beskou as die twee tipes
belang wat by uitstek in
'n geval soos die huidige beskermingswaardig is (vgl. die
Rawlins
-saak
supra op 541B-C). Trouens, daar is al beweer, na aanleiding van Engelse gesag,
dat dit die enigste werklike gevalle is waar
'n belang beskermingswaardig is
(vgl. die
Recycling Industries
-saak
supra
te 258G-H; die
18
Sibex Enqineerinq
-saak 502C-F; 505F-I; 507D-508A). As dit so is,
is dit natuurlik die einde van die debat aangesien Basson, soos reeds
gesê,
daarin geslaag het om aan te toon dat sy geval nie onder enige van
dié twee erkende kategorieë tuis hoort nie.
Vir huidige
doeleindes vind ek dit onnodig om my oor dié vraagstuk uit te laat.
Weereens is ek bereid om, soos Eksteen AR,
ten gunste van die Chilwans te
aanvaar dat daar nie 'n
numerus clausus
van beskermingswaardige belange
bestaan nie en dat die begrip "redelikheid" in ons reg soepel genoeg is om ook
ander gevalle te behels
waar 'n andersoortige belang van die een party swaarder
mag weeg as die ooreenstemmende beletsel van die ander.
En om 'n stap verder te gaan: ek is ook bereid om in hul guns te aanvaar
dat 'n party wat hom op 'n beletsel in die kontrak beroep
nie beperk is tot die
belange, indien enige, wat in die kontrak self omskryf word nie, mits dit
origens uit die getuienis blyk wat
sodanige
19
ander belange wel is.
Die vraag is dan of daar ander belange
as vertroulikheid en klandisie-beskerming is wat op die getuienis ter sprake is,
wat beskermingswaardig
is, wat deur Basson in gedrang gebring is en wat meer tel
as die oorweging dat Basson nie sy gekose beroep sal kan beoefen nie. Alleen
dan
sal die aangevraagde regshulp geregverdig wees. Om hierdie vrae te beantwoord,
is dit nodig om stil te staan by die saak wat
die respondente op die stukke
probeer uitmaak het.
In die funderende verklaring het die klem op "trade secrets" geval. Dit
is laat vaar. Wat die repliserende verklaring betref, het
ek vroeër verwys
na sekere uittreksels waar die belange van Coach-Tech beklemtoon word. Elders in
die repliserende verklaring
word die hele kwessie weer oor 'n ander boeg gegooi,
te wete, die belange van die Chilwans. Die betekenisvolste aanhaling is stellig
in paragrawe 1.5 en 1.6 van die repliserende
20
verklaring te vind wat soos volg lui:
"1.5 It was recognised by all concerned f rom the outset that the new
business would be heavily dependent on Respondent's expertise
and that, should
he leave it, the whole venture would be in jeopardy. While there was no way of
locking Respondent into the venture
permanently, my brothers and I at least
wanted the assurance that if he were to leave it, we would not be confronted
with him as
a competitor in building and marketing the very vehicles or services
such as refurbishment and reconditioning which he had joined
forces to
provide.
1.6 It was against this background
that the restraint clause was incorporated into the contract. My brothers and I
were not willing
to go into the venture without such protection. Respondent, who
is not an unsophisticated man, understood our concern and the implications
of
the clause in question and was completely agreeable to the restraint which was
imposed upon him."
Soos reeds vermeld het die Chilwans meer as ' n
miljoen rand in die onderneming belê. Coach-Tech self
het geen belegging gemaak nie. Dit gaan dus suiwer om die
belegging van die Chilwans. In die gemelde paragrawe
word onomwonde erken dat dit die Chilwans se oogmerk was
om hul kapitale belegging in Coach-Tech te beskerm deur
21.
Basson as 'n potensiële mededinger van Coach-Tech te
elimineer - nie alleen vir die duur van die kontrak nie maar vir 5 jaar
na
beëindiging daarvan.
Van oudsher is aanvaar dat die blote uitskakeling van mededinging as
sodanig nie die soort belang is wat, in ' n geval soos hierdie,
deur ' n
bekamping van handelsvryheid na afloop van die ooreenkoms beskerm kan word nie;
oftewel, dat dit nie opweeg teen die nadeel
wat die ander party ly as hy sy
beroep nie vryelik kan beoefen nie (vgl. die
Recycling
-saak
supra
256B-E, 258G, 259E-F;
Maqna Alloys
-saak
supra
904I).
Die situasie verander myns insiens nie omdat die beperking nie sommer na
willekeur beding is nie maar om 'n belegging te beskerm -
sy dit, soos hier, 'n
belegging van kapitaal, sy dit 'n belegging in tyd en aandag wat aan die
opleiding van 'n werknemer bestee
is, soos in die
Sibex Enqineering
-saak
(vgl. ook
Highlands Park Football Club Ltd v Viljoen and Another
1978 (3)
SA 191
(W) te
22
200H-201B). Dit beteken nie dat 'n belegging van hierdie aard nie
beskermingswaardig is nie; dit beteken alleen dat dit normaalweg
nie by wyse van
'n beding wat handelsoutonomie ná beëindiging van die ooreenkoms
probeer inkort, beskerm kan word nie;
anders gestel, dat die belang wat die
beperking op dié wyse trag te beskerm in die reël nie opweeg teen
die belang van
die ander party om nie in sy gekose veld werkloos te wees
nie.
Die aangewese wyse waarop so 'n belang ten beste beskerm kan
word, is stellig om die ander party kontraktueel vir 'n bepaalde termyn
te bind
- in welke . geval die werknemer sy ooreengekome vergoeding ontvang en nie
onproduktief is nie, en die werkgewer die gebruiklike
gemeenregtelike remedies
tot sy beskikking het indien die werknemer voor verstryking van die ooreengekome
termyn sou padgee en vir
'n konkurrent gaan werk. Volgens die chilwans sou 'n
eis vir skadevergoeding in die huidige geval 'n nuttelose remedie wees aangesien
hulle
23
van oordeel was dat Basson "was not a man of any financial means." Selfs
al sou dit so wees, sou dit die Chilwans nie noodwendig sonder
'n remedie gelaat
het indien hulle op 'n bepaalde termyn ooreengekom het en Basson kontrakbreuk
gepleeg het nie. In beginsel sou
hulle, afhangende van die bewoording van hul
ooreenkoms, 'n interdik teen Basson kon aangevra het indien hy sy ooreenkoms in
die
loop daarvan verbreek het en by 'n mededinger in diens sou getree het. 'n
Sprekende voorbeeld van 'n geval waar 'n werknemer belet
is om vir 'n
kompeterende instansie te werk, is
Roberts
.
Construction Co Ltd v
Verhoef
1952 (2) SA 300
(W). 'n Interdik is toegestaan teen 'n skrynwerker
wat uit Holland ingevoer is en wat onderneem het om vir 'n jaar vir die
applikant
te werk maar wat na 'n maand of wat gedros het. In dié saak
word te 304F op die onderskeid gewys tussen 'n bepaling wat die
werknemer belet
om by 'n mededinger van sy werkgewer in diens te tree (i) tydens
24
die duur van die kontrak en (ii) na beeindiging daarvan. In die eerste
geval word die werknemer vir die termyn van die kontrak vergoed,
in die ander
geval nie; in die eerste geval is die werknemer produktief, in die ander geval
denkbaar nie. Dit is belangrike oorweginge
wanneer dit by die beoordeling van
die redelikheid van die inperking kom (vgl. egter
Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B.N.
Aitken (Pty) Ltd
1982 (1) SA 398
(A) te 439B-440B). In die eerste geval geld
die beletsel ná beëindiging van die kontrak ook net as die werknemer
gedros
het, waarvoor hy net homself te blameer het, terwyl dit in die ander
geval onder alle omstandighede van kontrakbeëindiging geld,
behalwe miskien
waar dit die werkgewer self is wat daarvoor verantwoordelik was dat die kontrak
tot 'n einde gekom het (vgl.
Drewtons (Pty) Ltd v Carlie
1981 (4) SA 305
(C) te 308D-E;
Capecan (Pty) Ltd v Van Nimwegen and Another
1988 (2) SA
454
(C) te 460B-C;
Botha and Another v Carapax Shadeports (Pty) Ltd
[1991] ZASCA 134
;
1992
(1) SA 202
(A) te
25
215C-E).
New United Yeast Distributors (Proprietarv) Ltd v Brooks and
Another
1935 WLD 75
en
Forman v Barnett
1941 WLD 54
('n koop- en nie
'n dienskontrak nie) waarop Eksteen AR hom verlaat, is albei juis gevalle waar
die beletsel gedurende die bestaan
en nie na beëindiging van die kontrak
van toepassing was nie. Op dieselfde wyse sou die Chilwans Basson se
betrokkenheid by
Coach-Tech -en sy onbetrokkenheid by enige mededinger - kon
probeer bewerkstellig het "in building up a sound reputation for the
fledgling
firm in the early years of its existence", soos Eksteen AR dit stel. Of so 'n
poging sou slaag, sou van die redelikheid
van die beperking, alles in ag genome,
afhang. Onteenseglik sou hulle dan op 'n vaster voetstuk gestaan het as
nou.
Die kwessie van werfkrag ("goodwill") word glad nie deur die Chilwans in
hul funderende eedsverklaring geopper nie en in die repliserende
verklaring word
dit net skrams genoem. Presies wat daaronder verstaan moet
26
word, is nie so duidelik nie. As dit op die Chilwans en/of Coach-Tech se
potensiaal slaan om klante vanuit die staanspoor te werf,
of van ander
konkurrente weg te lok of om bestaande klante te behou, is dit nie die saak wat
op die stukke uitgemaak is nie: op so
'n belang het Basson, soos reeds
gesê, in elk geval ook nie inbreuk gemaak nie. Dit was nooit Basson se
funksie om klante te
werf of te paai nie. As hy 'n "goodwill" help vestig het,
was dit nie soseer aan sy persoonlikheid te danke nie as aan die gehalte
van die
produk wat hy vervaardig het en wat Coach-Tech aan klante kon verkwansel. Dit is
'n werfkrag wat as 't ware aan die produk
gekleef het (vgl.
Protea Holdings
Ltd and Another v Herzberq and Another
1982 (4) SA 773
(C) te 786G-787E;
Botha and Another v Carapax Shadeports (Pty) Ltd supra
te 211H-2121). Wat
die Chilwans beoog het, was om Basson te verhinder om hom ten koste van hul
kapitale belegging in Coach-Tech by
'n ander onderneming aan te sluit waar
sy
27
insette 'n beter produk sou verseker as wat Coach-Tech sonder hom kon
lewer. Op stuk van sake is dit niks anders as 'n poging om kompetisie
ten
opsigte van potensiële toekomstige klante te smoor nie. Klousule 11 van die
ooreenkoms is 'n blatante poging om 'n monopolie
oor Basson se bekwaamheid,
vaardigheid en kundigheid as busbakbouer te verwerf deur Basson vir 5 jaar as
busbakbouer buite aksie
te stel. Daardie belang, met daardie oogmerk, kan na my
mening nie opweeg teen die nadeel wat dit vir Basson inhou indien hy verhinder
word om sy gekose beroep vir 'n periode van vyf jaar te beoefen nie.
Na my oordeel het Basson daarin geslaag om aan te toon dat die beperking
onredelik en gevolglik onafdwingbaar is.
Daar was geen versoek aan die hof
a quo
, of aan hierdie hof, om
die beperking na sy omvang of tydperk in te kort nie. Gevolglik is dit onnodig
om verder aan
28
die hipotese aandag te skenk dat 'n mindere beperking dalk wel redelik
sou wees (vgl. die
Sunshine Records-
saak
supra
te
795-6).
Die appellant het aansoek gedoen om kondonasie. Eksteen AR
verwys in sy uitspraak daarna. Die enigste grond waarop die aansoek bestry
is,
was die vermeende gebrek aan meriete in die appèl. Blykens hierdie
uitspraak moet die appèl daarenteen slaag. Kondonasie
word gevolglik
verleen. Die appellant is anspreeklik vir die koste wat deur die aansoek verkwis
is.
Die volgende bevel word gemaak:
1. Die appèl
slaag met koste.
2. Die bevel van die hof
a quo
word ter syde
gestel en
vervang deur 'n bevel dat die aansoek
met koste van die hand gewys
word.
P. M. NIENABER AR
MILNE AR stem saam.
VAN HEERDEN AR
:
2
Van oudsher word geleer dat beperkings wat op 'n kontraktant se
bevoegdhede geplaas word - soos byvoorbeeld sy bevoegdheid om sy goed
te
vervreem -onafdwingbaar is indien die ander kontraktant nie 'n belang by die
beperking het nie. Sien
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd
1968
(3) SA 167
(A) 189 en gesag daar aangehaal.
Maar
selfs indien die tweede kontraktant wel
sodanige
belang het, kan die beperking nogtans
onafdwingbaar
wees. Dit is by uitstek die geval indien 'n
be-
perking op so 'n kontraktant se handelsvryheid
onre-
delik is, en wel omdat 'n dusdanige beperking in
die
reël die openbare belang skaad en dus strydig met
die
openbare beleid is:
Maqna Alloys and Research
(SA)
(Pty) Ltd v Ellis
[1984] ZASCA 116
;
1984 (4) SA 874
(A) 894,
en
Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling and Others
1990
(4) SA 782 (A) 794.
Soms word gesê dat 'n beperking wat op A se
3 handelsvryheid in 'n ooreenkoms tussen hom en B geplaas word, onredelik
is indien dit slegs daarop gerig is om B teen mededinging
deur A te beskerm. Dit
is nie juis nie. Indien B bv sy onderneming aan A verkoop sou so 'n beperking -
mits andersins rede-lik -
onaanvegbaar wees selfs indien dit net ten doel het om
mededinging deur A uit te skakel. Bogenoemde stelling sou egter in die reël
van toepassing wees op 'n beperking wat 'n werkgewer plaas op sy werknemer se
handelsvryheid na beëindiging van die diensver-houding.
Dit is egter nie 'n
onbuigsame reël of een sonder uitsonderings nie. Diensverhoudings kan
immers vele gestaltes aanneem, vanaf
een waarin die werknemer 'n volslae
onderhorige is tot een waarin hy 'n aansienlike mate van seggenskap het oor sy
werk-gewer se
onderneming.
Om te bepaal of 'n beperking op
handels-vryheid al of nie onredelik is, moet vanselfsprekend-
4 nie
net gelet word op die belange van die kontraktant op wie die beperking geplaas
is nie, maar ook op dié van die ander
kontraktant. By 'n opweging van die
belange kan 'n groot aantal faktore oorweging ver-dien, soos byvoorbeeld die
aard van die verhouding
tussen die partye; die redes vir die oplegging van die
beperking, en die strekking en omvang daarvan. In hierdie verband bestaan
daar
dan ook nie 'n beginselsverskil tussen my benadering en dié van my
kollega, Nienaber, nie.
Die omstandighede wat tot die oplegging van
die onderhawige beperking gelei het, en die tersaak-like inhoud van die
skriftelike kontrak,
word uiteen-gesit in die uitspraak van my kollega, Eksteen.
Ek beklemtoon slegs die volgende:
1) Tydens die onderhandelinge
tussen die Chilwans en Basson wat tot ondertekening van die kontrak gelei hety
het Coach-Tech nog nie
bestaan
5 nie. Hulle het egter klaarblyklik
mondelings op die bepalings van die latere skriftelike kontrak ooreen-gekom juis
met die oog op
oprigting van Coach-Tech en 'n reëling van hul verhoudings
onderling asook teen-oor die beslote korporasie wat in die vooruitsig
gestel
is.
2) Dit is onbetwis dat die Chilwans nie
die kontrak
sou gesluit het indien dit nie die
beperking op Basson se
handelsvryheid vervat het nie.
Trouens, dit is oorweldigend
waarskynlik dat indien
Basson kapsie daarteen gehad het die
onderhandelings
sou verval en Coach-Tech nie opgerig sou gewees
het
nie.
3) Selfs ten tye van die
ondertekening
van die kontrak was Coach-Tech as't ware nog 'n
leë
dop.
4) Die kontrak het bepaal dat die Chilwans en Basson elk 'n gelykwaardige
belang in
6 Coach-Tech sou hê; elk 'n sogenaamde uitvoerende
lid sou wees, en elk gelyke regte ten opsigte van die bestuur van Coach-Tech
se
sake sou geniet.
In die lig van bostaande is enkele opmerk-ings
aangewese. Eerstens sou dit kortsigtig wees om Basson as 'n blote werknemer van
Coach-Tech
te bestempel. Hy was inderdaad veel meer as dit. Net soos elk van die
Chilwans was hy 'n lid van die beslote korporasie wat as sulks
deelname aan die
bestuur daarvan gehad het en in die winste daarvan kon
deel.
Tweedens het die Chilwans net so seer as Coach-Tech 'n belang
by die beperking gehad. Enige handeling wat tot nadeel van Coach-Tech
sou strek,
sou onvermydelik nadelig op hul ledebelange inwerk. Bowendien was hulle partye
tot die kontrak waarin die beperking op
Basson gelê is, en hoewel dit na
woord-lui slegs ten gunste van Coach-Tech beding is, was
7 die
beperking klaarblyklik daarop gerig om direk vir
Coach-Tech en
indirek hul ledebelange daarin te beskerm, te meer omdat beoog is dat die fondse
vir die opbou van Coach-Tech se onderneming
deur hulle verskaf sou
word.
Ek kom dan by 'n opweging van die belange van Coach-Tech en
die Chilwans teenoor dié van Basson om na beëindiging van
sy
verhouding met Coach-Tech vry doende te wees. Ek stem saam met my kollegas dat
die beperking nie kon dien om handelsgeheime of
vertroulike klanteverhoudings te
beskerm nie. Ek aanvaar ook dat die beperking, indien afdwingbaar, slegs sal
dien om Coach-Tech
teen direkte of indirekte mededinging deur Basson te beskerm.
So gesien, dien die beperking ter beskerming van Coach-Tech se werfkrag
oftewel
die "goodwill" wat dit opgebou het. Dat die beperking o a met die oog hierop
beding is, blyk duidelik uit para 11.1 van die
8
kontrak waarin om aan "trade secrets" 'n uitgebreide betekenis gegee is
sodat dié ook "goodwill" ingesluit het. En dat Coach-Tech
by Basson se
uittrede reeds 'n aansienlike werfkrag opgebou het, ly geen twyfel nie. Op
daardie stadium het Coach-Tech immers reeds
12 nuwe busse vervaardig, was ander
in aanbou, en het die korporasie ook reeds 'n aantal busse herbou. Dit was
hoofsaaklik aan twee
faktore te wyte: Basson se kundigheid en die Chilwans se
bydrae van meer as Rl miljoen aan Coach-Tech.
By 'n besinning oor
die al of nie redelik-heid van die beperking vervat in para 11.4 van die kontrak
moet die klem na my mening op
die volgende val:
1) Indien Basson nie
tot die beperking toegestem het nie sou die kontrak nie aangegaan gewees het en
sou Coach-Tech nie opgerig gewees
het nie.
9
2) Basson was nie 'n blote werknemer van
Coach-Tech nie, maar
inderdaad 'n lid van die kor-
porasie met dieselfde
bestuursbevoegdhede as die
Chilwans.
3) Hoewel Basson
beweer dat, afgesien
vir 'n tydperk van 'n jaar, hy vanaf 1961
konsekwent
in die busboubedryf werksaam was, sê hy nie dat
hy
nie buite daardie bedryf werk sal kan vind indien
die
beperking afgedwing word nie, of dat 'n
andersoortige
pos vir hom aansienlike finansiële verlies
sal
meebring nie.
Basson se posisie verskil vir my nie
noemenswaardig van dié van A in die volgende voor-beeld nie. Drie
prokureurs, A, B en
C, meen dat hulle 'n winsgewende praktyk in dorp Z kan
opbou. Derhalwe spreek hulle af om 'n maatskappy te stig waarin elk 'n gelyke
aandeelhouding sal hê; dat die maatskappy kantore vir 'n lang termyn sal
huur en
10 deur middel van beskikbaarstelling van fondse van een of
meer van die lede ameublement, 'n boekery ens sal aankoop, en om onder
die
vaandel van die maatskappy te praktiseer. Al drie is egter begaan oor die
moontlikheid dat een van hulle later mag uittree en
dan op Z in mededinging met
die maatskappy mag praktiseer. Hulle kom dus ook ooreen dat indien 'n lid
uittree hy vir 'n bepaalde
tyd nie aldaar mag praktiseer nie. Uitvoering word
aan die afspraak gegee en na twee jaar tree A uit, verkoop sy aandele aan 'n
derde
en begin ay eie praktyk op z. In so 'n geval sou die belang van die
maatskappy (en vanself-sprekend die oorblywende lede) in die
afdwing van die
beperking na my mening sterker weeg as A se belang om vryelik as prokureur op z
te praktiseer.
My kollega, Nienaber, betwis nie dat
Coach-
Tech - of meer spesifiek die Chilwans as lede van
die
korporasie - 'n "beskermingswaardige" belang in die
11
afdwing van die onderhawige beperking gehad het
nie. Hy meen egter dat dit op 'n ander wyse beskerm moes gewees het; nl deur
Basson
kontraktueel te verbind om vir 'n bepaalde tydperk lid en werknemer van
Coach-Tech te bly. As dit gebeur het, redeneer hy, sou die
Chilwans bes moontlik
by wyse van die ver-kryging van 'n interdik vir Basson kon verhoed om voor
verstryking van die periode in diens
van 'n mededinger van Coach-Tech te tree.
By wyse van voorbeeld beroep my kollega hom op die beslissing in
Roberts
Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef
1952 (2) SA 300
(W).
In daardie
saak het 'n dienskontrak bepaal dat die werknemer nie gedurende sy dienstermyn
in 'n onderneming anders as dié van
die werkgewer werksaam sou wees nie.
Dowling R het die beding onderskei van een wat na afloop van 'n diensverhouding
'n beperking
op 'n werknemer se, handelsvryheid plaas. Wat die
12
kern van die onderskeid is, is nie vir my heeltemal duidelik nie. Ek sou meen
dat in beide gevalle die afdwingbaarheid van die
beding aan die hand van 'n
afweging van die onderskeie belange beoordeel moet word, waarby die feit dat in
die eerste geval die beperking
slegs gedurende die dienstermyn van toe-passing
is, maar een van die tersaaklike faktore is. Te veel klem kan ook nie geplaas
word
op die voort-bestaan van die diensverhouding nie, want die werk-gewer is
vanselfsprekend nie verplig om die werknemer se salaris
te betaal indien hy nie
dienste lewer nie. Indien die werknemer in
Roberts
sou verkies het om nie
na sy voormalige werk terug te keer nie, sou hy dus werkloos en onproduktief
gewees het.
Die Roberts-meganisme sou ook nie in alle gevalle 'n
oplossing bied nie. Gestel dat in bo-staande voorbeeld die drie partye die
moontlikheid
bespreek om te beding dat hulle vir 'n tydperk van
10
13 jaar as lede van die maatskappy in Z sal praktiseer, maar dat
hulle daarteen besluit byvoorbeeld omdat hulle voor oë het dat
een of meer
van hulle mag verkies om vroeër op te hou praktiseer of om elders te gaan
praktiseer. In gevalle waarin 'n party
nie gewillig is om hom vir 'n bepaalde
tydperk tot een of ander verhouding te verbind nie, is 'n beperking wat na
beëindiging
van die verhouding geld dus al uit-weg.
In die lig
van al bostaande oorwegings is ek van oordeel dat die belange van Coach-Tech
-waarvan dié van die Chilwans nie losgemaak
kan word nie - swaarder as
dié van Basson weeg of dat, ten beste vir Basson, die skaal balanseer.
Die beperking is dus nie
onredelik nie vir soverre dit 'n beletsel op Basson
plaas om in diens van 'n mededinger van Coach-Tech te tree.
Soos my kollegas tereg daarop wys, is nie
14 aangevoer dat die beperking onafdwingbaar is vanweë sy omvang en
tydsduur nie. Ek stem dus saam met die bevel vervat in die
uitspraak van my
kollega, Eksteen, en wys slegs daarop dat die wysiging van die bevele van die
hof a
quo
nie substansiële sukses aan die kant van Basson daarstel
nie.
H J O VAN HEERDEN AR
BOTHA
JA
:-
2
I agree with NIENABER JA that the appeal should be allowed. I also agree
entirely with the reasoning set forth in his judgment. In
view of the
differences of opinion between the members of the Court I wish merely to mention
a few additional considerations which
weigh with me in respectfully differing
from my Colleagues VAN HEERDEN and EKSTEEN.
The incidence of the
onus in a case concerning the enforceability of a contractual provision in
restraint of trade does not appear
to me in principle to entail any greater or
more significant consequences than in any other civil case in general. The
effect of
it in practical terms is this: the covenantee seeking to enforce the
restraint need do no more than to invoke the provisions of the
contract and
prove the breach; the covenantor seeking to avert' enforcement is required to
prove on a pre-
3
ponderance of probability that in all the circumstances of the particular
case it will be unreasonable to enforce the restraint; if
the court is unable to
make up its mind on the point the restraint will be enforced. The covenantor is
burdened with the onus because
public policy requires that people should be
bound by their contractual undertakings. The covenantor is not so bound,
however, if
the restraint is unreasonable, because public policy discountenances
unreasonable restrictions on people's freedom of trade. In regard
to these two
opposing considerations of public policy, it seems to me that the operation of
the former is exhausted by the placing
of the onus on the covenantor; it has no
further role to play thereafter, when the reasonableness or otherwise of the
restraint is
being enquired into. "The paramount importance of upholding the
sanctity of contracts", which is emphasized by
4
EKSTEEN JA, finds its complete expression in the
rule of the law that the onus is on the covenantor; it has no bearing on the
issue
whether the particular restraint in question is unreasonable. Accordingly
I cannot agree with the statement that where parties contract
on a basis of
equality of bargaining power the principle
pacta sunt servanda
"will find
strong application". Equality of bargaining power cannot affect the nature of
the onus; it is relevant only as one of
the multitude of factors to be taken
into account in the enquiry as to the reasonableness of the restraint. And in
relation to this
enquiry I venture to suggest that it serves no useful purpose
to invoke the observation, made with reference to contracts contrary
to public
policy in general, that the court's power in this regard should be exercised
"only in the clearest of cases". By a long
process of judicial development it is
clearly established-
5
that, in the particular case of a contract in re-straint of trade, an
unreasonable restraint is con-trary to public policy, and that
the covenantor
can avoid contractual liability by discharging the onus of proving
unreasonableness, according to the ordi-nary standard
of proof required in a
civil case.
The view that the restraint clause in the present case
has not been shown to be unreasonable rests crucially upon the basis that the
Chilwans and Coach-Tech were possessed of a legitimate interest to protect the
corporation against competition by Basson, for the
purpose of safeguarding the
goodwill of Coach-Tech. In this regard VAN HEERDEN JA has referred to the
example of the purchaser of
a busi-ness restraining the seller from competing
with it. The example given is, of course, a familiar one; in that kind of
situation
there is ordinarily no diffi-culty in enforcing the restraint against
competition
6
if the area and the duration of its operation are
found to be reasonable. In my opinion, however, that
situation is
fundamentally and vitally different from the situation with which we are dealing
in the present case. In the case of
a sale of a business, its goodwill is an
existing asset which is part of the
merx
which passes from the seller to
the buyer; the value of the goodwill is necessarily reflected in the price paid
by the buyer and
received by the seller. Competition by the seller will impinge
upon that value, and the reasonableness of a restraint the object
of which is to
prevent that from happening is self-evident. In the present case there was no
goodwill in existence when the restraint
was imposed. Basson had no asset to
sell, unless one regards his bus-body building skill and experience as an asset
of which he could
dispose by a binding contract, irrevocable for a period of at
least five years.
7
That was no doubt the light in which the Chilwans regarded the situation,
as appears from their affidavits and from EKSTEEN JA's comment
that Basson's
"wealth of experience and skill in the bus construction industry would be an
important, if not indispensable asset
in the venture". But the Chilwans could
not appropriate Basson's expertise to themselves or to Coach-Tech, as if it were
a freely
disposable commodity, by investing their money in the business. If
Basson had left Coach-Tech after the Chilwans had invested a million
rand in
putting up a factory and equipping it, but before the commencement of business,
I cannot imagine that the court would have
enforced the restraint. And I cannot
see how the building up of goodwill during the time that the business was being
carried on,
as a result of the Chilwan's investment and Basson's skills, can
make any difference. In essence, the Chilwans are seeking
8
to prevent Basson from using his skill and experience, and his innate or
acquired abilities, to the potential detriment of their investment.
In this
respect the case bears no resemblance to the case of the seller and buyer of a
business. On the contrary, it approximates
closely to the case of an employer
and employee relationship, in one respect. In relation to such cases it has
often been said in
the authorities that a man's skills and abilities are a part
of himself and that he cannot ordinarily be precluded from making use
of them by
a contract in restraint of trade. The impact of that observation in the
circumstances of the present case is not detracted
from, I consider, by the fact
that the Chilwans and Basson had equal bargaining power, nor by the fact that
Basson's position in
the venture was that of an equal partner, and not an
employee.
In his judgment VAN HEERDEN JA poses
the
9
hypothetical example of three attorneys forming a
company and investing money in it in order to carry
on practice in the town of Z. He considers that a
restraint
against competition would be reasonable and
enforceable. I beg to
differ, in view of what has been said above. But in any event the facts in the
example differ in one crucially
important respect from the facts in the present
case. The difference relates to the area of the restraint, and it is a
difference
which serves to focus the attention on what I consider to be the
single most important, and indeed decisive, feature pointing to
the
unreason-ableness of the restraint in the present case. In the example, the
restraint applies to the town of Z; in the present
case, it applies to the whole
of Southern Africa. The attorney is still free to practise his profession in the
next town; Basson
is not to be allowed to carry on his trade anywhere
in
10
the country of his birth, or even close to it. I am not aware that a
restraint so oppressive in scope has ever been countenanced in
our courts. It is
said by VAN HEERDEN JA that Basson does not allege that he will be unable to
find employment outside the bus-body
construction industry or that he will
suffer substantial financial loss if he is compelled to take up a different kind
of employment;
and by EKSTEEN JA that the restraint will not prevent Basson from
exercising his skills in other spheres of the con-struction industry.
Personally, I find these obser-vations inappropriate. On the evidence it is
plain that Basson is an expert in the building of bus-bodies
and a master of
that trade, to which he has devoted substantially the most of his working life.
By way of contrast, it appears that
the Chilwans have obtained the services of
someone else to replace Basson and it has not been suggested that they
11
experienced any real problems in doing so. They are simply bent on
putting Basson's superior skills out of action. Basson cannot be
faulted for not
having proposed a lesser area of restraint as being reason-able . The case
sought to be made against him was that
the respondents required the restraint to
be enforced in its entirety. In respect of the area of it, it was alleged
inter alia
that there are only five or six bus-body construction concerns
in the Republic. In meeting that case, Basson said, at the outset
of his
affidavit, with reference to the effect of the restraint,
"dat ek daardeur verhoed word dat ek my algemene kennis en vaardigheid en
onder-vinding in die busboubedryf tot my eie voordeel kan
gebruik en my bestaan
maak in die ambag waarin ek reeds ongeveer 30 jaar
werk",
and on this basis he contended that,
having regard to
all the circumstances set out in the rest of his
12
affidavit, it would be unreasonable and contrary to public policy to
enforce the restraint. I agree with
his contention, and I concur in
the order made by NIENABER JA.
A S BOTHA JA
MILNE JA
CONCURS