S v Shandu (214/92) [1993] ZASCA 29 (15 March 1993)

75 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Death penalty — Appellant convicted of murder, robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm; sentenced to death for murder — Appellant's appeal against death sentence based on claims of diminished moral blameworthiness and mitigating factors — Court finds appellant played a leading role in the crime, which was premeditated and executed with extreme violence against a vulnerable victim — No substantial mitigating factors identified; aggravating circumstances outweigh any claims for leniency — Appeal dismissed, death sentence upheld.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These were appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Africa (Appellate Division), in which the appellant, Dalious Nkosi Shandu, appealed against sentence imposed after convictions in the trial court. The respondent was the State.


In the court of first instance the appellant and three co-accused were convicted of murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances. The appellant was additionally convicted of the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder, 12 years’ imprisonment for the robbery, and 4 years’ imprisonment for the firearm and ammunition offences.


The appeal was limited to the death sentence. No appeal lay against the convictions or the other terms of imprisonment. The dispute accordingly concerned the proper sentence for a murder committed in the course of a planned robbery against an elderly person in his home, and whether any mitigating factors or other considerations meant that the death penalty was not the only proper sentence.


2. Material Facts


The material facts were those found by the trial court, and accepted as the factual foundation for sentence. The deceased was a retired man who lived alone in a semi-detached flat in a retirement village in Eshowe.


The court a quo found that on the afternoon of 21 September 1990 at approximately 15h30 the deceased returned to his flat and remained there. After dark that evening, persons who had arrived earlier that afternoon in a blue motor vehicle gained access to the deceased’s flat. The deceased’s resistance was overcome by force, and the court considered it probable that he was threatened with a firearm.


The assailants ransacked the flat and removed numerous goods, placing them in the deceased’s motor vehicle parked in the adjoining garage. The use of the deceased’s vehicle was found to be calculated to effect removal of the goods as unobtrusively as possible. The deceased was then forcibly put into his own car and driven to a secluded spot in a State forest (the judgment noting that the distance mentioned as 59 kilometres should in fact have been 70 kilometres). The location was found to be isolated and not frequented.


At that spot the deceased was removed from the vehicle and shot in the head. His body was set alight with an inflammable substance such as petrol in order to remove traces, and became extensively charred. The killing was found to be intentional in the sense of dolus directus. The trial court further found that those who removed the deceased from his home did so with the intention that he be permanently removed, and that to that extent the gang members acted with common purpose or in concert to achieve that objective.


As to the appellant’s role, the trial court found he was one of the gang and that he played a leading role in the commission of the crime. In the appeal it was contended that the appellant’s older brother Musa (who later died when police attempted to arrest him) had planned or “orchestrated” the offence, and that the appellant’s role was overstated. The appellate court recorded that the trial court accepted it was reasonably possible Musa had targeted the deceased’s house, but nonetheless found the appellant played a major role. The appellate court treated the following as material to that conclusion: the appellant was found driving the deceased’s car in Durban six days after the murder; he took virtually all the spoils of the robbery and concealed them; and his version that he became involved only after Musa had already committed the murder and robbery was rejected by the trial court as false.


3. Legal Issues


The central issue was whether the death sentence was, on the facts as found and in the light of relevant sentencing principles, the only proper sentence for the murder.


This required determination of an evaluative sentencing question involving the application of legal principles to the established facts, including an assessment of whether there were mitigating factors of real significance and whether, when weighed against aggravating features and the purposes of punishment, those mitigating factors justified a sentence other than death.


A subsidiary issue, relevant to the sentencing evaluation, was whether there was any basis to interfere with the trial court’s factual finding that the appellant played a leading or major role in the crime, because that finding materially affected the assessment of moral blameworthiness and sentence.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The appellate court approached the appeal on the basis that the convictions stood and that it was concerned only with the propriety of the death sentence. It addressed, first, the challenge to the trial court’s finding that the appellant played a leading role. The appellate court held there was no basis to interfere with that finding, emphasising the appellant’s possession and use of the deceased’s vehicle shortly after the crime, his control over and concealment of the stolen goods, and the rejection of his exculpatory version as false. These considerations supported the conclusion that the appellant’s involvement was substantial and that he was not a peripheral participant.


The court then evaluated the mitigating factors advanced on appeal. Three were relied upon: diminished blameworthiness due to consumption of liquor during the robbery; limited formal education and disadvantaged upbringing, including negative influence from criminally-involved brothers; and the possibility of reform.


On intoxication, the court reasoned that there was no direct evidence that any of the accused drank liquor that night, and while there was evidence suggesting alcohol was consumed in the deceased’s home, there was no proof identifying the appellant as one of those who drank (except that fingerprints connected a beer glass to another accused). The appellant’s own version was that he did not even enter the deceased’s home. Even assuming in the appellant’s favour that it was reasonably possible he had drunk during the robbery, the court held there was no evidence that it influenced him in a way that could mitigate the offence.


On background and education, the court accepted the appellant’s difficult circumstances in early life but considered that he had nonetheless overcome that background to a significant degree. He had passed Standard 6, had taught himself to be a motor mechanic, and was earning enough to support dependants. The court also noted that the appellant was 28 years old and was the eldest of the four accused, a consideration bearing on maturity and responsibility.


On prospects of reform, the court found they were remote. It relied on the appellant’s prior convictions involving violence, including a robbery for which he received an eight-year sentence, his escape from custody, and the fact that the present offence was committed while he was at liberty after escaping. In the court’s view there were no mitigating factors of real significance.


Having found mitigation insubstantial, the court considered aggravating features which, in its assessment, strongly pointed to the severest punishment. It emphasised that the crime was planned in advance, that the victim was an elderly man (69) living alone in a retirement village, and that the perpetrators travelled from Empangeni to Eshowe. It highlighted the manner of execution: overpowering the deceased in his own home, forcibly transporting him to an isolated forest location, assaulting him (with broken ribs), shooting him in what the trial court characterised as a cold-blooded execution, and burning the body to destroy evidence. The court further treated as a serious aggravation the motive to avoid detection and punishment for the robbery, which could have been carried out without killing or seriously injuring the deceased, and it noted the value of the stolen goods (R7 335.00). It also referred to evidence that similar attacks on elderly and defenceless persons in the area had increased in recent years, bearing on deterrence.


In deciding whether the death sentence was the only proper sentence, the court applied the approach summarised in S v Tloome 1992(2) SACR 30 (A), namely that the main objects of punishment—retribution, prevention, deterrence and reformation—must be weighed, and that where elderly victims are murdered in their own homes with robbery as motive, retribution and deterrence tend to come to the fore. The court held these observations applied to the present case. In its ultimate evaluation, it characterised the murder as particularly shocking, committed for the worst motives, and concluded that the death sentence remained the only proper sentence.


5. Outcome and Relief


The appeal against the death sentence was dismissed. The effect was that the death sentence imposed for the murder remained in place. The judgment did not make a distinct costs order in relation to the appeal.


Cases Cited


S v Tloome 1992(2) SACR 30 (A)


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Appellate Division held that there was no basis to interfere with the trial court’s finding that the appellant played a major role in the offences, and that the mitigating factors advanced (alcohol consumption, disadvantaged background and limited education, and the possibility of reform) were not established or were not of real significance on the evidence and facts found.


It further held that the aggravating features—planned targeting of an elderly victim in his home, forcible abduction to an isolated place, execution-style killing, burning of the body to conceal evidence, and murder committed to avoid detection for the robbery—together with sentencing objectives, especially retribution and deterrence as articulated in S v Tloome, meant that the death sentence was the only proper sentence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that, in deciding whether to impose (or confirm) the death penalty for murder, a court must weigh the main purposes of punishment, namely retribution, prevention, deterrence, and reformation, and evaluate whether, considering all relevant factors, death is the only proper sentence.


It applied the further principle that where the murder involves elderly victims in their own homes and the motive is robbery, considerations of retribution and deterrence will commonly be prominent in the sentencing balance, particularly where the murder was unnecessary to accomplish the robbery and is committed to avoid detection.


The judgment also reflected the approach that asserted mitigating factors must be supported by an evidential foundation and must be shown to have real mitigating force; speculative claims (such as unproven intoxication or unsupported assertions of impaired responsibility) do not reduce moral blameworthiness absent evidence demonstrating their effect.

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[1993] ZASCA 29
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S v Shandu (214/92) [1993] ZASCA 29 (15 March 1993)

Case No 214/92 /wlb
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
In the matter between:
DALIOUS NKOSI SHANDU
Appellant
and
THE STATE
Respondent
CORAM
: MILNE, EKSTEEN JJA et Van Coller AJA
DATE OF HEARING
: 5 March 1993
DATE OF JUDGMENT
: 15 March
1993
JUDGMENT
/MILNE JA
2
MILNE JA:
The appellant and three others were convicted of murder and robbery with
aggravating circumstances. The appellant was also convicted
of the unlawful
possession of a firearm and ammunition. He was sentenced to death on the murder
charge, to 12 years' imprisonment
on the robbery charge and 4 years'
imprisonment on the other charges. He appeals only against the sentence of
death.
The deceased was a retired man. He lived on
his own in a semi-detached flat in a retirement village
in Eshowe. The trial court found as facts the
following:
"1. ... that the deceased returned to his flat on the afternoon of the 21st
September 1990 at about 3.30 pm and that he remained there
thereafter.
2.
After dark on that Friday
evening persons who had arrived in the vicinity earlier that afternoon in a blue
motor-vehicle gained access
to the deceased's flat.
3.
The deceased's resistance was overcome by force.
We
3
think that he was probably threatened with a fire-arm.
4. His assailants thereupon ransacked the flat, removing the goods Exhs 1 to 41
and placing these in the deceased's motor-vehicle
parked in the adjoining
garage.
5. The deceased's motor-vehicle was used because the removal of the goods would
be effected as unobtrus-ively as possible.
6. The deceased was forcibly put into his own car and his assailants drove off
to the secluded spot in the State forest some 59 kilometres
from his home. (This
distance should actually be 70 km)
7. The spot itself is isolated and clearly not frequented by people.
8. The deceased was removed from the vehicle and he was shot in the head.
9. In order to remove all traces of him his body was set alight with an
inflammable substance, such as petrol. The burning resulted
in the body being
extensively charred.
10. We find that the killing of the deceased in these circumstances was
intentional in the sense of dolus directus.
11. We find further that the persons who removed the deceased from his home did
so with the intention that he be permanently removed.
To that extent every
member of this gang acted in common purpose or in concert to achieve that
objective."
The Court found that the appellant was
one of
the gang referred to and, indeed, that he had played a
leading role in the commission of the crime.
4 It was urged upon us by
Mr Ludick
for
the
appellant, to whom we are indebted for his
assistance, that the trial court had erred in finding that the appellant had
played a leading
role and that there were a number of mitigating factors
present. The elder brother of the appellant, one Musa (who was shot dead
when
the police were attempting to arrest him) was, so it was submitted, the person
who had planned and "orchestrated" the commission
of the offence. The court a
quo found that it was reasonably possible that Musa had "earmarked and targeted"
the deceased's house
in Eshowe but that nevertheless the appellant had played a
major role. There is no basis for interfering with this finding. The appellant
is the one who took the deceased's car and drove it to Durban where he was found
driving it six days after the commission of the
murder. He was the one who took
virtually all the spoils of the robbery and concealed them. It was his version
that he had become
involved only after Musa had already committed the
murder
5 and the robbery but the court rejected that version as
false.
The mitigating factors relied upon were
that:
(a) the appellant's moral blameworthiness was diminished because he had consumed
liquor in the course of committing the robbery;
(b) he had had little formal education and had been raised in disadvantaged
circumstances and influenced by his brothers who were
"no strangers to criminal
activity"; and
(c) the possibility of the appellant's reform could not be
excluded.
For reasons which follow I find that there is no
sub-stance in these submissions, but even if there had been, their effect would
have
been far outweighed by a number of serious aggravating features.
There is no direct evidence that any of the accused drank liquor that night.
The evidence suggests
6 that someone drank beer and some spirituous liquor in
the
deceased's home that night but (save with regard to
Accused No 2 whose
fingerprints were found on a beer
glass) there is no evidence as to the identity of those
persons. On the appellant's version he did not even
enter the deceased's home let alone have anything to
drink in it. Assuming however in appellant's favour,
that it was reasonably possible that he had something to
drink in the course of committing the robbery, there is
not a shadow of evidence to suggest that it influenced
him in any way which would mitigate his offence.
He had had some schooling - he had passed Standard 6 and he had taught
himself to be a motor mechanic. He was earning sufficient from
this trade to
support himself, his children and his sister's children at the time this offence
was committed. True his parents died
when he was a very young child and no doubt
his brothers were a bad influence, but the appellant had
7 overcome his
deprived background sufficiently to be able
to earn a reasonable living. The appellant was 28 years
old at the time when the murder was committed and was in
fact the eldest of the four accused.
The prospect of the appellant's reform is remote. He has a number of previous
convictions involving violence. His last was a conviction
for robbery in respect
of which he was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment. He did not serve the full
term because he escaped from
custody and in fact committed this very offence
whilst at liberty. In my judgment there are no mitigating factors of any real
significance.
The aggravating factors I referred to are the following: (a) The crime was
planned in advance. The deceased,
aged 69, lived in a retirement village in Eshowe.
The accused came from Empangeni, 59 km away.
8
(b) The manner in which the crime was committed. I
cannot improve upon the following description by the
learned trial judge (Levinsohn J):
"... this elderly and defenceless man, who was entitled to live out the rest of
his days in peace, was overpowered in his own home
and forcibly removed to a
lonely spot in the forest where he was done to death. He was obviously assaulted
(so seriously that three
ribs were broken) prior to being killed and the manner
in which he was finally killed was nothing short of being a cold-blooded
execution."
(My parenthesis)
(c) The motive for the murder was to avoid detection and punishment for the
robbery which could easily have been carried out without
killing or seriously
injuring the deceased. The value of the articles stolen was R7 335.00.
(d) The fact that a number of attacks of this nature on elderly and defenceless
persons in the area has on the evidence increased
in the last few
years.
To sum up. This is a particular shocking murder committed
by a heartless criminal who did it for
9
the worst possible motives.
The question still remains whether the death
sentence is the only proper sentence. In S v Tloome
1992(2) SACR 30 (A) at 39h the Chief Justice said:
"This Court has on a number of occasions indicated that in determining whether
or not the death penalty should be imposed the main
objects of punishment,
retribution, prevention, deterrence and reformation should be weighed. At the
same time, in cases of murder
of elderly victims in their own homes with robbery
as the motive, inevitably the factors of retribution and deterrence tend to come
to the fore."
These remarks apply in this case. The appeal is
dismissed.
A J MILNE
Judge of Appeal
EKSTEEN JA ]
] CONCUR VAN COLLER AJA ]