IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

Case number: 2025-105798

In the matter between:

REGINALD DAVID SNYDERS First Applicant

SPECELINE SNYDERS Second Applicant

And

FRIDOLAIN CHAMFORT DJOMO DJOUFANG First Respondent

STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY Second Respondent

SHERIFF OF THE LOWER COURT, STELLENBOSCH Third Respondent

Coram: Pangarker, J
Date of hearing: 14 August 2025
Date of Judgment: 15 August 2025
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
______________________________________________________________________
PANGARKER J

[1] On 21 July 2025, this Court delivered its written reasons for orders granted on 10
July 2025 pursuant to an urgent application heard on 9 July 202 5. The written reasons
appear on Saflii as Djoufang v Snyders and Others (Reasons) [2025] ZAWCHC 297.
The first respondent in the current application, Mr Djoufang, was the applicant in both
the urgent application and the earlier eviction application heard in the Stellenbosch
Magistrates’ Court. On 24 July 2025, Mr and Mrs Snyders, who are the applicants in this
application, and were the first and second respondents respectively in the urgent
application and eviction, delivered a document which purported to be an application for
leave to appeal this Court’s 10 July order and subsequent reasons. The document did
not comply with the provisions of rule 49(1) read with Practice Directive 45B. I refer to
the parties as cited in the application heard yesterday.

[2] In view of the issues related to the abovementio ned document, t he applicants
were requested to consider obtaining legal advice or legal representation to assist them
in bringing a proper application for leave to appeal the order of 10 July 2025. They were
also informed that once a proper application was delivered, a date for the hearing of the
leave to appeal application would be communicated to the parties.

[3] Subsequently, a second application, along with several further documents, w as
indeed delivered by the applicants, who drafted the documents themselves and
continued to represent themselves. In order to expedite matters and ensure that the
applicants were heard, the matter was allocated for hearing yesterday, 14 August 2025.
As with the urgent application, and the delivery of various documents, often
duplications, the Court’s approach was relatively flexible , bearing in mind that the
applicants were unrepresented litigants.

[4] In order to ensure that the second document, the “Notice of Motion: Application

[4] In order to ensure that the second document, the “Notice of Motion: Application
for leave to appeal on case 2025 -105798 Western Cape High Court: Urgent Roll ”, was
in fact the respondents’ leave to appeal application, the Court explained section 17(1) of
the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 and the test in leave to appeal applications to the

applicants. Mr Snyders , the first applicant, confirmed that th is second document was
indeed his and his wife’s leave to appeal application in respect of this Court’s order and
written reasons pursuant to the urgent application heard in July 2025.

[5] The order of 10 July 2025 stated the following:

“1. That condonation is granted for the non-compliance with time periods, forms
and processes set out in the Uniform Rules of Court. In terms of Rule 6(12),
the application is urgent.
2. That it is declared that the document titled “Notice of an appeal on case
126/2024: Stellenbosch Magistrates ’ Court”, filed on 25 June 2025 at the
Stellenbosch Magistrates’ Court which purports to be a Notice of Appeal
against the order granted by that Court on 13 March 2025 (the eviction order)
is out of time, irregular and defective.
3. That it is declared th at the operation and executability of the eviction order is
not suspended.
4. The Fifth Respondent is directed to carry out the eviction of the First to Third
Respondents as set out in paragraph 4 of the eviction Order as requested by
the Applicant.
5. The First, Second and Fifth Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this
application, jointly and severally.”

[6] The applicants attached an affidavit to their Notice of Motion (leave to appeal)
wherein they, inter alia, (i) take issue that this Court’s order renders their appeal against
the eviction and condonation for the late Notice of Appeal , null and void ; (ii) that the
authorities referred to in the written reasons, namely, President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others v Mod derklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 1 and Panayiotou v
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd and Others2, were irrelevant to the urgent application;(iii)
that the decision in Charnell Co mmando and Others v City of Cape Town and

1 2004(6) SA 40 SCA
2 2016(3) SA 110 (GJ)

Another3 should be followed ; and, (iv) that there is a reasonable prospect of success
on appeal and some compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

[7] I point out that the affidavit is largely a re -visit of the Snyders’ opposition to the
urgent application for declaratory relief. Furthermore, large parts of the affidavit present
submissions and averments related to the subject matter of the urgent application which
were already canvassed during that hearing, considered and addressed in the written
reasons of 21 July 2025.

[8] Be that as it may, i n their Notice of Motion, the applicants request the following:
leave to appeal the 10 July 2025 order ; a hearing for a revised order on an urgent
basis”4; a stay of the eviction order; an order that the Sheriff, Stellenbosch be restrained
from acting in accordance with the declarator granted on 10 July ; a rescission of the 10
July order and that the Legal Aid Board be directed to assist the m. On enquiry during
the hearing, Mr Snyders confirmed that the applicants wish to have the 10 July order
suspended or rescinded and also leave to appeal such order.

[9] On consideration of the Notice of Motion, it is evident that the applicants seek
leave to appeal but the rest of the relief sought are orders which the first respondent
and his legal representatives were of the view, were not competent. They were called to
Court on a leave to appeal application and the additional relief sought makes no
provision for the delivery of a Notice of Opposition and an answering affidavit. In respect
of the latter submission, I agree with the first respondent’s submission.

[10] In the circumstances, therefore, the Notice of Motion is approached from the
perspective that the applicants seek leave to appeal the 10 July 2025 order and the
subsequent written reasons. In his oral submissions, Mr Snyders’ attac ked the lack of
urgency in the 9 July application for declaratory relief based on the same argument as

urgency in the 9 July application for declaratory relief based on the same argument as
presented during th at hearing. However, there is no indication that the applicants hold

3 [2024] ZACC 27
4 Notice of Motion, p74

the view that the Court was wrong or committed an error on the question of urgency, but
to the extent that the applicants do say this (th ough very unclearly), the written reasons
dealt fully with th e urgency issue and set out why the Snyders’ argument regarding
urgency had no merit. In these circumstances, the applicants have not shown that there
is a reasonable prospect that another Court might come to a different conclusion on the
question of urgency.5

[11] On their view that this Court’s order renders the applicants’ appeal of the eviction
order null and void, the submission is certainly incorrect. It was made abundantly clear
in the reasons that as a single Judge hearing an urgent application and having found
that the Snyders’ Notice of Appeal 6 did not suspend the eviction order due to its late
delivery, it was not for th is Court at the time, to hear and consider a condonation
application in respect of such late Notice of Appeal. This aspect is addressed at
paragraphs 16 and 17 of the reasons . At the risk of repetition , any condonation
application in respect of a late Notice of Appeal, would have to be placed before the
Judges hearing the appeal.

[12] Mr Snyders also takes issue with th is Court’s reference to the Modderklip
Boerdery and Panayiotou judgments referred to in its reasons. He regards the
Supreme Court of Appeal ’s Modderklip Boerdery judgment as a “non -starter” and
irrelevant to case number A138/2025 , the eviction appeal . In this respect, and as
correctly submitted by counsel for the first respondent , the Court dealt with the two
judgments in its reasons and set out why the principles laid down therein - that the
suspension of execution of an order presupposes a valid application for leave to appeal
and that (as held by Sutherland J ) in Panayiotou7, the delivery of a condonation
application does not automatically suspend the operation of the order or judgment 8 -

application does not automatically suspend the operation of the order or judgment 8 -
apply equally to a Notice of Appeal filed in relation to a Magistrates’ Courts’ order and
judgment. Clearly, the judgments were neither irrelevant to the issue before the Court in

5 The Mont Chevaux Trust v Goosen and Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) para [6]
6 In respect of the Stellenbosch eviction order
7 At para [15]
8 Para 25, 26 of written reasons

the urgent application nor a “non -starter”, and accordingly, the submission as
contended for by the applicants is without merit or substance.

[13] As for the reference to the Commando judgment, upon which Mr Snyd ers relies
in the leave to appeal application, the Court enquired whether that judgment may not be
more relevant to the appeal of the eviction as opposed to the leave to appeal application
related to the urgent declaratory order. Mr Snyders was reminded that he was not
arguing the appeal of the eviction order but was to limit himself to the grounds for leave
to appeal the urgent declaratory order. In my view, this ground for leave to appeal also
has no merit.

[14] Mr Snyders requested, at the conclusion of his submissions, that leave to appeal
should be granted and that t his Court’s order of 10 July 2025 should be suspended
since the appeal of the eviction order is due to be hear d in September. He also took
issue that Stellenbosch Municipality was not p resent at Court to participate in the leave
to appeal application, an a spect which, in my view, has no bearing on the success or
otherwise of the leave to appeal application.

[15] Having considered the application and submissions, it is apparent that the
applicants have conflated the leave to appeal with the previous urgent application, the
eviction, the appeal against the eviction order , the condonation application and the
application to admit new evidence on appeal, the latter being a further application
attached to the leave to appeal documents. It would also seem that the Snyders wish to
shift the proverbial goal posts to their appeal date in September 2025 and so remain in
the first respondent’s property. Having regard to their various requests, all confusingly
combined in a leave to appeal application, the Court agrees with counsel for the first
respondent, that it is not at liberty to suspend its own order nor the eviction order of the

respondent, that it is not at liberty to suspend its own order nor the eviction order of the
Stellenbosch Magistrates’ Court. The correctness of the eviction order is a matter for the
appeal Court, and not for this Court.

[16] Counsel also submitted that in July 2025, there was no application to suspend

the eviction order, nor a counter -application to the urgent application, thus the Snyders
could not now, via the back door, seek a suspension of th is Court’s order or its
rescission. In the event that their Notice of Motion purports to do so (seek a rescission
and/or suspension) , it in any event suffers from fatal defects as indicated above .
Ultimately, the only matter which this Court was seized with yesterday, was the
applicants’ application for leave to appeal the urgent declaratory order.

[17] In the test applicable to leave to appeal applications, it must be emphasized that
leave to appeal may only be granted if the Judge(s) concerned is of the opinion that the
appeal would have reasonable prospects of success or that there is some other
compelling reason why the appeal should be heard 9. In considering such application,
the Judge should approach the application objectively. Furthermore, the use of the word
“would” in section 17(1)(a) refers to “a measure of certainty” that another Court will differ
from the Court whose judgment is the subject of a leave to appeal application.10

[18] In view of this test, it was incumbent upon the Snyders to demonstrate on proper
grounds that there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of being successful on
appeal. Having considered their ap plication, and the oral and written submissions by
both parties , my view is that the applicants have failed to meet the threshold set in
section 17(1) for leave to appeal to be granted in their favour. To add, the applicants
presented no sound nor rational basis to find that there is a reas onable prospect of
success on appeal in relation to the July order and reasons.11

[19] Furthermore, there is also no compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.
Obviously, if the appeal Court finds in their favour, and sets aside the eviction order, the
effect of such order would have potential consequences for the declaratory order

effect of such order would have potential consequences for the declaratory order
granted on 10 July, but this is not a compelling reason why leave to appeal should be
granted, especially as the appeal mu st still be heard and there is no guarantee that the
applicants (as appellants) would be successful in such appeal. Accordingly, the

9 Section 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.
10 Mont Chevaux, supra para [6], paraphrased
11 Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Rattan No 2019

application for leave to appeal will be dismissed.

[20] As for costs, Mr Snyders requested that each party should pay their own costs.
The Court , to the extent that it was able to, assisted the applicants, and took a less
formalistic approach, as did the first respondent’s counsel, mindful that the Snyders are
unrepresented litigants. However, this does not absolve them of informing themselves of
the requirements and threshold in section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act , particularly
as it was clear that Mr Snyders draft ed all the Notices, affidavits and docume nts in the
matters which have been placed before this Court. Another Court may well have struck
the application from the roll given all the confusion surrounding it, duplication of
documents and incompetent relief sought in the further orders in the Notice of Motion.

[21] Notwithstanding the communication from the Court’s Registrar after the first set
of incorrect documents, that Mr and Mrs Snyders were urged to obtain legal advice or
legal representation for the leave to appeal , the y ignored the Court’s request or
direction and forged ahead with a problematic application, for all the reasons sketched
above. In all these circumstances, there is no reason why costs should not follow the
result.

[22] In the result, the following order is granted:

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, to be paid jointly and
severally by the First and Second Applicants (scale B).


________________________
M PANGARKER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT


Appearances:

For First and Second Applicants: Both in person

For First Respondent: Adv R de Wet
Instructed by: Christo Marais Attorneys & Conveyancers
STELLENBOSCH

Per: Ms C Redelinghuys

No other appearances.