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[1993] ZASCA 6
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S v Ncube (543/90) [1993] ZASCA 6 (22 February 1993)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE
DIVISION
)
CASE NO 543/90
In the matter:
PHILLY
NCUBE
APPELLANT
AND
THE STATE
RESPONDENT
CORAM
: HEFER, GOLDSTONE JJA et HARMS AJA.
DATE HEARD
: 20 NOVEMBER 1992
DATE DELIVERED
: 22 FEBRUARY 1993
2
JUDGMENT
GOLDSTONE JA:
On the night of 6 January 1988, Mr John Roussos, to whom I shall refer as
"the deceased", drove home from his shop in Waterkloof Glen,
Pretoria. He parked
his motor vehicle in the garage where a group of men were awaiting his arrival.
As he alighted from his car he
was attacked by members of the group. He was
severely assaulted about the head with a hammer and in consequence of the
injuries thus
inflicted he died.
Five men were arrested and charged with the murder of the deceased and
robbery with aggravating
3
circumstances. One of them was the appellant.
Before their trial in the Transvaal Provincial Division, the appellant escaped.
The
other four were tried and convicted. One of them, Edward Tobie Qekisi, was
sentenced to death. His appeal against the death sentence
was dismissed by this
Court.
Subsequently, the appellant was rearrested and stood trial before Weyers
J and two assessors. He was found guilty of the murder of
the deceased and of
robbery with aggravating circumstances. In respect of the murder the sentence of
death was imposed. For the robbery
he was sentenced to eight years'
imprisonment. The appellant has appealed to this Court against the conviction
for murder and, in
the alternative, against the imposition of the death
sentence.
The state relied primarily upon the evidence of Qekisi. The Judge a
quo
correctly held that he could not safely rely on the evidence of this
witness and it is
4
unnecessary to set out the detail of his version.
Suffice it to say that he placed the hammer in the possession of the appellant
and
testified that it was the appellant who assaulted the deceased with it. (I
might mention that in convicting Qekisi of murder in the
earlier trial it was
held proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it was he who struck the hammer
blows).
At all times the appellant has admitted being present with the other
members of the group on the night in question. He originally
relied on a version
which distanced himself from the actual attack on the deceased. Again, it is not
necessary to set out the detail
of that version which, indeed, was repeated by
the appellant when he testified in the Court a
quo
. It is unnecessary
because whilst he was still testifying in his own defence, the appellant decided
to change his version. The trial
court, again correctly, decided that in the
absence of other acceptable evidence the guilt or
5
innocence of the appellant would have to be
determined on the basis of his second version to which I now
turn.
According to the appellant he was enlisted by Qekisi to join a
group of men which was to rob the deceased. They waited for the deceased
outside
the garage of his apartment. It was agreed that the appellant and Qekisi would
attack the deceased in the garage. The appellant
was to hold him while Qekisi
searched him. The other three men would search the deceased's car. When the
deceased alighted from his
car the appellant grabbed him around his neck and
held him down. Instead of searching the deceased, Qekisi took a hammer out from
under his shirt and began to hit the deceased with it. The first blow struck the
deceased. The second, which presumably came immediately
after, hit the
appellant's left elbow. It was a painful blow as a result of which the appellant
released his strangle hold of the
deceased. Qekisi continued to hit the
deceased
6
with the hammer and did not let up even after the
deceased fell to the floor.
The appellant stated that he did not know that Qekisi was armed with any
weapon. He was not aware of any intention but to rob the
appellant, tie him up
and make a getaway.
It would appear from the appellant's version that the group had intended
also to take the keys of the deceased's shop, go there, and
steal goods from it.
The appellant said that after they left the deceased he refused to do
so.
That, then, is the version of the appellant. It is highly suspect and
unreliable. That the appellant is a self-confessed liar brooks
of no argument;
that he played a more active role in the affair and that he knew that the
deceased was to be attacked is highly probable.
In particular it is unlikely
that the robbers would have set out unarmed, and it is improbable that the
appellant
7
would only have held the deceased so that he could
be searched and no more. However, as the judge a
quo
pointed out, the
trial Court had before it two versions -both from self-confessed liars. And
inferences cannot be drawn only on probabilities
in the absence of evidence to
support them.
The guilt or innocence of the appellant must therefore be tested on the
basis that it was Qekisi who attacked the deceased with the
hammer. On that
assumption, the questions to be answered are those succinctly set out by
Nienaber JA in
S v Majosi and Others
, 1991(2) SACR 532(A) at 537 c -
e:
"That appellant No 2 was a party to a common purpose to commit armed
robbery is undisputed. The real issue, therefore, is whether
appellant No 2
foresaw and reconciled himself with the risk that any of his associates, in the
course of the execution of their plan
to rob, might cause the death of someone -
in which case he would be guilty of murder - or, if he did not,
8
that he ought reasonably to have foreseen that consequence - in which case
he would be guilty of culpable homicide. (
S v Nkwenja en 'n Ander
1985(2)
SA 5 60 (A);
S v Mbatha en Andere
1987 (2) SA 272
(A) at 283B.) The
enquiry is directed to the state of mind of appellant No 2 at the time he
embarked on the venture
S v Shaik and Others
1983(4) SA 57 (A) at 62 G
-H), although his act of association, for the purpose of his common purpose to
rob, must exist at the time
of the offence.
S v Nzo
(
supra
at
11H).)"
According to the appellant, he was
unaware that Qekisi was in possession of the hammer and he denied that other
members of the group
were armed. The only evidence, apart from that of Qekisi,
which contradicts the appellant is that of one Maputla. He testified on
behalf
of the State in both the earlier trial and that of the appellant. He said that
prior to the night in question, at the request
of Qekisi, he pointed out the
home of the deceased. He said that Qekisi was
9
accompanied by five other men and that one of them
dropped a hammer. Another was in possession of a long knife. He was unable to
recognise
any of the men other than Qekisi.
As the trial judge pointed out, in material respects, Maputla
contradicted aspects of the evidence he gave in the earlier trial. He
held that
it would be dangerous to place much reliance on his evidence. Whilst there is a
high probability that the robbers, or at
least some of them, were armed, it
would be speculative to make a factual finding as to the nature of such weapons
let alone the
appellant's knowledge thereof.
There is another consideration. Unless it was discussed, there is an
inherent improbability that a common hammer would be likely to
be used by a
robber as a murder weapon against the victim of the robbery. The possession by a
would-be robber of a hammer is at least
equally open to the inference that its
use would relate
10
the breaking of a lock or cupboard or some
similar purpose. Furthermore, at the scene of the murder, the police found some
cut electrical
wire. Its presence there lends some support to the appellant's
later version that the intention of the robbers was to tie up the
deceased. That
intention is not consistent with a prior agreement to kill the
deceased.
In short, I have come to the conclusion that it was not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the nature of the
arms carried by any
of his companions, or and more particularly, that Qekisi was possessed of a
hammer. On his version, the attack
with the hammer on the deceased was
unexpected and after the first blow was struck he ceased to be a party to the
inflicting of the
remaining blows. Whether the appellant disassociated himself
from the ensuing attack because of the pain he was suffering or for
a more
laudable reason matters not. He ceased to participate
11
therein. It cannot be found, therefore, that the
appellant associated himself with the fatal attack on the deceased either before
or, (save for the first blow), during its execution. The blood found on the
appellant's shirt could well have been the consequence
of the first blow struck
by Qekisi. Furthermore, on the appellant's evidence, he did not associate
himself with any of the conduct
which followed the attack. In any event, that
was limited to three of his companions continuing to search for objects to steal
from
the deceased's motor vehicle.
The Court a
quo
found the appellant guilty of the murder on the
basis that he only released his hold of the deceased when he himself was hit and
that after the attack he associated himself with the subsequent conduct of his
companions. As I have attempted to demonstrate both
of those findings are
insufficient to support the murder conviction.
12
In the result the appeal is upheld
and the
conviction and sentence in respect of the murder count
are set aside.
R J GOLDSTONE JUDGE OF APPEAL
HEFER
, AR:
In die lig van die meningsverskil tussen my kollegas ag ek dit raadsaam
om aan te dui waarom ek die skuldigbevinding nie kan ondersteun
nie.
2
Aangesien die appellant na sy frontverandering
toegegee het dat hy die oorledene vasgehou het terwyl Qekisi hom met die hamer
toegetakel
het, gaan die appél wesenlik oor die redelike moontlikheid van
sy verdui-deliking dat dit nie vooraf beplan was om hulle slagoffer
fisies leed
aan te doen anders dan om hom vas te gryp, te deursoek en dan vas te bind nie;
dat Qekisi se aanval onverwags en onbeplan
was; en dat hy nie eens bewus was van
die hamer onder Qekisi se hemp nie totdat laasge-noemde dit tevoorskyn gebring
en die oorledene
te lyf gegaan het.
By ons oorweging van die aanvaarbaarheid van die verduideliking kan die
verhoorhof se bevindings natuurlik nie buite rekening gelaat
word nie. Die
getuienis is deurspek met leuens aan beide kante en die appellant het selfs na
sy frontverandering klaarblyklik nog
steeds gelieg in 'n poging om homself in 'n
beter lig te stel. Dit was die taak van die verhoorhof - en tans
3
is dit ons s' n - om die kaf van die korrels te probeer
skei. Ons taak word boonop bemoeilik deur die gebrek aan eksplisiteit in die
verhoorhof se uitspraak en ons moet versigtig wees om nie bevindings te
impliseer bloot op grond van ons eie oordeel oor die waarskynlikhede
nie.
Daardeur word die gevaar geskep om bevindings ten koste van die appellant se
geloofwaardigheid aan die verhoorhof toe te dig
waartoe daardie hof self nie
bereid was nie. Die verhoofhof het appellant se finale weergawe slegs
gedeeltelik verwerp en wat ek
probeer sê, is dat ons nie ligtelik verdere
gedeeltes kan verwerp op grond bloot van ons eie oordeel oor die waarskynlikhede
nie. Geloof-waardigheid kan immers nie aan die hand van waarskynlik-hede alleen
beoordeel word nie.
Daarom is dit belangrik om daarop te let dat die verhoorhof die bewering
nóg uitdruklik nóg implisiet verwerp het dat
geen fisiese leed
beplan was ander dan dit wat reeds genoem is nie. Trouens, die feit dat
die
4
verhoorhof twyfel uitgespreek het oor die
aanwesigheid
van direkte opset om te moor en die skuldigbevinding
op
dolus eventualis gebaseer het, dui juis daarop dat die
verhoorhof nie bereid was om daardie gedeelte van
appellant se getuienis te verwerp nie. Dit sal gewaagd
wees om dit nou te doen.
Dit kom my dus voor dat die beslissende vraag
is of 'n
onbeplande
aanval deur een van die ander rowers
wat tot die dood van die slagoffer kon lei, voorsien is.
Die verhoorhof se onuitgesproke gevolgtrekking dat
appellant so 'n aanval inderdaad voorsien het, word
gemotiveer deur die bevinding dat -
"... (ons) glo nie die beskuldigde dat hy nie kennis gedra het van die
wapens
wat saamqeneem was op die rooftoq nie
."
Die woorde wat ek gekursiveer het, skep ' n probleem.
Watter wapens het die verhoorhof in gedagte gehad en
watter getuienis is daar dat enigiets saamgeneem is ander
dan die hamer wat blykbaar toevallig as wapen gebruik is?
5
Met betrekking tot die laaste vraag
is Maputla se getuienis van geen hulp nie; hy het getuig oor twee geleenthede
waarop hy saam met
Qekisi en sy trawante na die oorledene se huis is. Sou sy
getuienis waar wees, moes die aanval klaarblyklik op die tweede geleentheid
geloods gewees het en hy het beweer dat hy by die eerste geleentheid 'n hamer en
'n mes geslen het. Sy getuienis is in elk geval
nie aanvaar nie en is as van
blote "historiese belang" beskou. Die enigste ander getuienis oor wapens is
Qekisi se bewering dat hy
persoonlik 'n vuurwapen gehad het en appellant die
hamer terwyl die ander gewapen was met pangas en ' n mes. Maar die verhoorhof
was nie, soos ek die uitspraak verstaan, bereid om Qekisi se getuienis te
aanvaar behalwe in soverre dit gestaaf was nie. Daarom:
word gelet op die
formulering van die bevinding - "ons glo nie die beskuldigde....nie" - en op die
feit dat appellant herhaaldelik
beweer het dat hy nie geweet het dat
Qekisi
6
'n hamer gehad het voordat hy dit inderdaad
gebruik het nie, is ek geneig om te dink dat die verhoorhof slegs die hamer in
gedagte
gehad het. Enige ander vertolking van die bevinding sou impliseer dat
die hof 'n ernstige wanopvatting gehad het van die strekking
van die
getuienis.
Op die basis dan dat die verhoorhof bevind het dat appellant bewus was
van die hamer in Qekisi se besit meen ek nie dat sonder redelike
twyfel aanvaar
kan word dat appellant voorsien het dat dit as aanvalswapen gebruik sou word
nie. Dit was ' n doodgewone klouhamer
en, in al die omstandighede van die saak,
regverdig die besit van so 'n stuk gereedskap deur een van die rowers nie die
gevolgtrekking
- as die enigste redelike afleiding - dat appellant voorsien het
dat dit gebruik sou word om die kop van die voorgenome slagoffer
te ver-morsel
nie.
Gevolglik ondersteun ek Goldstone AR se bevel.
J J F HEFER