THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case No. 2025-112376
In the matter between:
GREGORY CLYDE HUTCHINSON Applicant
and
GLOBAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD First Respondent
WERNER ROETS N.O. Second Respondent
Heard: 17 July 2025
Delivered: 24 July 2025
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 24 July 2025.
JUDGMENT
MAKHURA, J
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[1] The applicant brings these urgent proceedings in which he seeks the following
final relief:
‘2. That the Respondents be ordered to immediately reinstate the Applicant
as the Chief Information Officer of the 1st Respondent;
3. That the Respondents be ordered to immediately to restore, and/or to
allow, the Applicant access into the first Respondent's place of business at 2
Nicol Road, Bedforview, Johannesburg;
4. That the Respondents be ordered to immediately return the Applicant ’s
[work] laptop to the Applicant;
5. That the first Respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this application
on attorney and client scale;’
[2] On 2 July 2025, the applicant was presented with a notice of termination of the
Service Level Agreement (SLA). The notice reads, inter alia, that:
‘The service provider, through Gregory Clyde Hutchinson, was deployed in the
role of the Chief Information Officer to the Alpha Group, which includes Alpha
Insure and the wholly owned subsidiaries of Alpha Head Office Holdings, in
terms of the Service Level Agreements entered into with the contracting
companies.
It is hereby confirmed that the contracting companies hereby terminate the
service level agreements with immediate effect, and that the services of the
service provider will no longer be required effective from 2 July 2025, for the
reasons set out below…
TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT you are not an employee of any entity within
the Alpha Group…’
[3] The applicant was required to hand over all assets, including the laptop, to the
Alpha Group Chief Operations Officer. He was also informed that he was no longer
permitted access to the business premises and was reminded to send all outstanding
invoices to the companies.
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[4] Although Ms Nortje, who appeared for the applicant, sought to deny during the
hearing that the above notice triggered the current proceedings, it is clear from the
applicant’s founding affidavit that thi s application was brought in reaction to the above
termination notice. The applicant allege d that as a “shareholder and employee” of the
first respondent and its related entities, the respondents have unlawfully denied him
access to his office, the first respondent’s premises, and confiscated his laptop. He then
concludes that he was being prevented from performing his job in terms of his contract
of employment.
[5] The high-water mark of the applicant ’s case is that he “served as the Chief
Information Officer of the first respondent and related sister companies” and earned “a
gross monthly salary of R223 738.00”. To support these allegations, he attached a copy
of his payslip from the first respondent for October 2023. Ms Nortje submitted that the
applicant remains an employee of the first respondent and that he seeks immediate
reinstatement, access to the business premises and return of the laptop.
[6] The respondents raised a special plea of jurisdiction. They admitted that the
applicant was an employee of the first respondent in October 2023 (as per the payslip).
However, they contended that the employment contract between the applicant and the
first respondent terminated at the end of December 2023 and that from January 2024,
the applicant provided the services in terms of an SLA entered into between his
company, Trinity Equity Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Trinity) on the one hand and Insure HR (Pty)
Ltd and Alpha Head Office Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Alpha Group), which is a holding
company of various companies, including the first respondent, on the other. In simple
terms, the respondents disputed that the applicant is or was an employee of the first
respondent. This is how they pleaded the non-existence of an employment contract
respondent. This is how they pleaded the non-existence of an employment contract
between the applicant and the first respondent:
‘The Respondents confirm that the Applicant was an employee until December
2023, but not thereafter. There exists no current or recent payslip for the
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applicant as an employee, because he was not employed by the First
Respondent, but rather by his company, Trinity, as stated above.
Moreover, the reason the Applicant has failed to allege any terms of this
purported (but denied) 'employment', is that there exists no employment
agreement and the applicant was not an employee of the First Respondent,
Alpha Insure or the Alpha Group; accordingly, this Honourable Court cannot
consider same.’
[7] It is common cause that the SLA referred to by the respondents was not signed,
and that the applicant refused to sign a copy that was presented to him. The
respondents contend that in terms of this SLA, the applicant would, through Trinity,
submit invoices monthly for payment for the services rendered. The respondents
attached copies of t he tax invoices , addressed to Insure HR (Pty) Ltd and Corporate
Staffing (Pty) Ltd (from January 2023 up to February 2025) and thereafter to Insure HR
and Alpha Head Office Holdings . In terms of these invoices, Trinity claimed consulting
fees, gym fees, pension and parking from Alpha Group and consulting fees from Insure
HR.
[8] In reply, the applicant contended that he was appointed and employed by the first
respondent as the CIO and assisted other affiliated companies . He insisted that he
remains an employee of the first respondent. He disputed that he signed an SLA with
any Alpha Group-affiliated companies or that he verbally concluded such an agreement.
The applicant contended that he refused to sign the SLA when it was presented to him.
Furthermore, the applicant denied that his employment terminated in December 2023
as alleged and submitted that the respondents failed to plead how his employment was
terminated. He pleaded that:
‘I will not entertain the issue of the SLAs any further as I have not signed them. I
note that the deponent alleges a verbal contract with regards to the SLAs, which I
deny. I submit herein that when the SLAs were presented to me, my intention
deny. I submit herein that when the SLAs were presented to me, my intention
was always for them not to be signed, that is why my signature does not appear
on same, nor on any document the Respondents can produce containing my
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counter signature. A copy of two such unsigned SLAs is attached hereto as
annexure “H1 and H1.1”.
At no stage prior to me being presented with the one sided signed SLA ’s, or
thereafter, did my role or impression to other staff , or my duties change. During
my employment up until my abrupt ejectment off the premises I reported to the
CEO / COO of the Managing Company. Upon my abrupt ejectment, I returned to
the representatives of the company the work equipment, being the confiscated
laptop, which I was provided with to perform my duties.’
[9] The applicant’s best effort to dispute the tax invoices, which reflect Trinity’s
details, the invoice number, the bank details and the amounts due for payment, was:
‘I further wish to state that the invoices referred to by the Second Respondent as
annexures “DRW6” were not generated by myself, nor were they generated by
my company, and that is why they do not contain my signature or the Trinity
letterhead. These were all generated by the Respondents, or I would assume
people under the control of the Respondents.’
[10] Despite disputing the terms of the unsigned and verbal SLA, in his heads of
argument, the applicant submits that if the facts of the matter are considered, including
the SLA, he is, for all intents and purposes, an employee of the first respondent.
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[11] This Court derives its jurisdiction from s ection 157 of the LRA and its powers are
outlined in s ection 158 of the LRA. Its concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court is
derived from section 77 and its powers in s ection 77A of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act
2 (BCEA).
1 If the applicant’s allegation is accepted that he earned R223 738.00 per month (which is disputed by the
respondents), section 200A of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), does not apply. For discussion
on the nature of the relationship, whether it is a contract of or service, see SA Broadcasting Corporation v
McKenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585 (LAC) ; [1998] ZALAC 13 at para 10; Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ
1256 (LAC); [2005] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC) at para 93; State Information Technology Agency (SITA) (Pty) Ltd
v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others [2008] ZALAC 1; (2008) 29 ILJ 2234
(LAC) at para 12.
2 Act 75 of 1997.
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[12] The applicant seeks , in terms of paragraph 2 of the notice of motion,
reinstatement. It is now settled law that r einstatement is a remedy available in terms of
section 193(1) of the LRA for unfairly dismissed employee. 3 The applicant’s case is that
he remains employed by the first respondent. A fter discussing the issue of jurisdiction
and competency to grant the relief of reinstatement with Ms Nortje, who appeared for
the applicant, the relief was abandoned.
[13] The applicant persists with the t wo remaining orders: access to the first
respondent’s premises and the return of the work laptop. In his papers, t he applicant
contends that this Court has jurisdiction in terms of section 77(3) read with section
77(A)(e) of the BCEA to grant the relief sought . The ground upon which the relief is
sought is that the first respondent repudiated the contract of employment by refusing to
comply with the terms thereof.
[14] The question is which contract did the first respondent repudiate? Other than
stating that he “served” as the first respondent’s CIO, t he applicant has not pleaded any
terms of the employment contract , nor has he attached a copy of the contract of
employment. This point was taken by the respondents in their answering affidavit.
[15] In reply, t he applicant has not disputed that from January 2024, he had been
claiming payment from Insure HR and Corporate Staffing (later Alpha Head Office
Holdings) by submitting invoices through his company, Trinity, for services rendered.
Although he disputes the conclusion of the SLA, he acknowledged that two copies of
the SLA were presented to him, which he refused to sign. He submitted that the SLA
was one-sided. The applicant attached an old payslip, and the respondents asked him
to produce a payslip after December 2023, which he failed to pr ovide. The applicant,
though denying the invoices, could not provide any proof of how he received the alleged
though denying the invoices, could not provide any proof of how he received the alleged
salary from the first respondent . He did not dispute that Trinity invoiced Alpha Head
Office Holdings nor that Trinity was paid the amounts reflected in the invoices.
3 Steenkamp & others v Edcon Ltd (National Union of Metalworkers of SA intervening) 2016 (3) SA 251
(CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 564 (CC) at paras 189 and 192.
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[16] The duty to prove that he was an employee rests with him, not the respondents.
He was aware, at least on 2 July 2025, that the respondents did not recognise him as
an employee. His application simply made a bald allegation that he was an employee.
This, in a case where he seeks a final relief.
[17] It is trite that in motion proceedings, a final order can be granted i f the facts
stated by the respondent together with the admitted facts in the applicant’s affidavits
justify the order, unless if the allegations or denials by the respondent do not give rise to
a genuine or bona fide dispute of fact, or they so far -fetched or so untenable that they
fall to be rejected.
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[18] Having considered the applicant’s affidavits and the respondents’ answering
affidavit insofar as they relate to an enquiry whether the applicant was an employee, I
find that the applicant has failed to establish in his founding and replying affidavits that
he is an employee of the first respondent. The allegations made by the respondents that
the applicant was not an employee, considered against the applicant’s failure to attach
the alleged contract of employment or to plead and substantiate when and how the
contract of employment was concluded and the terms of that contract insofar as it
relates to issues such as the monthly salary , his entitlement to a work laptop and to
report for duty at the first respondent’s premises, raised a genuine or bona fide disputes
of fact. The applicant’s company, Trinity, concluded a contract of service with Alpha
Head Office Holdi ngs to render services to Alpha Head Office Holdings and its
subsidiaries, including the first respondent. For the services rendered, Trinity submitted
tax invoices to Alpha Head Office Holdings. Trinity invoiced for consulting , gym and
parking fees and for pension.
[19] Based on the above, the applicant , despite his reliance on the BCEA, has failed
[19] Based on the above, the applicant , despite his reliance on the BCEA, has failed
to prove that he is an employee, and therefore, this Court’s jurisdiction has not been
4 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at
634E – I and 634A – C.
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engaged. The special plea of jurisdiction must succeed, and the application must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
[20] The respondents sought the costs of opposing this application. The application
was emailed on Sunday, 13 July 2025, giving the respondents until 18h00 on Tuesday ,
15 July 2025 to file an answering affidavit. The applicant received the termination notice
for the SLA on 2 July 2025. He had eleven calendar days from 2 July 2025 to launch
these proceedings, but only afforded the applicant no more than 48 hours to answer to
the allegations therein.
[21] The application is misdirected and an abuse of this court’s processes, particularly
the urgent court processes. As the respondents stated in their answering affidavit, which
I agree with:
‘… this application constituted nothing more than an abject abuse of the process,
an opportunistic grab for relief, an unnecessary clutter on the Court ’s urgent roll
and an invasion of the rights of the Respondents to participate in litigation in an
orderly and reasonable manner.’
[22] The respondents should not be saddled with the costs of opposing thi s
misdirected application. Although both parties sought punitive costs against each other,
I am not persuaded that a case has been made out to warrant a costs order on an
extraordinary scale.
[23] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
1. The special plea of jurisdiction is upheld.
2. The application is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
3. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application.
M. Makhura
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Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Ms N Nortje
Instructed by: SG Seepamore Inc.
For the Respondents: Mr A Jansen van Vuuren
Instructed by: Engelbrecht Attorneys