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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

Case number: 111146/2025
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 23/7/2025
SIGNATURE

In the matter of:

KOPANO DIALE First Applicant

KEA DIALE Second Applicant

MOLEPO MAMPURU Third Applicant

SHIRLEY MABASA Fourth Applicant

CHELESANI SIBANDA Fifth Applicant

NONZUNZO CELE Sixth Applicant

CITY OF JOHANNESBURG Seventh Applicant

and

ALANT PROPERTIES INVESTMENT (PTY) LTD First Respondent
Registration number : 2012/189179/07)

ALANT ALBERT STEFANUS Second Respondent

JUDGMENT


Coram Ferreira AJ
1. In this matter the Applicants were evicted from the premises they occupied
known as Section 33, number 1 […], B[...] T[...] , 5[...] A[...] Road, Berea,
Johannesburg, Gauteng. This eviction occurred on 9 July 2025. Two days
later and at midnight the present application was launched with no notice to
the Respondents. The court directed that service be effected on the
Respondents. This was done, the Respondents opposed and the matter was
ventilated with full argument and a full set of papers on 18 July 2025.

2. Although there are some duplicates of documents in the papers, the
CaseLines file consisted of more than 600 pages of documents.

3. After debate with counsel for the Applicants, upon invitation from the court, Mr.
Marishane, made it clear that only the following relief, apart from a ruling in
respect of urgency, will be sought from the Applicants amended notice of
motion:

“2. That the court order dated 4 March 2025 made by
Magistrate CG Rouy be suspended in terms of Rule 45A
of the Uniform Rules of Court until such time that the
suspension is lifted by court order or set aside.
…

4. That the Second Respondent immediately provides
unlimited and unimpeded access to the immovable
property forming the subject matter of the eviction,
which property is described as Door 3 […] section,
number 1[…], B[...] T[...], with street address being 5[...]
A[...] Road, B[...] T[...].

5. That the Second Respondent restores possession of the

immovable property forming the subject matter of the
eviction, which property is described as Door 3 […]
section, number 10, B[...] T[...] , with street address
being 5[...] A[...] Road, B[...] T[...] , to the First and
Second Applicants.

6. That the Second Respondent should not disturb and/or
interfere, in any way, with the First and Second
Applicants and/or those that occupy the property
through or under them after being restored possession
and taking occupation again by virtue of this order.

7. That the Second Respondent removes all blockades,
bucklers, barriers, locks, chains, security personnel
(placed and/or installed after the eviction was carried
out) and to return any keys taken from the First and
Second Applicants, and hand over any new keys of the
property mentioned under paragraph 4 and 5 above, to
the First and Second Applicants within 4 hours of this
order.

8. Alternatively, if the Second Respondent fails and/or
refuses to act as aforesaid in paragraph 7 above, the
Applicants are authorised to break any blockades,
bucklers, barriers, locks, chains, and to have removed
by the members of the South African Police Service
(SAPS) the security guards placed to guard the
property.

9. That the Second Respondent be interdicted from
further interfering, in any way, with the First and
Second Applicants occupation of the said property,
including not to use third parties to evict the First and
Second Applicants or those that occupy the property
through or under them during the period of suspension

or at all by virtue of this order until such time that the
suspension is lifted by court order or set aside.

…

13. That this order be served on the Second Respondent,
the sheriff and/or his / her deputy, caretaker (or
anybody acting in his place) via their known email
addresses, or company representatives, legal
representatives, including WhatsApp numbers, and
SMS messaging.

14. That the Second Respondent is ordered to restore
possession to the Applicants by taking back the movable
property previously removed by them through the use
of third parties, and placed on the sidewalk/pavement
during the eviction, into Door 3 [...] section, number
1[…], B[...] T[...] , with street address being 5[...] A[...]
Road, B[...] T[...] within 6 hours of this court.

15. That the Second Respondent should pay the costs of
this application at attorney and client scale.”

4. The eviction complained of by the Applicants follows , inter alia , from an
eviction order (“the eviction order”) granted in the Lower Courts on 4 March
2025. Both the First and Second Applicants herein are identified as the First
and Second Respondents in the eviction order of 4 March 2025.1

5. The eviction order is now subject to an appeal in terms of a notice of appeal
filed by the present Applicants on 9 July 2025.2

6. The court pauses to state that there is a title deed in the name of the First
Respondent having purchased the property on a sale in execution levied

1 CaseLines 074-54
2 CaseLines 074-34

against the present Applicants ’ parents. A purchase consideration of
R336 339.00 is indicated as having been the purchase price paid by the First
Respondent on the sale in execution. This deed of transfer was registered in
the First Applicants name on 16 February 2022. This followed an order of this
court of 20 June 2019 declaring the relevant property executable.

7. The First and Second Applicants seemingly opposed the eviction proceedings
in the Lower Courts, filed notices of intention to oppose and opposing
affidavits.

8. This court must follow the settled legal position in respect of the status of court
orders. The eviction order is a legitimate and enforceable order. In the most
recent full court decision of Van Dyk vs Rhodes A2024-076119 and delivered
on 24 February 2025, the court found as follows:

“1. The central question in this appeal is whether a court
order can be rescinded merely upon proof that the
common law would have regarded it as a nullity. We hold
that, in light of section 165 (5) of the Constitution, 1996,
and of the decisions of the Constitutional Court in
Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 (2) SA 622 (CC)
(“Tasima”) and City of Ekurhuleni City v Rohlandt
Holdings CC 2025 (1) SA A (CC) (“Rohlandt”), a court
order can no longer be ignored or rescinded merely upon
proof that it would have been regarded as a common law
nullity. The ordinary principles of rescission or appeal will
always apply to court orders wrongly granted, no matter
what error led to their issuance.”

9. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court does not include jurisdiction to
interfere with the principle of the finality of judgments.3

10. In consequence this court has difficulty, despite the First Respondents de -
registration, to find that there was any form of spoliation and is of the view that

3 De Wet vs Western Bank Limited 1977 (4) SA 770 (T)

the eviction was consequent upon due process having been followed.

11. This leads the court to the enquiry as to whether an interim interdict of any
kind is appropriate. The Applicants contend in paragraph 8.4 of their founding
affidavit4 that:

“8.4 It has always been my contention that the First and/or
Second Respondents are not the owner(s) of the
property and that in fact my mother and father owned the
said property which was given to myself and family
before my father passed away.”

12. It is trite that ownership in respect of immovable property passes by way of
registration. The Applicants do not contend that they have a title deed in their
name. The title deed in the name of the First Respondent clearly demonstrates
that the property was purchased pursuant to execution levied on the
Applicants’ parents. A further complicating feature for the Applicants is that the
underlying judgment against their parents and the subsequent sale in
execution, in part, now falls within the deceased estate of the Applicants ’ late
father as he passed away, on their version.

13. There is no factual basis to contend that the First Respondent did not become
the owner of the relevant property, having purchased it on a sale in execution
and despite being in some form of de-registration.

14. The locus classi cus in respect of a prima facie right for purposes of
considering an interim interdict is Webster vs Mitchell SA 1948 (1), page
1186. Interestingly enough , it involved ownership issues in respect of a
registered racehorse and its registration.

15. In the present matter , the Respondents proffer a legitimate version for the
registration of the relevant immovable property in the name of the First
Respondent. The Applicants proffer no additional explanation for their claimed
title but for that the property was given to them before the Applicants ’ father

4 CaseLines 006-37

passed away. The court is not told when the Applicants ’ father passed away
and why they did not obtain the registered title of the property in their names. It
brings into question whether the present Applicants can succeed in any
proceedings to attack the underlying judgments. They ought to have
established a prima facie right “though open to some doubt”. In applying the
test in Webster vs Mitchell above namely:

“… is to take the facts as set out by the applicant,
together with any facts set out by the respondent which
the applicant cannot dispute, and to consider whether,
having regard to the inherent probabilities, the applicant
could on those facts obtain final relief at a trial. The fats
set up in contradiction by the respondent should then be
considered. If serious doubt is thrown on the case of the
applicant he could not succeed in obtaining temporary
relief, for his right, prima facie established, may only be
open to “some doubt”. But it there is mere contradiction,
or unconvincing explanation, the matter should be left to
trial and the right be protected in the meanwhile, subject
of course to the respective prejudice in the grant or
refusal of interim relief. Although the grant of a
temporary interdict interferes with a right which is
apparently possessed by the respondent, the position of
the respondent is protected because, although the
applicant sets up a case which prima facie establishes
that the respondent has not the right apparently
exercised by him, the test whether or not temporary relief
is to be granted is the harm which will be done. And in a
proper case it might well be that no relief would be
granted to the applicant except on conditions which
would compensate the respondent for interference with
his right, should the applicant fail to show at the trial that
he was entitled to interfere.”5


5 Webster supra 1189 - 1190

16. In the present case , it is difficult to see that the Applicants can succeed with
any final relief at a trial. The proof that is constituted and confirmed by the
title deed of the relevant property gainsays this version. The execution order
was not made against them and their father is now deceased. The eviction
order was executed already despite there now being a pending appeal
thereto.

17. The main thrust of the Applicants case is that the First Respondent have
become de -registered in terms of the CIPC records and could never have
instructed the sheriff to execute same nor could or should the First
Respondent have obtained the eviction order.

18. The Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008) of South Africa governs the
process of deregistration under certain sections. The key sections relevant to
the deregistration of a company, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are
outlined below:

18.1 Section 73 – Deregistration of a Company:

18.1.1 This section covers the process of deregistering a company,
including the procedures and conditions that apply. It sets out
the CIPC's powers to deregister a company and the grounds
under which a company can be deregistered.

18.1.2 Subsection (1): States that a company may be deregistered if
it has failed to submit its annual returns for two consecutive
years and has no outstanding liabilities.

18.1.3 Subsection (3): Specifies that if a company has not been
carrying on business, it can be deregistered under certain
conditions.

18.1.4 Subsection (4): Requires that CIPC must publish a notice of
deregistration in the Government Gazette , providing a grace
period (typically 3 months) for any objections to be raised.

18.2 Section 74 – Restoration of Deregistered Company:

18.2.1 This section deals with the restoration of a company that has
been deregistered. It provides for the restoration procedure if
there are valid reasons for wanting to restore a company that
was deregistered either voluntarily or involuntarily, particularly
if it was deregistered due to non -compliance (like non-filing of
annual returns).

18.2.2 If there are valid reasons for the company's restoration, such
as missed filing or unnoticed liabilities, the company can apply
for its restoration through the CIPC.

19. Although the CIPC printouts annexed to the Applicants papers indicate that
the First Respondent is in final de -registration, there is nothing before this
court suggesting that there has been compliance with Section 73(4) for such
alleged de-registration to be effective. In any event, the probative value of the
unconfirmed CIPC printouts is limited.

20. On the one hand, the Applicants contend that the property they were evicted
from are theirs because it was given to them by their parents before their
father passed away. On the other hand, as a result of the alleged de -
registration of the First Respondent, the Applicants contend that the property
is bona vacantia. This inherent contradiction is self -destructive of any rights
that the Applicants may have claimed to have in respect of the property
pursuant to the eviction order.6

21. There is no new imminent threat to the Applicants. The eviction has occurred
already. A court cannot interdict something that has occurred already.

22. In consequence of all of the above , this court finds that any prima facie right
that the Applicants managed to establish , is subject to serious doubt if any
evidence therefore has been established at all.

6 CaseLines 006-33

23. In addition, it is trite that the court has a discretion whether or not to grant an
interdict which must be decided on the circumstances of each case.7 8

24. Furthermore, for purposes of considering the outcome of this application, it is
accepted that the relief sought by the Applicants ought to include the First
Respondent. This is despite the Applicants counsel abandoning relief sought
against the First Respondent during argument.

25. On a conspectus of the entire case, available evidence, relief sought and the
courts discretion in granting or refusing interdicts, the courts discretion is
exercised against granting any order against the Respondents.

26. In consequence, the application is to be dismissed . The court has a
discretion in respect of costs. In the exercise of this discretion, the court is of
the view that the Applicants are not to be saddled with costs for bringing this
application, despite its failure. The court can find no reason for the
Respondents to pay the Applicants costs. Equally , the Respondents
opposition to the present application has some merit , although certain
unexplained issues, such as the First Respondent’s alleged de-registration, if
any, causes the court to deviate from the normal rule that costs should follow
the result.

27. In the premises, the following order is granted:

“1. The application is dismissed.
2. Each party is to bare its own legal costs.”



7 Mostert v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1893) 7 HCG 25 at 33; Wynberg Municipality v Dreyer
1920 AD 439 at 447; Rivas v The Premier (Transvaal) Diamond Mining Co Ltd 1929 WLD 1 at 14 –
16; Transvaal Property & Investment Co Ltd v SA Townships Mining & Finance Corp Ltd 1938 TPD
512 at 520 – 521; Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1996 (4) SA 348 (A) at 361H – 362C; Lieberthal v
Primedia Broadcasting (Pty) Ltd 2003 (5) SA 39 (W) at 43 E; Cape Town City v South African
National Roads Agency Ltd 2015 (6) SA 535 (WCC) at 632 F – G. The discretion of the court is not a

“narrow discretion” as an appeal court is entitled to substitute its view for that of the court ( Fedsure
Life Assurance Co Ltd v Worldwide African Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2003 (3) SA 268 (W) at 277
I – 278 B).
8 Kemp, Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 (1) SA 673 (O) at 689 I – 690 A.

EJ FERREIRA
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division


Date of hearing: 18 July 2025
Judgment delivered: 23 July 2025
For the Applicants: Marishane Attorneys
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr. Marishane (Attorney with right of appearance)
Attorney for the Respondents: Ntozake Attorneys
Counsel for the Respondents: Advocate P Mafu