SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION)
Case number: 2025-105798
In the matter between:
FRIDOLAIN CHAMFORT DJOMO DJOUFANG Applicant
And
REGINALD DAVID SNYDERS First Respondent
SPECELINE SNYDERS Second Respondent
ALL OCCUPANTS OF THE PROPERTY Third Respondent
MUNICIPALITY OF STELLENBOSCH Fourth Respondent
SHERIFF OF THE LOWER COURT, Fifth Respondent
STELLENBOSCH
Coram: Pangarker, J
Date of hearing: 9 July 2025
Order granted: 10 July 2025
Reasons delivered: 21 July 2025
REASONS FOR ORDER
PANGARKER J
1. The matter came before me as an urgent application during the mid -year
recess. The common cause facts from the documents filed and those placed before
the Court by the Applicant which were uploaded by the First to Third Respondents,
on the Court Online system but not properly filed, are the following:
1.1 On 13 March 2025 the Stellenbosch Magistrates' Court granted an
order against various Respondents who occupied 4 […] F[...] Street,
Cloetesville, Stellenbosch, who included the First to Third Responden ts in this
matter.
1.2 In terms of that order, the Magistrate evicted the Respondents from the
aforesaid property, having found them to be unlawful occupiers as defined in
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998 (PIE Act). The Respondents were ordered to vacate the property on or
before 30 June 2025, failing which the Sheriff was authorized to evict them on
1 July 2025 or as soon as possible thereafter.
1.3 Furthermore, the Sheriff of the Court (Stellenbosch) was authorized to
act on the order and execute the ejectment, and the Stellenbosch Municipality
was to be notified in order to make the necessary arrangements so that the
Respondents could be allocated an emergency housing structure.
1.4 The Respondents were present at the Magistrates' Court and the order
was explained to them.
1.5 No judgment was delivered as the unlawful occupation was not in
dispute.
2. On 25 June 2025, the First and Second Respondents filed a document
entitled "Notice of an Appeal on ca se 126/2024: Stellenbosch Magistrates Court".
Attached to the purported Notice of Appeal was an affidavit by the First Respondent.
The "Notice of an Appeal" contains various paragraphs, indicating that the
Respondents wish to appeal the Magistrates' ord er, seeking an extension of six
months to remain in the property, prohibiting the Sheriff from executing the ejectment
order, seeking a revised order and sets out errors by the Magistrate. The affidavit
sets out a timeline and chronology of events in the M agistrates' Court, and
motivation for the Magistrates' Court to approve the appeal.
3. On 26 June 2025, the Applicant's legal representative, Ms Redelinghuys,
emailed the Sheriff informing that office that the purported Notice of Appeal was
defective, that the Respondents did not comply with the Magistrates' Courts Rules in
noting the appeal within 20 days after the date of judgment and that the Notice did
not suspend the operation of the eviction order.
4. The Sheriff was provided with the issued warrant of ejectment and requested
to proceed with the eviction on 1 July 2025 as per the order. I pause to point out that
on 23 June 2025, the legal representative enquired from the Stellenbosch
Municipality whether it would make alternative accommodation availa ble for the
Respondents.
5. Stellenbosch Justice Centre, on behalf of the Respondents, confirmed on 24
June 2025 that some Respondents were in contact with the Municipality to secure
emergency housing as they found premises upon which to secure a wendy house.
The Municipality's re sponse between 24 to 27 June 2025 was that only two of the
Respondents found premises where they could erect a wendy house which the
Municipality assisted with, but that the First and Second Respondents did not reach
out to the Municipality.
6. On 23 June 2025, the Respondents' legal representative was reminded of the
6. On 23 June 2025, the Respondents' legal representative was reminded of the
looming eviction date and also requested to advise whether these Respondents
would vacate voluntarily. On the same day, the Sheriff was provided with a copy of
the Court order and requested t o execute the order. Despite the correspondence
from the Applicant's legal representative and being referred to authority in an email,
the Sheriff refused to carry out the eviction as requested, because he believed that
the purported "Notice of an appea l" suspended the operation of the 13 March 2025
order.
7. Having considered the application, and the parties' submissions, the Court
was satisfied that the application was indeed urgent. Given the chronology of events
as sketched above and referred to in the annexed emails between the Applicant's
and Respondents' legal representatives, the Stellenbosch Municipality and the
Sherriff, it became apparent that the dual actions being the Respondents' failure to
vacate the premises by late June 2025 and the She riff's refusal to carry out the
eviction as per the Magistrate's order and the Applicant's legal representatives
request, forced the Applicant's hand. He was left with no other option but to
approach this Court for relief on an urgent basis.
8. The First Respondent submitted that the Applicant makes out no case for
urgency and does not explain why substantial relief cannot be obtained in the normal
course. In so far as the latter requirement of Rule 6(12)(b) is concerned, it bears
emphasizing that the Appl icant was armed with the ejectment order which was not
set aside. In view of that order, he was entitled to have a warrant of ejectment issued
in order for the Sheriff to execute the eviction. As is common place, eviction orders
contain a date by when a Re spondent and other unlawful occupiers are ordered to
vacate, and a second date by when (or after) the Sheriff is authorized to evict them.
9. In view of the specific nature of an eviction order and warrant of ejectment, it
cannot surely be reasonably cont ended that the Applicant could or should have
waited for months in order to have the matter heard on the semi -urgent or opposed
waited for months in order to have the matter heard on the semi -urgent or opposed
roll. In the circumstances of this matter, relief which seeks a declaration that the
Respondents' Notice of 25 June 2025 is defe ctive and directs the Sheriff to proceed
on the warrant of ejectment, is urgent. Thus, the Respondents' opposition to urgency
was without merit.
10. The question that required answering was whether the Notice of 25 June
2025 is a Notice of Appeal and whether it stayed the eviction order of 13 March 2025?
As the order emanates from the Magistrates' Court, I have regard to the Magistrates'
Courts Rules and the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 (as amended). Rule 51
governs appeals in civil cases. Rule 51(3) states as follows:
"51 Appeals in civil cases
(3) An appeal may be noted by the delivery of notice within 20 days after the
date of a judgment appealed against or within 20 days after the registrar or
clerk of the court has supplied a copy of the j udgment in writing to the party
applying therefor. "
[Sub-rule (3) substituted by GN R4476 of 8 March 2024 with effect from April
2024]
11. Applying the above sub -rule to the circumstances of this matter, and as read
with Rule 2 which deals with the compu tation of days, it would mean that the period
of 20 days commenced from 14 March 2025 and would have lapsed on 11 April
2025.1 Issues of payment of security in terms of Rule 51(4) aside, the last day for the
Respondents to have delivered a Notice of Appeal was 11 April 2025. As seen from
the facts of the case, this did not transpire and a document purporting to be a Notice
of Appeal was filed with the Clerk of the Stellenbosch Magistrates' Court on 25 June
2025.
12. As for service of the document, I shall accept in the circumstances that the
Applicant's legal representatives were made aware of the Respondents' Notice. Thus,
delivery of the Notice occurred on 25 June 2025, almost three months after the last
day for delivery of a Notice of Appeal in terms of Rule 51(3). Clearly, the Notice, to
the extent that the Respondents submit that it was a Notice of Appeal, was delivered
late.
13. This raises the question as to whether the Notice was accompanied by a
condonation application, as suggested by the First Re spondent during his oral
condonation application, as suggested by the First Re spondent during his oral
1 For the computation of time in terms of Rule 2, the public holiday on 21 March 2025 and weekends
were excluded.
submissions at the hearing. In this regard, Rule 51 must be read with sections 83
and 84 of the Magistrates' Courts Act. Section 83(b) allows an aggrieved party to
appeal an order which has the effect of a final judgment, and it is indeed so that the
eviction order has the effect of a final judgment or order.
14. Section 84 requires of the aggrieved party to appeal within the period and in
the manner prescribed by the Rules, "but the court of appeal may in any case extend
such period"2. The language of section 84 is peremptory, meaning that the party so
appealing is bound by the time period set in the Rules. In this instance, the first time
period refers to the 20 days after the Magistrate's order.
15. Civil appeals from the Magistrates' Court must comply with the Magistrates'
Court Rules in respect of the time periods and procedure for noting an appeal, but
the prosecution of an appeal is governed by Uniform Rule 50 as it is a proceeding in
the High Court. Any failure to comply with the time-period prescribed in Rule 51(3) as
in this case, may be extended by the Court hearing the appeal.3
16. In this matter, the Notice filed on 25 June 2025 was late and not supported by
a condonation application. It was brought to this Court's attention that the
Respondents were issued with an appeal case number and hearing date in
September 2025 in A138/2025. It would seem that copies of these documents were
uploaded onto the Court Online system and placed before the Court by the
Applicant's legal representative. The Index indicates a condonation application which
on the face of it, does not contain an application but only a founding affidavit by the
First Respondent.
17. Be that as it may, to the extent that the Respondents filed a request or
application for condonation in A138/2025, it is for the Court hearing the appeal to
consider same and pronounce on condonation, not this Court.
18. As for the Notice filed on 25 June 2025, it is supported by an affidavit, which is
18. As for the Notice filed on 25 June 2025, it is supported by an affidavit, which is
not the correct fo rmat either. To the extent that this Court has taken note of the
2 Section 84 Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944
3 Section 84 Magistrate's Courts Act
content of such affidavit, the first Respondent indicated at paragraphs 13 and 14
thereof that he requested reasons for the order in terms of Rule 51(1) and on 4 and
10 April 2025 respectivel y, but nothing was forthcoming from the Magistrate and
Clerk of the Court except a verbal indication that the eviction order arose pursuant to
a settlement agreement between the parties.
19. It is evident from the documents filed in this application that there is no
indication of a request for reasons in terms of Rule 51(1) nor a judgment by the
Magistrate; there is only an order. There is no answering affidavit to this application
which is supported by a copy of any Rule 51(1) request referred to in the F irst
Respondent's affidavit. The First Respondent prepared a "Notice of Motion
(Opposing"), which the Applicant brought to the Court's attention, but which ex facie
the document, was not delivered.
20. From the documents delivered, it is apparent that the Respondents elected to
deliver what they thought was a Notice of Appeal. It was out of time, wrongly
contained an affidavit and its delivery does not automatically suspend the
Magistrate's eviction order. In terms of the common law and section 78 of the
Magistrates' Courts Act, execution of an order/judgment is automatically suspended
upon the noting of an appeal.4
21. In the circumstances of this matter, whatever may transpire in an appeal in
case number A138/2025, an appeal against the Magistrate's orde r was not noted
within 20 days after the order was granted. Furthermore, if this Court were to accept
the Respondents' version in the email dated 7 July 2025 to the Chief Registrar of the
High Court and to the Applicant's legal representative, that reasons for the order
were requested on 4 and 10 April 2025 respectively, then it would still mean that the
last date for filing of a Notice of Appeal was 11 April 2025. This is because neither of
these two requests in April 2025 elicited reasons from the Magistrate for the 13
these two requests in April 2025 elicited reasons from the Magistrate for the 13
March 2025 order.
4 Jones and Buckle: The Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Courts in South Africa. Volume 1, RS32,
2025 Act- p560; Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972(1) SA 589(A) at 667
22. In the event that the Clerk of the Court had indeed supplied the Respondents
with a copy of the judgment in writing, after a Rule 51(1) request, the Respondents
would then have had 20 days to note an appeal by delivery of the Notice of Appeal
as per Rule 51(3). Put differently, in the case of a Rule 51(1) request to the
Magistrate, the 20 days commence from the date after the party intending to appeal,
is provided with the Magistrate's judgment. The Magistrate is obliged to provide a
judgment within 15 days of such request and is not at liberty to ignore such request
nor refuse it on the basis of non-compliance.5
23. Having regard to what is sketched above, until a condonation application is
granted by the Court of appeal in respect of t he Notice delivered on 25 June 2025,
such Notice is irregular, late and does not have the effect of suspending execution of
the eviction order. Thus, in the absence of a proper Notice of Appeal which forms the
basis upon which an appeal arises, there is th erefore no valid appeal pending
between the parties.
24. In these circumstances therefore, the Applicant was entitled to execute upon
the warrant of ejectment as he was armed with an eviction order, and the Sheriff was
authorized to act upon the warrant, which he failed to do despite the legal
representative's correspondence of 26 June 2025 which alerted the Sheriff to the
status of the apparent Notice of Appeal and the relevant authorities.
25. To elaborate, the legal representative of the Applicant aler ted the Sheriff to
the dicta in the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici
Curiae)6 which, in summary and with reference to the repealed Uniform Rule 49(11),
stated that the suspension of execution of an order presupposes a valid application
for leave to appeal to bring about the suspension of an order. Furthermore, in
Panayiotou v Shoprite Checkers (P ty) Ltd and Others 7, Sutherland J, referring to
Panayiotou v Shoprite Checkers (P ty) Ltd and Others 7, Sutherland J, referring to
the failure to serve Notices of Appeal and Court records timeously, confirmed with
5 Priem v Hilton Stuart Trust 1994(4) SA 255 (E) at 2551 -259C.
6 2004(6) SA 40 SCA para [46]; see also Infusion Social Club; Camps Bay (Pty) Ltd v Camps Bay
Investment Trust (Pty) Ltd and Another (2024] ZAWCHC 288 para [32] - [37]
7 2016(3) SA 110 (GJ) para [13] – [15]
reference to Modderklip Boerdery that the result is that the appeals lapse and
condonation is required to revive them.
26. Significantly, Sutherland J elaborated by stating further that:
"It is untenable that upon the service of a condonation application the
judgment would then be suspended. ''8
The above principles related to the effect of delayed or late Notices of Appeal and
applications for leave to appeal in High Court proceedings but apply equally to a late
Notice of Appeal in a Magistrates' Court: the order sought to be appealed is not
automatically suspended because a valid Notice of Appeal was not delivered.
Furthermore, the delivery of a condonation application thus does not suspend the
operation of the order or judgment in this instance. Condonation is indeed needed to
revive a lapsed appeal.
27. In view of all the above findings, the Applicant was entitled to proc eed on the
warrant of ejectment and the Sheriff Stellenbosch should have proceeded to act in
terms of the warrant and order. There is no application to this Court seeking a
suspension of execution and/or an interdict against the Sheriff and the Applicant t o
prevent them from acting on the order and warrant. In the circumstances, the
application for a Declarator was granted, with costs granted against the
Respondents and the Sheriff, jointly and sev erally, as per the Order granted on 10
July 2025, attached hereto.
M PANGARKER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
8 Para [15]
Appearances:
For Applicant: Adv R de Wet
Instructed by: Christo Marais Attorneys & Conveyancers
STELLENBOSCH
Per: Ms C Redelinghuys
For 1 - 3 Respondents: In person
No appearance for 4th and 5th Respondents
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case No. 2025-105798
HELD AT CAPE TOWN ON 9 JULY 2025
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE PANGARKER
In the matter between:
FRIDOLAIN CHAMFORT DJOMO DJOUFANG Applicant
And
REGINALD DAVID SNYDERS 1st Respondent
SPECELINE SNYDERS 2nd Respondent
ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF THE PROPERTY 3rd Respondent
THE MUNICIPALITY OF STELLENBOSCH 4th Respondent
THE SHERIFF OF THE LOWER COURT, 5th Respondent
STELLENBOSCH
ORDER
Having heard Counsel for the Applicant and First Respondent in person, and
having read and considered the documents filed of record and the parties'
submissions,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. That condonation is granted for the non -compliance with time -periods, forms
and processes set out in the Uniform Rules of Court. In terms of Rule 6(12), the
application is urgent.
2. That it is declared that the document titled "N otice of an appeal on case
126/2024: Stellenbosch Magistrates' Court", filed on 25 June 2025 at the
Stellenbosch Magistrates' Court which purports to be a Notice of Appeal
against the order granted by that Court on 13 March 2025 (the eviction order) is
out of time, irregular and defective.
3. That it is declared that the operation and executability of the eviction order is
not suspended.
4. The Fifth Respondent is directed to carry out the eviction of the First to Third
Respondents as set out in paragrap h 4 of the eviction Order as requested by
the Applicant.
5. The First, Second and Fifth Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this
application, jointly and severally.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
COURT REGISTRAR