THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no: 276/2024

In the matter between:

HASSODY KATHA APPELLANT

and

PRIMATHIE PILLAY N O FIRST RESPONDENT
KANDER UBY RAMOOTHY N O SECOND RESPONDENT
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, GAUTENG
JOHANNESBURG THIRD RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Hassody Katha v Primathie Pillay N.O. and Others (276/2024)
[2025] ZASCA 106 (18 July 2025 )
Coram: MATOJANE, KOEN JJA AND DLODLO, DAWOOD AND STEYN AJJA
Heard : 23 May 2025
Delivered : This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal website
and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down of the judgment is deemed
to be 18 July 2025 at 11 h00.
Summary: Prescription – Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (the Act) – whether death
constitutes a superior force as contemplated in section 3(1) (a) of the Act, which
suspends the running of acquisitive prescription.

2



ORDER


On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (Moultrie AJ,
sitting as court of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed.


JUDGMENT
__ ___

Steyn AJA ( Matojane and Koen JJA and Dlodlo and Dawood AJJA concurring):

Introduction
[1] Pivotal to this appeal is a claim to ownership of an immovable property located
in the Benoni area. The ownership of the property has, at all relevant times, been
registered in the name of Lutchmia Katha (Ms Katha), the mother -in-law of the
appellant , Hassody Katha. After Ms Katha passed away on 18 August 2014 the
appellant instituted an action in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg
(the high court) alleging that she had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription, as contemplated in s 1 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (the 1969 Act) .
The high court upheld the special plea raised by the first and second respondents,
namely that the required prescription period was not completed, and stayed the
remaining issues in the action for later determination. The appeal, with the leave of the
high court, is against that order.

Background
[2] The appellant’s claim that she has acquired ownership of the property by
acquisitive prescription, is based on her having possessed the property since 1986,
for more than 30 years , openly and as if she was the owner of the property , as provided
in s 1 of the 1969 Act .1 This claim was resisted by Ms Katha’s two daughters, Primathie
Pillay and Kanderuby Ramoothy , cited in their official capacities as the first and second

1 Section 1 of the 1969 Act is quoted in paragraph 7 below.
3

respondent s respectively. They are the executrixes of their mother’s estate , having
been a ppointed by letters of executorship issued by the Master of the High Court on 2
October 2017.

[3] The executrixes raised a special plea that , all the other requirements for
acquisitive prescription aside , the appellant should fail in her claim , since the required
statutory prescription period of 30 years had not been completed by the end of May
2016 . Their special plea is grounded on the contention that the death of Ms Katha
constituted a ‘superior force’ , as prescribed in section 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act , which
served as an impediment to the completi on of the prescription period.2

[4] The high court separated the special plea from all the other issues in the action.
The parties agreed that n o evidence would be led. The matter was instead decided on
the crisp issue of whether the death of Ms Katha constituted a ‘superior force’ that
serve d as an impediment which delayed the running of acquisitive prescription. The
high court held that the running of the period was suspended on the date of Ms Katha’s
death, and that her death constituted a ‘superior force’. The special plea to the
appellant’s claim of acquisitive prescription was accordingly upheld.3 The issue before
this Court is whether that conclusion was correct. The respondents have not
participated in the appeal apart from filing a notice to abide by the decision of this
Court.

Issues for determination
[5] The following issues require determination:
(a) Whether the interpretation of section 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act , as determined by
the high court, was correct;

2 It was pleaded that on a proper calculation, taking into account the date of death of Ms Katha, and
section 3(1) of the 1969 Act, the 30 -year period calculated from June 1986 w ould only have been
completed by 1 October 2020.
3 I consider it necessary for the sake of completeness to quote the entire order issued by the court:
‘1. The first and second defendants’ special plea to the plaintiff’s main claim of acquisitive
prescription is separated from, and is to be determined prior to, all other issues in the action.
2. The remaining issues in the action (including, if necessary, whether the plaintiff has possessed
the property “openly” and as if the plaintiff was the owner thereof) shall be stayed until the first and
second defendants’ aforesaid special plea has been di sposed of.
3. The first and second defendant’s special plea to the plaintiff’s main claim of acquisitive
prescription is upheld.
4. Claim A, as pleaded in the plaintiff’s particulars of claim (as amended) is dismissed with costs.’
4

(b) Whether the death of Ms Katha constituted a ‘superior force’ that delayed the
running of the 30 -year acquisitive prescription period .

Legislative framework
[6] The legislation in place before the 1969 Act was the Prescription Act 18 of 1943
(the 1943 Act) . I consider its terms important in order to analyse the changes
introduced by the 1969 Act. The law of prescription had been formalised by the
adoption of the 1943 Act. Although the 1969 Act repealed the 1943 Act, it did not do
so retrospectively. Accordingly, prescription claims commencing before 30 November
19704 have to comply with the requirements of the 1943 Act. Both the 1943 and 1969
Acts make provision for acquisitive prescription and the requirements are substantively
the same. The 1969 Act however , in my view, simplified the text used in the 1943 Act
and its context remains part of the contextual interpretation of the 1969 Act. It is
necessary to scrutinise the applicable provisions of the 1969 Act to determine whether
it lends itself to the interpretation followed by the high court.

[7] Section 1 of the 1969 Act stipulates as follows :
‘(1) Acquisition of ownership by prescription
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter and of Chapter IV, a person shall by prescription
become the owner of a thing which he has possessed openly and as if he were the owner
thereof for an uninterrupted period of thirty years or for a period which, together with any
periods for which such thing was so possessed by his predecessors in title, constitutes an
uninterrupted period of thirty years.’ (Emphasis added.)

[8] The type of possession contemplated in s 1 is civil possession. In Glaston
House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality , 5 Corbett J, stated:
‘At common law acquisitive prescription confers ownership of property upon a person who has
possessed it continuously for a period of 30 years nec vi nec clam nec precario. The
possession required is full juristic possession (possessio civilis) , i.e. the holding or detaining
of the property in question with the intention of keeping it for oneself. (See Welgemoed v
Coetzer and Others , 1946 T.P.D. 701 at pp. 712 - 3). Both the physical act of detention and
the mental state must concur. The limited possessio naturalis of, for example, a lessee is not

4 The date on which the 1969 Act came into operation was 1 December 1970.
5 Glaston House (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1973 (4) SA 276 (C).
5

sufficient because he lacks the intention of acquiring and keeping the property for himself
(Welgemoed's case, supra ). It has not been suggested that successive Prescription Acts (Act
18 of 1943 and Act 68 of 1969) have in any way altered the position; nor do I think that they
have.’6 (Emphasis added.)7

[9] The common law, remains important in deciding on issues of prescription, since
the two Acts did not codify prescription in our law.8 This has been made clear i n
President Insurance Co Ltd v Yu Kwam9 where the Court decided on the issue of
extinctive prescription and stated in relation to the prescription legislation that it was :
‘. . . not intended to be, and in fact was not, an exhaustive codification of the law of
prescription in South Africa…’ .(Emphasis added .) In Minnaar v Rautenbach,10 the
court correctly confirmed that the 1943 Act did not change the common law
requirements for acquisitive prescription.11

[10] Section 3(1) of the 1969 Act provides for the postponement of the completion
of prescription in certain prescribed circumstances. It reads as follows:
‘If–
(a) the person against whom the prescription is running is a minor or is insane, or is a
person under curatorship, or is prevented by superior force from interrupting the
running of prescription as contemplated in section 4 ; or
(b) …
(c) the period of prescription would, but for the provisions of this subsection, be completed
before or on, or within three years after, the day on which the relevant impediment
referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) has ceased to exist ,
the period of prescription shall not be completed before the expiration of a period of three
years after the day referred to in paragraph (c).’ (Emphasis added.)


6 Ibid at 281C -F.
7 Section 2 of the 1943 Act was similar to s 1 of the 1969 Act. The main difference lies in the initial
requirement of nec vi , nec clam , nec precario in the 1943 Act ha ving been replaced with the formulation
of ‘openly and as if he was the owner thereof’ , in the 1969 Act. The Acts appl y to both movable and
immovable things.
8 Pienaar v Rabie 1983 (3) SA 126 (A) at 13 4H – 135B and the authorities listed by the court.
9 President Insurance Co Ltd v Yu Kwam9 1963 (3) SA 766 (A) at 774B -C.
10 Minnaar v Rautenbach [1999] 1 All SA 571 (NC) ( Minnaar ).
11 The court in Minnaar dealt with the requirements of prescription in terms of section 2 of the 1943 Act
and did not interpret section 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act and the outcome of this appeal is dependent on the
interpretation of section 3 of the 1969 Act.

6

[11] Section 4 of the 1969 Act provides for the judicial interruption of prescription
and for the sake of completeness , I quote it:
‘(1) The running of prescription shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), be
interrupted by the service on the possessor of the thing in question of any process whereby
any person claims ownership in that thing.
(2) …
(3) If the running of prescription is interrupted as contemplated in subsection (1), a new
period of prescription shall commence to run, if at all, only on the day on which final judgment
is given.
(4) For the purposes of this section “process” includes a petition, a notice of motion, a
rule nisi and any document whereby legal proceedings are commenced.’

Interpretation of the 1969 Act
[12] The high court in applying the trite principles of interpretation concluded that
the text, purpose and context of s 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act favour the conclusion that
the death of Ms Katha constituted a superior force and that the acquisitive prescribed
period of 30 years had not been completed. Accordingly, the approach followed by the
high court is now considered. It remains necessary to re-affirm the importance of the
context of the words used in s 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act and why I did not consider it
necessary, despite being invited by counsel for the appellant to analyse the
memorandums that preceded the Act, as interpretive aids , in my decision of the
meaning of the words used. In my view the published memorandum of Prof J C de
Wet, should not form part of the interpretation process . This view is based on this
Court’s repeated endorsement of the principles of interpretation as stated in Natal Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (Endumeni ).12

[13] As to the meaning of words in the specific context that it is used, Wallis JA
stated the following in Endumeni :
‘[T]he present state of the law can be expressed as follows. Interpretation is the process of
attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory
instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the particular
provision or provisions in the light of t he document as a whole and the circumstances attendant
upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be
given to the language used in the light of the or dinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context

12 Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) (Endumeni ).
7

in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material
known to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each
possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective not
subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or
unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be
alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute w hat they regard as reasonable,
sensible or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory
instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation. In a contractual context
it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact made. The ‘inevitable
point of departure is the language of the provision itself’, read in context and having regard to
the purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation and production of the
document.’13 (Footnotes omitted)

[14] This Court then went further and departed from the golden rule of interpretation,
that existed, and that we were all taught to follow during our years as young law
students namely the intention of the Legislature which was regarded as the cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation. Wallis JA regards this legislative intent as unrealistic
and misleading.14 The court in rationalising the conclusion stated the following
reasons:
‘Unlike the trial judge I have deliberately avoided using the conventional description of this
process as one of ascertaining the intention of the legislature or the draftsman, nor would I
use its counterpart in a contractual setting, ‘the intention of the contracting parties’, because
these expressions are misnomers, insofar as they convey or are understood to convey that
interpretation involves an enquiry into the mind of the legislature or the contracting parties.
The reason is that the enquiry is restri cted to ascertaining the meaning of the language of the
provision itself. Despite their use by generations of lawyers to describe the task of
interpretation it is doubtful whether they are helpful. Many judges and academics have pointed
out that there is no basis upon which to discern the meaning that the members of Parliament
or other legislative body attributed to a particular legislative provision in a situation or context
of which they may only d imly, if at all, have been aware. Taking Parliament by way of example,
legislation is drafted by legal advisers in a ministry, redrafted by the parliamentary draftsmen,
subjected to public debate in committee, where it may be revised and amended, and then
passed by a legislative body, many of whose members have little close acquaintance with its
terms and are motivated only by their or their party’s stance on the broad principles in the

13 Endumen i para 18.
14 Endumeni para 21.
8

legislation . In those circumstances to speak of an intention of parliament is entirely artificial.
The most that can be said is that in a broad sense legislation in a democracy is taken to be a
reflection of the views of the electorate expressed through their representatives, although the
fact that democratically elected legislatures sometimes pass legi slation that is not supported
by or unpopular with the majority of the electorate tends to diminish the force of this point. The
same difficulty attends upon the search for the intention of contracting parties, whose
contractual purposes have been filtered through the language hammered out in negotiations
between legal advisers, in the light of instructions from clients as to their aims and financial
advice fr om accountants or tax advisers, or are embodied in standard form agreements and
imposed as the terms on which the more powerful contracting party will conclude an
agreement.15 (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added)

[15] Given the conclusion reached in this judgment I avoid seeking the intention of
the Legislature or to consider the legislative history, which in my view would have
included the published notes of Prof J C de Wet. What were followed were the
conventional principles post Endumeni in determining the meaning of the words
‘superior force’ in s 3(1) of the 1969 Act.

[16] Any interpretation of a statute should be in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.16 Section 39(2) thereof provides that ‘when interpreting any
legislation . . . every court . . . must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights ’. In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd,17 the Constitutional Court emphasised the
importance of section 39(2) of the Constitution when it held:
‘Since the coming into force of the Constitution in February 1997, every court that interprets
legislation is bound to read a legislative provision through the prism of the Constitution. ’
(Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)

[17] I accordingly commence the process of interpretation by measuring the
acquisition of property th rough acquisitive prescription against the protection offered
in the Constitution. Acquisitive prescription remains a method to obtain ownership of
property. The jurisprudential tension is between a registered owner on the one hand ,

15 Endumeni para 20.
16 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
17 Makate v Vodacom Ltd [2016] ZACC 13; 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC); 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC) para 87.
9

who stands to be deprived of his/her property , and a prospective owner who claims an
entitlement by acquisitive prescription to the property possessed.

[18] The right to own property is protected in terms of s 25(1) of the Constitution .18
Accordingly, an owner is entitled as of right to protect their rights to the property when
it is claimed. Effectively, any deprivation of property,19 including property obtained
through the process of acquisitive prescription, needs to comply with legislative
prescripts. In casu, the registered owner’s right was protected by her daughters, who
defended the claim against her estate. As the executri xes of her estate, they ha ve to
ensure that her assets are properly administered and distributed in accordance with
her wishes.20 There can be no doubt that the immovable property owned by Ms Katha
remained an asset in her estate.

[19] Regarding the interpret ation of s 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act, the following statement
by the Constitutional Court in AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC
v President of the Republic of South Africa21 as a guide to interpretation is instructive :
‘As always, in interpreting any statutory provision, one must start with the words, affording
them their ordinary meaning , bearing in mind that statutory provisions should always be
interpreted purposively, be properly contextualised and must be construed consistently with
the Constitution. This is a unitary exercise. The context may be determined by considering
other subsections, sections or the chapter in which the key word, provision or expression to
be interpreted is located. Context may also be determi ned from the statutory instrument as a
whole. A sensible interpretation should be preferred to one that is absurd or leads to an
unbusinesslike outcome.’22 (Emphasis added and footnotes omitted .)


18 Section 25(1) reads: ‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’.
19 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002
(7) BCLR 702 (CC) para 57 where the Constitutional Court held that deprivation would encompass all
species of where right or title to property would be affected.
20 Gross and others v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) at 625B where Corbett CJ re -affirmed that executors
act in legal proceedings on behalf of a deceased estate.
21 AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa
[2022] ZACC 31; 2023 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2023 (5) BCLR 499 (CC) .
22 Ibid para 36 . Also see Minister of Police and others v Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd and others
[2022] ZACC 16; 2022 (2) SACR 519 (CC); 2023 (3) BCLR 270 (CC) para 34.
10

[20] This Court in Capitec Bank Holdings Limited and Another v Coral Lagoon
Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others23 emphasised the importance of the meaning of
words as follows:
‘Endumeni simply gives expression to the view that the words and concepts used in a contract
and their relationship to the external world are not self -defining. The case and its progeny
emphasise that the meaning of a contested term of a contract (or provision in a statute) is
properly understood not simply by selecting standard definitions of particular words, often
taken from dictionaries, but also by understand ing the words and sentences that comprise the
contested term as they fit into the larger structure of th e agreement, its context and purpose.
Meaning is ultimately the most compelling and coherent account the interpreter can provide,
making use of these sources of interpretation. It is not a partial selection of interpretational
materials directed at a predetermined result.’24
In order to determine the purpose of the legislation regard must be had to the context
in which the words appear in section 3 of the 1969 Act.

[21] The appellant ’s counsel submitted further that death had not been included as
a factor by the Legislature in s 3 of the 1969 Act, which refers to a ‘superior force’ .
Accordingly , if it were to be considered as a factor delaying the operation of
prescription, then the Legislature would have expressly defined it as such . This
argument relies, inter alia , on the Legislature having expressly referred to death as a
factor in terms of s 13 of the 1969 Act, in the context of extinctive prescription . This
submission is however misplaced.

[22] Section 3, read in its context, is aimed at protecting the rights of various owners
of property, ie minors, the insane, those under curatorship and those prevented from
protecting their rights due to a superior force. The class is not a closed category , if
consideration is given to the words used at the beginning of the section, namely the
reference to ‘the person’. In the context of acquiring ownership through acquisitive
prescription , it is clear that prescription cannot run against a person who is not able to
interrupt the completion of the running of the prescriptive period .25 Thus the section

23 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and others [2021]
ZASCA 99; 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA); [2021] 3 All SA 647 (SCA).
24 Ibid para 50.
25 The authors of Lawsa 3 ed Prescription para 231 also contend that this reasoning ‘is in line with the
well-established Roman -Dutch maxim contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio’. Loosely
translated as prescription does not run against a person unable to protect his or her rights.
11

provides for an equitable balance between the rights of owners of property and the
possessors of the property who want to acquire ownership through acquisitive
prescription.

[23] The term ‘prevented by superior force’ is, as Jones J concluded in Gqamane v
The Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident’s Fund ,26 susceptible to a wide variety of
meanings. He held, albeit in the context of s ection 13(1) (a) of the 1969 Act, that :
‘either he must act in a particular way, or he cannot act in a particular way, because he has
no choice in the matter …. In Knysna Hotel CC v Coetzee NO 1998 (2) SA 743 (SCA) the
Supreme Court of Appeal did not give a definitive exposition of the term “superior force” as
used in the subsection. It says no more than that it has to be a superior force which, objectively
regarded, prevents the debtor from enforcing his claim by summons. Any attempt at an
exhaustive definition is probably counter -productive .’27
There should be no distinction between the interpretation of the words used in s ection
3(1)(a) and section 13(1) (a) of the 1969 Act. The words used in section 3(1) (a) of the
1969 Act are clear, unambiguous and should be given their ordinary grammatical
meaning.

[24] Given the tension between the rights of the owner of the property and the rights
of the possessor , who aims at obtaining ownership of the property registered in the
name of another , ‘superior force’ must be interpreted as an occurrence beyond the
control of the registered owner ; in other words, an event that inhibits the owner from
acting. ‘Superior force’ is little or no different to the concept of force majeure , which
principally finds its footprint in contractual obligations.28 Death is not a foreseeable
event , nor is it an event controlled by anyone.29


26 Gqamane v The Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund [1999] 3 All SA 671 (SE).
27 Ibid at 686G - J.
28 In MV Snow Crystal Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal [2008]
ZASCA 27; 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA) para 28, Scott JA said the following about the defence of
impossibility, albeit in reference to vis major:
‘. . . As a general rule impossibility of performance brought about by vis major or casus fortuitus will
excuse performance of a contract. But it will not always do so. In each case it is necessary to “look to
the nature of the contract, the relation of the parties, the circumstances of the case, and the nature of
the impossibility invoked by the defendant, to see whether the general rule ought, in the particular
circumstances of the case, to be applied.’ (Emphasis added.)
29 Under French law, force majeure is an event that is unforeseeable, unavoidable and external that
makes execution impossible. The term has it origin in the Code of Napoleon of France.
https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/glossary/force -majeure , accessed on 23 June 2025.
12

[25] Although t he appellant advanced a number of grounds of appeal , there is a
central theme to them . This theme is that if death is regarded as a ‘superior force’ for
the purposes of s 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act, then it is an impediment that only ceases to
exist upon the appointment of the executor of the estate of the owner of the property,
and this would have a detrimental effect in delaying the completion of the prescribed
period of acquisitive prescription. The appellant submit ted in argument that this could
ultimately result in an indefinite period during which ownership cannot be obtained due
to the continued existence of the impediment . This, so the argument went, would lead
to legal uncertainty and the pot ential of a multiplicity of lawsuits to enforce the right.

[26] That argument is however based on a very narrow interpretation of section
3(1)(a) of the 1969 Act. It also does not consider the class of people listed in terms of
section 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act. The same result will obtain in respect of, for example
the period of insanity of an insane person , which could be for an undetermined period.

[27] It was also submitted during oral argument that this Court ’s findings in Standard
Bank of South Africa Limited v July and others30 support the appellant ’s argument that
an heir may step into the shoes of the executor . We were specifically referred to
paragraph 2 of th at judgment which reads:
‘The high court held that although as a general rule only an executor can claim on behalf of
an estate, there is an exception to this principle, known as the Beningfield exception, which
allows beneficiaries of an estate to claim where the executor will not or cannot. Dawood J
considered that since the executor of the estate was himself deceased, the beneficiaries could
make claims against a person who had taken transfer of immovable property when not entitled
to do so. She held that the applicants had locus standi to make the claims. A referral to oral
evidence is pending the decision of this court on the respondents’ locus standi . Only the bank ,
raised the issue of locus standi and only it has appealed against the order, with Dawood J’s
leave. The other respondents in the high court abide the decision of this court.’31
That judgment however merely confirmed that in exceptional circumstances ,
beneficiaries have locus standi to claim assets from a person in possession of the
assets. No such exceptional circumstances were raised in th e current appeal .


30 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v July and others [2018] ZASCA 85.
31 Ibid para 2.
13

Conclusion
[28] The context and purpose of s 3(1) (a) of the 1969 Act is to avoid any arbitrary
and capricious deprivation of rights of ownership. A ccordingly , ‘superior force’ on a
proper construction of the phrase, in the context of the 1969 Act and having regard to
its purpose, would include an occurrence of death and it will suspend the running of
acquisitive prescription .

[29] The high court was not misdirected in its interpretation of the provision. It
correctly upheld the special plea raised by the respondents. The respondents elected
not to participate in this appeal. It would be just in the circumstances not to make any
order as to costs.

[30] In the result, I make the following order:
The appeal is dismissed.



_________________________________
E J S STEYN
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL



14

Appearances

For the Appellant: M Karolia
Instructed by: DP Attorneys Inc, Johannesburg
Honey & Partners Inc, Bloemfontein

For the R espondent s: No appearance.

.