IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

REPORTABLE
Regional Court Case no: SHB 154/2;
SHD 49/20;
SHE 109/23 ;
SHE 116/23; SHB 140/21 .
Special review no: 29/2025
In the matter between:

THE STATE

and

1. RYAN PHILANDER

2. RICARDO CARTER

3. MUSTAPHA HENDRICKS

4. SIMONE BAREND

5. NICO STOFBERG

Coram : Le Grange J et Holderness J

Received : 5 March 2025 /16 May 2025
Delivered : 6 June 2025

Summary: Special review - accused represented in the regional court by
advocate who had no right of appearance after his name was struck from roll
of legal practitioners – whether court proceedings are a nullity.

JUDGMENT DELIVERED: 6 JUNE 2025
________________________________________________________________
Le Grange J

[1] The matter of S v Philander came before us on special review at the request
of the regional magistrate of Wynberg (the regional magistrate) . It came to ou r
attention that there are other matters facing the same diffic ulty. Four matters were
subsequently placed before us. We have decided to prepare one judgment covering
all five matters .

[2] The accused, Mr . Rian Philander (Philander) was arrested on 5 September
2023 and charged with one count of murder and one count of attempted murder. He
pleaded not guilty to both charges. The accused is currently out on bail.

[3] At all relevant times since his arrest Philander was represented by a former
advocate, Mr. Patrick Scott (Scott).

[4] On 26 November 2024 the regional magistrate addressed an e -mail to the
Legal Practice Council: Western Cape ( the LPC) stating it had come to his attention
that the Western Cape High Court had struck Scott off the rol l of advocates.

[5] On 5 December 2024, the LPC confirmed by email that:

5.1 In terms of a judgment handed down on 29 October 2021, Scott was
struck from the roll of advocates following an application by the Cape Bar
Council (the CBC) to have him removed.
5.2 To her knowledge he has not appealed the judgment. The CBC
confirmed that they have not received any application for leave to appeal.
5.3 The CBC confirmed that Scott is neither an admitted advocate, nor a
member of the Cape Bar Council.

[6] The basis of the special review is set forth in the cover letter by the regional
magistrate wherein t he following was recorded :

‘1. The accused appeared before me in regional court B on a charge of
murder. The accused is out bail. Advocate P Scott is the legal representative
for the accused.
2. One state witness testified. The witness was duly cross -examined by
Adv Scott. The case was adjo urned until 7 February 2025 for further
evidence.
3. It only came to light before the second witness testify (sic) that
Advocate Scott was struck from the rol l of advocates by the High Court of the
Western Cape in Cape Town on 29 October 2021.
4. The matte r is now referred to the High Court for review and the
Honourable Judge for guidance ( sic).
5. Attached find a copy of the charge sheet.’

[7] According to the regional magistrate , four of the five cases are partly heard,
and one is at sentenc e stage.

[8] The regional magistrate confirmed that since November 2024 , Scott failed to
appear in any of these matters after it became known that he was struck from the
roll. According to the regional magistrate , this is but the tip of the ic eberg as there
are several matters pending in different courts , awaiting the outcome of this review,
where Scott appeared whilst being struck from the roll of advocates.

[9] The main reason Scott , a legal practitioner of 20 years’ standing was struck
from the roll of advocates was because of his direct interaction with a client during
2014 and 2015 and the receiv ing of funds without an instructing attorney . This
happened before the commencement of the L egal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (L PA)
when there was a cl ear divide between the attorneys and advocates p rofession. At
the time our law recognised a divided profession coupled with the referral system . In
terms of th at system an advocate may, (save in certain exceptional circumstances
which is not relevant in these cases ) only accept instructions from an attorney1.
Advocates, unlike attorneys, were not obliged to operate trust accounts nor were
they required to hold fidelity fund trust certificates.

[10] It is well known among legal practitioners that t he obligations to hold trust
accounts and fidelity fund trust certificates operate for the protection of the public
and to ensure that there was a proper account for monies received and an insurance
fund against which a claim could be lodged. During the referral system the public
had simply no such protection under the fund when monies were received by an
advocate 2.

[11] The complaint against Scott was about his accept ance of monies directly from
a client , to pr osecute an appeal. Scott appeared on behalf of the client during the
trial. The client was convicted of murder , the unlawful possession of a firearm and
sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. The appeal was never prosecuted and
lapsed .

[12] Scott blamed the instructing attorney for not following the necessary steps to
prosecute the appeal. In turn, the attorney blamed Scott for consulting directly with
the client and accepting fees without his knowledge. It is not in dispute that the client
subsequently obtained judgment in the small -claims court against Scott in the
amount of R10 000 . The monies were alleged ly for the fees paid to prosecute the
appeal. The Court in striking Scott from the roll of advocates , made the following
remarks3:

“[10.1] The respondent’s dishonesty in deposing to this answering affidavit,
that he accepted monies directly from Maritz and that he interacted with

1 See Commissioner, Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar of South Africa and
Others 2002 (6) 606 (SCA) at 620C -D); Noordien v Cape Bar Council and Others (9864 /2013 [2015]
ZAWCH C 2 (13 January 2015)
2 De Freitas and another v Society of Advocates of Natal and Another 2001 (3) SA 750 (SCA).
3 The Cape Bar Council and Patrick Scott (WCHC Case no 728/2017 ) at para 20
clients directly without the intervention of an attorney, leads to the conclusion
that (i) the impugned conduct wa s established and that (ii) the respondent is
not a fit and proper person to continue with practice.”
At para 22 and 24 it continued:

“The respondent’s attitude towards the proceedings was almost
contemptuous, and lacked a discernible appreciation of the seriousness of the
matter…
The respondent’s failure to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and
absence of true remorse weighed heavily with the Court. These factors
indicated that a recurrence of the offending conduct was highly probable.”

[13] As the prosecuting authority has a direct and substantial interest in the
outcome of these matters, the opinion of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Adv
Bell, was sought and obtained. I would like to express our gratitude to Advocates
Friester Sampson and Hendry -Sidaki for the comprehensive memorandum furnished
to this Court.

[14] The DPP recorded that due to the serious nature of the crimes the accused
are facing, i.e. Murder, Rape, Attempted Murder and the unlawful possession of
firearms and ammunition , in which Scott appeared, the DPP will reinstate
proceedings against all the accused de novo , in the event the proceeding are
declared a nullity .

[15] The DPP further submitted that, notwithstanding the contentions in the
memorandum by the regional magistrate , the general empowering l egislation , s
304(4) of the C riminal Procedure Act, 51 of 19774, upon which magistrates ordinarily
rely to send matters on review find no application in the present instance . According
to the DPP the matters should be considered within the review process as envisaged

4 S 304(4) pro vides: If in any criminal case in which a magistrate's court has imposed a sentence
which is not subject to review in the ordinary course in terms of section 302 or in which a regional
court has imposed any sentence, it is brought to the notice of the provincial or local division having
jurisdiction or any judge thereof that the proceedings in which the sentence was imposed were not in
accordance with justice, such court or judge shall have the same powers in respect of such
proceedings as if the record thereof h ad been laid before such court or judge in terms of section 303
or this section.
in s 22 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 , which provides a numerus clausus for
the review of proceedings of the Magistrates’ Court.

[16] Section 22 of the S uperior Courts Act reads as follows :

“22 Grounds for review of proceedings of Magistrates’ Court
(1) The grounds upon which the proceedings of any Magistrates’ Court may
be brought under review before a court of a Division are –
(a) absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court;
(b) interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on the part of the presiding
judicial officer;
(c) gross irregularity in the proceedings ; and
(d) th e admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or the rejection of
admissible or competent evidence.
(2) This section does not affect the provisions of any other law relating to the
review of proceedings in Magistrates’ Courts. ”

[17] The DPP further recorded the following : Scott came on record at different
stages of the proceedings on review ; new legal practitioners have since been
appointed to appear for the individual accused and where ne cessary the record of
proceedings have been transcribed for the benefit of the accused and his legal
representative ; the setting aside of the entire proceedi ngs in each case can have
serious unintended consequences for the prosecution , i.e. accused persons will be
released from custody and need to be rearrested which may cause further delay,
witnesses will have to be recalled and be cross -examined again, most matters are
gang -related and there is a real fear that some accused may interfere wi th state
witnesses which will cause them not to re-testify due to legitimate fear for the lives;
the re-hearing of all the matters will place an unnecessary burden on already limited
resources and the undue delay in finali sing cases may bring the administration of
justice into disrepute .

[18] The DPP requested that each case be considered on its own merits to
determine whether the appearance by Scott was so grossly irreg ular that it tainted
the entire proceedings with unremitting impropriety .

[19] The submissions made by the DPP are persuasive. Firstly, it is obvious the
irregularit y complain ed of does not fall under s 304(4) of the CPA as that provision
and cross references to s 303 and 30 2 of the CPA relates to sentences which are
subject to review in the ordinary course. In the present instance , the correct process
to follow falls squarely under s 22(c) of the Superior Courts Act which contemplates
‘gross irregularity in proceedings’ . The latter however does not preclude a High Court
from using its inherent powers to restrain illegalities in lo wer courts 5.

[20] Secondly, the right to a fair trial is a right that not only has consequences for
an accused person but also extends to others who have an interest in the criminal
justice system. Our Apex court in Thebus v S6 held that :

“Although a principal and important consideration in relation to a fair trial is
that the trial must be fair in relation to the accused, the concept of a fair trial is
not limited to ensuring fairness for the accused. It is much broader. A court
must also ensure that the trial is fair overal l, and in that process, balance the
interests of the accused with that of society at large and the administration of
justice” .

[21] With the se established rules as guideline s, the question now is whether in
each of the five cases , the court proceedings fall to be review ed and set aside .

[22] The legislative scheme regarding the appearance of legal practitioners in
criminal matters can be summarised as follows . In terms of Section 35(3) of the
Constitution an accused person has the right to be represented by a legal

5 Wahlhaus and Others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg and Another 1959 (3) SA 113 (A) at
119G ; The authors of Gardiner and Lansdown also opined: ‘While a Superior Court having
jurisdiction in review or appeal will be slower to exercise any power, whether by mandamus or
otherwise, upon the unterminated course of proceedings in a court below, it certa inly has the power to
do so, and will do so in rare cases where grave injustice might otherwise result or where justice might
not by other means be attained … In general, however, it will hesitate to intervene, especially having
regard to the effect of suc h a procedure upon the continuity of proceedings in the court below, and to
the fact that redress by means of review or appeal will ordinarily be available.’
6 Thebus v S 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para [127] per minority judgment of Kollapen J (Mlambo AJ
concurring)
practitioner of his or her choice. Section 73(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (the CPA) reinforces that right and provides that:

‘An accused shall be entitled to be represented by his legal adviser at criminal
proceedings, if such legal adviser is not in terms of any law prohibited from
appearing at the proceedings in question.’

[23] In terms of Section 33(1) of the LPA:

‘Subject to any other law no person other than a legal practitioner who has
been admitted and enrolled as such in terms of this Act may, in expectation of
any fee, commission, gain or reward:
(a) appear in any court of law or before any board, tribunal or similar
institution in which only legal practitioners are entitled to appear;’

[24] In addition, Section 33(4), of the LPA provides that :

“A legal practitioner who has been struck off the Roll or suspended from
practice may not –
(a) render services as a legal practitioner directly or indirectly for his or her
own account, or in partnership, or association with any other person, or as a
member of a legal practice; or
(b) be employed by, or otherwise be engaged, in a legal practice without
the prior written consent of the Council …”

[25] It is also an offence, in terms of s 93 of the LPA , to contravene se ctions 33
and 34 thereof and upon conviction liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period
not exceeding two years or to both such fine and imprisonment .

[26] Scott did not obtain any written consent from the LPC after he was struck from
the roll . He also failed to prosecute an appeal against the said order . Scott has
clearly contraven ed s 93 of the Act, which is a punishable offence.

[27] A similar situation recently arose in S v Mkhize7 (Mkhize ). In that matter
Mkhize was represented at his criminal trial by a n attorney that had no entitlement or
right to do so, given the LPC has suspen ded the attorney from practicing. The court
at paragraphs [8]-[13] essentially held that where a legal practitioner is under
suspension by the LPC , the proper administration of justice will fall into disrepute, if
legal practitioners are permitted to appear without consequence before the courts. It
ultimately reviewed and set aside the entire proceedings . According to the court, the
irregularity occurred was so profound and serio us that the proper administration of
justice and dictates of public policy require the proceedings to be regarded as fatal
and not in accordance with justice.

[28] Mkhize is but one of a long line of cases wherein it was held that the lack of
authorisation or temporary suspension of a legal representative to appear on behalf
of accused persons in criminal proceedings constitutes a fatal irregularity which per
se necessitated the rescission of the criminal proceedings, although the
representatives concerned had the required academic qualifications8.

[29] Recently, in S v Goit seone Serache and Others9, (Serache) the Full Court in
the Northwest Division considered a similar question . In that matter the accused
persons were charged with robbery, with aggravating circumstances and a count of
malicious injury to property. They were all represented by an attor ney of that Court
without being in possession of a valid fidelity fund certificat e. All the accused were
convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment . The attorney was last
issued with a fidelity fund certificate on 3 April 2014 and practi sed for almost a
decade without a valid certificate.

[30] On review, t he minority held that the act of practi sing without a fidelity fund
certificate as required by s 84(1) of the LPA is not only a criminal offence in terms of

7 (Special Review) (RC552/2024; 15/2024) [2024] ZAKZPHC 123 (23 December 2024) .
8 See Dlamani en ʼn Ander 2008 (2) SACR (T); S v Khan 1993 (2) SACR 118 (N); S v Gwantshu and
Another 1995 (2) SACR 384 (E); S v La Kay 1998 (1) SACR 91 (C); S v Nkosi en Andere 2000 (1)
SACR 592 (T); S v Stevens en ‘n Ander 2003 (2) SACR 95 (T); S v Tume and
Others (188/2004) [2006] ZANCHC 12 (24 February 2006); S v Nghondzweni 2013 (1) SACR
272 (FB) and S v Swapi and Others (14/14, RCZ 300/13, 6/2014) [2015] ZAECBHC 23 (1 September
2015); S v Van der Sandt [2016] JOL.
9 HC 12/2025 delivered on 6 May 2025 .
s 93(8) , but a violat ion of the accused ’s fair trial rights . Accordingly, it held that it is
an irregularity so fundamental and serious that public policy, and the proper
administration of justice . demands that the proceedings to be set aside in their
totality.

[31] The majority reasoned different ly and adopted the approach follow ed in NW
Civil Contractors CC v Anton Ramaano Inc & Another10 (NWC Civil Contractors )
where s 41(1) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 197911 came under scrutiny , which was the
forerunner of s 84(1) of the LPA .

[32] In NWC Civil Contractors12 the SCA held that two consequences follow for
practi sing without a fidelity fund certificate, namely, disentitlement to a fee for the
work done and a criminal conviction. It further considered the reasoning in Oilwell
(Pty) Ltd v Protec International Ltd13, where Harms DP referred to J
Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 1.3.16 (Gane’s translation), who said:

“Things done contrary to the laws are not ipso jure null if the law is content
with enacting a penalty against transgressors. ”

[33] The SCA ultimately held the court proceedings in the matter under discus sion
were not void ab initio as a visitation of nullity was not contemplated by th e Act.

[34] The majority in Serache found on a proper interpretation of s 84 of the LPA,
the prima ry aim is to protect the public against financial misconduct, such as the
misappropriation of trust funds, rather than regulating a practitioner’s competence to
represent clients in court. It further held that: 'the legislature intended non -
compliance with s 84 to attract criminal sanctions against the practitioner and not to
invalidate judicial proceedings ; the regulatory compliance with financial rules is
separate from courtroom competence and an accused would have to demonstrate
specific instances of deficient pe rformance tied to the trial’s outcome to challenge its

10 2020 (3) SA 241 (SCA) (14 October 2019)
11 S 41 (1) provided that ‘A practitioner shall not practise or act as a practitioner on his [or her] own
account or in partnership unless he [or she] is in possession of a fidelity fund cer tificate’
12 at para [19].
13 2011 (4) SA 394 (SCA) .
fairness, rather than relying on the lateral issue of the fidelity fund certificate ; that
absent such evidence, the trial’s legitimacy remains intact, as fairness is assessed
by the judicial process, n ot speculative inferences about counsel’s overall
professionalism ’14. Ultimately, the majority held that the court proceedings were not a
nullity as contemplated by the Act.

[35] The latter approach is sobering and considerably different from previous
authorities . In Mkhize , the reasoning in NW Civils Contractors CC was not
considered or followed. In my view th e reasoning of the SCA is not only convincing
but binding on this court. The issue is whether that approach should apply in the
present instance.

[36] Advocates are obliged to strictly adhere to t he referral rule15. It is trite that,
before the commencement of the LPA , there was no obligation upon advocates to
operate trust accounts , nor were they required to hold fidelity fund trust certificates ,
the primary purpose of which was to protect the public and to reimburse clients of
legal practitioners who may suffer pecuniary loss due to the theft of money or
property entrusted to them . The latter protection encourages the public to use the
services provided by legal practitioners with confidence.

[37] Scott’s conduct undeniably places the entire legal profession into disrepute.
His failure to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession is cause of grave
concern. C ourts decry such conduct. Had th e true position been known , he would
not have been permitted to participate in the court proceedings. His conduct certainly
amounts to an offence which should be reported to the relevant authorities.

[38] Despite the long line of decided cases where t he setting aside of the court
proceedings was the result, the question remains if that would be the proper
approach to follow in these circumstances ? I do not think so.


14 See Serache ibid at para 44 and further.
15 De Freitas and Another v Society of Advocates of Natal and Another SA 750 (SCA) 2001 (6) :
Rösemann v General Council of The Bar of South Africa [2003] ZASCA 96 (26 September 2003 .
[39] The starting point must be what the Legislature contemplated in s 33(4) of the
LPA. On a proper construction of s 33(4) read with s 93(7)(c) the Legislature
contemplated two consequences for practising advocates when struck from the roll .
The first is the disentitlement to a fee f or the work done and secondly a criminal
conviction. The Act does not envisage the nullity of court proceedings if such
conduct had been established. The Legislature has rather criminalised such conduct.
It is therefore not open to this court , no matter how dep lorable the conduct of Scott ,
to simply nullify court proceeding s if the Legislature did not intend to do so16. Each
case must be decided upon its own facts, to determine if the proceedings
demonstrate specific instances of serious deficiency tied to the trial to challenge its
fairness . Absent such evidence, the trial’s legitimacy remains intact, as fairness must
be assessed in its broader terms in the judicial process .

[40] In my view, s uch an approach is consistent with the principle that ‘things done
contrary to the laws are not ipso jure null and void if the law is content with enacting
a penalty against transgressors .’ In addition, the consideration whether “greater
inconveniences and impropriety would result from the rescission of what was done,
than would follow the act itself done contrary to the law” must also be a factor to
consider .17

[41] Courts in our country are obliged to ensure that proceedings before them are
always fair. However , the concept of a fair trial is not limited to ensuring fairness for
the accused . It is much broa der. The interest of society and proper administration of
justice are also factors that cannot be ignored .18

[42] It is obvious Scott appeared for more than 3 years with impunity in the lower
courts. In all these matters , however, the accused instructed Scott out of their own
free will . They trusted him to conduct their defences. There is no evidence to suggest
that his mere appearance demonstrably prejudiced the integrity of the trial
proceedings. From the record it appears Scott discharged his duties properly and

16 NW Civils Contractors, ibid
17 See: NW Civil Contractors CC at para 19.
18 See Thebus supra.
efficiently. There is no indication that the integrity of the cou rt proceedings was
compromised by his incompetence or that he failed to execute on his mandate.

[44] To adopt an approach now that all the work done by Scott in executing or
purporting to execute the mandates of the accused in these proceedings is a nullity
will have far -reaching consequences that could undermine the proper administration
of justice. In my view a ‘greater inconvenience and impropriety would follow if the
proceedings were summarily set aside ’.

[45] Our courts operate on the presumption that practitioners are compliant unless
proven othe rwise. It appears the magistrates were unaware of Scott’s status. A
magistrate’s role is largely that of a trier of fact, to pronounce on disputes and to
uphold legal standards and the law. A magistrate’s function is not to audit the
credentials of legal practitioners appearing before them, although there is nothing
wrong, when the circumstances warrant it, to call for their credentials. That however
should be the exception. The auditing of legal practitioners’ credentials is primarily a
matter for the LPC , and the broader legal profession. In this instance there is no
indication from the LPC that they alerted the public, the broader legal profession or
the magistracy about the Scott’s positio n. The magistrates’ conduct in these
proceedings are therefore beyond reproach.

[46] Turning to the individual matters :

The State versus Ryan Philander (SHB 154/23)

The accused was arrested on 19 February 2023 and first appeared in the regional
court on 5 September 2023 on charges of murder and attempted murder. the
regional magistrate had been on reco rd before the trial proceedings commenced. on
2 July 2024, t he acc used pleaded not guilty to both charges. Gleaning f rom the
record , the state presented one state witness on 8 November 2024 which was duly
cross -examined by Scott . The matter was there after postponed for further trial to 7
February 2025 . On the latter date , the matter was sent on review. In the trial
proceeding t here is nothing to suggest that the impropriety of Scotts’s conduct
tainted the proceedings as it stands. In any event, according to the DPP a new legal
representative had been appointed and ready to proceed with the further trial . There
is no indication that the proceedings before the magistrate during the trial was
irregular and not in accordance with justice . It follows that there is no legitimate
reason to interfere in the proceedings, and the matter is referred to the magistrate to
resume proceedings until its conclusion.

The State versus Ricardo Carter (SHD 49/20)

The accused was arrested in October 2019 and first appeared in the regional court
on 4 March 2020 on a charge of murder. The accused pleaded not guilty on 25
February 2022 to a count of murder. Whilst the proceedings were partly -heard the
accused on 2 February 2023 terminated his former legal represe ntative’s mandate
and Scott came on record . He confirmed receiving all the necessary instructions and
particulars to proceed with the trial. After hearing evidence over a period , the
accused was convicted on 4 October 2024, and the matter was postponed for
sentence proceedings. Since then, Scott failed to appear. Mr van Vogt since 27
November started to appear for the accused and awaiting the outcome of the review
proceedings. Considering the trite principles pertaining to judicial reviews , there is no
suggestion that the magistrate may have misapplied the facts or misinterpreted the
law or committed a gross irregularity in the proceedings to date.
In fact, t he DPP commented tha t this was a particularly difficult trial in that a key
witness soiled herself during her evidence for fear of the accused.
This is one of those cases where substantial inconvenience and impropriety will
result if the proceeding are set aside due to the infractions committed by Scott . It
follows that no irregularities had been established before the magistrate that
warrants inference by this court on review.

The State versus Mustapha Hendricks (SHE 109/23)

The accused was arrested on 27 November 2022 and first appeared in the regional
court on 6 June 2023 on 2 charges of murder and 5 charges of attempted murder
committed on 24 August 2022. The accused is in custody since his arrest.
The accused terminated his former legal representative ’s mandate on 19 September
2024 . Scott came on record. on that day, a plea of not guilty was entered on the
record. The trial commenced and one state witness was led and cross -examined by
Scott . There is no evidence to suggests that the appearance of Scott tainted this part
of the trial proceedings with impropriety amounting to a gross irregularity . A new
legal representative was appointed on behalf of the accused and willing to proceed
with the trial. There is no indication that the accused fair trial right s were
compromised . The proceedings so far were in accordance with justice and the
matter is referred to the trial magistrate to resume with the proceedings.

The State versus Simone Barend (SHC 116/23)

The accused was arrested on 3 September 2022 and first appeared in the regional
court on 26 June 2023 on a charge of murder. Scott has been on record since the
first appearance in the Regional Court. The accused was released on bail.
The trial commenced on 20 November 2023. Various admissions were made on
behalf of the accused by Scott . The accused tendered a plea of not guilty and
indicated he acted in self-defence.
The State called one witness so far and was extensively cross -examined by Scott .
Scott requested to withdraw from the matter on 19 August 2024 for lack of financial
instructions. His request was granted, and the legal aid attorney who come on record
received a transcript of the proceedings. On 8 November 2024 the practitioner and
the State confirmed their readiness to proceed with the partly heard matter.
There is nothing to suggest that the accused’s fair trial rights were compromised or
the integrity of the proceedings tainted by Scott’s conduct . It follows that proceedings
thus far were in accordance with justice and the tri al must proceed until its logical
conclusion.

The State versus Nico Stoffberg (SHB 140/21)

The accused was arrested on 7 July 2020 and first appeared in the regional court on
10 August 2021 on charges of possession of a firearm and ammunition. The
accused was represented by different legal representatives before Scott came on
record .
The accused was granted bail but failed to appear in court. On 3 May 202 0 his bail
was finally forfeited to the state . The accused was brought before the court on a
warrant of arrest on 8 December 2022 and since remained in custody .
The matter was postponed on several occasions for legal representation and on
8 Novembe r 2023 Scott came on record. After several postponements the accused
pleaded not guilty . The state called one state witness who was duly cross -examined
by Scott . The matter was postponed to 21 January 2025 for further trial. On that date
Mr. Van Voight appeared on behalf of the accused on instructions of the family. He
indicated that Scott had problems and could not proceed. The matter was
subsequently postponed for the outcome of these review proceedings.
In this matter, there is no evidence to support the notion that Scott’s appearance
tainted the trial proceedings amounting to a gross irregularity . It follows that the
proceedings so far before the trial court is in accordance with justice and must
proceed until its conclusion. The matter is referred to the magistrate to deal with the
matter until its conclusion.

[47] To conclude, i t needs to be mentioned that given the inordinate timeline Scott
continued to practi se in contravention of section 33(4) of the LPA, does not bode well
for the proper administration of justice. Courts are not there to act as enforcers to
ensure that legal practitioners comply with administrative credentials . That is the
primary task of the LPC and the legal profession at large . Failing to do so will not
only bring the administration of justice into disrepute it will also subvert the rule of
law.

[48] For all the abovementioned reasons , the proceedings as it stands in each
individual case are in accordance with justice and must proceed until its logical
conclus ion.

[49] In the circumstances the following order is made:

1. The proceedings instituted against all the above -mentioned accused
are herewith removed from the roll. The respective matter s are returned to the
individual magistrates to proceed with it until its logical conclusion.
2. The Chief Registrar must send a copy of this judgment to the Legal
Practice Council, Western Cape to consider whether further disciplinary steps
and or criminal charges needs to be taken against Mr Patrick Scott .
3. The Chief Registrar must also send a copy of the judgment to the
Regional Court President, and the different Chief Magistrates in the Province
for their attention.

I agree.

___________________________
Holderness, J

It is so ordered.
_____________________
Le Grange, J