SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

Case No: 050803/ 2022
REPORTABLE: No
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
REVISED
27 JUNE 2025

In the matter between:

CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY Excipient /Applicant

MINISTER OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT Second Excipient

MEC: GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC WORKS Third Excipient

And

NU-WAY HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS (PTY)
LIMITED Plaintiff/ Respondent

In re:

NU-WAY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT (PTY)
LIMITED Plaintiff

and
2


CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY First Defendant

MINISTER OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT Second Defendant

MEC: GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC WORKS Third Defendant

REGISTRAR OF DEEDS: PRETORIA Fourth Defendant

THE ILLEGAL OCCUPIERS OF THE PROPERTY
SITUATED AT PORTION 83 (A PORTION OF
PORTION 73) OF THE FARM OLIFANTSFONTEIN
410 J- R Fifth Defendant

THE ILLEGAL OCCUPIERS OF THE PROPERTY
SITUATED AT PORTION 84 (A PORTION OF
PORTION 73) OF THE FARM OLIFANTSFONTEIN
410 J- R Sixth Defendant

THE UNKNOWN OR UNIDENTIFIED OTHER
PARTIES ACTING PERSONALLY AND/OR
THROUGH, UNDER AND/OR REPRESENTING THE
FIFTH TO SIXTH DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND/OR SEVERALLY Seventh Defendant

THE SHERIFF: KEMPTON PARK Eighth Defendant

THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES :
TEMBISA BRANCH Ninth Defendant

This judgment is prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected as
3

such and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties / their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 27 June 2025.


JUDGMENT

RETIEF J
INTRODUCTION

[1]The matter arises from a delictual action instituted by the Plaintiff [Nu-Way] against
the First Defendant [Municipality] and others on the basis that the Municipality
unlawfully took control and possession of its property, Portion 83 and 84 (a Portion of Portion 73) of the Farm Olifantsfontein 410 J -R [collectively the property] and,
that it together with the Second Defendant, the Minister of Human Settlements [the
Minister] and the Third Defendant, the MEC: Provincial Department of Human Settlements and Public Works [MEC] caused the Fifth and Sixth Defendants
[illegal occupiers] to occupy the property by allowing them to erect illegal s helters
thereon. Nu -Way now, inter alia , seeks compensation from the Municipality, the
Minister and the MEC in the form of common law damages, alternatively
constitutional damages , further in the alternative it seeks the eviction of the illegal
occupiers from the property with costs.

[2]The Municipality , the Minister and the MEC have all excepted to Nu- Way’s
amended particulars of claim. Procedurally, Nu- Way’s amended particulars of
claim was triggered by an initial combined rule 23 and 30 notice served by the
Municipality. The Municipality , who was still not satisfied with the amended
particulars of claim , caused a second combined notice in terms of rule 23 and 30
to be delivered . This procedural step did not elicit a response from Nu- Way. The
Municipality set its exception down for hearing and on the 30 August 2023
launched an application in terms of rule 30. The Minister and the MEC then joined
the Municipal ity and excepted to Nu -Way’s amended particulars of claim . This too
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did not elicit a response from N u-Way. The Minister and the MEC filed their
exception.

[3]All the parties were in agreement that because the grounds relied on in the
Municipalit y’s rule 30 application overlap ped with the grounds it raised on
exception, both could conveniently be adjudicated pari passu. The matter before
this Court proceeded on that basis . This Court now deals with both of the
exceptions and the rule 30 application. To avoid confusion reference to the parties
will be made as cited in the action.

[4]Nu-Way did not formally oppose the rule 30 application but r aised two in limine
points. The first was an that the Municipalities rule 30 application is out of time and
that, in the absence of an explanation for such delay, the Court should not
entertain the application. The second was that the Municipality failed to address
the aspect of prejudice in its founding papers and on that basis alone, the application should be dismissed. The Municipality now aware of the point s to be
taken at the hearing deals wit h its response in its written heads of argument . It
therefore appears prudent then t o first deal with this in limine point /s as the
determination thereof will dictate the necessity for this Court t o deal with the
grounds raised in the rule 30 together with those are raised by way of exception.
THE RULE 30 APPLICATION

[5]The central issue in the Municipalities rule 30 application is that the amended particulars of claim offend rule 18, in particular rule 18(4) for lack of particularity . It
is common cause that the 13 (thirteen) grounds of attack overlap the majority of the grounds raised on exception. Although two (2) points in limine are raised by
Nu-Way, logically if the first point raised will be decisive.

[6]It is common cause that the Municipalit y’s rule 30 application was delivered out of
time. Nu-Way contends that the Municipality is therefore time barred to prosecute
the rule 30 application unless it seeks an extension of time and/or condonation in terms of rule 27 . Upon f ailure by a party to adhere to the times prescribed in the
rules , non-compliance arises and a party, like Nu- Way, is entitled to take this
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stance in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Upon the Municipality
becoming aware of this point being taken and, on what basis it was taken, it was
open to the Municipality to file an affidavit satisfactorily explaining the delay to
enable the Court to understand how it came about, and to assess conduct and motive. The explanation is required for the entire length of the delay .
1 In this way ,
a Court is able to exercise its wide discretion and condone the non- compliance if it
can’t determine or be satisfied that good cause has been addressed or
demonstrated.

[7]The fact that an application is filed out of time does not render it an irregular step
as envisaged in terms of rule 30 and as argued by the Municipality . Nu-Way is not
challenging that the step taken itself, to file the rule 30 application, is irregular in
any form , but that it is simply out of time. In fact , Nu-way could have raised this
complaint at the date of the hearing, but it chose to do so timeously to allow the
Municipality to remedy it and to file an affidavit so that this Court could be in a
position to exercise a discretion.

[8]The Municipality did not file an affidavit nor did it seek condonation for the
extension of the time non- compliance. Nu-Way’s point in limine succeeds and the
rule 30 application was filed out if time without explanation. Therefore it is not
necessity for this Court to deal with the remaining point in limine nor the grounds
raised by way of rule 30 notice. Notwithstanding, the points raised by the
Municipality on exception can conveniently be dealt with and in this way, no
unnecessary delay is caused in the resolution of the matter.

[9]This Court now turns to the exceptions before it.

THE EXCEPTIONS

[10]From the pleadings it appears that the nub of attack raised by the Municipality and
the Minister and MEC is in respect of claim s 1 and 2 of Nu -Way’s amended
particulars of claim. The Municipality raised 13 grounds of complaint but has

1 Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another (CCT12/07) [2007] ZACC 24; 2008 (2) SA 472
(CC); 2008 (4) BCLR 442 (CC) (6 December 2007) at par 22.
6

indicated that it does not wish to persist with complaint s 8, 10, 11 nor 13. In
argument their Counsel further refined the attack by stating that the exception
raised in respect of claim 1 (c omplaints 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 ) is on the basis of
vague and embarrassing and that they are unable to plead to such allegations ,
and in respect of claim 2, (complaints 1 and 12) that Nu-Way’s claim for
compensation does not sustain a cause of action. The Municipality seeks that the
offending paragraphs in claim 1 and that claim 2 be struck.

[11]The Minister and the MEC raise 2 grounds on exception on the basis that the
averments which are necessary to sustain a cause of action are lacking and that
such averments are bad in law.

[12]To grasp the reason for the complaints requires an understanding of claims 1 and
2 and how they arose, as pleaded, so that, at exception stage, all the possible
readings of the facts can be explored2 as against the complaints.
Synopsis of pleaded case in respect of the complaints raised in claim1 and claim 2

[13]Nu-Way, a property development company aim s to promote and facilitate the
provisions of affordable low -cost housing to low -income earners in South Africa. It
is the lawful owner of the property upon which it , at its cost established two (2)
townships , Tswelopele Proper and Tswelopele Extension 1. Nu -Way in 2016, as
the owner transferred two erven, Erf 3[ …] in Tswelopele Proper and Erf 5[ …] in
Tswelopele Extension 1 to beneficiaries. However it pleads that as a result of the Municipalit y’s intentional conduct the Municipality refus ed to consent and allow
transfer, therefore no further erven have been transferred. This conduct persists
notwithstanding a Court order dated the 28 September 2021 in which Nu- Way was
ostensibly granted authority to alienate and transfer erven situated on its property .

[14]Instead, the Municipality has allowed the illegal occupiers to take occupation of the
property , it has taken civil possession of the property and, together with the
Minister and MEC who, notwithstanding their obligations and due process i n terms

2 Tembani and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2023 (1)
SA 432 (SCA) para 14.
7

of the provisions of the Housing Act, have both caused or allowed such illegal
occupiers to erect low -cost housing on the property . The low -cost housing
constituting illegal structures. This constituting the pleaded the unlawful conduct
unlawful.

[15]Such unlawful conduct constituting an infringement on Nu- Way’s ownership right
of possession. It has not received any compensation for its loss and/or for its
deprivation of control and/or occupation of the property occasioned by the unlawful conduct and as a result thereof has suffered damages . Nu-Way pleads that t he
property can’t be repossess ed, alternatively , it would in any event be unfair to
uproot the community of illegal occupiers which have already established
themselves on the property. In consequence , Nu-Way seeks pecuniary damages ,
being the market value of the property , alternatively constitutional damages for the
loss it had suffered for the infringement of its property rights, or it seeks the
common law to be developed in terms of section 39 of the Constitution.

[16]Against this brief background this Court deals with the exceptions .
MUNICIPALIT IES EXCEPTION

[17]Of the remaining complaints, c omplaint 1 and 12 overlap and are the central attack
against the claim of compensation, in particular as claimed in claim 2 . The
remaining complaints 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 all attack claim 1. This Court will
commence with the challenges advanced as a result of vagueness constituting an
embarrassment and an inability to plead thereto.
Claim 1: Complaints 2, 3, 4, 5, 7

[18]Nu-Way’s amended particulars of claim are drafted according to a particular
format. Th e format was confirmed by Nu- Way’s lead Counsel in both his written
and in oral argument. Paragraphs 12 to 52 he confirmed, deal with and are
headed ‘Background to Plaintiff’s C laim’. The background to the Nu- Way’s claim is
further divided into five sub-headings dealing with the following subject matters:
Property, the Township dispute, the Housing Development S cheme, Nu-Way’s
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ownership rights and the P ossession and occupation of the property. Nu-Way’s
standard reply to the complaints raised as against paragraphs 27- 29, 32, 36-36.6
and 53 of the amended particulars of claim, being complaints 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, are
that the averments do not constitute facto probanda upon which its cause/s of
action is/are based nor premised and, i n consequence Nu- Way argues that it did
not have to plead it [standard reply] .

[19]Unfortunately, Nu-Way did plead it and what of the remaining paragraphs which
make up a great deal of its background, being the remaining portions of
paragraphs 12- 52 which are not under scrutiny ? It’s not so much the volumes , but,
as contended by Counsel for the Municipality , that such information, at times , is
repea ted and fleshed out under the different sub- headings . The fleshing out of
information when repeated has created inconsi stencies , causing confusion. The
confusion has been compounded by the fact that the Municipality , in an attempt to
plead complains that it can’t discern whether the facts are pleaded for background
purposes or as factors for consider ation in respect of the compensation claim.
Therefore, the Municipality find s it difficult to be pleaded. Such difficulty and the
unnecessary averments renders the amended particulars of claim vague and
embarrassing.

[20]Even if the Municipality accepts Nu- Way’s standard reply which is now after the
facts is being explained, Counsel for the Municipality argues that this does not
assist Nu -Way and invite d the Court to consider the matter T he Secretary for
Finance v Esselman3 in which the Court highlighted that :

“In my understanding of the formulation of the exceptions none of the
defendants have taken issue with the prolixity of the particulars of claim. Likewise there is no objection, per se, to the pleading of history. The objection is to the plaintiff's failure to set out clearly what is history to which the defendants do not have to plead or those section of the particulars of claim which have no relevance against a particular defendant. The paragraphs listed as being irrelevant in the case against the third defendant

3 1988 [1] SA 594 SWA 577 G -H read with Erasmus , Superior Court Practice, RS 20, 2022,
D1-232B.
9

which number approximately 27 demonstrate this point graphically. There is
no onus on any of the defendants to analyse and determine which of the
paragraphs in the particulars of claim refer to them and consequently must
be pleaded to. It is the duty of the plaintiff to set this out clearly and
concisely so that there can be no doubt what case each defendant has to answer to. ”

[21]Nu-Way’s standard reply , with reference to the engineering agreement as
referenced in complaint 2 and 4, with reference to the consent which was sought
by the Municipality to allow or pass transfer of erven to beneficiaries as
referenced in complaint 3 and 5 and the relevance of the Court order in September
2021 in respect of the pleaded deprivation of control and beneficial possession of
the property with reference to complain 7, i s that it need not have pleaded that
information. M oreover , Nu-Way contends that the Municipality can in any event
obtain the information it seeks , in so far as it is relevant and does not constitute
evidence to be led at the hearing of the action, by way of further particulars .
4

[22]The difficulty with Nu- Way’s standard reply is that having regard to the basis of the
delictual claim 1, the unlawful conduct relied on by Nu- Way as against the
Municipality in respect of the property is causally linked by paragraph 56 which
states that:

“[56] The first defendant, knowing that the plaintiff is the registered owner,
has exercised effective control and possession (own emphasis) of the
properties in the manner as pleaded supra (own emphasis) and infra. ”

[23]Logically, “supra” can only mean the preceding paragraphs in relation to
paragraph 56 to ascertain the manner of effective control and possession of the
properties by reference. Therefore, in so far as effective control and possession of
the properties is relied on to demonstrate the unlawfulness of such conduct by the
Municipality, the information as background and history is not clearly severed from the cause of action as stated in the standard answer by Nu- Way. The Municipality

4 Jowell v Bramwell -Jones and Others 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) at 900 J.
10

should not be asked to try and discern which paragraphs “ supra” relates to. This is
why if information is to be pleaded and is purely for history, the pleader should do
this with caution5 as the pleadings may be rendered vague and embarrassing.
Considering the standard argument by Nu- Way, such complaints on the basis of
vague and embarrassing must stand in respect of these complaints.

Complaint 6 and 9

[24]Both complaint s cent er around Nu- Way’s inability to make reference to the exact
sections of a statute reli ed upon. With regard to complaint 6, the complaint is that
Nu-Way didn’t specify which provisions of the National Environmental
Management Act, 107 of 1988 [NEMA ] in paragraph 39 it relied on when it pleaded
that the Municipality , the Minister and the MEC impacted on the rights of Nu- Way
and the community, which it alleges caused or is likely to cause an adverse effect
by the person in control of or using the land. Reference to NEMA is pleaded under background facts under the sub- heading ‘Property ’.

[25]Although it is trite that a specific section need not be pleaded, reading t he
amended particulars of claim as a whole it is still unclear what the reason for the
allegations are which are to be duly supported with reference to NEMA.

[26]In complaint 9, the Municipality, with reference to the illegal structures in paragraph 64, pleaded that the structures erected or allowed to be erected by the Municipality and the unlawful occupiers did not comply with the National Building
Regulations and Building Standards Act, 103 of 1977, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, 16 of 2003 and its regulations and the relevant Tshwane Town Planning Scheme and the zoning of the property. This supporting
the conclusion relied on by Nu- Way that the low -cost housing are illegal structures.

[27]Although Nu-Way correctly argues that reference to particular sections of a statute
need not be pleaded, it is trite that if relief upon as a cause of action, that such
reliance must be formulated in clear terms so that from the reading of the

5 See Footnote 1.
11

particulars of claim , it would be clear to the reader which provision the pleader
intends to rely upon at trial.6 This makes perfect sense so that each party knows
what case it must meet. Nu-Way does not engage with this argument in any way
other than to rely on the general principle already referenced to. With reference to
the Fund Trust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) matter Court considered a situation where
particulars of claim were lacking the pleaded reference to a specific section,
section 53(b) of the 1973 Companies Act. In so doing, Hefer JA relied on and
made reference to an extract by quoting the C ourt a quo (per Tebbutt J) . The
quoted reference is :

“It is not necessary in a pleading, even where the pleader relies on a
particular statute or section of a statute, for him to refer in terms to it
provided that he formulates his case clearly (see Ketteringham v City of
Cape Town 1934 AD 80 at 90) or, put differently, it is sufficient if the facts
are pleaded from which the conclusion can be drawn that the provisions of the statute apply (see Price v Price 1946 CPD 59; Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987
(3) SA 629 (SWA) at 6341). I am of the view; the plaintiff has pleaded all the
factual allegations so as to justify reliance on 53(b). ”

[28]The question is, if the facts alleged in the particulars of claim are established at trial, will they bring the section into operation without reference to a specific section? On a reading of the particulars of claim as a whole and at the exception stage, the applicability of the NEMA is not apparent with regard to complaint 6 and
although vague its vagueness does strike at the cause of action as pleaded in claim 1 and for that reason it must fail under exception. This may have been a different outcome in respect of the rule 18(4) complaint.

[29]Complaint 9 as raised and reasoned must also f ail.
Claim 2: Complaint 1 and 12


6 Fund Trust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Van De venter 1997 (1) SA 710 (A) at 725H -726A.
12

[30]According to the Municipality , complaint 1 and 12 overlap in that they are both
directed at the compensation claimed for the de jure or de facto occupation of the
property by the illegal occupants . The Municipality complains that the claims for
compensation lack averments necessary to disclose a cause of action in that:

30.1. there is an unexplained delay to vindicate their ownership rights; and
30.2. there is failure to pursue alternative effective remedies.

[31]In argument Counsel for the Municipality explained that complaints 1 and 12 were
to be confined to claim 2, being a claim for constitutional damages, alternatively
calling for the development of the common law.

[32]As this Court understand the attack, t he Municipality does not complain that Nu-
Way has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish the fundamental right involved nor that a determination of whether there was a breach of the fundamental right can’t be established nor harm for that matter but, the complaint strikes at Nu-Way’s entitlement to claim constitutional damages on that basis for its failure to
positively plead further facts . If that is so , such further facts are those of
unexplained delay and failure to pursue alternative effective remedi es.

[33]These complaints are raised by the Municipality when Nu -Way, in claim 2 , only
requests the trial court to exercise its discretion to consider constitutional damages if its claim 1, at common law, is not available as a suitable remedy . In
consequence its appreciates that its entitlement to constitutional compensation is an exercise of the Court’s discretion having regard to all the facts on a case to case basis.
[34]Notwithstanding a consideration of the complaints.
Unexplained delay

[35]The Municipality argues that Nu- Way has failed to allege facta probanda
establishing that its delay of over twenty ( 20) years in seeking to vindicate its right
13

of ownership by either claiming compensation or eviction was itself not culpable
and unreasonable.7 The Municipality argues that without the facta probanda
dealing with delay, it has not established a cause of action as the unexplained
twenty ( 20) year delay is patently culpable and unreasonable and it is therefore not
entitled to the relief it is seeking without the missing material facts.

[36]Nu-Way argues that the question of delay is a fact-bound inquiry8 as opposed to
facta probanda and accordingly the Court should be reluctant to make a decision
at the exception stage in respect of a fact -bound issue. Furthermore, it contends
that it is open for the Municipality to raise unreasonable delay as a defence.
Failure to peruse ot her effective remedies

[37] The Muni cipality argues that Nu- Way failed to allege facts establishing that it
sought a court order for the eviction of the illegal occupiers.9 Furthermore that
Nu-Way failed to allege that it sought a decision by the Municipality in terms of
section 9(3) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 [Housing Act] which empowers the
Municipality to expropriate land from private owners and Nu- Way has failed to
allege that is sought such a decision in relation to the erven on the property and if
such decision was not made, then the Municipality argues that the correct remedy
would be a review under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 or
the principle of legality if appropriate.

[38]Nu-Way has appreciated that if it has established a constitutional claim as
pleaded, it is the Court’s obligation to consider what effective relief will be having
regard to all the facts. What appropriate compensation or relief will be in the
circumstance, is a fact -bound inquiry. Such logically can therefore not be pinned to
facta probanda which strikes at the heart of a cause of action enquiry at this stage.

7 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd
(Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae; President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal
Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) at par 32- 38. See also President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA
and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at par 28 and 38.
8 Klokow v Sullivan 2006 (1) SA 259 (SCA).
9 See footnote 7.
14


[39]The necessity to plead further facts whether dealing with undue delay or
appropriate remedy to sustain the compensation does not strike at the core of the
cause of action and surely then can’t be a bar for compensation in respect of claim
2.

[40]The Municipalit y’s complaints must fail.
EXCEPTION OF THE MINISTER AND THE MEC

[41]Confusingly, the Minister and the MEC on exception call for the dismissal of claim 1 and 2 on the basis that claim 1 and 2 of Nu- Way’s amended particulars of claim
lack averments which are necessary to sustain a cause of action and are bad in law. On the face of it, a dismissal of the claims not apparent .

[42]The Minister and MEC raise two grounds in respect of both claim 1 and claim 2 on
the basis that no cause of action has been established.
Ground of exception in respect of claim 1

[43]The Minister and MEC contend that the amended particulars of claim do not set out facts from which the conclusion can be drawn that the provisions of the Housing Act as set out in the amended particulars of claim apply. It is on this basis that it contends that it relies for lack of averments to bring claim 1 within the
statute, the Housing Act . Such a complaint , in context, does not attack the core of
Nu-Way’s cause of action.

[44]Nu-Way’s claim ar ose from delict and as such, reference to the Housing Act is to
set out the statutory obligations upon which they will rely to establish the Ministers and or the MEC’s statutory obligations. At the exception stage a Court accepts that
the property was earmarked for low -cost housing in terms of the Housing Act as
pleaded and that the erven where part of a housing initiative scheme. Flowing from that the provisions relied on in the Hou sing Act, if such not implemented as
obligated, then as pleaded, such establishes wrongfulness, an element of delict.
15


[45]In consequence, claim 1, the delictual claim does not have to be brought within the
ambit of the Act as relied on in this ground as Nu-Ways claim does not arise in
terms of the provisions of the Act but arises in delict. In consequence, this
complaint must fail as relied on.

Ground 2 in respect of claim 2

[46]The nub of ground 2 goes to the alternate remedy, the need for the Court to
develop the common law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution in circumstances where another remedy already exist s with reference to the
common law and eviction in claim 3 . The complaint is not raised as against the
lack of allegations to sustain the relief sought (i.e. sufficient facts to sustain the
development of the common law), but rather that it is inappropriate relief under the circumstances. In this regard, the reasoning in paragraph [38] above is repeated.
In consequence, this ground must fail.

[47]The Minister and the MEC ’s grounds failed to address an appropriate legal attack
striking at the core of Nu- Ways’s cause of action as called for when raised on
exception on this basis .
COSTS

[48]There is no reason why the costs should not follow the result.

[49]The following order:

1. The late filing of the First Defendant’s Uniform Rule 30 application is
not condoned.
2. The First Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff’s costs occasioned
by the rule 30 appli cation including , the cost of two Counsel if so employed,
both taxed on scale C.

16

3. Grounds 2, 3, 4,5 and 7 of the First Defendant ’s exception succeed s.

4. The Plaintiff is ordered to, within 1(one) month from date hereof,
amend it s amended paragraphs 27- 29, 32,36- 36.6 and 53 of its particulars
of claim, failing which, paragraphs 27- 29, 32,36- 36.6 and 53 will be struck.

5. The Second and Third Defendants ’ exception is dismissed with costs
and the Second and Third Defendant s are jointly and severally liable to pay
the Plaintiff’s costs , including the cost of two Counsel if so employed, both
taxed on scale C.

L.A. RETIEF
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division

Appearances:

For Plaintiff : FH Terblanche SC
J De Beer SC

Instructed by attorneys: Kruse Attorneys Inc
Tel: 012 460 0987
Email: robert@kruseattorneys.co.za
Ref: NUW1/0021

For First Defendant : Adv D Watson
Adv MZ Gwala
Sandton Chambers
Instructed by attorneys: Salijee Govender Van Der Merwe Inc
Tel: 011 728 7752
Email: robert@sgvattorneys.co.za

17

For Second and Third Defendant : Adv R Ram SC

Instructed by attorneys: State Attorney
Tel: 012 309 1500
Email: rpnkkhosa@justuce.gov.za

Date of hearing: 25 April 2025
Date of judgment : 27 June 2025
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