SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
REPORTABLE
Case no: 17538/24
In the matter between:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL APPLICANT
PRACTICE COUNCIL
and
DEON JAKOBUS BEUKMAN RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: The South African Legal Practice Council v Deon Jakobus
Beukman (Case no : 17538/24 ) [202 5] ZAWCHC (11 July 2025 )
Coram: SLINGERS J AND MAYOSI AJ
Heard : 18 June 2 025
Delivered : 11 July 2025
Summary : In this application, the applicant seeks the striking of the respond ent from
the roll of legal practitioners of this Honourable Court , as well as relief ancillary thereto.
ORDER
1 Deon Jakobus Beukman (Beukman ) is struck from the roll of legal practitioners
of this Honourable Court.
2 Beukman shall immediately deliver to the Registrar of this Honourable Court his
certificate of enrolment as a legal practitioner of this Court.
3 In the event of Beukman’s failure to comply with paragraph 2 above, the Sheriff is
authorised and directed to take possession of the certificate and to hand it to the
Registrar of this Court.
4 Beukman shall pay Mr Ian Jacobs the sum of R50 000.00 (fifty tho usand rands)
no later than 30 November 2025.
5 In the event that Beukman fails to comply with the terms of paragraph 4 above,
either the LPC or Mr Ian Jacobs may institute contempt of court proceedings
against Beukman.
6 Beukman shall pay the costs of this application on a party and party scale.
JUDGMENT
Mayosi AJ :
Introduction and relevant background
1 The applicant ( the LPC ) is the regulatory body for the legal profession in South
Africa , established in terms of section 4 (read with section 120(4)) of the Legal Practice
Act 28 of 2014 ( the LPA ), to exercise oversight over the conduct of both candidate legal
practitioners and legal practitioners .
2 The legal interest that the LPC has in brin ging this application flows f rom the L PA
Rules and Code of Conduct promulgated in terms of section 36 of the LPA, as well as
the common law , in terms of which the LPC is charged with , and is empowered to, inter
alia:
2.1 promote and protect the public interest ;
2.2 determine, enhance and maintain appropriate standards of professional
practice and ethical conduct of all candidate legal practitioners and legal
practitioners ;
2.3 give effect to the provisions of the LPA in order to achieve the purpose of
the Act as set out in section 3 thereof ;
2.4 exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over all practit ioners who are, or are
allegedly unprofessional or dishonourable or unworthy ; and
2.3 in appropriate cases , and in terms of sections 40(3)(a)(iv) and 44(1) of the
LPA, launch an application for the striking off of the practitioner’s name from the
roll, or the suspension from practice of a legal practitioner if the court is satisfied
that the legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to continue to practice.
3 Prior to the LPA, the Law Society’s Rules and the authority of section 74 of the
Attorneys Act applied to all attorneys until 1 March 2016 , when the Rules for the
Attorneys’ Profession came into effect. These Rules applied to the conduct of attorneys
subsequent to 1 March 2016 until 20 July 2018, when the LPA Rules and Code of
Conduct came into ef fect.
4 These long-established codes of professional conduct , including the applicable
statutory duties and prohibitions applicable to legal practitioners, have been interpreted
and applied by the courts in a vast number of cases over a long period of time . A legal
practitioner , in their conduct , must be guided not only by the Codes of Conduct set out
in the statutes and case law, but also by the inherent virtues of integrity, honesty and
decency.
5 Turning now to the respondent . He is a 70-year-old who was admitted as an
attorney of this Honourable Court on 12 January 1983 . He removed his name from the
roll on 31 July 1993 and was re -admitted as an attorney on 4 February 1994. In terms
of section 114 of the LPA, every attorney that was a dmitted by the High Court and was
authorised to be enrolled as such in terms of the Attorneys Act prior to 1 November
2018 is regarded as having be en admitted to practice under the LPA.
6 The facts and circumstances which ultimately led to the LPC instituting these
proceedings first came to its attention on 1 July 2021, when a written complaint was
received by it from a Mr B Jacobs (the complainant ) on behalf of his son, Mr I an
Jacobs (the son, alternati vely the buyer ). In the letter of complaint, the complainant
alleged that the respondent was appointed as the conveyancer in terms of a sale
agreement between his son and a Mr A A Herhade ( the seller ) in which the
complainant’s son purchased Erf 7[...], Somerset West for R550 000.00.
7 The son paid an amount of R5 61 921.46 to the respondent and consented to
certain funds being paid to expedite the registration of the transfer . The respondent
further paid an amount of R41 250.00 to the estate agent, Mr Paul Matthews, for the
latter’s commission.
8 The seller died on 20 February 2009 before the transfer was registered, and the
executor of the seller’s estate elected to c ancel the sale agreement as the seller’s
deceased estate was insolvent.
9 On 31 March 2009, the respondent refunded the buyer an amount of
R481 653.81 together with interest of R67 895.53. The buyer subsequently issued a
summons in the Magistr ate’s Court against the respondent under case number
3349/2009 in which he claimed an amount of R81 935.34, as the buyer believed that he
was entitled to a full refund of the R561 921.46 that he had paid to the respondent ,
together with interest in the amount of R69 563.22.
10 During the course of the civil proceedings , the buyer’s attorney of record
contacted the estate agent , Mr Matthews , and enquired as to whether or not the estate
agent’s commission had be en paid over to him by the respondent. Mr Matthews
advised that it had been paid over to him . He had refunded the R50 000.00 (the
commission plus interest) to the respondent in February 2015 as a result of the dispute
between the buyer and the respondent.
11 The respondent did not refund the buyer; nor did the respondent inform the buyer
that Mr Matthews had refunded the estate agent’s commission.
12 During the litigation process the parties negotiated a settlement in terms of which
it was agreed that the responde nt would pay the buyer R50 000.00 in full and final
settle ment of all the buyer’s claims against the respondent. This amount was equivalent
to that paid by Mr Matthews to the respondent flowing from the failed sale transaction;
i.e.; agent’s c ommission of R4 1 250.00 plus interest. The r espondent, however, failed to
make the payment to the buyer .
13 One of the respondent’s responses to the complaint laid against him with the
LPC was that Mr Matthews had refunded him the funds in terms of an indemnity signed
by Mr Matthews, and that there was therefore no duty on the respondent to invest the
funds in his trust account. He later recanted from this view in his evidence during the
disciplinary proceedings , wherein he concede d that the indemnity did not protect him
against a claim for money held in trust for and on behalf of his clients, as in the case of
the R50 000.00 at issue , which he held in trust for and on behalf of the buyer . Another
of his responses to the complaint was to question the complainant’s mandate to lay a
complaint of alleged unprofessional conduct against him with the LPC. He , moreover ,
stated that he in any event could not re spond further to the complaint as the entire
matter was sub judice , a position with which the LPC disagreed , correctly so in my view,
as recorded in i ts co rrespondence to the respondent on 20 October 2021.
14 It is not clear what happened in the matter from this date until 2024 . There
appears to have been a lull in it.
15 On a date that is not stated in the record, t he LPC’s investigating committee
considered the matter and directed that the case be referred to its Disciplinary
Committee (the DC ) for adjudication . It is not apparent from the record exactly when
this referral occurred.
16 The respondent was called to appear before the DC in person , to answer the
following charge /s:
“… that he is guilty of misconduct in terms of Clause 2A of the Lega l Practice
Council’s Code of Conduct in that he breached and / or contravened:
Charge 1
Provision 3.15 of the Code of Conduct for all legal practitioners in that he brought
the legal profession into disrepute by misappropriating R50, 000.00 which was
paid to him by Mr Paul Matthews , and which funds should have be en paid to Mr I
Jacobs.
Alternatively
Provision 3.8 of the Code of Conduct for all legal practitioners in that he failed to
account faithfully, accurately and timeously to Mr I Jacobs for the R50, 000.00
which came into his possession, and keep such money separate from his own
money, and retain such money for only as long as strictly necessary.”
17 The respondent attended the DC hearing held at the LPC’s Provincial Offices on
30 April 2024 , representing himself . He initially pleaded not guilty to the charges ,
however , during his cross -examination he changed his plea to guilty.
The findings of the DC
18 The DC’s findings and sanctions, provided on 30 April 2024 were as follows:
18.1 The respondent was found guilty as pleaded to the charge as provided for
in Provision 3.15 of the Code of Conduct, i.e., he brough t the legal profession
into disrepute by misappropriating the R50 000.00 that ought to have been paid
back to the buyer.
18.2 It was resolved to recommend to the LPC that this application be launched
for an order seeking the striking of the responden t’s name from the roll of legal
practitioners. This was in keeping with the prov isions of section 40(3 ) (iv)(aa)
read with Rule 40.4 .1.4.1 of the LPA, as amended, which requires the DC , in
respect of a legal practitioner who has been found guilty of misconduct, to advise
the LPC to apply to the High Court for an order striking the name of the legal
practitioner concerned form the roll .
18.3 The r espondent was ord ered to pay compensation to the buyer in the
amount of R50 000.00 in terms of the settlement agreement entered into
between them, within six months of receipt of the LPC’s decision.
18.4 The r espondent was liable to pay the costs for the DC’s hearing.
18.5 The r espondent was informed that he had the right to appeal the findings
and sanction imposed by the DC.
19 The LPC resolved to institute the current application o n 6 July 2024.
20 It contends that the respondent contravened the legal practitioner’s Code of
Conduct in that he brought the legal profession into disrepute by misappropriating the
R50 000.00 paid by Mr Matthews to him, and which funds he did not pay back to the
buyer ; alternatively that the respondent failed to account faithfully, accurately and
timeously to the buyer for the R50 000.00 which came into his possession , and he failed
to keep such money separate from his own funds and retain it only for as long as it was
strictly necessary to do so .
21 The LPC instituted these proceedings in August 2024, and the application was
set down for hearing on 2 May 2025. The respondent initially opposed the application
but subsequently withdrew his opposition.
22 On th e hearing date, at which the respondent was neither present nor
represented , this Court raised with the applicant’s counsel some concerns regarding
certain information that was absent from the papers , and which it considered necessary
in order for the Court to properly exercise its discretion .
23 The Court raised the following issues that were not covered in the papers:
23.1 Whether or not an amount of the mag nitude of R50 000.00 warranted the
respondent being struck from the roll , given the drastic impact of such an order
on his livelihood , about which there was no information on the papers.
23.2 The reasons why t he respondent had been removed from the attorneys ’
roll initially on 31 July 1993, before he was re -admitted on 4 February 1994.
23.3 Whether or not the R50 000.00 had to date been paid back by the
respondent to the buyer.
23.4 The reasons for the LPC’s delay in prosecuting the complaint to its
completion , given that the complaint was made to it o n 1 July 2021, was
determined by the DC only on 30 April 2024, and ultimately finalise d by the LPC
on 6 July 2024 , more than three years after the complaint had be en lodged .
24 The Court postponed the matter for hearing on 18 June 2025 , directing the LPC
to file a supplem entary affidavit addressing these outstanding issues and to serve it on
the responden t; granting him an election to thereafter file a replying affidavit if he chose
to oppose the matter ; and further directing that heads of argument be filed .
25 The supplementary and replying affidavits were indeed filed. Some objection to
the respondent’s replying affidavit was raised by the LPC in the heads of argument filed
on its behalf for the reason that the affidavit constituted an irregular step given tha t the
respondent had not file d a notice of opposition to the application. Given the contents of
the replying affidavit, however, and their materiality and relevance to the striking inquiry
that is before this Court , the interests of justice justify the ad mission of the replying
affidavit into evidence notwithstanding the absence of a notice of opposition by the
respondent .
26 The LPC’s reasons for its internal delay of more than three years in prosecuting
the case to completion are not ideal , given the critical oversight role it plays over the
conduct of legal practitioners in the promotion and protection of the public interest.
According to the deponent to its supplementary affidavit, after the judgement in Legal
Practice Council v Van Wyk (3920/ 2013) [ 2021] ZAWCHC 223 , the LPC conducted an
audit of all matters that were outstanding an d during the course of this assessment, this
matter was identified, and its finalisation was prioritised. The LPC has proffered an
apology for this delay . However, i t must be said that as a regulatory body charged with
championing the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in the eyes of the public , it
must do better. The importance of its statutory mandate enjoins the LPC to act with the
necessary ha ste in prosecuting complaints that come before it. Although the
respondent appears to have had some role to play in the delay, the LPC’s own
tardiness cannot be lost sight of.
27 From the LPC’s supplementary affidavit , the reason that the respondent’s name
was removed from the roll of attorneys on 31 July 1993 is that he was seeking
admission to the Bar. This is confirmed by the respondent in his affidavit. Nothing
further is known about that , including from the respondent himself . This Court therefore
has no evidence before it that suggests that his initial removal from the roll has a
bearing on this application.
28 The respondent addressed his livelihood in his replying affidavit, in response to
this Court’s question s in that regard. He did so by means of a single paragrap h. When
regard is had to that paragraph and what he furth er told this Court about his liveliho od
during the hearing, his version can best be described as opaque , if not also
contradictory.
29 He addressed his current livelihood in the following single paragraph in his
replying affidavit : that the LPC’s decision “had such a dramatic effect on [his] life and
relationship with previous attorneys, that [he] had to vacate his offices and relinquish the
secretarial services and sharing the fees in Road Accident Fund matters as [he] would
have be en disbarred from sharin g offices and fees with attorneys.” This stands in stark
contrast to what he told this Court at the hearing on 18 June 2025 , at which the
respondent appeared in person. The respondent informed this Court that he is presently
sharing fees from RAF matters with at least one attorney , and offices to a limited extent
to consult with clients – conduct for which , on his own version , he could be disbarred
given the finding s of the LPC against him that were arrived at after his admission of
guilt.
30 At the hearing, the respondent told this Court that : (a) he is currently running his
offices from his home; (b) he is currently working with Raymond McCreath of Raymond
McCreath Inc. as a consultant; ( c) he helps McCreath to initiate RAF claims (for wh ich
he consults with clients at McCreath’s offices ) and finalise those claims; ( d) they share
fees in RAF matters on the basis of McCreath paying him 50% of the contingency fees
received by him upon finalisation of a RAF claim ; and (e) the respondent does not
appear in court nor does he handle funds as all of that is handle d through or by
McCreath .
31 None of this information was in the replying affidavit that he placed before th e
Court. It was provided upon pro bing of the respondent by th is Court.
32 It is clear from this information that, contrary to what he stated in his replying
affidavit, the respondent does indeed share fees in RAF matter s and offices to a limited
extent for those purposes , at least with this particular attorney.
33 When faced with further probing from the Court regarding his livelihood and how
he subsists (given that he told this Court that he could not give an indication as to when
he could pay the R50 000.00) , the respondent stated that he receives an amount of
maintenance from his son who gives him some R15 000.00 per month , plus an
additional approximately R12 000.00 per month to cover his life insurance policies. This
is an oral loan arrangement with his son, secured by the cession of the proceeds of the
respond ent’s life policy in favour of his son.
34 As with the McCreath arrangement , details regarding the maintenance from the
son are not in the replying affidavit. There are no supporting affidavits regarding the
oral version given to the Court. This is informa tion which the LPC could not have
known . It is also information that is relevant to this Court’s exercise of its discretion in
relation to both the fit and proper component of this enquiry, as well as what constitutes
an appropriate sanction in the event of an adverse finding .
The legal approach to a striking application
35 In determining whether or not the respondent’s name should be struck from the
roll of legal practitioners, this Court must engage in a three - stage d inquiry .1
36 First, we must decide whether or not the alleged offending conduct is established
on a balance of probabilities . This is a factual inquiry .2
37 Second, we must consider whether or not the respondent, in our discretion, is not
a fit and proper to continue to practise . This involves a weighing u p of the conduct
complained of against the conduct expected of an attorney and, to this extent, is a value
judgment.3
1 Jasat v Natal Law Society 2000 (3) SA 44 (SCA) , at para 10
2 Nyembezi v Law Society Natal 1981 (2) SA 752 (A) at 756 H – 758A; Kekana v Society of Advocates of
South Africa 1998 ZASCA 54; 1998 (4) SA 649 (SCA) at 654D
3 Malan v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces (568/2007) [2008] ZASCA 90 (12 September 2008)
at para 4
38 The third l eg of the enquiry is the question whether or not , in all the
circumstances , the respondent should be removed from the roll of attorneys or whether
an order suspending him from practice for a specified period will suffice , in the
discretion of this Court .4
The offending conduct
39 In the present matter the offending conduct of the respondent is common cause.
He has admitted that he is guilty of the misappropriation of trust funds belonging to his
client .
40 Such conduct does indeed bring the legal profession into disrepute and can only
diminish the public’s trust in the legal profession in general, and in legal practitioners in
particular.
Is the respondent a fit and proper person to practise?
41 To be clear, the respondent’s offending conduct is not confined to the admitted
act of misappropriati ng R50 000.00, which may appear to be an insignificant amount to
some , though not to this Court in the context of the issues raised by this application.
The respondent’s offending conduct is compounded by his further actions which
displayed persistent dishonesty ; a lack of reliability and called his integrity into
question .5 It is against this background , set out more fully below, that we exercise our
discretion as to whether the respondent is not a fit and proper to practice person to
practise .
42 First, the estate agent’s commission plus interest was p aid by Mr Mat thews to the
respondent more than ten year s ago - in February 2015 . Not only did the respondent
not pay the money over to his client ; he did not even inform his client that th e
4 Naylor v Jansen 2007 (1) SA 16 (SCA) at para 21
5 Vassen v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope [1998] ZASCA 47; 1998 (4) SA 532 (SCA) at 538G
commission with interest had been refunded . This lack of transparency and
accountability is deeply problematic for a legal practitioner charged with trust funds that
do not belong to him.
43 Second, the civil proceedings instituted by the buyer against the respondent for
recovery of the funds were settled on the basis of a settlement agreement in terms of
which the respondent was to pay the money back to the buyer. He failed to do so . To
date, no such payment has been made to the buyer .
44 Third, at his disciplinary hearing the respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge
against h im, relying on an indemnity signed by Mr Matthews to support his argument
that he was not obliged to pay the money to his client. Furthermore, h e admitted that he
had used the funds to pay for his own legal fees . It was onl y during his cross -
examination , after he was constrained to concede that the indemnity did not absolve
him from repaying his client , that the respondent changed his plea from not guilty to
guilty. This recalcitrance, in the face of these facts, was not conduct befitting of a legal
practitioner.
45 Fourth, the respondent once again failed to make payment to the buyer after the
LPC ordered him to comply with the settlement agreement with and make payment ; and
to do so within six months of receipt of the LPC’s decision. The respondent remained
undeterred in his refusal to pay the buyer , even in the face of a striking off application
contemplated by t he LPC , which if granted would curtail his livelihood.
46 The reasons why the funds have not be en repaid to the buyer are unacceptable .
One is tempted to conclude that the respondent simply did not care , even w hilst starring
down the barrel of a possible striking off.
47 During the hearing the respondent first informed the Court that he cannot say
when he will be in a position to repay the money . He was then pointed to the contents
of his replying affidavit wherein he referred to (and attached) letters that he had
addressed to the buyer’s attorney of record in September and December 2024 offering
to mak e payment in instalments of R5 000.00 per month starting from 8 December 2024
and thereafter on the 8th day of each month until full payment. When asked by this
Court why he had no t made the payments that he had offered , his response s were
twofold: (a) that he was awaiting a response from the buyer’s attorney of record who
had responded to him on 2 December 2024 saying he would seek instructions from his
client ; and (b) he assumed the buyer had abandoned the claim.
48 Both responses are dising enuous and suggest quite strongly that his offers to
pay were not made bona fide . Taking instruction s regarding the manner of payment of
a claim owing by a debtor i s hardly synonymous with the abandonment of that claim by
the creditor ; nor is it a get -out-of-jail-free card for a legal practitioner who has
misappropriated trust funds , and worse, is already under threat of being struck off the
roll. Why the need to await instructions ? This is a question that the respondent was
unable to answer. The buyer ’s attorney of record was correct in his strongly -worded
response to the respondent dated 22 May 2025 to the effect that there was no justifiable
reason why his client should be required to wait months (it has been years, in reality) to
receive funds that are rightfully due to him ; and that had the respondent not
misappropriated funds en trusted to him by Mr Matthews , payment could and should
have be en made without delay.
49 And that is the crux of the issue – payment could and should have been made a
long time ago by an honest legal practitioner with integrity , who had acknowledged his
wrongdoing first to his former client and thereafter to the profession at large . The
amount of maintenance that the respondent receives from his son is not an insubstantial
amount and therefore payment can be made .
50 And it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to assert, as he did in his
replying affidavit, that : “It was not necessary to come to court for R50 000.00. ” The fact
that the amount is a ‘mere’ R50 000.00 as he seems to suggest is an aggravating factor
against him, not a mitigating one. In the circumstances of this case , it appears to have
been very necessary to approach this Court in relation to this amount, as all other
efforts (including the respondent’s undertakings) had failed and this seems to be the
only remedy now available to the buyer , and the LPC in the discharge of its mandate .
The proverbial run -around that the respondent ha s been giving the buyer , to this day,
regarding the repayment of the funds is a blight on his integrity and honesty that
transcends th is singular (known) incident of him having misappr opriate d a client’s funds .
Integrity and honesty are traits that are crucial to the calling of a legal practitioner , and
in this regard the respondent has demonstrated himself to be sorely wanting .
51 These circumstances of t he respondent’s consistent failure to conduct himself
ethically , together with his blatant disregard for upholding his oath as an attorney render
him a person that is not fit and proper to continue to practise as an attorney.
The appropriate sanction
52 Having dealt with the two inquiries, I now turn to deal with the third leg of the
inquiry, namely whether, in all the cir cumstances, the respondent is to be removed from
the roll of legal practitioners or whether an order suspending h im from practice for a
specified period would suffice. Each case is to be examined in t he light of its own facts
and circumstances ; the aim being to discipline and punish the errant practitioner , and
protect the public particularly where trust funds are involved, as is the case in the
present matter.6
53 As far as this Court is aware, in all the years that he has be en in practice since
1983 , no other complaint has be en laid against the respondent .
54 The LPC persisted wit h its submission that the circumstances of this case called
for the striking of the respondent’s name from the roll, but submitted, however, that if
this Court was not so inclined then in that event an appropriate sanction would the
suspension of the respondent from practice for a period of time . A draft order
6 Summerly v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA), para 19
contemplating the suspension of the respondent from practice for a period of three
years , similar to the order that was granted by this Court i n Swartz7, was handed up by
the LPC in anticipation that this Court might be inclined to suspend the respondent for a
period, rather than to order that his name struck from the roll.
55 This Court is minded to strike the respondent from the roll of legal practitioners,
for the reasons set out below as foregrounded in the remainder of this judgment. The
respondent’s conduct, viewed in its totality, supports a conclusion that he suffers from a
character defect that renders him a danger to society and the legal profession. The
offending conduct is so gross and egregious that it manifests a lack of integrity such that
the respondent is rendered unfit to remain on the roll of legal practitioners.
56 Dealing first with Swartz , in which this Court suspended the legal practitioner
from practice fo r three years subject to certain conditions, the facts of the misconduct in
Swartz are different from those underpinning the misconduct that is before us ;8 and t he
facts of that case are further distinguishable from the presen t matter in the following
respects:
56.1 The respondent i n Swartz9 was frank and candid when confronted by the
LPC. She did not deny the allegations against her. In the present matter, the
respondent denied the allegations against him (notwithstanding that he had
earlier settled the civil claim and agreed to pay the R50 000.00) until he was
placed in a n untenable position where his denials could not be sustain ed under
cross examination, whereupon he changed his plea to guilty.
56.2 The respondent in Swartz10 had never received any funds from the
complainant in that matter, a nd the Court found that her intent was never to
cause the complainant any prejudice. That is not the case in this matter. The
respondent received funds from the buyer which he persistently failed and/or
7 South African Legal Practice Council v Swartz (15857/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 60 (21 February 2025)
8 In that case the respondent had allowed the complainant’s claim to prescribe in her hands, and was
dishonest to her client about it.
9 Para [45]
10 Para [49]
refuse d to repay. And furthermore he, admittedly , used these funds for his own
personal benefit, i.e., to pay for his legal costs, thereby not only prejudicing the
buyer but do ing so for his own personal benefit .
56.3 The respondent in Swartz11 made significant efforts to address her
mistake , as a result of which she endured considerable financial strain by paying
an amount of R398 000.00 to the complainant in that matter, which the court
found underscored her commitment to rectifying the situation. The same cannot
be said about the respondent in our matter. He has persistently refused and/or
failed to date, to repay the money that he embezzled.
56.4 Furthermore, the respondent in Swartz12 was still young and a junior
attorney when the incident complained of in that matter occurred. She had just
established her own practice, was still junior and inexperienced , the court found.
Once again t he same cannot be said for the respondent. He has been a legal
practitioner since 1983. When the sale fell through in 2009 , he had be en in
pract ice for 26 years. When the R50 00 0.00 was refunded to him by Mr Matthews
in February 2015 and he not only concealed th e fact of the repayment but also
failed to repay it to the buyer , the respondent had been in practice for 32 years.
57 In the replying affidavit that he placed before this Court, which dealt cursorily and
superficially with his personal circumstances, the respondent failed to take this Court
into his confidence in such a manner as to persuade it to exercise its discretion in his
favour.
58 In all of the circumstances of this case, having read all the documents filed of
record and heard , in particular , the respondent in Cour t, and when regard is had to the
nature of the respondent’s misconduct including its persistent nature o ver a lengthy
period of time, weighed against the legitimate interests of the profession, the public and
their justifiable expectation that this Court will protect their interests in an appropriate
and fair manner , this Court is of the view that striking the respondent’s name from the
11 Para [50]
12 Para [53]
roll is the appropriate sanction. In our view, suspension will not achieve the desired
effect. As things stand, according to his replying affidavit the respondent has been in
some fo rm of self -imposed ‘suspension’ since the LPC’s decision , where after he gave
up his offices and secretarial services due in large part to the dim view his colleagues in
the profession took of him after the LPC’s finding. According to him, he does not acce pt
monies from clients; does not handle trust funds; does not appear in court. However,
given his lack of candour , this Court is wary of the credibility of his assurances that
whatever limited practice he is pursuing can be of no harm to the public.
59 Therefore following order is made:
59.1 Deon Jakobus Beukman ( Beukman ) is struck from the roll of legal
practitioners of this Honourable Court.
59.2 Beukman shall deliver to the Registrar of this Honourable Court his
certificate of enrolment as a legal practitioner of th is Court within five (5)
court days of receipt of this Order .
59.3 In the event of Beukman’s failure to comply with sub-paragraph 2 above,
the Sheriff be authorised and directed to take possession of the certificate
and to hand it to th e Registrar of this Honourable Court.
59.4 Beukman shall pay Mr Ian Jacobs the sum of R50 000.00 ( Fifty thousand
rands) on or before 30 November 2025.
59.5 In the event that Beukman fails to comply with the terms of sub-paragraph
4 above, either the LPC or Mr Ian Jacobs may institute contempt of court
proceedings against Beukman .
59.6 Beukman shall pay the costs of this application on a party and party scale.
_____ ________________________
N MAYOSI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree , and it is so ordered.
_____ ________________________
H SLINGERS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For applicant : Ms Rehanna Parker from RKP Attorneys Inc .
For respondent : In person.