Jordan v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Others (2025/055433) [2025] ZAGPJHC 663 (8 July 2025)

40 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Appeal — Leave to appeal — Locus standi — Applicant's standing to bring application questioned — Court found applicant failed to establish direct interest in subject matter — Application for leave to appeal dismissed on grounds of lack of reasonable prospects of success and absence of compelling reasons — Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 applied.

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[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against an urgent
application in which it was found that (a) the matter is urgent,
and (b) the applicant failed to establish locus standi and the
application consequently was as such dismissed.

[2] The application for leave to appeal is brought on the grounds
that this Court erred in the following findings:

2.1. That it is not clear in which capacity the applicant is
acting, being it personal, as representative of the
property, alternatively the owner of the property
(Foresight Office Unit CC), or as representative of his
mother and her care -taker;

2.2. That no regard is to be given to the Power of Attorney
from the owner of the property, Foresight Office Unit CC,
in favour of the applicant;

2.3. That the applicant does not have a direct interest in the
subject matter of the application, notwithstanding the fact
that the applicant is the party liable for payment of the
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account of the 1st respondent for services supplied by the
respondents, which services is an integral subject matter
of the application;

2.4. That the applicant does not have a direct interest in the
subject matter or the application, notwithstanding the fact
that he is the lessee incidental to a lease agreement in
terms of which the applicant pays rent for the property that
he utilises for the purposes as set out in his founding
affidavit;

2.5. That the applicant does not have a direct interest in the
subject matter of the application, notwithstanding the fact
that he is a person who has or at all relevant times had
legal authority to give permission to any person to enter
or reside on the property in ques tion;

2.6. That the applicant does not have a direct interest in the
subject matter of the application, notwithstanding the fact
that he is a person who has or at all relevant times had
legal authority to give permission to any person to enter
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or reside on the property in question;

2.7. That the owner of the property, Foresight Office Unit CC,
which has not occupied the property to which the
electricity and water supply and municipal services are
provided by the respondents since at least 2019, would
have a direct interest in the outcome of the application as
opposed to the interest of the applicant;

2.8. That the role and position of the Applicant in the
application is not 'unequivocally clear' to 'any person
reading the court papers" .

[3] The applicant seek s leave to appeal to the full court of this
Division, alternatively the Supreme Court of Appeal.

[4] The test for granting leave to appeal is set out in Section
17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, which
provides that leave to appeal may only be granted if the Court
is of the opinion that:

4.1. The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of
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success; or

4.2. There is some other compelling reason why the appeal
should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the
matter under consideration.

[5] In the matter of The Mont Chevaux Trust (IT 2012/28) v Tina
Goosen and 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) the following
was stated:
‘It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to
appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been
raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to
appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect
that another court might come to a different conclusion,
see Van Heerden v Cronwright & Others 1985 (2) SA
342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would" in the new
statute indicates a measure of certainty that another
court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought
to be appealed against.’

[6] The courts are discouraged of granting leave to appeal where
scarce judicial resources are utilised on matters where
another court would not come to a different conclusion. A
certain amount of confidence has been introduced, in that the
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court must consider whether another court would, not should,
come to a different conclusion. Put differently, it must be very
probable that another court would come to a different
conclusion, before a court should grant leave to appeal.

[7] After consideration of the grounds for the leave to appeal, the
following findings are made:

7.1. The grounds of appeal, as advanced, do not have any
reasonable prospects of success.

7.2. There is no other compelling reason why the appeal
should be heard .

[8] As such, I find that the application for leave to appeal does not
meet the requirements set out in Section 17 of the Superior
Courts Act and stands to be dismissed.

Costs
[9] The general principle is that the successful party is entitled to
its costs. I find no reason to deviate from the general principle.
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DATE OF LEAVE TO APPEAL: 20 JUNE 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 8 JULY 2025


REPRESENTATION:
FOR THE APPLICANT: MS M VAN WYK


INSTRUCTED BY: MELANIE VAN WYK
ATTORNEYS 22 NURSERY
ROAD THE GARDENS
JOHANNESBURG
TEL: 083 258 2411
E-MAIL: mel@mvw -legal.co.za
REF: CA JORDAN / CJ56


FOR THE RESPONDENT: MADHLOPA & THENGA INC
54 SEVENTH AVENUE
PARKTOWN NORTH
E-mail:
hugo@madhlopathenga.co.za
Tel :( 011) 442 -9045