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[1991] ZASCA 173
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Cohen NO v Roetz NO In Re: Estate Late AJA Heyns and Others (169/90) [1991] ZASCA 173; 1992 (1) SA 629 (AD); [1992] 4 All SA 106 (AD) (28 November 1991)
169/90 N v H
DALE GORDON COHEN
versus
CORNELIS JOHANNES ROETZ N O and OTHERS
SMALBERGER, JA -
1
169/90 NvH
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
In the matter between:
DALE GORDON COHEN N
O
Appellant
and
CORNELIS JOHANNES ROETZ
N O
First
Respondent
IN RE
ESTATE LATE A J A HEYNS
CATHERINE ELAINE
BAXTER
Second Respondent
JENNIFER ANN HEYNS
Third Respondent
MICHAEL TSELENTIS N
O
Fourth Respondent
CORAM:
CORBETT, CJ, SMALBERGER, VIVIER,
EKSTEEN, JJA, et VAN COLLER, AJA
HEARD
: 11 November 1991
DELIVERED
: 28 November 1991
JUDGMENT
SMALBERGER, JA :-
In terms of their mutual will dated 8 July 1947 ("the will"), Matthys
Marthinus Heyns and
2/
2
Margaretha Susanna Heyns ("the testators") bequeathed
certain farm
properties ("the properties") to their
three children Andries Johan Adam, Martha Johanna and
Johanna Jacoba in
undivided shares. The bequest was
made subject to a number of special
conditions. The
first provided for a life usufruct over the properties
in favour of the survivor. The second contained
directions as to how the properties were to be divided
amongst the three children. Then came the following
conditions:
"(iii) In the event of any of our said children predeceasing us or dying
subsequently, without leaving descendants, our surviving
children or
grandchildren shall be entitled to succeed in egual shares per stirpes to such
deceased child's share in the aforesaid
properties unrestrictedly. (iv) That our
said son and daughters are restricted and shall not have the right to mortgage,
encumber,
sell or otherwise alienate their respective properties set out in
3/
3
subclause (ii)(a), (b) and (c) hereof, an advantageous contract in respect of
minerals on the properties not being debarred, however.
The respective portions
of the said farms are entailed and shall devolve on the eldest child of each of
our aforesaid three children
after their death, to the fourth generation, the
succeeding descendant's eldest child always succeeding his or her parent."
The testatrix passed away in 1948, and the
testator
in 1973. The one-third share of the
properties that devolved upon Andries
Johan Adam Heyns
("the deceased") was transferred into his name in 1949,
subject to the
testator's life usufruct and special
conditions (iii) and (iv) of the will.
The second
respondent, Catherine Elaine Baxter ("Catherine") was
born on
18 April 1956. She was the daughter of the
deceased's wife, Catherine Salome Heyns, by a previous
marriage. On 1
March 1967 Catherine was adopted by
the deceased under the provisions of the Children's Act
4/
4 33 of 1960 ("the 1960 Act"). The third respondent, Jennifer
Ann Heyns ("Jennifer"), was born to the deceased and his wife on 6 May
1967. She
was the eldest of three daughters born of their marriage. The deceased passed
away on 3 October 1987.
The first respondent is the executor testamentary in the estate of the
deceased. The terms of the will require him to transfer the
deceased's one-third
share of the properties from the estate of the deceased to the deceased's
"eldest child". The first respondent
was unsure as to whether Catherine or
Jennifer qualified as the deceased's "eldest child". His uncertainty in this
regard related
to whether the term "eldest child" included an adopted child (in
which case Catherine, by reason of the fact that she was older than
Jennifer,
would qualify as such), or was limited to natural children (in which case
Jennifer,
5/
5 being the eldest child born of the deceased's marriage to
Catherine Salome Heyns, would be the one to benefit). The first respondent
accordingly sought a declaratory order in the Witwatersrand Local Division so
that the matter might be determined. Prior to the hearing
of the application,
the fourth respondent was appointed as
curator ad litem
to the minor and
unborn children of Catherine; the appellant was appointed as
curator
ad
litem
to the unborn children of Jennifer. In due course they both filed
reports with the Court, each ascribing a different meaning to the
words "eldest
child" in special condition (iv) of the will. The matter eventually came before
COETZEE J. He came to the conclusion
that Catherine qualified as the "eldest
child" and ordered that the deceased's one-third share in the properties was to
devolve upon
her and, on her death, on her eldest child. Leave to appeal to
this
6/
6
Court was granted by the learned Judge a
quo
.
The issue on appeal
is whether Catherine or Jennifer is the "eldest child" of the deceased in terms
of special condition (iv) of the
will. The answer lies in the proper
interpretation to be given to those words. At the hearing of the appeal Mr
Doctor represented
the appellant on behalf of the unborn children of Jennifer;
Mr Tselentis (the fourth respondent), represented the minor and unborn
children
of Catherine. Neither Catherine nor Jennifer were represented, both having
elected to abide the decision of this Court.
The will took effect on the death of the testatrix in 1948 - in keeping with
the general principle that a will takes effect on the
death of a testator or, in
the case of a mutual will, on the death of the first-dying (
Greeff v Estate
Greeff
1957(2) SA
7/
7
269 (A) at 275 C). At that time adoption and its
effects were governed by
the relevant provisions of the
Children's Act 31 of 1937 ("the 1937 Act").
Sec 71(2)
of the 1937 Act provided:
"Subject to the provisions of section
seventy-nine
, an adopted child
shall for all purposes whatsoever be deemed in law to be the legitimate child of
the adoptive parent: Provided
that an adopted child shall not by virtue of the
adoption -
(a) become entitled to any
property
devolving on any child of his adoptive
parent by virtue of any
instrument
executed prior to the date of the order
of adoption (whether
the instrument
takes effect
inter vivos
or
mortis
causa
), unless the instrument clearly
conveys the
intention that that property
shall devolve upon the adopted child;
(b) inherit any property ab
intestato
from
any relative of his
adoptive parent."
(Sec 79 deals with the effect of adoption on marriage
and has no relevance to the present appeal). The 1937
Act was in due course replaced by the 1960 Act. Sec
8/
8
74(2) of that Act re-enacted in identical terms sec 71(2) of the preceding
Act. By the time the deceased died in October 1987 the
1960 Act had been
replaced by the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 ("the 1983 Act"). The equivalent
section in the 1983 Act to secs 71(2)
and 74(2) of the 1937 and 1960 Acts
respectively is sec 20(2). The provisos that were attached to its predecessors
have been omitted,
and sec 20(2) simply
reads:
"An adopted child shall for all purposes
whatever be deemed in law to be the
legitimate child
of the adoptive parent, as
if he was born of that parent during the
existence of a lawful marriage."
I shall later
consider whether this change in wording
has any effect on the present appeal.
Special condition (iv) of the will created a
fideicommissum "to the fourth generation". The
deceased was a member of the first generatlon, having
9/
9
acquired his rights in the properties through his
parents, the testators. The identity of the deceased's
"eldest child" (the fideicommissary) fell to be
ascertained on the death of the deceased (the
fiduciary). But it had to be ascertained with due
regard to what the testators had in mind by the use of
the term "eldest child" - in other words, did they
intend those words to be limited to blood relations or
to have wider application. This is so because "the
golden rule for the interpretation of testaments is to
ascertain the wishes of the testator from the language
used" (per INNES ACJ in
Robertson v Robertson's
Executors
1914 AD 503
at 507;
Horowitz v Brock and
Others
1988(2) SA 160 (A) at 183 G - H). In
endeavouring to ascertain the wishes of the testators
the will must in general be read in the light of the
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made
10/
10 (
Perrin and Others v Morgan and Others
[1943] AC
399
at 420; Ex
Parte
Bosch
1943 CPD 369
at 371-2), and the words of the
will must be interpreted accordingly. Only when the intention of the testators
has been ascertained
in this manner is it appropriate to enguire whether the
1937 or 1983 Acts in any way preclude effect being given to such intention.
For
it is the duty of the first respondent, as executor testamentary, to give effect
to the wishes of the testators unless he is
precluded by statute or the common
law from doing so. With these principles in mind I now turn to the relevant
provisions of the
will with a view to establishing the meaning of the words
"eldest child" in special condition (iv).
There are in my view strong indications in the will that the testators only
intended to benefit blood relations. The will commences
with a bequest of the
properties to the testators' three named
11/
11
children. One must assume, in the
absence of any
evidence or indications to the contrary, that all
three
were natural children. Special condition (iii) is a
si sine
liberis decesserit
clause which provides for a
gift over to the
testators' surviving children or
grandchildren "in the event of any of our
children
predeceasing us or dying subsequently, without
leaving
descendants
" (my emphasis). There is much to be said
for
the view that the ordinary meaning of the word
"child" or "grandchild" does
not go beyond a testator's
own child (his ""bloedkind"), or an own child of
such
child (
Boswell en Andere v Van Tonder
1975(3) SA 29(A)
at 35
in
fine
; Corbett et al:
The Law of Succession in
South
Africa
, at 551-3). If that were so, an adopted
child would, in the
absence of clear indications to the
contrary, be excluded. This is the
position in
English law where the word "child" has been held not
12/
12 normally to include adopted children (
Re Marshall
(deceased)
.
Barclays Bank, Ltd v Marshall and Others
[1957] 3 All
E.R. 172
(CA) at 178 H;
Re Valentine's Settlement
.
Valentine and
Others v Valentine and Others
[1965] 2 All E.R. 226
(CA) at 229 E; Re
Brinkley's Will Trusts
.
Westminster Bank, Ltd v Brinkley and
Another
[1967] 3 All E.R. 805(Ch)
at 808 E). It is, however, not necessary
to reach a firm conclusion on this point. What is significant is the use by the
testators
of the word "descendants". West's
Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary
defines a descendant as "(t)hose persons who are in the bloodline of an
ancestor, e.g., children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren
(the descendants
shared equally in her will)." Black's
Law Dictionary
says of
"descendent": "Those persons who are in the blood stream of the ancestor. Term
means those descended from another,
13/
13
persons who proceed from a body of another such as a child or grandchild, to
the remotest degree...". The Oxford English Dictionary
(2nd ed), vol (iv) gives
as one of the meanings of "descendant": "One who 'descends' or is descended from
an ancestor; issue, offspring
(in any degree near or remote)", and "descend"
means "(t)o be derived in the way of generation; to come of, spring from (an
ancestor
or ancestral stock)". The word "descendant", in its normal or usual
meaning, therefore includes only blood relations in the descending
line and
excludes adopted children. The same is true of its Afrikaans equivalent
"afstammeling" (
Boswell en Andere v Van Tonder
(
supra
) at 35 F -
H) . There is nothing to indicate that the testators intended to use the word
other than in its normal sense. The reference
in special condition (iii) to the
testators' "said
14/
1 4 children" or "our surviving children" are clearly to
those children named in the will (ie the testators' own children). Having
regard
to the meaning of the word "descendant", the reference to "grandchildren" can,
in the context, only be to grandchildren descended
by blood from the testators.
The gift over provided for in special condition (iii) was accordingly only
intended to be to a blood
relation.
Special conditions (iii) and (iv) must be read as complementing each other.
In the event of conflict, they would need to be reconciled.
But no such conflict
exists, as in my view a consideration of special condition (iv) leads inevitably
to the conclusion that the
fideicommissary substitution provided for was also
intended to be limited to blood relations. It will be recalled that the relevant
provision stipulates that "(t)he respective portions of
15/
15 the said farms are entailed and shall devolve on the
eldest child of each of our aforesaid three children after their death, to
the
fourth generation, the succeeding descendant's eldest child always succeeding
his or her parent". The term "eldest child"
per se
suggests a natural
child, conveying as it does the
concept of the first-born child and the corresponding right of primogeniture.
Further colour is lent to these words by the later use
of the word "descendants"
in the phrase "the succeeding descendant's eldest child always succeeding his or
her parents". This strongly
suggests that the testators had in mind a line of
descent through the bloodline. The entailment of the properties to the fourth
generation
also seems to reflect a wish to keep the properties in the family ie
the natural family. A further consideration is this. It seems
fairly apparent
from the terms of the will that it was drawn up by a professional person,
probably
16/
16 an attorney. At the time the provisions of sec 71(2) of
the 1937 Act were operative. The effect of the first proviso thereto was
clear.
No child adopted after the execution of an "instrument" could inherit property
devolving on any child of his adoptive parent
under such instrument unless it
"clearly conveys the intention that the property shall devolve upon the adopted
child". If the testators
had intended to benefit adopted children they would
presumably have been advised of the need to include such class of children in
express terms in the will (cf
Kinloch NO and Another v Kinloch
1982(1) SA
679(A) at 693 G - H). Their omission to do so is indicative of the fact that
they had no such intention. All the above
considerations lead inexorably to the
conclusion (as a matter of pure interpretation) that by the use of the words
"eldest child"
the testators intended to benefit
17/
17 a natural child only ie someone in the same bloodline as
the testators. It is this intention that must be given effect to unless
there
are legal considerations which necessarily preclude this from happening.
I turn now to consider what effect, if any, the provisions of sec 71(2) of
the 1937 Act or sec 20(2) of the 1983 Act, whichever is
applicable, have on the
devolution of the deceased's one-third share of the properties, bearing in mind
the intention of the testators.
The Judge a
quo
came to the conclusion
that the 1937 Act was applicable and that, applying its provisions, an adopted
child was entitled to inherit
as a child under the will. He accordingly held
that Catherine was the "eldest child" in terms of the will. The gist of his
reasoning
is contained in the following passage in his judgment:
18/
18
"Mr Tselentis argued that unless there are express statements to exclude adopted
children then 'child' and 'descendants' include
adopted children because both
categories have been enlarged by the fiction contained in section 71. Therefore
in clauses (iii) and
(iv) the categories are similarly enlarged. In my view this
contention is correct. I do not accept Mr Doctor's submission that clauses
(iii)
and (iv) show a deliberate intention on the part of the testator to exclude
adopted children. The will in my view does not
specifically exclude adopted
children from the category of 'children'."
With due respect to the Judge a
quo
it
seems
to me that he clearly misinterpreted the
provisions of
sec 71 (2) of the 1937 Act. It is apparent from the
wording
of proviso (a) to sub-sec (2) that an
adopted child (in the position of
Catherine) would not
qualify as a child under the will, and would
therefore
not be entitled to any property devolving thereunder,
unless the will "clearly conveys the intention that the
property shall
devolve upon the adopted child". In
19/
19 concluding that the will did not specifically exclude
adopted children from the category of "children" the Judge a
quo
applied
the wrong test. The test is not whether they were specifically excluded by the
will,
but rather whether the will clearly conveyed an
intention to include them (so that any property under
the will might devolve upon them). No such intention
is conveyed by the will. On the contrary, for the
reasons given, the intention of the testators was not
to include adopted children under the will. If
therefore the provisions of the 1937 Act were
applicable, Catherine would have been precluded from
qualifying as the "eldest child" by virtue of proviso
(a) of sec 71(2).
Mr Tselentis, alive to this fatal flaw in
the judgment of the Judge a quo, submitted on appeal
that the provisions of the 1983 Act governed the
20/
20
present matter. He argued that although the will
took
effect on the death of the testatrix, that is not
necessarily the
relevant date for determining when
rights to particular beguests vest or
benefits are to
be ascertained when dealing with a fideicommissum.
The
condition on which the fiduciary interest of the
deceased ceased and
the fideicommissary interest of his i
"eldest child" began was the death of the deceased. It
was only then that the identity of the "eldest child"
was ascertainable, and only then that such child' s
fideicommissary rights vested (cf
Estate Kemp and
Others v McDonald's Trustee
1915 AD 491
at 500). One
therefore had to have regard to the law as at the date
of the deceased's death in 1987, at which time the 1983
Act was the operative one.
If the date of the fideicommissary substitution is the relevant date to look
at in order
21/
21
to determine when the fideicommissary right took effect, then there is force
in the argument that the provisions of the 1983 Act apply.
The basis for such
argument would be that any legislation affecting a will, which comes into
operation between the date of execution
of a will and the date on which the
terms of such will take effect, applies (cf
R v Grainger
1958(2) SA 443
(A) at 448 C - 449 C). It is, however, not necessary to decide the point for I
am prepared to assume, for the purposes
of the present appeal, that the 1983 Act
applied. This assumption also renders it unnecessary to consider Mr Tselentis'
alternative
argument that the 1983 Act is retrospective in its operation.
Sec 20(2) of the 1983 Act is couched in very wide terms. Mr Tselentis argued
that its provisions were indicative of a legislative
intent to equate natural
and adopted children for all purposes
22/
22
whatsoever, without any qualification. If this were
so the effect thereof
would be, in the case of a will,
to create a rule of interpretation. Any reference to
children, issue or descendants in a will would, in
consequence of such rule of interpretation, include an
adopted child, irrespective of when the will was
executed or what the intention of the testator was. To
give the words of sec 20(2) so absolute and unqualified
a meaning could detract from the principle of freedom
of testation and run counter to testamentary
intention. It would also, in my view, be contrary to
the decision of this Court in
Boswell en Andere v Van
Tonder
, the correctness of which was not challenged on
appeal. In order, therefore, properly to interpret
sec 20(2) it is necessary to have regard to the
decision in that case. For the sake of convenience I
shall refer to it as "
Van Tonder's
case".
23/
23
The mutual will in
Van Tonder's
case bequeathed specified properties
to named children of the testators in that case. The bequests were made subject
to,
inter alia
, the following conditions: (1) that after the death of one
of their children the farm or farms bequeathed to them were to go to their
"wettige afstammelingen", and (2) that if one of their children should die
"zonder een kind of kinders na te laten", the property
of such child should
devolve upon the testators' other children "of hunne wettige afstammelingen".
The property "Klipfontein" was
bequeathed to the testators' daughter, Johannes
Wilhelm van Zijl ("JW"), and in due course transferred to her subject to the
conditions
of the mutual will. She married D F van Tonder and died in 1973,
having appointed her husband her sole heir by her will. She and
her husband had
no children of their own, but in
24/
24
1949 had lawfully adopted a son, Dan Johan.
On appeal it was accepted that
the applicable provision was sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act, and the matter was
argued on that basis. It
was common cause that Dan Johan could not succeed to
"Klipfontein" on his mother's death as a fideicommissary because of the wording
of proviso (a) to sec 74(2), as the will of JW's parents had been made in 1926
prior to the date of the adoption order. The point
in issue was whether JW's
husband had succeeded to "Klipfontein" on JW's death, on the ground that JW had
not died without leaving
lawful descendants but on the contrary had left a
"lawful descendant" (ie the adopted son Dan Johan), so that, although the latter
could not himself succeed under the mutual will, the property nevertheless
remained an asset in JW's estate and therefore devolved
on her husband as her
heir.
25/
25
In order to reach a conclusion in the
matter,
this Court in
Van Tonder's
case was called upon,
inter
alia
, to interpret the words "an adopted child shall
for all purposes whatsoever be deemed in law to be the
legitimate child of the adoptive parent" ("the deeming
provision") in sec
74(2) of the 1960 Act. In the
course of doing so it held that:
(1) The Legislature did not intend to interfere
with the freedom of a
testator to dispose of his
property as he wishes (at 40 A);
(2) The deeming provision did not embody a rule
of interpretation
applicable to all testamentary
instruments, namely, a rule that words such
as
"children" or "descendants" appearing in such
instruments were not to
bear their ordinary, everyday
meaning but a wider meaning which included an
adopted
child (at 38 D-E; 39 E-F);
26/
26
(3)
Had the Legislature
intended to make such a rule one would have expected an express provision to
that effect, in terms at least similar
to those of sec 13(2) of the English
Adoption Act, 1950 (at 38 E-F);
(4)
In
contrast to the relevant provisions of the English Adoption Act, sec 74(2) did
no more than describe the consequences of an adoption
(at 38
G-H);
(5)
The deeming provision created a
legal fiction whereby an adopted child was for all purposes whatsoever deemed in
law to be a legitimate
child ("bloedkind") (at 36E;
38H);
(6)
The presumption in favour of the
operation of such a fiction could be displaced if by applying the ordinary rules
of interpretation
a contrary testamentary intention appeared (at 40
F-G).
(It should be noted that the findings in (1)
to (6)
27/
27 above, which constitute the
ratio decidendl
in
Van Tonder's
case, were arrived at independently of a consideration of
the provisos to sec 74(2), although proviso (a) was seen as strengthening
the
Court's conclusion (at 39 B).) In the result the Court held, for reasons that
appear from the judgment, that since the legal
fiction established by the
deeming provision was in conflict with the manifest scheme and intention of the
testators in that case,
which was clearly that only children related by blood
were to be regarded as "kinders" for the purposes of the will, JW had to be
regarded as having died "zonder een kind of kinders na te laten." Accordingly
"Klipfontein" did not devolve on her husband.
Do the findings in
Van Tonder's
case still hold sway in the light of
the altered wording of sec 20(2) of the 1983 Act? In my view they do. The
words
28/
28
of the deeming provision in sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act
have, with one
non-material exception, been re-enacted
at the commencement of sec 20(2). The
only difference
is that the word "whatsoever" has been replaced by the
word "whatever",
which is a word of identical meaning.
(That this is so is abundantly apparent from the
Afrikaans texts where the
corresponding words "vir alle
doeleindes" feature in both sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act
and sec 20(2) of the 1983 Act.) The concluding words
of sec 20(2) "as if he was born of that parent during
the existence of a lawful marriage" are new, and
provisos (a) and (b) to sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act have
been deleted. The meaning accorded the deeming
provision in
Van Tonder's
case is in my view unaffected
by the concluding words of sec 20(2). Those words
merely state what was presumed in
Van Tonder's
case to
be the effect of the deeming provision. In the words
29/
29
of JANSEN JA (at 39 A-B);
"Dit is nie die omskrywing in die testament
wat in 'n ander sin as die gewone alledaagse
betekenis gelees word nie, maar wel die
aangenome kinders wat geag word die
wettige
bloedkinders van die testateure (die aannemende ouers) te wees en derhalwe geag
word uit hul huwelik gebore te wees."
It is not
necessary to speculate on the reason for the
repeal of the provisos to sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act.
Whatever the reason for their repeal, that in itself
does not detract from what was said in
Van Tonder's
case, bearing in mind that the deeming provision was
interpreted separately from such provisos.
There is no reason why sec 20(2) of the 1983
Act should be interpreted as going further than sec
74(2) of the 1960 Act, and in fact laying down a rule
of interpretation.
Van Tonder's
case was one of
considerable importance, being the first case in this
Court to deal with succession to, or through, adopted
30/
30
children. The Legislature must be taken to have been aware of the
construction placed on the deeming provision in
Van Tonder's
case.
Furthermore, the point was clearly made in
Van Tonder's
case that had the
Legislature intended sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act to create a rule of
interpretation it would have used more explicit
and appropriate language.
Nothwithstanding this, sec 20(2) of the 1983 Act was enacted in a form which
does not differ in essence
from the deeming provision in sec 74(2) of the 1960
Act. The most probable inference to be drawn from this fact is that the
Legislature
did not seek to alter the law as laid down in
Van Tonder's
case. There is sound reason for the Legislature adopting such an approach. The
principle that a testator is free to dispose of his
property as he wishes, and
that effect must be given to his intention, is so deeply rooted in our law that
the
31/
31 Legislature would understandably be reluctant to do
anything which might detract from the due recognition of such principle. It
f
ollows that sec 20(2) of the 1983 Act must be interpreted in a manner consonant
with the interpretation of the deeming provision
in sec 74(2) of the 1960 Act in
Van Tonder's
case.
To revert to the facts of the present matter. In keeping with what was held
in
Van Tonder's
case, the legal f iction created by sec 20(2) of the 1983
Act must give way to a contrary intention in the testators' will. For the
reasons already given, such a contrary intention is manifest on a proper
interpretation of special conditions (iii) and (iv). It
is clear from them,
applying the normal rules of interpretation, that the testators did not intend
to include an adopted child within
the meaning of "eldest child". It follows
that Catherine is excluded from inheriting under the
32/
32
will, and that Jennifer qualifies as the deceased's eldest child. In the
result the appeal must be allowed. The parties are agreed
as to the costs order
that should follow such result.
The following order is made:
(1) The appeal is
allowed.
(2) Paragraph 1 of the order of the
Court a quo is amended
by
substituting the words "second
respondent" (ie Jennifer Ann
Heyns)
for the words "first respondent"
wherever those words appear in
that
paragraph.
(3) The costs of all parties to the
appeal are to be paid out of
the
estate of the late Andries Johan
Adam Heyns on the attorney and
own
client scale.
J W SMALBERGER, JA
CORBETT, CJ )
VIVIER, JA )
EKSTEEN, JA ) CONCUR
VAN COLLER, AJA )