THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no : 242/2024

In the matter between:


THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH
AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE APPELLANT

and

AFRICAN BANK LIMITED RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v
African Bank Limited (242/2024) [2025] ZASCA 101 (8 July 2025)
Coram: ZONDI DP and KEIGHTLEY JA and DLODLO and STEYN and
NORMAN AJJA
Heard: 15 May 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives via email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website , and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down is deemed to be 8
July 2025 at 11h00 .
Summary: Jurisdiction: whether the jurisdiction of the tax court engaged in
instances where the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service refuses to
make a determination under s 17(1) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (VAT Act)
in the terms as sought by a taxpayer – whether such refusal constitutes a decision
subject to objection and appeal procedure under the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011
– interpretation of s 32(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT Act.

2



ORDER

On appeal from: The Tax Court of South Africa, Western Cape (Myburgh AJ):
The appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs of two counsel , where so
employed.


JUDGMENT

Zondi DP (Keightley JA and Dlodlo and Steyn and Norman AJJA concurring) :
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Tax Court of South
Africa , Western Cape (the tax court) dismissing the appellant ’s special plea that the
tax court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate upon and determine the appeal lodged to it
in terms of s 107 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (the TAA) . The appeal is
with leave granted by that court . The appeal concerns the interpretation of s
32(1) (a)(iv) read with s 17(1 ) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (the VAT Act) .
The question is whether a ratio determination made by the appellant , the
Commissioner for the South African Re venue Service (the Commissioner) under s
17(1) of the VAT Act constituted a refusal as contemplated in s 32(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT
Act.

Applicable statutory provisions
[2] Section 32 (1)(a)(iv) of the VAT Act provides for the decisions of the
Commissioner that are subject to objection and appeal. Section 32(1) stipulates the
following :
‘32 Objections to certain decisions
(1) The foll owing decisions of the Commissioner are subject to objection and appeal:
(a) any decision given in writing by the Commissioner –
(i) in terms of section 23 (7) notifying that person of the Commissioner’s refusal to register
that person in terms of this Act;
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(ii) in terms of section 24 (6) or (7) notifying that person of the Commissioner’s decision
to cancel any registration of that person in terms of this Act or of the Commissioner’s refusal
to cancel such registration; or
(iii) …
(iv) refusing to approve a method for determining the ratio contemplated in section 17 (1);
or
(b) …
(c) any decision made by the Commissioner and served on that person in terms of section
50A (3) or (4) .’

[3] Section 17(1) of the VAT Act , to which reference is made in s 32(1) (a)(iv),
makes provision for the apportionment of input value -added tax where goods or
services are acquired or imported by a vendor partly for the purpose of making taxable
supplies and partly for the making of exempt supplies (mixed supplies). Only that
portion of the input tax may be deducted as determined by the Commissioner in
accordance with a ruling as contemplated in Chapter 7 of the TAA or s 41B of the VAT
Act. Section 17(1) of the VAT Act , without its provis o, provides :
‘17. Permissible deductions in respect of input tax
(1) Where goods or services are acquired or imported by a vendor partly for consumption, use
or supply (hereinafter r eferred to as the intended use) in the course of making taxable supplies
and partly for another intended use, the extent to which any tax which has become payable in
respect of the supply to the vendor or the importation by the vendor, as the case may be, of
such goods or services or in respect of such goods under section 7(3) or any amount
determined in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) of the definition of “input tax” in section 1,
is input tax, shall be an amount which bears to the full amount of such tax or amount, as the
case may be, the same ratio (as determined by the Commissioner in accordance with a ruling
as contemplated in Chapter 7 of the Tax Administration Act or section 41B) as the intended
use of such goods or services in the course of making taxable supplies bears to the to tal
intended use of such goods or services … .’

Background
[4] The appellant is the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
(SARS) and t he respondent is African Bank Limited (African Bank ), a registered bank
and Value Added Tax vendor. In terms of s 7 of the VAT Act , African Ban k as a vendor
is, subject to the exemptions, exceptions, de ductions , and adjustments , liable to pay
VAT on the supply of goods and services supplied by it in the course or furtherance of
its enterprise calculated at the rate of 15 per cent on the value of the supply concerned.
4

It is entitled to deduct, as input tax, the VAT incurred by it on goo ds and services
acquired for the purpose s of consumption, use or supply in the course of making
taxable supplies.

[5] As a credit provider, African Bank is engaged in the provision of credit which is
exempt in terms of s 12 (a) read with s 2(1) (f) of the VAT Act,1 but also taxable to the
extent that the consideration it charges in respect of such supply of credit constitut es
a fee, as per the proviso to s 2 of the VAT Act.2 In other words, it acquires supplies for
mixed purposes .

[6] The VAT Act provides in s 17 for the method whereby the deducti ble ‘input tax’
is calculated where the goods or services are acquired partly for consumption, use or
supply in the course of making taxable supplies and partly for another intended use . It
is clear from s 17(1) that it obliges a VAT vendor that acquires supplies for mixed
purposes to make permissible deductions of input tax in accordance with an
apportionment ruling made by the Commissioner . The ruling that was in place at the
relevant time was Binding General Ruling 16 (BGR 16) , which the Commissioner
issued on 25 March 2013 and reissued on 30 March 2015 with effect from 1 April 2015 ,
and which authorised the vendors to apply the varied standard turnover -based method
of apportionment in determining the ratio contemplated in s 17(1) .

[7] What gave rise to the present dispute is the following . On 21 September 2020
African Bank’s representative addressed a letter to the Commissioner in which it


1 Section12 (a) of the VAT Act determines:
‘12 Exempt supplies
The supply of any of the following goods or services shall be exempt from the tax imposed under section
7 (1) (a):
(a) The supply of any financial services, but excluding the supply of financial services which, but
for this paragraph, would be charged with tax at the rate of zero per cent under section 11; ’
Section 2(1)(f) of the VAT Act determines:
‘2 Financial services
(1) For the purposes of this Act, the following activities shall be deemed to be financial services:
. . .
(f) the provision by any person of credit under an agreement by which money or money's worth is
provided by that person to another person who agrees to pay in the future a sum or sums exceeding in
the aggregate the amount of such money or money's worth; ’
2 Section 2(1) of the VAT Act determines: ‘. . . Provided that the activities contemplated in paragraphs
(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (o) shall not be deemed to be financial services to the extent that the
consideration payable in respect thereof is any fee, commission, merchant's discount or similar charge,
excluding any discount cost.’
5

requested the Commissioner to issue a binding VAT ruling. It sought confirmation from
the Commissioner that African Bank ‘ may continue to apply transaction count
apportionment method as set out in its previous r uling dated 12 August 2019
(Reference 2017/323 (28 /17/2)), with the modifications set out in section 5 of [its]
application ’.

[8] In a letter dated 23 September 2021 the Commissioner summarised African
Bank’s binding ruling request as follows:
‘[African Bank] requests in terms of section 41B, read with section 17(1) of the VAT Act that –
2.1 the Commissioner for SARS (the Commissioner) confirm by way of a ruling that it may
continue to apply transaction -based method of apportionment as approved in the Amended
Ruling, which is set out in paragraphs 1.17 and 1.18, with the following modifications … ’.

[9] The letter also included the ruling issued by the Commissioner :
‘5. Ruling
5.1 In light of the above, [African Bank] may apply the varied turnover -based method of
apportionment as set out in paragraph 5.2 to deduct VAT incurred in respect of mixed
expenses, excluding mixed expenses in respect of the IT system. ’

[10] On 13 October 2021 African Bank objected to the Commissioner’s ruling. Its
complaint was that the Commissioner did not approve the alternative method of
apportionment for determining the ratio contemplated in s 17(1) of the VAT Act as
requested by it. Instead, the Commissioner unilaterally approv ed another alternative
method, not requested by African Bank. One of the grounds for the objection was:
‘. . . that the decision of the Commissioner not to approve the alternative method for which
[African Bank ] applied in a ruling application . . . , and to impose a different alternative method,
does not align with his mandate to approve a method that reflects the extent to which [African
Bank ] applies goods and services acquired by it for the purposes of making taxable supplies,
as required by section 17(1) of the VAT Act .’

Dismissal of the objection
[11] The Commissioner disallowed the objection and advised African Bank to appeal
if it was dissatisfied with the decision. As advised , African Bank lodged an appeal in
the tax court. In the appeal , African Bank requested that the ruling be altered to one
approving the alternative method of apportionment request ed by it. The Commissioner
opposed the appeal.
6


[12] On 3 November 2023 the Commissioner amended its rule 31 statement , made
in terms of the rules issued under s 103 of the TAA (TAA rules) , by introducing a
special plea in which he challenged the tax court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal . The
special plea reads thus :
‘The respondent pleads that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon, determine and
dispose of the appeal, for the following reasons:
1. Section 117 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (“TAA”) provides that the Tax
Court has jurisdiction over appeals lodged under section 107.
2. Section 107 of the TAA provides that after the delivery by the Commissioner of a notice
of a decision to either allow or disallow an objection in terms of section 106(2), a taxpayer to
an assessment or “decision” may appeal against the assessment or “deci sion” to the Tax
Court.
3. Section 32(1) of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (“VAT Act”) sets out the decisions
of the Commissioner that are subject to objection and appeal.
4. Section 32(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT Act provides that a decision by the Commissioner
“refusing to approve a method for determining the ratio contemplated in section 17(1)” of the
VAT Act is subject to objection and appeal.
5. Section 17(1) of the VAT Act requires that where goods or services are acquired or
imported partly for taxable and partly for exempt (or other) purposes, only that portion of the
input tax may be “deducted as determined by the Commissioner in accordance with a ruling
as contemplated in Chapter 7 of the T AA or section 41B.”
6. The jurisdictional requirement of section 31(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT Act is not met in that
the respondent has granted a ruling to the appellant as contemplated in section 17(1):
6.1 The appellant requested a “method for determining the ratio contemplated in section
17(1)”, on 21 September 2020 (“the ruling request”).
6.2 The respondent furnished the appellant with a ruling on 23 September 2021.
7. The Tax Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the
“decision” by the respondent (the ruling) is not subject to appeal in terms of section 32(1)(a)(iv)
of the VAT Act.’
In short, the Commissioner’s plea is that the tax court did not have jurisdiction to
determine the appeal against the imposition of the varied standard turnover -based
method as opposed to the revised transactio n count method , which was requested by
African Bank.

[13] African Bank opposed the amendment of the Commissioner’s rule 31 statement
on the grounds , first, that t he Commissioner had no prospect of succeeding should the
7

amendment be granted . Moreover, and in any event , the amendment should be
refused to the extent that the Commissioner had not in terms of rule 35 (2) of the TAA
rules , first requested African Bank to agree to th e proposed amendment before
approaching the tax court .

The proceedings in the tax court
[14] The tax court allowed the amendment . It proceeded with the determination of
the special plea and dismissed it. Relying on the case of ITC 1930 ,3 the tax court held
that the ruling, by definition, encapsulate s the refusal to approve the method requested
by African Bank and that ‘[I]n its stead the Commissioner ruled that a different method
should apply . [The Commissioner] thus made a decision as contemplated in section
17(1) of the V AT Act.’ It rejected the construction of s 17(1) of the VAT Act as
contended for by th e Commissioner as such construction of the section strain s the
language of the provision and lead s to an unbusinesslike and unwieldy result.

[15] The tax court also rejected the Commissioner’s submission that s 17(1) is not
concerned with the method of apportionment requested by the vendor . According to
the tax court :
‘[the] ruling in terms of section 17(1) of the VA T Act and Chapter 7 of the TA A is made in
response to a request to apply a particular method. If SARS agrees with the vendor, it
approves the method contained in the request . If SARS disagrees with the method requested
by the vendor, it refuses or declines the request and determines which method is to apply.
That decision is subject to objection and appeal to this Court, which may in the exercise of its
powers of revision discard the method imposed by SARS and approve a different method .’

Submission s of the parties
Commissioner’s contentions
[16] The Commissioner submits that the tax court lacks jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal. He contends that his refusal on 23 September 2021 to grant the
apportionment ratio in the terms sought by African Bank was not a decision which is
subject to objection and appeal procedures under s 32(1) (a)(iv). This is because that
decision was not a decision ‘refusing to approve a method for determining the ratio
contemplated in section 17(1) ’. It is argued by the Commi ssioner that the provisions


3 ITC 1930 (2020) 82 SATC 271 (C).
8

of s 32(1)(a)(iv) are clear and unambiguous . To constitute a decision that is subject to
objection and appeal procedures , continues the argument, the Commissioner must
have refuse d to approve a ny method for determining the ratio . This is so, runs the
argument , because the word ‘refusing’ is qualified by the words ‘to appr ove a metho d
for determining the ratio contemplated in section 17(1) ’. The Commissioner argues
that because he determined an apportionment ratio in this case, albeit not the one
requested, there was no refusal decision and that being the case , the jurisdiction of
the tax court was not engaged.

[17] On the Commissioner’s interpretation of s 32 (1)(a)(iv) the jurisdiction of the tax
court is not engaged in this matter, because strictly speaking , the Commissioner did
not refuse to approve a method for determining the ratio. He made a ruling determining
the apportionment method to apply to the mixed supplies.

[18] It was p ut to counsel for the Commissioner that the danger of interpreting the
section so restrictively is that it deprives a taxpayer who is aggrieved by the
Commissioner’s decision of access to the objection and appeal remedies afforded by
s 32(1) (a)(iv). Counsel’s first response was that the se remedies are circumscribed by
section in that only certain decisions may be subject to objection and appeal. His
second response was that a taxpayer is not without a n alternative remedy. It may
approach the high court for a review under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000 , or a declarator , or approach the Commissioner for a reconsideration of his
decision.

African Bank’s contentions
[19] African Bank’s case is that a ‘refusal’ that is contemplated in s 32(1) (a)(iv) is
not limited to a refusal to approve a method for determining the apportionment ratio
but the section , interpreted purposively, also contemplates a ‘refusal’ by the
Commissioner to approve a method for dete rmining the ratio in the terms as sought
by the vendor . It contends that such ‘refusal ’ constitutes ‘any decision given in writing
by the Commissioner refusing to approve a method for determining the ratio. ’ It
maintains that its interpretation of the section advances the objectives of the section ,
which are to provide the remedies of objection and appeal to a taxpayer aggrieved by
the Commissioner’s decision.

9



Discussion
[20] Recently the Constitutional Court in United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd
Limited v Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service and four other case s
(United Manganese)4 analysed the statutory provisions of the TAA dealing with the
structure and the authority of the tax court . It reaffirmed the principles established by
this Court in Africa Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd v SARS5 that the tax court is a creature
of statute. It must operate within the four corners of the empowering statutory
provision. That statutory provision is s 1 17 of the TAA which is a source of the tax
court ’s jurisdiction. It provides as follows:
‘117 Jurisdiction of the Tax Court -
(1) The Tax Court for purposes of this Chapter has jurisdiction over tax appeals lodged
under section 107.
(2) …
(3) The court may hear and decide an interlocutory application or an applicatio n in a
procedural matter re lating to a dispute under this Chapter as provided for in the
“rules ’”.

[21] Section 104(2) of the TAA reads thus:
‘104 Objection against assessment or decision
…
(2) The following decisions may be objected to and appealed against in the same manner as
an assessment -
(a) a decision under subsection (4) not to extend the period for lodging an objection;
(b) a decision under section 107 (2) not to extend the period for lodging an appeal; and
(c) any other decision that may be objected to or appealed against under a Tax Act.’

Section 107(1) of the TAA provides:
‘107 Appeal against assessment or decision -
(1) After delivery of the notice of the decision referred to in section 106 (4), a taxpayer
objecting to an assessment or “decision” may appeal against the assessment or


4 United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd Limited v Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service
and four other cases [2025] ZACC 2 ; 2025 (5) BCLR 530 (CC) .
5 Africa Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service [2019] ZASCA 148,
2020 (2) SA 19 (SCA).
10

“decision” to the tax board or tax court in the manner, under the terms and within the
period prescribed in this Act and the “rules”.’
Section 32(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT Act is a provision in a Tax Act referred to in s104(2)(c)
of the TAA . ‘Tax Act’ is defined by the TAA as meaning the TAA or an Act, or portion
of an Act , referred to in s 4 of the SARS Act 34 of 1997 .

[22] In terms of s 107 of the TAA a taxpayer may appeal against an assessment or
a decision to the tax court . The question therefore is whether the Commissioner’s
refus al to approve the method requested by the vendor for determining the
apportionment ratio contemplated in s 17(1) is a decision that ‘may be … appealed
against under a Tax Act’ in terms of s 104(2) (c) of the TAA. (Own emphasis.)

[23] The determination of this question involves the interpretation of s 17(1) and
s 32(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT Act . These sections must be considered in accordance with
the interpretative approach established in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v
Endumeni Municipality6 and reaffirmed in Capitec v C oral Lagoon Investments 194
(Pty) Ltd .7

[24] The starting point is the language of s 32(1) (a)(iv) of the VAT Act, understood
in the context in which it is used, and having regard to its purpose. The text of
s 32(1) (a)(iv) states that a refusal by the Commissioner to approve a method for
determining a ratio is subject to objection and appeal procedures. On a literal reading ,
the section may be understood to mean that it is only where the Commissioner has
refused outright to approve a method to determine a ratio that the taxpayer will be
entitled to object to, and appeal against such refusal. In other words, an approval
instead of a different ratio to that sought by the taxpayer , is not a ‘refusal’ within the
meaning of the section. But this literal interpretation may only be correct if one ignores
the context and purpose of the provision of s 32(1) (a)(iv) as read with s 17(1). If regard
is had to the context and purpose of s 32(1) (a)(iv), it becomes clear that th is literal


6 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA).
7 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and Another v Cor al Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others [2021]
ZASCA 99, 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA) ; [2021] 3 All SA 647 (SCA) .

11

interpretation of the section is not correct . It also impermissibly undermines the ruling
request mechanism provided by s 17(1).

[25] The following context in which the Commissioner gave the ruling in issue is
important . African Bank could deduct VAT on goods or services it acquired to the
extent that it constituted ‘input tax’ as defined in s 1 (1). This subsection provides that ,
among others , to be entitled to deduct input tax, the goods or services must have been
acquired by the vendor for consumption, use or supply in the course of making its
taxable supplies. African Bank , as a credit provider is engaged in the provision of
credit , which is exempt in terms of s 12(a) read with s 2(1) (f) of the VAT Act , but also
taxable to the extent that the consideration it charges in respect of such supply of
credit constitutes a fee in terms of the proviso to s 2 of the VAT act . In other words, it
acquires supplies for mixed purposes. VAT on mixed expenses incurred must be
apportioned in accordance with s 17 (1), that is to say , in terms of a method determined
in accordance with a binding general ruling in terms of Chapter 7 of the TAA or a VAT
ruling in terms of s 4 1B of the VAT Act .

[26] African Bank was therefore required to directly attribute the VAT on goods or
services acquired according to the intend ed purpose for which the goods or services
would be consumed, used or supplied, prior to applying the apportionment method to
mixed expenses . Notably, s 17(1) of the VAT Act does not stipulate ratio. That is to be
determined by way of a binding ruling from the Commissioner as contemplated in
Chapter 7 of the TAA or s 41B of the VAT Act.

[27] Pursuant to s 41B read with s 17(1) of the VAT Act, African Bank request ed the
Commissioner to confirm by way of a binding ruling that it could continue to apply a
transaction -based method of apportionment as approved in the amended ruling with
the following modi fications:
(a) Service fees - Service fees levied and counted on a monthly basis . Some
charges are levied on an annual basis (such as card annual fees ) which are
counted on an annual basis as and when they are levied;
(b) Binder fees and credit insurance claims administrations – one transaction would
be counted for every insurance claim processed by African Bank in respect of
which it received binders fees;
(c) Other fees are charged and counted as follows :
12

(i) Early withdrawal fees – as and when they are charged ;
(ii) Withdrawal fees as and when they are charged ;
(iii) Airtime and electricity sale commission – counted as one transaction every time
airtime and electricity are purchased ;
(iv) Other ad hoc taxable supplies counted as one transaction as and when it
occurs ;
(v) Legal fees on-charged to customers – one taxable and one exempt transaction
counted for every amount debited to a customer account.

[28] It is clear from this that African Bank made a request for a pproval of a very
particular ratio calculation metho d. The Commissioner , instead approved a
substant ively different method of ratio calculation , ruling that African Bank had to apply
the varied turnover -based method of apportionment to deduct VAT incurred in respect
of mixed expenses, excluding mixed expenses in respect of the IT system. Although
couched in the language of approval, the plain material effect of the Commissioner ’s
ruling was to refuse to approve the ratio calculation method sought . It is difficult to
fathom a rational reason why such a decision should not fall within the intended scope
of the remedy provided in s 32(1)( a)(iv). Why should a taxpa yer in African Bank’s
position not be afforded the streamlined, statute -specific remedy of an objection and
appeal ? What sense could there possibly be in forcing it into the administrative law
remedy of judicial review where the complaint is so obviously aligned with the purpose
of the statutory scheme?

[29] The literal interpretation of s 32(1) (a)(iv) contended for by the Commissioner
fails to have regar d to the context and the purpose of the section. That purpose is to
provide remedies to the vendor s who are aggrieved by the Commissioner’s decision
and such remedies may be sought by way of an objection and the appeal procedures.
The interpretation of the Commissioner , if followed , would result in vendors being
deprived of their rights to seek remedies provided for under s 32(1) (a)(iv). VAT
vendors are aggrieved where the Commissioner refuses to approve a method for
determining the ratio which they consider to be appropriate for their businesses and
instead issues a determination which is different from the determination requested.
The construction of the section contended for by African Bank must be preferred to
the one advanced by the Commission er as it gives effect to the purpose of the
remedies of objection and appeal provided by s 3 2(1)(a)(iv) of the VAT Act. Legislation
13

must be interpreted purposively. Moreover, t he construction of the section contended
for by the Commissioner encourages piecemeal adjudication of disputes which would
prolong litigation and lead to wasteful use of judicial resources.

[30] The Commissioner’s approach to the tax court’s jurisdiction is inconsistent with
the Constitutional Court judgment in the United Manganese in which a similar
argument was raised b ut rejected by the Constitutional Court :8
‘[48] However , it does not follow from this that review and declaratory applications are not hit
by section 105. If the taxpayers were right, section 105 would never operate, because (a) only
the Tax Court can hear appeals under Chapter 9; and (b) the Tax Court cannot entertain any
of the tax -related proceedings in which the High Court would ordinarily have jurisdiction, such
as reviews and declaratory applications. The purpose of section 105 is that challenges to
assessments that the High Court, but not th e Tax Court, could entertain should ordinarily be
excluded in favour of Chapter 9 appeals that only the Tax Court may entertain.
[49] The fact that the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain PAJA and legality
reviews or grant declaratory orders may be relevant in assessing whether a section 105
direction should be given, but section 105 is applicable to such High Court proceedings. ’

[31] The tax court was correct therefore in findi ng that bec ause the Commissioner
had made an alternative ruling to the one re quested by the African Bank, this
amounted to a refusal to approve a method for determining the ratio as contemplated
by s 32(1) (a)(iv). The special plea of lack of jurisdiction was properly dismissed.

Order
[32] In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs of two
counsel , where so employed.


__________________
D H ZONDI
DEPUTY PRESIDENT


8 United Manganese fn 4 above paras 48 – 49.
14

Appearances

For the appellant : A R Sholto -Douglas SC with H Cassim
Instructed by : The State Attorney , Cape Town
The State Attorney , Bloemfontein

For the respondent : T Emslie SC with T Ntsewa
Instructed by: Nirenstein Attorneys Inc , Cape Town
McIntyre Van der Post , Bloemfontein .