THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case No: 2020/47431
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO.
(3) REVISED: NO
nA.:m.;, 18 JUNE 2025 c..
In the matter between:-
RAMAPUPUTLA MOJABENG LUCY
and
ESTATE AGENCY AFFAIRS BOARD
ESTATE AGENCY FIDELITY FUND
RAWSON PROPERTY GROUP (PTY) LTD
NAVAL MALATJIE
Judgment APPLICANT
1 ST RESPONDENT
2ND RESPONDENT
3RD RESPONDENT
4TH RESPONDENT
2
RUST, AJ
1. Before me is an opposed application in terms of Rule 30 of the Uniform Rules of
Court wherein the applicant seek s an order as follows:
1.1 That the first and second respondents withdraw/remove their notice in terms
of Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Court as it comprises an irregular step;
1.2 In the event that the first and second respondent s fail to comply with paragraph
1 of this order, the respondents’ defence will ipso facto be struck out on the
day of the hearing and the applicant may then approach the registrar for a date
for hearing on the default trials roll; and
1.3 That the first and second respondents are directed to pay the costs of this
application.
2. Before considering the merits of th is application, it is prudent to set out the
background relevant to this application.
Background
3. On 18 September 2020, the applicant herein (“Ms Ramapuputla ”, also the plaintiff
in the actio n), issued summons out of this court under the same case number
against the Estate Agency Affairs Board (the first defendant in the action and the
first respondent in the application at hand , herein referred to as “the Board ”), the
Estate Agency F idelity Fund (the second defendant in the action and the second
respondent in the application at hand , herein referred to as “the Fund ”), R
Woodbridge Trading 4, Pretoria Nort West, Gauteng, trading as Rawson Propert ies,
Pretoria Nort West Franchisee as the third defendant in the action, and Naval
Malatjie as the fourth defendant in the action , demanding payment from the first,
second, third and fourth defendants “solely, jointly, alternatively, the one paying the
other to be absolved ” of the amount of R 750 000.00 plus interest and costs.
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4. In terms of the particulars of claim, Ms Ramapuputla on the 10th of August 2018
entered into an agreement to purchase certain immovable property , in respect of
which the fourth defendant in his official capacity as a director and principal estate
agent, represented the third defendant . On the instruction and instance of the third
defendant , Ms Ramapuputla on the 14th of August 2018 made payment of the
purchase price of R 750 000.00 into the bank account of the third defendant. Ms
Ramapuputla later established that the property was since transferred to somebody
else, and that the purchase price she paid seems to be embezzled by the third and
fourth defendants . Ms Ramapuputla therefore claims that she had suffered a loss
of R 750 000.00 plus interest and costs.
5. The Board was cited in the particulars of claim as a juristic person established in
terms of section 2 of the (now repealed) Estate Agents Affairs Act 112 of 1976 . Ms
Ramapuputla claim s that the Board is liable to reimburse persons who suffer
pecuniary loss by reason of theft, committed by an estate agent of any money or
property entrusted by or on behalf of such persons to him in his capacity as an estate
agent. In paragraph 23 of the particulars of claim, Ms Ramapuputla further required
the Board to exercise its discretion to extend any of the time periods within which a
claim and proof of such theft must be submitted to the Board.
6. The Fund was cited in the particulars of claim as a juristic person established in
accordance with section 13(1)(a) of the Estate Agents Affairs Act , which, read with
section 18 of that Act, shall reimburse persons who suffer pecuniary loss by reason
of any moneys received by an estate agent and payable by him in respect of a
contract of purchase and sale of immovable property or any contract or deed of
alienation defined in section 1(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.
7. Ms Ramapuputla claims to have given timeous notice “ to institute legal proceedings ”
as required by section 18(3) of the Estate Agents Affairs Act . That subsection
(before the repeal of the Act) provided as follows:
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“(3) No person shall have any claim against the board in respect of a theft or
failure referred to in subsection (1) unless -
(a) the claimant has, within three months after he became aware of such theft
or failure or by the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware
of such theft or failure, given notice in writing to the board of such claim;
(b) the claimant has, within six months after a written demand was sent to him
by the board, furnished to the board such proof as the board may
reasonably require:
Provided that if the board is satisfied that, having regard to all the
circumstances, a claim was lodged or the proof required by it was furnished as
soon as practicable, it may in its discretion extend any of the periods referred
to in this subsection. ”
8. Having applied for default judgment against the first, second, third an d fourth
defendants , the attorney of record for Ms Ramapuputla on 17 June 2021 filed a
notice in terms of which the plaintiff’s application for default judgment was withdrawn
against the Board and the F und.
9. On 12 October 2021, Ms Ramapuputla sought and was granted default judgment
against the third and fourth defendants only, for payment of the amount of R
750 000.00 plus interest and costs on the attorney and own client scale . The default
judgment makes no mention whatsoever of the claim against the Board and the
Fund .
10. Acknowledging the fact that her claim was delivered to the Board outside of the
prescribed time limit in section 18(3) of the Estate Agents Affairs Act , Ms
Ramapuputla on 14 June 2023 filed an appli cation to this Court for an order that
condonation be granted for the late lodgement of her claim with the Board . In the
founding affidavit for the condonation application, Ms Ramapuputla admitted that
she delayed the submission of her claim to the Board because of purported
settlement discussions with the fourth defendant . It is furthermore stated in that
founding affidavit that Ms Ramapuputla “submitted an interna l affidavit in support of
request for condonation for the late lodgement of claim ” to the Board, but that the
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newly established board of the Property Practitioner Regulatory Authority1 resolved
to refuse condonation for such late submission.
11. Despite the fact t hat section 18(3) of the repealed Act empowered only the Board
(and not the Court) to entertain an application for condo nation for the late
submission of a claim to the Board , this Court on 14 December 2023 granted the
following peculiar order (“the condonation order ”):
“Having heard counsel for the applicant and having read documents filed on
record, it is ordered that:
1. Condonation of the applicant’s late lodgement of the claim in terms of
section 18(3)(a) of the Estate Agents Affairs Act 112 of 1976.
2. No order as to costs. ”
12. Notably, the application for condonation was neither granted nor dismissed.
13. The Board and the Fund in December 2023 f iled a notice of appearance to defend
together with the ir special pleas. Firstly, the Board and the Fund confirm ed that the
plaintiff ’s claim was rejected as the cl aim was not submitted within the statut ory time
limit prescribed by section 18(3)(a) of the Act , and that the Board declined to
condone the late filing of the cl aim. Secondly, the Board and the Fund pleaded that
the plaintiff f ailed to exhaust other available remedies , and that section 19(1) of the
Act provide d that permission must be obtained from the Board prior to commencing
legal proceedings , unless a cl aimant has exhausted all relevant rights of action and
other legal remedies available against the estate agent in respect of w hom the cl aim
arose and all other person s liable in respect of the loss suffered by such cl aimant.
14. On 1 February 2024 , the Board and the Fund requested th is Court to furnish reasons
in terms of Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Court for the peculiar condonation order
granted on 14 December 202 3. This request for reasons is what gave rise to the
Rule 30 application that is the subject matter of the opposed application at hand .
1 In terms of the Property Practitioners Act 22 of 2019 , commencing on 1 February 2022.
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The Rule 30 application
15. The attorney for Ms Ramapuputla on 7 February 2024 gave notice to the Board and
the Fund that the notice in terms of Rule 49 allegedly constitute s an irregular step
and/or a failure to comply with the rules of the court , that Rule 49 is utilised for
application for leave to appeal , that it cannot be utilised against an interlocutory
order that is not appealable , and that the step taken by the Board and the Fund will
have no practical effect or result on the substance of the matter .
16. On 9 May 2024, the attorney for Ms Ramapuputla brought an application in terms of
Rule 30 in which relief is sought to the effect that the first and second respondents
withdr aw or remove their notice in terms of Rule 49, failing which the applicant be
granted leave to return to court on the same paper s to request that the ir defence be
struck out , and that the first and second respondents are directed to pay the costs
of this application .
17. The Rule 30 application became opposed when the first and second respondents
on 6 June 2024 filed their notice of intention to oppose the application in terms of
Rule 30 , and their answering affidavit on 16 August 2024 . They highlighted the fact
that, although the y were joined in the action proceedings , no judgment was granted
against them in the default judgement , and the proceedings were not separated
between the parties against which judgment was obtained . The Board and the Fund
further submitted the following:
17.1 The correct procedure for the plaintiff would have been to launch an application
to review and set aside the ruling of the board of the Property Practitioner
Regulatory Authority on her application for condonation , not to launch a fresh
application for condonation to this Court, and that they were advised that the
purported cond onation order of 14 December 2023 is null and void since it is
premised on a wrong legal principle . I agree with this submission.
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17.2 The Board and the Fund deny that the request for reasons constitute an
irregular s tep as contended by the applicant . The reasons for judgment are
requested in order for the Board and the Fund to exercise their rights . The
application for irregular step stands to be dismissed as it fails to meet the
jurisdictional factors required under Rule 30.
17.3 The main matter is res judicata , the court is functus officio in regard to the main
matter, and it is legally incompetent for the applicant to revive the main matter.
While th is Court is seized with the opposed application in terms of Rule 30, it
is not necessary to deal with this submission herein.
18. In reply, the applicant contends that the request for reasons is an irregular step as
it goes against the flow of litigation and is inconsistent with the Uniform Rules of
Court. According to the applicant , the condonation order is interlocutory in nature
and an appeal against such interlocutory order would result in piece -meal
adjudication . It is furthermore submitted that t he correct procedural step for the first
and second respondents would have been to fil e a rescission application in terms of
Rule 42 against the condonation order, instead of invoking an inquiry in terms of
Rule 49 . The applicant contends that the filing of the request for reasons is nothing
but a further delay in the finalisation of the matter to the prejudice of the applicant .
The applicant is furthermore of the view that the m ain action is not res judicata
against the first and second respondents , and that the applicant will proceed with
the m ain action against the Board and the Fund .
Analysis
19. Rule 30 (1) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that a party to a cause in which
an irregular step has been taken by any other party , may apply to court to set it
aside.
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20. Although t he term ‘irregular ’ is not defined in the rule, it can be accepted that the
rule applies only to irregularities of form and not to matters of substance .2 A ‘step’
as provided for in the Uniform Rules is nothing but a ‘procedural step ’ and an
‘irregular step ’ is then a procedural step which advances the litigation in disregard
of the rules and which cause unfairness and/or inefficiency or, better stated, has a
prejudicial effect on the innocent party’s rights in the future conduct of their litigation.3
21. To succeed with an application in terms of Rule 30(1), the applicant must therefore
show (i) a procedural step which is taken in the inappropriate use of the rules of
court4, (ii) which step advances the proceedings one stage nearer completion5, and
(iii) prejudicially affects the innocent party’s rights in the future conduct of their
litigation.
22. It is trite that l itigants are ordinarily entitled to reasons for a judicial decision following
upon a hearing, and, when a judg ment is appealed, written reasons are
indispensable . Failure to supply reasons will usually be a grave lapse of duty, a
breach of a litigant ’s rights, and an impediment to the appeal process .6 The
respondent s’ request for re asons was filed in terms of Rule 49 in order to afford
these parties with an opportunity to exercise their rights in respect of the peculiar
condonation application, whether by means of an appeal, an application for
rescission , or not at all . On receipt of the requested reasons, the respondents will
be in a position to select the appropriate manner in which to exercise their rights in
respect of the condonation application, for purposes of which the reasons for that
order will form the basis of either the ir application for leave to appeal, or the ir
application for rescission thereof . Such a request for reasons can therefore not be
regarded as a procedural step which is taken in the inappropriate use of the rules of
court .
2 Singh v Vorkel 1947 (3) SA 400 (C) 406.
3 See BMW Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Doola [2025] 2 All SA 107 (GP) at par [14] -[18].
4 Cochrane v City of Johannesburg 2011 (1) SA 553 (GSJ) at par [31].
5 Cyril Smiedt (Pty) Ltd v Lourens 1966 (1) SA 150 (O) at 152E.
6 Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO 2010 ( 2) SA 92 (CC) at 96 G – 97A.
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23. While the concession was made on behalf of Ms Ramapuputla that the step taken
by the Board and the Fund will have no practical effect or result on the substance of
the matter, the request for reasons for the condonation order does not constitute a
step which advances the proceedings one stage nearer completion. The
respondent s’ request for re asons in terms of Rule 49 claims no relief, does not call
for adjudication, and does not affect the applicant ’s rights in the future conduct of
her case. Should the Board and the Fund on receipt of the requested reasons elect
to exercise their rights by means of an appeal, or an application for rescission , their
notice in respect of th at elected procedure will advance the process and may have
a prejudicial effect on the applicant ’s right s, to which relief under Rule 30 could be
available .
24. The Court has a discretion to set aside an irregular step , which discretion must be
exercised judicially on a consideration of all the circumstances and what is fair to all
the parties.7 Such discretion empowers the Court to overlook an irregularity in
procedure that does not cause substantial prejudice to the party complaining of it ,
because “technical objections to less than perfect procedural steps should not be
permitted, in the absence of prejudice, to interfere with the expeditious and, if
possible, inexpensive decision of cases on their real merits ”.8 However, i n order to
succeed with the application, the party who applies for the proceedings to be set
aside has to suffer prejudice relating to the continuation of the litigation.9
25. It is herein not the filing of the notice in terms of Rule 49 that may prejudicially affect
the applicant ’s right s in the future conduct of her litigation . To resort to a substantial
application in terms of Rule 30 when a notice in terms of Rule 49 is filed to request
reasons for the condonation order, is premature , as the respondents may on receipt
of the requested reasons still decide against the exercise of their rights in respect of
7 Minister van Wet en Orde v Jacobs 1999 (1) SA 944 (O) 958.
8 Mynhardt v Mynhardt 1986 (1) SA 456 (T); Rabie v De Wit [2013] JOL 30203 (WCC) at [13] –[14], [17],
[19].
9 Pinro Building & Steel Merchants (Edms) Bpk v Yawa [2003] 1 All SA 318 (C); Concrete 2000 (Pty) Ltd
v Lorenzo Builders CC t/a Creative Designs and Others [2014] 2 All SA 81 (KZD) at [36] –[37].
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the condonation application . In any event, Ms Ramapuputla failed to tender any
reason as to why the notice in terms of Rule 49 would cause her any prejudice in
the future conduct of her litigation , while the procedure that may be elected by the
respondents to exercise their rights, will provide a mechanism to object thereto, or
to oppose any such procedure . In fact, had Ms Ramapuputla not filed the application
in terms of Rule 30(1), the litigation between the parties may in the meantime have
progressed much further. Any delay in the finalisation of the matter , and any
prejudice that Ms Ramapuputla may have suffered, w ere caused by the Rule 30
application.
26. I accordingly find that the notice in terms of Rule 49 to request reasons for the
peculiar condonation order does not constitute an irregular step as contemplated in
Rule 30(1). For this reason, the application must fail.
27. Although it may be argued that the Rule 30 application of the applicant constitutes
an abuse of court processes and should ordinarily be met with a punitive cost order
as a way to discourage the applicant from such conduct in the future , counsel for
the respondents conceded that there was nevertheless some fault on the part of the
respondent s’ attorneys, and that costs should therefore be on the ordinary scale as
between party and party.
Order:
28. The Rule 30 application is dismissed with costs on Scale A.
Appearances :
For the Applicant: Mr N.E. R amapuputla
Ramapuputla Attorneys Inc
Pretoria
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For the Respondents: Mr Mswazi Makhubele
Instructed by:
Mr NU S efanyetso
Sefanyetso Attorneys
Pretoria