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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: A347/2023
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
DATE: 10/06/2025
In the matters between: -
PHILLIP BONGISWANE SKHOSANA APPELLANT
And
STATE RESPONDENT
___________________________________________________________________ ___
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________ ___
KEKANA AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] The appellant was charged in the Regional Court held at Ekangala with the following
charges:
1.1 Count 1: kidnapping
1.2 Count 2: kidnapping
1.3 Count 3: Contravention of section 120(6)(b) of the Fire Arms Control Act, Act 60
of 2000 – Pointing of a Fire Arm;
1.4 Count 4: Contravention of Section 5(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, Act 32 of
2007 -sexual assault
1.5 Count 5: Contravention of Section 5(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, -sexual
assault
1.6 Count 6: Contravention of Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act: Act 32 of 2007 -
Rape
1.7 Count 7: Contravention of Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act, Act 32 of 2007 -
Rape
1.8 Count 8: Contravention of Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act, Act 32 of 2007 -
Rape
1.9 Count 9: Contravention of Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act, Act 32 of 2007 -
Rape
[2] The Appellant was legally represented, and he pleaded not guilty to the charges. The
Appellant was subsequently convicted on 28th June 2023 on all the counts. On 9th June
2021 the learned magistrate proceeded to sentence the Appellant as follows:
2.1 Count 1 and 2: Counts taken together for sentence - 2 years’ imprisonment;
2.2 Count 3: 1 year’s i mprisonment;
2.3 Count 4 and 5: Counts taken together for sentence -2 years’ imprisonment;
2.4 Count 6: Life imprisonment;
2.5 Count 7: Life imprisonment;
2.6 Count 8: Life imprisonment;
2.7 Count 9: Life imprisonment.
[3] The appellant was sentenced to an effective life imp risonment in the Regional Court
and therefore has an automatic right to appeal the convictions and sentences, derived
from section 309(1)(a) of Act 51 of 1977.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[4] It was submitted that the trial court misdirected itself by:
4.1 Finding that the State proved their case beyond reasonable doubt;
4.2 Finding that the witnesses could be relied upon to convict the Appellant;
4.3 Not properly applying the cautionary rules applicable to single witnesses nor
adding enough weight to the contradictions and improbabilities in the State’s
case;
4.4 imposing a sentence in respect to the counts which is shockingly harsh and
inappropriate having light to the circumstances of the case;
4.5 not ordering the sentences run concurrently;
4.6 not considering the cumulative sentence that was imposed by the court;
4.7 not finding that there were substantial and compelling circumstances to
deviate from the minimum sentences in terms of the Minimum Sentence Act, Act
105 of 1997;
4.8 over -emphasizing the seriousness of the offence and the interest of the
society;
4.9 failing to consider the prospects of rehabilitation;
4.10 taking into account aggravating factors which were not presented to the
court through evidence by the State.
BACKGROUND
[5] The appellant met the two complainants for the first time o n 25 December 2019.
Earlier that day, they had interacted socially. The complainants later alleged that the
appellant raped them. The appellant denied the allegations and pleaded not guilty.
[6] During the trial, the State led the evidence of N[...] N[...] , Z[...] M[...], Dr Skhosana,
and Edward Xolani Nkambule. The appellant testified in his own defence and called
Pretty Maponya and Siyabonga Skhosana as witnesses.
COMPLAINANTS’ VERSION
[7] The complainants testified that on the 25 Decembe r 2019, Pretty Maponya
requested the appellant to attend to the complainants, who were en route to her house
while she was bathing. Later that day the appellant, the complainants and Pretty spent
time together at Makarina , a local tavern, where they sat a nd drank together. The
complainants drank Savanna, the non -alcoholic version of the beverage. Thereafter,
Pretty and the complainants returned to Pretty’s house.
[8] At approximately 23h00, Pretty requested the complainants to accompany her to her
boyfrie nd, Siyabonga’s place. When Siyabonga was not found at his residence, they
went to the appellant’s place in search of him. The appellant offered them chairs and
informed them to wait for Siyabonga. Pretty subsequently left the complainants with the
appella nt, indicating that he was going to look for Siyabonga and would be back.
[9] After Pretty left, the appellant locked the door and turned up the volume of the music.
He approached Z[...], and when she resisted his touch, he drew a knife and instructed
both complainants to undress.
[10] The appellant forcefully removed Z[...]’s clothes, kissed and licked Z[...]’s breasts
and vagina, and pushed her onto the bed. He then turned to N[...] , who had hidden
herself in a corner. He dragged her out, kissed her forcefully, touched her breasts,
undressed her, and threw her onto the bed.
[11] He retrieved a condom from the wardrobe, put it on, and resumed his assault.
When Z[...] resisted, the appellant went to the wardrobe and produced a firearm,
threatening them both. Thereafter, he climbed on top of Z[...], touched and kissed her,
and inserted his fingers into her vagina. When N[...] attempted to intervene, the
appellant overpowered her, pushed her onto the bed, and similarly assaulted her.
[12] N[...] tried to close her legs, at which point the appellant slapped her on the face
and pinched her thigh. He then inserted his penis in N […]’s vagina and had intercourse
with her and thereafter inserted his penis in Z[...]’s vagina and had intercourse with
Z[...]. When he realised that Z[...] was bleeding, he then moved to N[...] inserted his
penis in to her vagina and had intercourse with her again. He had intercourse with both
of them more than once. They were both crying. He brought them water to ba the
themselves with. A friend of the appellant knocked and ultimately the appellant opened
the door.
[13] Appellant walked with the complainants to Makarina in the company of his friend
who had come to his room after he was done assaulting them. At Makarin a , they
encountered Xolani, who subsequently helped them escape from the appellant. Xolani
took them to the police station after they told him what had occurred.
[14] Dr Skhosana, who examined both complainants and completed the J88 medical
reports, con firmed that the physical injuries observed were consistent with non -
consensual, forceful vaginal penetration. In the J88 Dr Skhosana recorded the following
injuries: Fresh vaginal bleeding and vaginal tears on both complainants, swollen and
tender side of the face, bruises on N[...] ’s thigh. He testified that there were no clinical
findings of alcohol in both complainants and therefore he did not perform blood tests.
[15] Xolani testified that he approached the complainants because he was interested i n
one of them. When the appellant found Xolani talking to the complainants, he chased
Xolani away. Later, the complainants came to Xolani and asked for help to escape from
the appellant. Xolani helped them escape and took them to the police station using h is
vehicle.
APPELLANT’S VERSION
[16] The appellant testified and denied raping the complainants. The appellant’s version
was that after Pretty left the complainants at his house, he informed the complainants
that he intended to sleep. He claimed that N[...] woke Z[...], who was asle ep on his bed,
and he walked them back to Makarina
[17] The appellant testified that he went to buy the complainants six Savannas, when he
returned, the appellant found the complainants in the company of Xolani. He handed
over the drinks and left the comp lainants there, asserting that he needed to return home
due to correctional supervision conditions, since he was on parole. According to the
appellant, it was approximately 19h00 when he left the complainants at Makarina.
[18] When asked why the complainan ts would falsely accuse him, the appellant alleged
a conspiracy orchestrated by his ex -girlfriend, P[...] M[...] , who the appellant claimed
held a grudge against him for allegedly posting her nude images on social media. The
appellant suggested that Xol ani conspired with P[...] and Sylvester, P[...]'s current
boyfriend, to falsely implicate the appellant. The appellant went so far as to suggest that
the complainants may have had sex with Xolani. The basis for this suggestion was the
observation by Dr Skhosana that the complainants' clothes were ‘soily’.
[19] Appellant called Pretty Maponya as a witness. Pretty denied that he sent the
appellant to fetch the complainants. She confirmed the appellant’s version that she and
the complainants drank alcohol. The reason Pretty, the appellant and the complainants
left Makarina was because N[...] said she saw her brother at Makarina and wanted to
leave. They all went to the appellant’s place, where they sat playing music. Z[...] was so
drunk that she fell a sleep on the appellant’s bed. Pretty’s boyfriend, Siyabonga came at
approximately 20h00 and stayed for thirty minutes. The complainants, the appellant,
Pretty and her boyfriend left the appellant’s place together going in different directions.
The complain ants and the appellant went to Makarina , while Pretty and her boyfriend
left together.
[20] Siyabonga testified and confirmed that she found Pretty at the appellant’s place,
and he spent thirty minutes there before leaving. Siyabonga denied that the appe llant
and the complainants left the appellant’s room with him and Pretty. He stated that when
they left the appellant’s room, the appellant and the complainants were getting ready to
go to Makarina.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
[21] The issues before us are twofold. First, whether the court a quo misdirected itself in
finding that the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, if the
conviction is upheld, whether the court a quo erred in its approach to sentencing.
THE LAW
[22] It is trite that an appellate court will not lightly interfere with the factual findings of a
trial court unless those findings are tainted by a material misdirection. It is well -
established that the State bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. Conversely, the accused is entitled to an acquittal if there exists a
reasonable possibility that the explanation he offered may be true . (see S v Van der
Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 447 (W); S v Chabalala 2003 (1) SACR 134 SCA) .
[23] These are not separate and independent tests, but expressions of the same
standard viewed from opposite perspectives. To convict, the evidence must establish
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, which will be so only if there is at
the same time n o reasonable possibility that the innocent explanation offered might be
true. The two are inseparable, each being the logical corollary of the other. ( see Van der
Meyden at 80H –81B)
[24] In S v Chabalala at paragraph 15 , the Supreme Court of Appeal approve d the
approach in Van der Meyden , with Heher JA stating:
“The correct approach is to weigh all the elements pointing towards the guilt of
the accused against those indicative of his innocence, taking proper account of
the inherent strengths and weaknesses, probabilities and improbabilities on both
sides. Having done so, the court must decide whether the balance weighs so
heavily in favour of the State as to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the
accused’s guilt. The result may hinge on a single piece of evi dence or a defect in
either party’s case (such as failure to call a material witness regarding an identity
parade), but this can only be determined retrospectively. The trial court —and
counsel —must resist the temptation to fixate on one seemingly obvious a spect
without assessing it in the context of the entire evidentiary picture.”
[25] Addressing the concept of "reasonable doubt," the Appeal Court in R v Mlambo
1957 (4) SA 727 A held that:
“There is no obligation on the Crown to close every avenue of esca pe available
to the accused. It is sufficient for the Crown to present evidence that raises such
a high degree of probability that the reasonable person, after mature
consideration, concludes there is no reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. The
court m ust be morally certain of the guilt. The accused’s claim to the benefit of
doubt must rest on a reasonable and solid foundation, whether from positive
evidence or inferences that are not contradicted or outweighed by the proven
facts.”
[26] In R v Difford 1937 AD 370 at 373 , the court stated:
“It is clear that no onus rests on the accused to convince the court of the truth of
any explanation offered. Even if the explanation is improbable, the court may not
convict unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable d oubt, that the explanation is
false. If there exists any reasonable possibility that the explanation is true, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.”
[27] Regardless of how the test is framed, it must be satisfied based on a holistic
assessment of all th e evidence. A court does not consider the evidence implicating the
accused in isolation to determine proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor does it assess
the exculpatory evidence in isolation to determine whether it is reasonably possibly true.
[28] In S v Hadebe & Others 1997 (2) SACR 641 (SCA) at 645E –F, the court confirmed:
“In the absence of demonstrable and material misdirection by the trial court, its
findings of fact are presumed correct and will only be disregarded if the recorded
evidence proves them to be wrong.”
THE FINDING OF THE COURT A QUO
[29] In finding the appellant guilty the court a quo considered the evidence of the
complainants and found the evidence to prove that the appellant raped the
complainants. The court a quo was satisf ied that the J88 corroborated the complainants’
allegation of rape. The court rejected the appellant’s version, which it noted to be a bare
denial. In particular, the trial court noted the fact that the appellant was left with the
complainants.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE
[30] The question is whether the guilt of the appellant was proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It is clear from the record that there are two conflicting versions of how the
events on that day unfolded. The court a quo accepted the v ersion of the complainants
and found that their evidence was corroborated by the medical evidence and rejected
the evidence of the appellant.
[31] The undisputed evidence is that Pretty, the complainants and the appellant spent
time together at the appellant’s place, although they differ on the reason they went
there. The complainants’ evidence that they were slapped, pinched and raped, is
corro borated by Dr Skhosana’s evidence that the vaginal tears were consistent with
forceful penetration. The J88 recorded vaginal tears, tender and swollen side of the face
and bruised thigh. The evidence of the complainants is similar in material respects, the y
corroborated each other regarding how the appellant threatened them with a knife and a
firearm.
[32] Z[...] witnessed the appellant rape N[...] , while N[...] witnessed the appellant rape
Z[...]. N[...] ’s evidence in this regard was that s he tried to intervene when the appellant
was raping Z[...] but the appellant overpowered her and raped her. Z[...]’s evidence was
that when the appellant realised that she was bleeding, he turned his attention to N[...]
and raped her. The complainants corroborated each other’s testimony. The
complainants’ evidence was clear and coherent.
[33] The appellant’s explanation that after Siyabonga and Pretty left his room, he walked
the complainants back to Makarina at approximately 19h30, is corroborated by
Siyabonga, who stated that when he and Pretty left the appellant’s place, the appellant
and the complainants were getting ready to go to Makarina. However, this evidence is
contrary to Pretty’s evidence who testified that the appellant and the complaina nts left
the appellant’s room together with her and Siyabonga.
[34] The appellant’s version is that he had no sexual contact with the complainants. The
medical evidence confirmed that the complainants had been raped. The fresh vaginal
tears, the bleeding, the bruises provided sufficient evidence and enabled Dr Skhosana
to conclude that there was clinical evidence of forceful penetration. The tenderness on
the side of the faces and the bruised thigh are in line with the evidence of the
complainants that the appellant slapped them on the face and further pinched N[...] on
her thigh to force them into submission. The appellant’s contention that the rape
allegation was a fabrication is meritless.
[35] The following aspects of the appellant’s testimony c onfirm the complainants'
evidence that (a) Pretty left them in the company of the appellant in his room; (b) the
appellant too k the complainants to Makarina after Pretty left; (c) the complainants and
the appellant encountered Xolani at Makarina .
[36] Ad ditionally, Xolani corroborated the complainants’ version regarding the time the
complainants and the appellant encountered Xolani at Makarina. Xolani testified that he
encountered the complainants and the appellant at Makarina in the early hours of 26
December 2019 and subsequently took the complainants to the police station. This
contradicts the appellant’s claim that he left the complainants in the company of Xolani
at Makarina at approximately 19h00 on 25 December 2019.
FACTORS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLA NT
[37] The appellant raised several issues against the complainant’s version: (a) the
absence of DNA evidence linking him to the complainants; (b) inconsistencies regarding
the presence and location of the firearm (c) the failure by Dr Skhosana to record any
signs of alcohol, despite the appellant’s claim that the complainants were intoxicated,
and alleged inconsistencies in the complainants’ testimony regarding the location of the
firearm and the sequence of events.
[38] Admittedly DNA evidence is valuable in rape cases however the absence thereof is
not fatal to the State’s case. The court has the complainants’ evidence, together with
the J88 and Dr Skhosana’s evidence and circumstantial evidence eg, the appellant’s
evidence that Pretty left the co mplainants in the appellant’s presence at the appellant’s
room. According to the complainants’ evidence, it was after Pretty left that the appellant
locked the room and started his assault on the complainants. This evidence is important
in the determinatio n of whether the appellant is guilty or not.
[39] Regarding the failure of Dr Skhosana to record any signs of alcohol, Dr Skhosana
testified that there was no clinical evidence of alcohol. Pretty’s testimony was that Z[...]
was so drunk that she fell a sleep on the appellant’s bed. If Z[...] was that inebriated,
wouldn’t that have been obvious to Dr Skhosana?
[40] A further issue raised by the appellant is the contradiction regarding where the
appellant retrieved the firearm from. According to Z[...], the appellant retrieved a firearm
from the drawer, while N[...] testified that the appellant retrieved the firearm from the top
of the wardrobe. The contradiction in this regard is immaterial, especially considering
their circumstances at the time. They both corroborate each other on the fact that they
were threatened with a firearm.
INCONSISTENCIES AND CONTRADICTIONS
[41] Pretty contradicted the appellant; she testified that the appellant, the complainant,
Pretty and her boyfriend left together from the appellant’s room and parted ways along
the way. This contradicted the appellant’s testimony that Pretty left the complainants at
the appellant’s room.
[42] The appellant's version suffered from material inconsistencies. He initially stated
that the complainants left Makarina due to N[...] ’s brother being present, but under
cross -examination, he altered this to say that N[...] recognised a man who was a friend
of her brother.
PROBABILITIES
[43] It is improbable that the complainants, having just met the appellant, would falsely
accuse him of rape, especially given the cordial manner in which he initially treated
them —buying them food and beverages , and offering them hospitality at his home.
[44] The suggestion that the complainants conspired with Xolani and his ex -girlfriend to
fabricate the rape allegation is far -fetched. The evidence of rape is corroborated
medically, supported by consistent testimony from both complainants and Xolani, and is
further strengthened by the inconsistencies and improbabilities in the appellant’s
version.
DUPLICATION OF CONVICTIONS
[45] The respondent submitted that count 4 and 5 of sexual assaults and count 7 and 8
of rape were ‘committed within the framework of single intent’.
[46] Regarding the duplication of punishment, the SCA in S v BM 2014 (2) SACR (SCA)
para 3 , remarked that :
‘It has been a rule of practice in our criminal courts since at least 1887 that
‘where the accused has committed only one offence in substance, it should not
be split up and charged against him in one and the same trial as several
offences”. The test is whe ther, taking a common -sense view of matters in the
light of fairness to the accused, a single offence or more than one has been
committed. The purpose of the rule is to prevent a duplication of convictions on
what is essentially a single offence and, conse quently, the duplication of
punishment.’
[47] The test which was developed by the courts to determine whether a duplication of
charges had occurred are: (a) whether the offences were committed with a single intent
and were part of one continuous transaction; and (b) whether the offences differed from
one another in their elements and whether the same evidence was necessary to prove
both offences.
[48] In this matter the appellant was convicted of sexual assault and rape. The sexual
assault was committed with an intention to rape the complainants, which the appellant
ultimately did. Therefore both the sexual assault and the rape were part of one
continuous transaction. The conviction of the appellant on separate counts of sexual
assa ult and rape resulted in duplication of convictions. The conviction on sexual assault
stands to be set aside.
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
[49] It is trite that the court of appeal will not interfere with a sentence unless it is vitiated
by misdirection or th e sentence is inappropriate and induces a sense of shock.
[50] In S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA), the approach to an appeal against
sentence was set out at paragraph 12 as follows: “The mental process in which courts
engage when considering questions of sentence depends upon the task at hand.
Subject of course to any limitations imposed by legislation or binding judicial precedent,
a trial court will consider the particular circumstan ces of the case in the light of the well -
known triad of factors relevant to sentence and impose what it considers to be a just
and appropriate sentence. A court exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot, in the
absence of material misdirection by the trial court, approach the question of sentence as
if it were the trial court and then substitute the sentence arrived at by it simply because
it prefers it. To do so would be to usurp the sentencing discretion of the trial court.
Where material misdirection by t he trial court vitiates its exercise of that discretion, an
appellate court is of course entitled to consider the question of sentence afresh. In doing
so, it assesses sentence as if it were a court of first instance and the sentence imposed
by the trial c ourt has no relevance. As it is said, an appellate court is at large. However,
even in the absence of material misdirection, an appellate court may yet be justified in
interfering with the sentence imposed by the trial court. It may do so when the disparit y
between the sentence of the trial court and the sentence which the appellate court
would have imposed had it been the trial court is so marked that it can properly be
described as “shocking”, “startling” or “disturbingly inappropriate”. It must be
emphas ised that in the latter situation the appellate court is not at large in the sense in
which it is at large in the former. In the latter situation it may not substitute the sentence
which it thinks appropriate merely because it does not accord with the sent ence
imposed by the trial court or because it prefers it to that sentence. It may do so only
where the difference is so substantial that it attracts epithets of the kind I have
mentioned. No such limitation exists in the former situation.”
[51] Section 51 (1) of Act 105 of 2007 prescribes minimum sentence of life imprisonment
for a conviction of rape where the complaint is raped more than once unless there are
substantial and compelling circumstances that justify a lesser sentence in terms of
section 51(3) of Act 105 of 2007.
[52] In sentencing the accused, the trial court has to take into account the nature and
seriousness of the offence, the interests of society and those of the victim, and the
personal circumstances of the accused. S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 53 7 (AD) .
SUBMISSIONS
[53] The appellant submitted that the court a quo erred in finding that there were no
substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a deviation from the prescribed
minimum sentence. It was submitted that the following factors, together with the
appellant’s personal circumstances, establish substant ial and compelling
circumstances: (a) the appellant had been incarcerated for a period of 3 years, 5
months, from the 26th of January 2020 to the date of sentence; (b) the appellant was 38
years at the time of sentence but was 34 years at the time of the i ncident; (c) the
appellant was not married and had no children; (d) it was not clear how far the appellant
progressed at school; (e) the appellant was self -employed; (f) the appellant was not a
first offender and he had relevant previous convictions; (g) t he appellant had fallen from
grace from his community; and (h) the appellant had lost his family support.
[54] The appellant further argued that the court a quo failed to enquire into the
proportionality between the offence and the period of imprisonment. Further that the
sentence ought to be reduced as it is unjust and disproportionate to the crime, the
criminal and the interests of society.
[55] The respondent submitted that the seriousness of the offense, the interests of
society, and aggravating factor s may outweigh the accused’s personal circumstances or
the mitigating factors. In this matter the aggravating factor is that the appellant had a
previous conviction of rape and attempted murder.
COURT A QUO’S APPROACH TO SENTENCE
[56] In sentencing the appellant, the court a quo considered the appellant’s personal
circumstances and found that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances
for the court to deviate from the minimum sentence.
[57] The court a quo considered the seriousness of the offence, noting that the appellant
brutally raped the complainants and the complainants would have to live with the
trauma of the rape. The court also took into account the personal circumstances of th e
appellant and found that the fact that the appellant was on parole was an aggravating
factor.
[58] I now turn to the prescribed minimum sentence imposed by the court a quo. The
enquiry is whether the evidence led by the appellant constitutes substantial and
compelling circumstances that should have persuaded the court to deviate from the
prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
[59] The appellant relied on the following personal circumstances in his bid to have the
court depart from the minim um sentence of life imprisonment:
(a) the appellant was not married and had no children; (b) it was not clear how far
the appellant progressed at school; (c) the appellant was self -employed; (d) the
appellant was not a first offender and he had relevant pr evious convictions; (e)
the appellant had fallen from grace from his community; (f) the appellant had lost
his family support; and (g) the appellant was 34 years old.
[60] The appellant’s relevant convictions cannot be relied upon to justify the reduction of
sentence. His loss of family support and standing in the community is as a result of his
criminal conduct and does not assist the appellant. The remaining personal
circumstances are similarly insufficient to constitute compelling and substantial
circums tances.
[61] In S V PB 2013 (2) SACR 533 SCA Boshielo JA noted that three earlier decisions of
the Supreme Court of Appeal not to impose life imprisonment for rape did not constitute
a benchmark or precedent which is binding on other courts. This is in re cognition of the
fact that no two cases present the same factual matrix. The court concluded that a
slavish following of a trend not to impose life imprisonment for rape was improper.
CONCLUSION
[62] The appellant took advantage of the vulnerability of the two trusting young girls, 18
and 19 years old, who were visiting a friend to celebrate Christmas. What should have
been a joyful day became a horrific ordeal. The appellant raped them repeatedly and
persisted even when they began to bleed. Undoubtedly, the complainants will carry the
psychological and emotional scars of that day for the rest of their lives.
[63] Aggravating t he situation further, is the fact that the appellant has a previous
conviction of rape and was out on parole when these offenses were committed. The
appellant showed no remorse. The appellant’s personal circumstances are far
outweighed by the seriousness o f the offence and the interests of society.
[64] This court finds no misdirection on the part of the trial court. The complainant’s
version was clear, detailed, and consistent and corroborated by objective medical
findings. The inconsistencies and contradi ctions in the complainants’ version, including
where the appellant retrieved the firearm, do not affect the weight of the complainant’s
evidence. While these points may raise peripheral concerns, they do not create a
reasonable doubt when weighed against t he totality of credible and corroborated
evidence presented by the State. The court a quo cannot be faulted for accepting the
complainant’s version.
[65] The appellant’s version on the other hand that he had no sexual contact with the
complainants and that the rape allegation was a fabrication is so farfetched and
inconsistent with the evidence. The explanation that the complainants conspired with
the appellant’s ex -girlfriend is so improbable that it was correctly rejected as false.
Accordingly, there is n o basis to interfere with the conviction .
[66] The sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the court is appropriate under the
circumstances. I therefore find that there was no basis for a departure from the
prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
In the result I make the following order:
1. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 1 is dismissed.
2. The appeal against c onviction and sentence on count 2 is dismissed.
3. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 3 is dismissed.
4. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 4 is upheld.
5. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 5 is upheld.
6. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 6 is dismissed.
7. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 7 is dismissed.
8. The appeal against conviction and sentence on count 8 is dismissed.
9. The appeal against conviction an d sentence on count 9 is dismissed.
_______________________________ _
P D KEKANA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I AGREE,
_______________________________ _
S MFENYANA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard on: 30 January 2025
Delivered on: 10 June 2025
Appearances:
For the Appellant : Adv M.G Botha
Instructed By: Pretoria Justice Centre
For the Respondent: Adv M.J Nethononda
Instructed By: The Director Public Prosecution