IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
( l) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED.
10Jun.25
DATE
In the matter between:
VILOT TRANSPORT CC
and
EMPEDOCLES , JULIAN PETER
TRANS BUS AFRICA CC
AMAROSA TRADING (PTY) LTD
t/a THARI BUS SERVICES
MOHASOA , DIMAKATSO ARNOLD MICHAEL
JUDGMENT
LABUSC HAGNE J CASE NO: 2025/073647
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Page 2
[1] In the week of 3 to 6 June 2025 the applicant brought an urgent application
against the respondents seeking urgent relief to the following effect:
“2. That the first respondent and second responden t, acting together or
independently of each other, be hereby restrained and interdicted from
interfering with the business operations of the applicant .
3. That the first respondent and second respondent, acting together or
independently of each other, are hereby restrained and interdicted from
harassing the employees of the applicant.
4. That the first respondent and second respondent, acting together or
independently of each other, are hereby restrained and interdicted from
contacting the clients of the applicant, particularly the third respondent,
under the preten ce that they ar e in possession of a provisional liquidation
order against the applicant.
5. That it is hereby declared that the provisional liquidation order that was
granted in favour of the second respondent on 25 February 2025 under
case number 2024 -113102 does not affect the applicant.
6. That the third respondent is hereby directed and authorised to release
the funds due to the applicant for service rendered in terms of the service
level agreement.
7. That the first and second respondents are hereby ordered to pay the
costs of this application on the attorney and own client scale.”
Page 3
[2] In 2012 the applicant intended entering into an agreement for the rendering of
a bus service with the third respondent (Thari) , which had a contract with the
Department of Transport in the North West Province. It was required of the
applicant to obtain a partner with experience in rendering a bus service. The
applicant then partnered with Rustenburg Coach Lines and established a joint
venture vehicle , Vilot RCL (Pty) Ltd (“RCL ”). The applicant contends that Vilot
RCL entered into a contract with the third respondent on 7 September 2012
and this contract was terminated on 28 February 2022. The termination flowed
from the lapsing of the contract between the Thari and the Department of
Transport. The applicant contends that the joint venture then disbanded and
that the applicant thereafter, in terms of an oral agreement, agreed with Thari
to continue rendering the same service on the same terms as the written
agreement between RCL and the third respondent. For purposes of
convenience, I will refer to the joint venture vehicle as “RCL” and I will refer to
the applicant as “Vilot”.
[3] The second respondent applied for the liquidation of RCL and obtained a
provisional order on 25 February 2025. The return date was 14 April but was
extended to 10 June 2025. The applicant has applied to intervene in the
aforesaid liquidation proceedings and its intervention will be argued on 10
June 2025.
[4] On 14 March 2025 Mr Kapp, attorney for the first and second respondents and
a manager of the second respondent attended at the applicant’s depot in Brits.
Mr Khounou was on duty. He was told by Mr Kapp that from that day on he
shall report to the manager of the second respondent. The deponent of the
Page 4
applicant, Mr Ebrahim was telephoned, and he also arrived at the premises.
Mr Kapp advised him that they have just come from the third respondent where
they met with Mr More lli. He said that they were then notified by Mr Kapp that:
“As of today the applicant is liquidated and that the deponent will be reporting
to the manager of Trans Bus Africa CC (the second respondent).”
[5] Mr Morel li, on behalf of the third respondent refuses to pay the applicant
without a court order.
[6] It is apparent that a provisional liquidation order was granted in respect of RCL
and not the applicant. It was obtained under case number 2024 -113102 .
[7] Although Mr More lli on behalf of the third respondent advised that funds will
only be released if a court order to that effect is granted, he filed a notice to
abide in the proceedings before me.
[8] The applicant contends that the urgency lies therein that the applicant has
been rendering the service for the third respondent without being paid for it for
the last few months and that its funds and resources are busy running out. If
the ro utes are stopped, the public will be left in the lurch.
[9] From the answering affidavit it is apparent that the liquidator of RCL is of the
view that RCL and the applicant are one and the same entity. That is clearly
not the case. There is however cause for confusion arising from the
documents that served before me. So, for example, the service level
agreement which the applicant contends was concluded between Thari (the
third respondent) and RCL in 2012 has confusing provisions. On the first page
Page 5
an entity called Vilot Transport (Pty) Ltd is identified as the operator . There is
no such entity as the applicant is a close corporation. In the body of the
agreement, in the clause dealing with chosen domicilia (clause 11.1) the
subcontractor is identified as RCL.
[10] Assuming that the same entity was intended, the description of the operator
on page 1 of the agreement lacks the words “RCL” and could constitute a
misnomer. However, it is not the applicant on the face of it as there is express
reference to that subcontractor having directors. As the applicant is a Close
Corporation with members, this is an indicator that a company was intended
to be referred to and not a close corporation like the applicant.
[11] Annexure “AA7” to the answering affidavit is a remittance advice which on the
face of it refers to payments made by the third respondent to the applicant.
However, in the body of the document reference is made to EFTs to “RCL”.
This again is a source of confusion as to who is the contracting party of the
third respondent.
[12] The issue of urgency requires further scrutiny. In a document dated 31 March
2025 annexed to the answering affidavit as Annexure “AA14 ” the third
respondent wrote a letter (represented by Franco More lli), its general
manager , and it was addressed to the applicant. It read s as follows:
“Re: Notice of termination of services
We refer to re cent communication from your legal representatives, where it is
alleged that an oral agreement was concluded between yourselves and our
Page 6
company, in terms of which you were to render transport services as a
subcontractor. We categorically deny the existence of any such oral
agreement.
While you assert that your Close Corporation has been providing transport
services to us, we are not certain of the identity of the legal entity engaged, as
there is no formal agreement in place between our company and yours.
Accordingly, you are hereby formally instructed to ce ase all services with
immediate effect.
We reiterate that no agreement exists between our entities and we do not wish
to receive any further services from you.
Yours faithfully
Signed Franco Morelli, General Manager
31/03/2025”
[13] At the foot of the document is an acknowledgement of receipt of the notice by
Eric, a general manager of the applicant. It is also dated 31 March 20 25
[14] The applicant is seeking urgent relief that includes payment by the third
respondent for services rendered . From the aforesaid letter it is apparent that
Thari has not required those services and in fact insisted on the termination of
those services with effect from 1 April 2025.
Page 7
[15] In light of the denial of liability to the applicant, perhaps influenced by
uncertainty as to whether the applicant is the party entitled to payment, the
effect of the aforesaid quoted letter is that the applicant has been rendering
services to Thari since 1 April 2025 at its own risk.
[16] In light of the clear direction to immediately cease rendering services, and the
applicant's subsequent ignoring of that instruction , I am of the view that
whatever urgency exists, due to the depletion of the applicant's resources , is
self-created.
[17] In light of the aforesaid, the applicant has not established that its application
is urgent within the meaning required in terms of rule 6(12) of the Uniform
Rules of Court. The applicant may obtain substantial redress in the application
in which it seeks to intervene on 10 June 2025.
[18] In the premises I make the following order:
1. The application is struck for lack of urgency.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs on Scale B.
LABUSCHAGNE J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT