IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 71868/ 2017
In the matter between:
ADVERT ISING DIGITAL SERVICES PTY (LTD) APPLICANT
and
STANDARD BAN K OF SOUTH AFRICA FIRST RESPONDENT
DU PLESSIS CORNELIS ADOLF SECOND RESPONDENT
‘This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ representatives
by email. The date and time of hand -down is deemed to be 11 June 2025.
In terms of the common -law it is not permissible for a director or a shareholder to legally
represent a juristic person in a court of law when he is not an attorney or advocate , unle ss
in exceptional circumstances with the leave of the court .
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
DATE SIGNATURE
11/06/202 5 KHUMALO J
2
JUDGMENT
N V KHUMALO J
Introduction
[1] This is an interlocutory application in terms of Rule 30 (1) of the Uniform Rules
of Court . Standard Bank of South A frica Limited (“Standard Bank”) , the Defendant in
the main action is seeking an order to set aside as an irregular step , the notice of
application for leave to appeal the Judgment of Maubane AJ, filed on behalf of
Advertising Digital Services, the Respondent/ Plaintif f in the main action , on the ground
that the Notice is signed by its sole director and shareholder Mr Johan Reynders , in
the absence of Mr Reynders being granted leave to do so, and without him not being
a legal practitioner .
[2] Advertising Digital Services is a company duly incorporated in terms of the
Companies Act of South Africa (henceforth referred to as “ADS“ , for ease of
reference ). It is the contention of Standard Bank that the signing of the notice for
Application for leave to appeal by Mr Rey nders is contrary to the provisions of R ule 18
(1), which directs that a plea must be signed by ‘an Officer of the Court‟ and “Mr
Reynders” is not. Reynders has also not sought any leave from the court to do so.
Factual Background
[3] On 28 July 2022 a judgment was delivered by Maubane AJ dismissing an action
for damages instituted by ADS against Standard Bank and upholdin g Standard Bank’s
special plea of prescription. Both sides were legally represented , ADS by counsel and
its erstwhile attorneys . On 17 August 2022 ADS’ erstwhile attorneys withdrew as
attorneys of record . On 18 August 2022 ADS delivered its notice for application for
leave to appeal the Maubane judgment signed by Reynders in his capacity as its sole
director .
3
[4] The Applicant argue s that Reynders is not a legal practitioner and has signed
the notice without applying for leave to represent ADS, therefore the notice for
application for leave to appeal is defective . On 31 August 2022 Standa rd Bank filed a
Rule 30 (2) (b) notice bringing the issue of the defective notice to the attention of
Rynders , giving ADS an opportunity to cure the irregular step and rectify the defective
notice which it failed to do.
[5] As a result Standard Bank argues that absent the cure , the delivery of the notice
for application for leave to appeal signed by Reynders without him having applied and
granted leave to represent ADS in these proceedings constitute s an irregular step and
is to be set aside . Standa rd Bank will otherwise be prejudiced if the application for
leave to appeal is argued and it is refused with costs awarded against ADS, as
Reynders may contend that ADS is not bound by th at because he was not given leave
by the court to represent the company .
[6] Reynders admits that indeed , ADS attorneys withdrew on 17th August 2022 and
he as a result , the next day, took it upon himself to file the Notice for applicat ion for
leave to appeal to be on time. He further points out in his affidavit that the notice had
to be filed by 18 August 2022, following the judgment. So, he had to do it to be within
the time.
[7] He however , failed to file the notice to oppose the Rule 3 0 (1) Notice and
instead proceeded to file what he titled Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Defendant’s Notice
in terms of Rule 30 (1). Reynders also failed to indicate in his Affidavit that he is
authorized to d epose to the affidavit on behalf of ADS. He alleges to have received
another offer of settlement from Standard Bank which he says he declined and noted
to Standard Bank that attorneys will be appointed in due course.
[8] Furthermore Reynders state d that with regard to the relevant issue s to be
determined , Standard Bank’s objection to the notice for application for leave to appeal
is premature, being contrary to Rule 37 A 5 (a) as the matter is under case
management which relates to a matter under ca se management not proceeding to trial
notwithstanding allocation of a trial date unless it has been certified to be trial ready.
4
[9] He then in addition , regurgitated the issues and arguments the merits of which
were adjudicated and decided upon at a trial in the High Court, Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg , then on appeal at the S upreme Court of Appeal and at the
Constitutional Court , which have no bearing to the objection raised against the filing
of a Notice of an Application for leave to appeal signed before this court which relates
to the process Reynders has followed in filing the Notice.
[10] He however in his Affidavit commented1 that he has been advised that “a juristic
person must be represented by legal practitioners and may not be represented by one
of its directors or officials unless some exceptional circumstances were present or
alleged to be. ” Further that the prohibition against audience ensures that the courts
will be served by legal practitioners who observe th e rules of their profession , who are
subject to a disciplinary code and familiar with the methods and scope of advocacy
followed in the presentation of argument. He reckons to be well aware of Rule 18 (1 )
and the Manoim Judgment .2
[11] In conclusion he again refe rs to the legal contestation s between the parties
that w ere concluded and resolved previous ly in the various courts , whilst arguing that
what he present s in this application in relation to those proceedings are shortcomings
which are an unassailable argument for th e matter , meaning the Application , to be
placed before the honourable court so that the full horror of the result and the
ramifications thereof can be tested against the record and argued in open court. That
is so , notwithstanding his concession that he is aware that he could not continue to
act on behalf of ADS without the leave of the court , and what ar e the ramifications if
he continues.
[12] Standard Bank in its reply, denied that the application launched for him to be
declared a vexatious litigant was to avoid a claim of aiding and abetting each other to
mislead the court and defraud ADS. In relation to Rule 37 it pointed out that the retired
1 in paragraph 96
2 Manong and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works and Another 2010 (2) SA 167 SCA
5
Fabricius J had conditionally ordered that the Defendants , that is Standard Bank and
Du Plessis, the 2nd Defendant could raise the Spec ial Plea in the action provided the
matter be subject to judicial case management . The order was granted by agreement
between the parties following extensive engagement between the Plaintiff’s erstwhile
attorneys and Counsel and the Defendant’s attorneys and Counsel and Fabricius J.
Millar J was appointed as a case manager following the clandestine approach by ADS
after judgment upholding Standard Bank ’s Special Plea was delivered.
Correspondence was directed to the Judge President and the Deputy Judge President
by the Plaintiff without copying the Defendant’s attorneys. The Defendants deny that
there is any merit to Reynders suggestion tha t “the disregard of the order will come
into focus. ”
[13] Standard Bank further denies that the concern raised in their Rule 30 (2)
application is of academic interest only. As in previous proceedings between them
after the trial at which Reynders represented ADS with the leave of the court and after
judgment was delivered against the Plaintiff, Mr Reynders suggested that the trial
proceedings were irregular because he was not authorized to represent th e Plaintiff.
This was despite him being the sole shareholder and director of the Plaintiff. In my
view this is a genuine concern by Standard bank . Reynders has acquiesced to the fact
of what the position is in law and the ramifications of not following the la w. He has
nevertheless , with total disregard continued further, to file additional documents
including the heads of argument and the practice note without seeking leave of the
court .
[14] The present interlocutory application follows the relic of litigation that span s a
period of more than 20 years . The subject matter of which stem s from a n action that
ADS instituted against Standard Bank in 2003 contingent nearly on the same set of
facts claiming compensation for the alleged unauthorized use by Standard Bank of its
intellectual property in contravention of an agreement concluded between the two ,
restraining such use. The dispute whether or not Rynders was granted leave to
represent ADS in that trial persisted till to the Constitutional Court.
[15] It is therefore understandable that Standard Bank would be weary of Rynders
again taking any actions on behalf of ADS without the leave of the court whereby he
6
would simply challenge the outcome on the basis of lack of locus standi and the
expertise to legally represent ADS.
[16] In this instance h e had indeed made an undertaking to appoint attorneys to
represent ADS but failed to do so . Even when he was given a further opportunity to do
so by Notice in terms of Rule 3 0 (2) with a warning that on such failure an application
to set aside his notice application will be sought, he persisted to default . He instead
continued to file further documents on behalf of ADS insensible to court processes
and protocol .
The legal framework
[17] The right to act in person does not in general extend to a juristic person. In
terms of the common -law it is not permissible for a director or a shareholder to legally
represent a juristic person in a court of law when he is not an attorney or advocate .
Any pleading filed on its behalf must ordinarily be signed by an attorney and an
advocate or an attorney who has been granted a right of appearance in the High Court
in terms of s 4 of the Right of Appearance in Court s Act 62 of 19 95.3
[18] In rare and exceptional or at least unusual circumstances t he general rule can
be relaxed not ex mero motu but when such leave is properly sought from the court
by a formerly lodged Application with proper motivation submitted to court , as
highlighted in Manong by Ponnan JA holding that4:
‘I have expressly refrained from formulating a test for the exercise of the court’s
inherent power as I believe that such cases can confidently be left to the good
sense of the Judges concerned lest this be misconstrued as a tacit or general
licence to unqualified agents , it needs to be emphasised th at in each such
instance leave must be by way of a properly motivated , timeously lodged formal
application showing good cause why , in that particular case , the rule
prohibiting non -professional representation should be relaxed . Individual
cases can thus be met by the ex ercise of t he discretion in the circumstances of
3 Rule 18 (1) supra
4 At 174 C-E
7
that case. It would thus be impermissible for a non-professional representative
to take any step in the proc eedings , including the s igning of pleadings, notices
or heads of argument (as occurred here) , without the requisite leave of the
court concerned first having been sought and obtained. ”
[19] ADS or Rynders is required on Application to the court , to demonstrate a
sufficient degree of exceptional facts for a deviation order by the court. The court
hearing the Application for leave will therefore be in a position to decide with all the
facts before it, the questions of exceptional circumstances whether or not exceptional
circumstances exists and or that no envisaged inconvenience or harm will be suffered
by the other party. The court has therefore to determine if the Applicant has made a
proper case for non -conformity with the general rule , there being good cause shown.
Only if such a decision has been arrived at can a question whether or not the non-
professional person be permitted to act as a represent ative in the legal proceedings .
[20] The purpose mainly is to prevent the abuse of judicial process and protect the
integrity of the legal system . The court’s responsibility in that vein is to uphold
procedural fairness and deter behavior that undermines the judicial process. This
proactiv e or hands on approach ensures efficient and equitable legal proce sses,
reinforcing the court’s authority. Indeed , in casu to prevent the Tsoga J saga outlined
by Standard Bank. .
[21] Rynders ’ situation is untenable , he did not even bother to appoint an attorney
notwithstanding an undertaking to do so . He instead after that continued undeterred ,
presuming to act on behalf of ADS , to file even the Heads of Argument . He was also
acting in total disregard of the knowledge he has that he requires the leave of the court
to.do so . Rynders persistent irregular conduct and future attempts to do so should be
put to an end . Indeed, there is no reason why in addition Reynders and ADS should
not be mulcted with costs on an attorney and client scale .
[22] In the circumstances I make t he following order: