SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2015/30703
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:NO
(3) REVISED: NO
In the matter between
PRINCE KGOSI KHAMBULE PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT
JUDGMEN T
WEIDEMAN, AJ:
[1] The plaintiff, an adult male born on 11 May 1991 instituted this action against
the defendant (the RAF) in his personal capacity on 16 September 2015. His claim is
for damages suffered as a result of injuries which he sustained in a motor vehicle
accident on 19 June 2013 and which was caused by the negligent driving of the RAF’s insured driver.
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[2] The negligence aspect of this matter was settled between the parties on 15
March 2018 by way of o ffer and a cceptance , the RAF accepting liability for 100% of
the plaintiffs proven or agreed damages .
[3] The RAF has not yet made an election in respect of the seriousness of the
injuries sustained by the p laintiff. The plaintiff’s application in terms of Rule 33(4) for
the separation of the aspect of general damages from the remainder of the issues
before me was accordingly granted. The issues before me for adjudication were past
and future hospital and medical expenses and past and future loss of income.
[4] The plaintiff ’s application in terms of the provisions of Rule 38(2) of the
Uniform Rules of Court for expert evidence and the evidence of lay witnesses to be
presented on affidavit was also granted.
[5] The plaintiff alleged in his particulars of claim that he suffered the following
injuries as a result of the accident : Chest injury, i njuries to both shoulders, a back
injury, a head injury, a neck injury and multiple wounds. [6] The plaintiff has placed sufficient evidence before court to support his claim in
the amount of R77 152.21 in respect of past medical expenses .
[7] There is similarly ample substantiation in the medico- legal reports presented
as evidence in terms of Rule 38(2) that the plaintiff will require extensive hospital and
medical care in future. The provision of a Section 17(4)(a) Undertaking by the RAF is
therefore appropriate in the circumstances .
[8] The plaintiff’s case for loss of income is premised on the averment that it was
at all times his intention to qualify as a firefighter and that the injuries sustained in the
accident ha ve now made it impossible for him to pursue his choice of career.
[9] In considering the factual information available at the time of the hearing of
the matter I was not persuaded by the submissions of the expert witness in respect
of the plaintiff’s reported desire to become a firefighter prior to the accident. In fact,
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the evidence presented in this regard related solely to occurrences after the accident
had already occurred. Counsel assured the court that there was evidence available
that would support the reporting to the experts of his intentions and desires. The
documentation relating to counsel’s submissions was, however, only uploaded after
the hearing of the matter.
[10] The plaintiff ’s training and education history consist s of the following:
2009 - failed Grade 12;
2010 - basic ambulance assistance course;
2012 – passed Grade 12;
January to April 201 3 - GEFSTA Fire Training Academy (did not complete)
[11] The accident occurred on 19 June 2013 and could clearly not have been the
reason for the plaintiff not having completed the GEFSTA course. No reason was
given for not completing the course during 2013.
[12] During the remainder of 2013 and 2014 he operated an internet café from his
house, predominantly helping school children with their assignments.
[13] The plaintiff again attended the GEFSTA Fire Training Academy from January
to May 2015, registering for the following courses :
Fire Fighting 1 (NFPA 1001) .
Fire Fighting 2 (NFPA 1001) .
Hazardous Materials for First Responders Operational Level (NFPA 472) .
Hazardous Materials for First Responders Awareness Level (NFPA 472) .
[14] His 2015 results show that t he plaintiff passed the theoretical as well as the
practical component s of each of the above courses during May 2015.
[15] During 2016 and 2017 he was an unpaid volunteer firefighter at the Orange
Farm Firehouse.
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[16] In May 2018 the plaintiff successfully passed an Ambulance Emergency
Assistant cours e.
[17] On or about 11 June 2018 the HPCSA recorded his qualification as a
”Certified Ambulance Emergency Assist – Impact Emergency Technologies” and he
was registered by the HPCSA as an Ambulance Emergency Assistant in the category
“Independent Practice”.
[18] The industrial psychologist prepared his original assessment on 17 October
2023 and a supplementary report , based on a telephonic follow up consultation, on
11 April 2025.
[19] In his report the industrial psychologist records the plaintiff’s pre- accident
occupation as “ Student – Fire Fighting”. This does not appear to be factually correct
as the plaintiff discontinued the course two months before the accident. It seems that
the industrial psychologist might not have been provided with a factually complete
pre – accident scenario.
[20] It is iniquitous to claim past loss of income based on a qualification which, ex
facie the available documentation the plaintiff did not obtain prior to the accident and
not as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident.
[21] The court accepts that the plaintiff’s claim is represented by the difference
between the projected future income as a Fire Fighter and the projected future
income as an Emergency Care Officer. The evaluation must, however, go further.
[22] In the “but for the accident” scenario provision is made for promotion and
income as if he would be able to secure employment at one of the larger metros and
which would be able to pay more than the smaller municipalities. In addition, his father’s income is used to account for a portion of the amount being used in the calculation. The calculation suggests that the plaintiff’s income would peak at age 45 at R436 136.75 per annum , with inflationary increases thereafter until age 60. At age
57 his father was earning R711 480 per annum . If the plaintiff’s projected income at
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age 45 is extrapolated forward to age 57, increased by inflation only, the result is a
figure much higher than what his father was earning at that age.
[23] The statement is made that the plaintiff would automatically be able to obtain
employment in the private sector once he retires and retain such employment to age 65. The evidence in support of this premise is inadequate.
[24] The income of a fire fighter makes provision for danger pay. This is equally
true of his employment as an e mergency care officer and which also includes danger
pay. There is a reason why both options includes danger pay and it would be wrong to attempt to confine the evaluation of what the appropriate contingency deductions
ought to be without providing for this element and which is not part of most other
careers.
[25] Next is the plaintiff’s “having regard to the accident” projected income
scenario. Based on the medical experts’ opinions the industrial psychologist project ed a delayed career and thus by implication a delayed income progression.
The difficulty with the expert’s opinion is that it does not provide guidelines as to why and how the employer, being a local government department , would evaluate when
to grant notch increases, who decides on it and why it would be every four years
rather than every two years and for the duration of his whole career. The effect of
this approach is that the plaintiff’s income (both figures in 2025 values) would increase from R221 253 in April 2025 to R233 580 in April 204 5, a miserly net
increase of R12 327 over a period of twenty years.
[26] There is no evidence why it could not be, for example, every three years
rather than every two years. If this is an equally possible option then it would
significantly increase the plaintiff’s post -accident income but, as indicated above, the
expert failed to provide a factual basis for his opinion that the plaintiff would receive notch increases only every four years rather than the normal two years.
[27] The industrial psychologist makes a rather surprising statement “early
retirement enforced by employer”, at age 55. [CaseLines 004- 114]. At that stage the
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plaintiff would have more than 20 years of service with the same employer, a local
authority. The Municipal Workers Pension Fund must contain guidelines as to
whether the plaintiff would lose any pension benefits due to medical enforced early
retirement or whether he would still, at that stage, be medically boarded. Without this information the report is incomplete and the calculation flawed. In addition, I could
not trace any explanation why his “pension income” from age 55 to age 60 should
not be brought into the calculation as it represent his factual income during that
period.
[28] Despite having allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to supplement his
documentation the evidence that had been put before court is unsatisfactory.
Nevertheless, it is all that is available and I must do the best it can with what is
available.
[29] It is my view that in the calculation of the plaintiff’s past loss of income the
contingency deduction in respect of the “uninjured earnings” should be 25%. No deduction in respect of the “injured earnings” is called for as it represents his actual income received.
[30] Uninjured Earnings: R2 506 100 – 25% = R1 879 575
[31] Injured Earnings: R1132 900 – 0 % = R1 132 900
[32] Total Net Past Loss of Earnings: R746 675.
[33] The court will apply a 40% contingency deduction from the future “uninjured”
income and a 25% contingency from the future “injured” income. The reasons and
motivations for these contingencies have been fully canvased above.
[34] Uninjured Earnings: R7 534 700 – 40% = R4 520 820
[35] Injured Earnings: R4 088 700 – 25% = R3 066 525
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[36] Total Net Future Loss of Earnings: R1 454 295
I grant an order which reads as follows:
[1] The plaintiff’s application in terms of Rule 38(2) is granted;
[2] The Plaintiff’s application in terms of Rule 33(4) is granted and the aspect of
general damages is postponed sine die;
[3] By agreement between the Parties : The Defendant is liable to compensate
the Plaintiff for 100% (One Hundred Percent) of his proven delictual damages
suffered as a result of the motor vehicle collision which occurred on 19 June 2013.
[4] The Defendant shall pay the capital amount of R2 278 122.21( Two million two
hundred and seventy eight thousand one hundred and twenty two rand and twenty one cent ) in full and final payment of the Plaintiff’s claim, which is calculated as
follows:
4.1Past Hospital and Medical Expenses: R77 152.21
4.2 Past Loss of Earnings: R746 675.00
4.3 Future Loss of Earnings: R1 454 295.00
[5] The capital amount is payable by means of direct fund transfer into the trust
bank account of the Plaintiff’s attorneys; Mills & Groenewald Trust Cheque Account,
Absa Bank, Vereeniging, Account no: 4[ …], Branch code: 6[..] , reference: A [...
[6] The Defendant shall furnish the Plaintiff with an unlimited Undertaking in
terms of Section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996, for the costs of
the future accommodation of the Plaintiff in a hospital and nursing home and treatment of and rendering of a service to the Plaintiff and the supplying of goods to the Plaintiff arising out of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff in the motor vehicle collision of 19 June 2013 after such costs have been incurred and upon proof thereof.
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[7] The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party and party costs
up to date on the High Court scale, which party and party costs shall include, but not
be limited to (as per the discretion of the Taxing Master):
7.1 The reasonable costs in respect of the preparation of the actuarial
calculations, medico legal and addendum reports of the experts;
7.2 Costs of counsel on scale C in terms of Rule 67A to date hereof, including the
preparation for and trial appearance on 29 April 2025 as well as the preparation
and drafting of the Plaintiff's Heads of Argument and annexures.
7.3 Qualifying and preparation fees for drafting of the following medico- legal
reports:
7.4 Dr G A Versfeld (Orthopaedic Surgeon) - Report and RAF4 Serious Injury
Assessment Report; Sunninghill Radiology; 7.5 Mrs. R Bennie and C Rice (Occupational Therapists);
7.6 Dr W Pretorius (Industrial Psychologist) – Report as well as Addendum
Report;
7.7 Munro Actuary reports.
[8] The Plaintiff shall, in the event that costs are not agreed, serve the notice of
taxation on the Defendant; The Plaintiff shall allow the Defendant to make payment
of the taxed or agreed costs 30 (thirty) days after the costs were taxed and/or
settled.
D F WEIDEMAN AJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading to the electronic file on Case Lines. The date for hand- down is deemed to be 24 JUNE 2025 .
Heard: 29 April 2025
Delivered: 24 June 2025
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APPEARANCES:
Applicant’s counsel: Adv. D Grobbelaar
desmond@grobbelaarlaw.co.za
Applicant’s Attorneys: Mills & Groenewald
dalene@mgp.co.za
Respondent No appearance