2
1. I am dealing with an application for leave to appeal against the whole of a judgment
(“the leave to appeal application ”) and order that I handed down on 8 November
2024 together with an application for condonation for the late filing of the application
for leave to appeal (“ the condonation application ”).
2. In light of my views about the merits of the application for leave to appeal, I will deal
with that application first, as those views also have to be taken into account in
determining the condonation application.
3. Mr and M rs Ross rely on sections 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts Act, Act 10
of 2013 in support of their application for leave to appeal . They argue that they have
reasonable prospects of success and there are compelling reasons why their appeal
should be heard.
4. Mr and M rs Ross instituted an action against Nedbank claiming delictual damages of
R1 663 400.00 together with interest at the rate of 8.75% per annum from the date of
summons to date of payment and costs from Nedbank . The claim is a claim for pure
economic loss.
5. I am not going to repeat the facts relevant to this matter as they are comprehensively
set out in my 8 November 2024 judgment.
6. Mr and M rs Ross were not clients of Nedbank. Despite this, they contend that Nedbank
owed them a legal duty, which was breached. It is trite that a bank can have a duty of
care towards third parties such as Mr and M rs Ross1, but their counsel conceded during
the hearing in the court a quo that if a duty of care was recognised in this matter, it
would be an extension of the duty of care previously recognised by our courts.
7. It is also trite that our law is generally reluctant to recognise pure economic loss claims,
where it would constitute an extension of the law of delict2.
1 Commission, South African Revenue Services & Another v Absa Bank Limited 2003 (2) SA 96 (W)
2 Country Cloud Trading CC v FNB 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 24 and footnote 2 and Old Mutual Unit Trust Managers
Limited v Living Hands (Pty) Limited & Others [2024] ZASCA 75 at para 47
3
8. It was argued on behalf of Mr and M rs Ross that indeterminate liability was one of the
primary considerations that influenced my finding that Nedbank did not owe them a
legal duty3. This is a misreading of my judgment.
9. The argument referred to in paragraph 8 above, ignores the following findings
contained in my judgment:
9.1. it fails to recognise that I found that the Ross’ had failed to discharge the onus
of wrongfulness in that –
9.1.1. FICA does not give rise to private law duties owed to third parties4;
9.1.2. Mr and M rs Ross were best placed to prevent the risk of payment
into the wrong bank account and were the architects of their own
misfortune5; and
9.1.3. Mr and M rs Ross did not prove their loss6.
10. It was contended on behalf of Mr and M rs Ross that leave to appeal should be granted
because I took a “firm stance on the questions of indeterminate liability and
vulnerability to risk”7 in an answering affidavit filed with the Constitutional Court for
an application for leave to appeal, in which the firm at which I practice, is the
respondent8.
11. It is therefore alleged by Mr and M rs Ross that I could never have been open to the
issues and be persuaded by their counsel, because of the firm stance that I adopted
on behalf of ENS in the above -mentioned answering affidavit. In addition, the argument
was advanced on behalf of Mr and M rs Ross that I could not objectively and reasonably
have been open minded and open to persuasion when I presided over the matter9.
DISCLOSURES BY THE JUDGE
3 0029 -4 at para 8
4 0028 -16 at para 60
5 0028 -18 at para 62
6 0028 -19 at para 67
7 0029 -18 at para 26
8 Hawarden v Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc. (ENS) CCT199/24
9 0029 -11 at para 23.1
4
i. Mr and M rs Ross also contend ed that my involvement in the Hawarden matter
was not disclosed to the parties at any point in time, even though I, through
the Registrar, had on the Friday preceding the commencement of the trial on
the Monday conveyed to both parties in writing that in my practice, I was
dealing with a matter for Nedbank and if that concerned them, they should
urgently write to me prior to the commencement of the trial. The Ross’ and
Nedbank had no objection to me being the judge appointed to the matter ,
despite me disclosi ng my involvement on behalf of ENS in the Hawarden
matter, in chambers, on the Monday morning before the commencement of
the trial.
12. This raises the question as to why I did not disclose to the parties in writing my
involvement in the Hawarden matter.
13. When I asked the Registrar to enquire whether the parties had any concerns about me
hearing the matter because I was dealing in my practice with a matter for Nedbank , I
had not studied the court file and I did not know what the issues were in the matter.
14. I did read all the documents filed in the matter over the weekend before the trial
commenced on the Monday. Prior to the trial starting on the Monday, the parties’
counsel and Mr and M rs Ross’ attorney came to my chambers to introduce themselves.
15. During the discussions in chambers, I mentioned to the parties’ legal representatives
that I was the attorney at ENS that was liaising with the attorneys appointed for ENS
by its insurers in the matter involving Ms Hawarden and ENS. I recorded that I was t he
person that co -ordinated the giving of instructions from ENS to the attorneys appointed
by our insurers to defend ENS against Ms Hawarden’s claim and invited the parties to
raise with me whether this raised any concerns on their part about me adjudicati ng the
matter.
16. The parties had no objection despite this disclosure that I made and Mr and M rs Ross’
counsel went as far as suggesting that they did research about me and they were
comfortable that I will deal with the dispute fairly. They had picked up that I did an article
following the determination of an interlocutory application in this matte r. At the time, I
had no recollection of the article they were referring to, but subsequently established
5
that I had done an article regarding joinder of parties, after the judgment in an
interlocutory application in this matter was delivered. The Ross’ noted in their replying
affidavit in the leave to appeal application that “nothing sinister turned on the fact that
the article with regards to the joinder application, (sic) relation to this matter, was
mentioned as the article does not remotely deal with any of the issues in the trial”10.
17. The disclosure I made in chambers was raised by Nedbank in its answering affidavit in
opposition to the condonation application, even though my disclosure about my
involvement in the Hawarden matter was not raised on behalf of Mr and M rs Ross in
the founding affidavit filed on their behalf in the condonation application.
18. In the replying affidavit in the condonation application, the Ross’ attorney indicated that
he could not recall that there was a discussion in chambers with regard to the
Hawarden matter and my involvement in that matter, but he recalled me mentioning
during the trial that I was involved in the Hawarden matter . I allegedly did not disclose
my involvement in that matter in the discussions in chambers prior to the
commencement of the trial11.
19. It is important for me to highlight that the Ross’ attorney did not expressly deny that I
made the disclosure about my involvement in the Hawarden matter. He simply said
that he could not recall it12.
20. In addition, in the replying affidavit , Mr and Mrs Ross’ attorney took issue with
Nedbank’s attorney recording what had transpired in chambers in the answering
affidavit, on the basis that she was not present in chambers when I disclosed my
involvement in the Hawarden matter13. This for me was an unduly technical approach
and I asked the Ross’ counsel whether I could take into account my recollection of what
had transpired in chambers, which seems to be consistent with the version set out in
Nedbank’s answering affidavit.
21. The Ross’ counsel conceded that I could take into account my recollection of what had
transpired in chambers.
10 0029 -128 at para 10
110029 -136 at paras 55 and 56
12 see footnote 11
13 0029 -128 at para 7
6
22. It is also important to emphasize that the Ross’ counsel confirmed that they were not
relying on actual bias, but only a reasonable apprehension of bias. What is strange in
this matter is that the Ross’ counsel argued that a reasonable apprehension of bias
“did not arise prior, during or after the hearing” . Instead, according to the Ross’ counsel,
the “sole and exclusive basis ” for the reasonable apprehension of bias arose from what
they saw in the answering affidavit in the Hawarden matter in Ms Hawarden’s
application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. They say that this affidavit
only came to their knowledge on the evening of 13 November 2024, but they did not
disclose exactly who had sent my affidavit to them. This was a number of days after
the judgment had already been delivered.
23. Actual bias, or a reasonable apprehension thereof, is typically raised by a party before
the matter is heard, or alternatively, during the course of the proceedings. Be that as it
may, I will consider whether the apprehension of bias raised by the applicants after the
delivery of my judgment was reasonable in this matter.
24. The Ross’ contend that because of the views I expressed in the answering affidavit
regarding indeterminate liability and the risk of vulnerability in the Hawarden matter,
that I had already formed the view that no legal duty can arise against third parties
premised on inter alia the factors of indeterminate liability and vulnerability to risk14
on the facts of this case. They further argue that I could not reasonably and objectively
have been open -minded and open to persuasion when presiding over the matter, and
that I had a vested interest in the principles to be decided in this matter as “this is
inter alia the same principle that ENS implores the Constitutional Court to refuse
Hawarden’s leave to appeal”15.
25. These arguments however, ignore the following:
25.1. The principles relating to indeterminate liability and risk of vulnerability are
well-known and trite in our law. They were not only for the first time dealt with
in the Hawarden matter. The views expressed in the answering affidavit in Mr
Hawarden’s appli cation for leave to appeal were based on the settled legal
position.
14 0029 -10 at para 21
15 0029 -11 at para 23.2
7
25.2. My judgment in this matter could not bind the Constitutional Court. There is
therefore no merit to the suggestion that I had a vested interest in the outcome
of this matter.
25.3. The facts in the Hawarden matter and this matter are not identical, even though
in both matters the court had to determine who should bear the loss after there
had been business email compromise. In the Hawarden matter, a crucial issue
that persuaded the S upreme Court of Appeal to absolve ENS from liability is the
fact that Ms Hawarden was aware of business email compromise and also
aware of the steps to take to guard against business email compromise, which
was making a phone call to verify the bank accoun t details received by email.
This is what Mr Hawarden had previously done , when she received bank
account details from Pam Golding. These facts are not what transpired in this
matter.
26. During argument, the Ross’ counsel conceded that the facts of this case were not
identical to the facts in the Hawarden case.
27. Whether or not a legal duty arises and whether or not there are risks of indeterminate
liability and issues relating to vulnerability to risk is fact dependent. I therefore do not
agree with the Ross’ contention that I did not keep an open mind, I was not open to
persuasion and consequently they had a reasonable apprehension of bias.
28. Counsel for the Ross’ conceded during argument that I found against the majority of
objections raised by Nedbank’s counsel during the trial and, in addition, on a critical
issue for determination in this matter, I found against Nedbank, namely that the
plaintiffs were duped by a fraud into paying someone other than the sellers of the
property or their agents. At the commencement of the trial, an outstanding issue was
also whether there should be a separation of the factual issue as to whether a fraud
had be en committed from the other issues in this matter. I expressed a prima facie
view that such a separation would not be convenient in this matter and thereafter
Nedbank’s counsel elected not to persist with the separation application.
29. In Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd 2011 (4) BCLR 329 (CC), the Constitutional Court noted
the following:
8
29.1. “The test for recusal which this Court has adopted is whether there is a
reasonable apprehension of bias, in the mind of a reasonable litigant in
possession of all the relevant facts, that a judicial officer might not bring an
impartial and unprejudiced mi nd to bear on the resolution of the dispute before
the court”16.
29.2. “The presumption of impartiality is implicit, if not explicit, in the office of a judicial
officer”17.
29.3. “This presumption [of impartiality] can be displaced by cogent evidence that
demonstrates something the judicial officer has done which gives rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias”18.
29.4. “The idea is not to permit a disgruntled litigant to successfully complain of bias
simply because the judicial officer has ruled against him or her. Nor should
litigants be encouraged to believe that, by seeking the disqualification of a
judicial officer, they will have their case heard by another judicial officer who is
likely to decide the case in their favour”19.
29.5. “An application for recusal should not prevail unless it is based on substantial
grounds for contending a reasonable apprehension of bias”20.
29.6. “It is not in the interests of justice to permit a litigant, where that litigant has
knowledge of all the facts upon which recusal is sought, to wait until an adverse
judgment before raising the issue of recusal. Litigation must be brought to finality
as speedily as possible. It is undesirable to cause parties to litigation to live with
the uncertainty that after the outcome of the case is known, there is a possibility
that litigation may be commenced afresh because of a late application for
recusal which c ould and should have been brought earlier. To do otherwise
would undermine the administration of justice”21.
16 at para 29
17 at para 31
18 at para 33
19 at para 35
20 at para 35
21 at para 75
9
30. Bearing in mind the disclosure I made in chambers and the plaintiffs’ counsel
indicating that they were satisfied that I would adjudicate the matter impartially (after
doing background research on me), I do not believe that it would be in the interests
of justice to allow the Ross’ to raise my recusal only after my judgment was delivered.
I also do not believe that the Ross’ have, on the basis of cogent evidence,
demonstrated a justification for them , or a reasonable person believing that a real risk
existe d that the Ross’ would not get an unbiased decision from me.
31. In McKonie v Body Corporate, Laborie [2023] ZAGPPHC 477, the court noted the
judgment in Le Car Auto Traders v Degswa 10138 CC and Six Others (2011/47650)
[2012] ZAGPGHC 286 wherein it was held that “The effect of a recusal can only be in
respect of a prospective or current proceedings. Asking a judge to recuse himself after
judgment is given is silly. Even if he chose to recuse himself, the judgment is not
thereby nullified. A judgment once given sta nds until an appeal sets it aside. The judge
who gave the judgment is functus officio”22.
32. In the matter of Mulaudzi v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (South Africa) Ltd and Others
2017 (6) SA 90 (SCA) , the SCA quoted with approval the judgment in S v Le Grange
& others 2009 (2) SA 434 SCA which held that:
“A cornerstone of our legal system is the impartial adjudication of disputes which come
before our courts and tribunals. What the law requires is not only that a judicial officer
must conduct t he trial open mindedly, impartially and fairly, but that such conduct must
be manifest to all those who are concerned in the trial and its outcome . . . . The right to
a fair trial is now entrenched in our Constitution . . . .The fairness of a trial would clearly
be under threat if a court does not apply the law and assess the facts of the case
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. The r equirement that justice must not
only be done, but also be seen to be done has been recognised as lying at the heart
of the right to a fair trial . . . .
It must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a
fair trial. The integrity of the justice system is anchored in the impartiality of the judiciary.
As a matter of policy it is important that the public should have confi dence in the courts.
22 at para 13
10
Upon this social order and security depend. Fairness and impartiality must be both
subjectively present and objectively demonstrated to the informed and reasonable
observer. Impartiality can be described — perhaps somewhat inexactly — as a state
of mind in which the adjudicator is disinterested in the outcome, and is open to
persuasion by the evidence and submissions. In contrast, bias denotes a state of mind
that is in some way predisposed to a particular result, or that is closed with regard to
particular issues. Bias in the sense of judicial bias has been said to mean a departure
from the standard of even -handed justice which the law requires from those who
occupy judicial office. In common usage bias describes a leaning, inclination, bent or
predisposition towards one side or another or a particular result. In its application to
legal proceedings, it represents a predisposition to decide an issue or cause in a certain
way that does not leave the judicial mind perfectly open to conviction. Bias is a condit ion
or state of mind which sways judgment and renders a judicial officer unable to exercise
his or her functions impartially in a particular case23.
33. The SCA further held in Mulaudzi v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (South Africa) Ltd
and Others that “An apprehension of bias may arise from an association or interest a
judicial officer has with or in one of the litigants or in the outcome of the case. It may
also arise from conduct or utterances by a judicial officer prior to or during
proceedings. There is as well what has been described as 'prejudgment', which
means that a decision may have been made or an opinion formed, most often
unfavourable, about a person or issue before knowing or examining all the facts. In
all these situations, the judicial office r must ordinarily recuse himself or herself”24.
34. Prior to argument being presented in the court a quo , and shortly after the defendant’s
case was closed, I asked both counsel to look at the judgments in the Hawarden matter
and in Commissioner, South African Revenue Service, and Another v ABSA Bank
Limited25.
35. If I was hell -bent on dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim, I would not have alerted counsel to
cases that may have a bearing on the issues that were debated before me in the court
a quo .
23 at para 47
24 at para 48
25 2003 (2) SA 96 (W)
11
36. In SARFU II the Constitutional Court formulated the approach to an application for
recusal as follows:
'It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this application for the recusal
of members of this Court is objective and the onus of establishing it rests upon the
applicant. The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would
on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion
by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the
apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the Judges
to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by
reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabu se
their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions. They must take into
account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged
to recuse themselves. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an imp artial
Judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not
hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of a
litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will
not be impartial’26.
37. As previously set out, the Ross’ counsel indicated that they had no reasonable
apprehension of bias prior, during or immediately after the trial. Instead, they only did
so after judgment had been delivered by me and after being provided with a copy of
the answering affidavit that I had deposed to in Ms Hawarden’s application for leave
to appeal. I do not believe that this gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias
as the contents of the answering affidavit were based on trite legal principles.
38. It was also contended on behalf of the Ross’ that I had a vested interest in the
principles applicable to this matter regarding the question of the imposition of liability
on Nedbank, as this was the same principle that ENS implored the Constitutional
Cour t to take into account to refuse Ms Hawarden’s leave to appeal. This is not
correct. In the Hawarden case, Ms Hawarden was not alleging that there was a duty
on the part of a bank, as was the case in this matter. In addition, the Ross’ counsel
conceded dur ing argument that the facts in the Hawarden matter were not the same
as the facts in this matter.
26 1999 (4) SA 147 at para 48
12
39. The suggestion that I had a vested interest also overlooks the fact that my judgment
could not bind the Constitutional Court and there was, in any event, a finding already
from the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Hawarden matter in favour of ENS. The
paragr aphs quoted from the affidavit that I deposed to in the Constitutional Court are
not novel issues, but are based on trite legal principles.
40. The stance I took in relation to indeterminate liability and vulnerability to risk in the
affidavit were not views plucked from the air but were based on trite legal principles.
41. I therefore find that there is no merit to the Ross’ suggestion that I ought to have
recused myself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.
PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS ON APPEAL
42. It was argued on behalf of the Ross’ that I had erred in finding that Nedbank did not
owe a legal duty to Mr and Ms Ross, and that I should have found that Nedbank owed
the Ross’ a legal duty under the common law when it opened the account of Mr
Nkomane an d its subsequent failure to monitor the account27. These arguments
overlook the fact that the alleged expert that provided evidence on behalf of the Ross’
was never involved in the opening of bank accounts, or the monitoring of bank
accounts when he operated as a banker. He could not testify what a reaso nable
banker would do when accounts were opened and how accounts were monitored.
43. He was not familiar with the systems that the banks use to monitor transactions and
the rules that dictate which transactions the system identifies as suspicious or
concerning.
44. There was therefore no evidence before me to prove that Nedbank acted wrongfully
and negligently when Mr Nkomane’s account was opened or in monitoring transactions
on the account.
27 0029 -25 at para s 47 and 49
13
45. It was also argued on behalf of the Ross’ that I had erred in concluding that the question
of indeterminate liability mitigated against the recognition of indeterminate liability28,
but I disagree. These arguments ignored the Constitutional Court finding in the Country
Cloud judgment.
46. The Ross’ also contended that I erred in finding that they could reasonably have taken
steps to avoid their loss and that I should have found that it would be unreasonable to
expect the Ross’ to be aware of the risk of possible fraud.29 Mr and Mrs Ross were
sophisticated business people and it is not credible to suggest that they were not aware
of probable fraud. It is well -known amongst business professionals who utilize
computer -based communication and payment methods that cybercrime i s prevalent 30.
47. In addition, our courts have regularly found that there is a duty on the payer to verify
the bank account details set out in an invoice or email sent to them, before making the
payment.31 This they could have done by:
47.1. phoning Ms Van Vreden or an accountant at NDBV Inc. to verify the relevant
bank account details;
47.2. checking with their daughter whether the bank account details stipulated for
NDBV Inc. was indeed the correct bank account details;
47.3. using the functionality on internet banking to verify that the bank account details
were the details of NDBV Inc.’s trust account.
48. I therefore found that the plaintiffs were best placed to prevent the risk of payment
into the wrong bank account and they were the architects of their own misfortune32.
49. I do not believe that there is a reasonable probability that another court would come to
a different conclusion on the question of whether the plaintiffs were best placed to
prevent the loss from occurring.
28 0029 -26 at para 50
29 0029 -28 at para 6 and 0029 -29 at para 57
30 Gripper & Co (Pty) Ltd v Ganedhi Trading Enterprises CC 2025 (3) SA 279 (WCC) at para 30.1
31 See Mosselbaai Boeredienste (Pty) Ltd v OKB Motors CC 2024 (6) SA 564 (FB) at para 58
32 0028 -18 at para 62
14
50. It is common cause that no evidence was led on behalf of the Ross’ to prove that they
had suffered a loss. It was argued on their behalf that this was not an issue in dispute
because it was not listed as an issue in dispute according to the parties’ joint practice
note.
51. It was, however, an issue on the pleadings because the plaintiffs alleged in paragraph
19 of the particulars of claim that as a consequences of the defendant’s breach of the
duty of care owed to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount of
R1 663 400 and Ne dbank denied this in paragraph 40 of its plea.33
52. In Dale v Rian Du Plessis Attorney & Conveyancer and Others (38406/2020) [2022]
ZAGPPHC 452, the Pretoria High Court hea rd an application for leave to appeal. The
main ground of appeal raised by the applicant was that the court misdirected itself in
raising a point that was never raised by the parties and not delineated in the parties’
Joint Practice Note for determination. Accordingly, the applicant contended that the
court should have exercised judicial restraint.34
53. The High Court disagreed with this contention and noted that “According to
Quartermark Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mkhwanazi & Another (768/2012) [2013] ZASCA
150, the court is well within its powers to raise an issue even though it had not been
raised by the parties” .35
54. The Ross’ counsel also conceded that even if the issue was not raised in argument by
Nedbank’s counsel, I could raise the issue mero motu .
55. I therefore find that the failure of the plaintiffs to prove their loss was fatal to their claim
and I do not believe that there is a reasonable probability that another court would
arrive at a different conclusion in this regard.
56. I am therefore of the view that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed
with costs.
CONDONATION
33 A10 at para 19 and A21 at para 40
34 at para 3
35 at para 11
15
57. That leaves me to deal with the condonation application. In Grootboom v National
Prosecuting Authority 2014 (2) SA 68 (CC), the Constitutional Court stated that the
granting of condonation is a matter to be determined having regard to the “interests
of justice”. In this regard, reference must be paid to:
57.1. the nature of the relief sought;
57.2. the extent and cause of the delay;
57.3. the effect of the delay on the administration of justice and other litigants;
57.4. the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay;
57.5. the importance of the issue to be raised in the intended appeal; and
57.6. the prospects of success.36
58. The Constitutional Court further stated that: "It is now trite that condonation cannot
be had for the mere asking. A party seeking condonation must make out a case
entitling it to the court's indulgence. It must show sufficient cause. This requires a
party to give a full explanation for the non -compli ance with the rules or court's
directions. Of great significance, the explanation must be reasonable enough to
excuse the default” .37
59. In Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC) , the Constitutional
Court reiterated that: “an applicant for condonation must give a full explanation for the
delay. In addition, the explanation must cover the entire period of delay. And, what is
more, the explanation given must be reasonable.”38
60. My judgment after the trial was delivered on 8 November 2024. The application for
leave to appeal ought to have been delivered by 29 November 2024. It was only
delivered on 3 December 2024.
61. It was alleged on behalf of the Ross’ that on the evening of 13 November 2024, my
judgment in this matter came to the attention of the legal representatives involved in
the ENS v Hawarden matter39. Presumably this was a reference to Ms Hawarden’s
legal representatives.
36 at para 22
37 at para 23
38 at para 22
39 0029 -9 at para 17
17
For the applicant s: Theuns J Jooste instructed by WWB Botha Attorneys
For the respondent: Moroka Phalane instructed by Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Attorneys
Date of Hearing: 24 February 2025
Date of Judgme nt: 20 June 2025