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REASONS
Mfenyana J
[1] The applicants instituted multiple applications under the banner of an
application for reconsideration. The purported reconsideration application
is a sequel to a judgment and order of Du Plessis J handed down on 5 March
2025. Before Du Plessis J, the applicants sought an order reviewing and
setting aside an agreement concluded between the first and second
respondents, in terms of which certain students who are indebted to the
University were permitted to register for the 2025 academic year, but did not
extend to graduates who are seeking to obtain their degree certificates
despite their indebtedness. In that order, Du Plessis J struck the application
from the roll for lack of urgency, and ordered the applicants to pay the costs
on Scale C.
[2] When the matter served before me in the urgent court, the second applicant ,
who is the first respondent’s daughter, and at the centre of the application
was not in attendance , and as such played no part in the proceedings. The
first applicant, not having authority to represent the second respondent,
could only proceed with the application in so far as it relates to him self.
[3] I made an order dismissing the application, ordering the first applicant to
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pay costs on a punitive scale as between attorney and client. I further
ordered that the first applicant was prohibited from bringing any application
on any issue associated with this case number as well as case number:
2022 - 07895 until security for cost s had been provided , in compliance with
the judgment of Fisher J of 15 November 2023. I further directed that a copy
of my order, as well the orders and judgments by Fisher J, Budlender AJ, van
Aswegen AJ, van de Walt AJ, and Meyer AJ be provided to the R egistrar of
this Court to avoid similar applications being instituted by the applicants.
[4] Before delving into further detail , it is pertinent to , at the outset state that
the first applicant transmitted email correspondence for the attention of my
registrar, in which he indicated that he was requesting reasons for the order
I issued. The said email was not accompanied by any notice or a notice
compliant with the provisions of rule 49(1)(b). That notwithstanding, the
first applicant appears to believe the email to my registrar to be such a
request , which it is not. It bears mentioning that in the course of preparing
these reasons, I observed that a notice in terms of rule 49(1)(b) was
uploaded on Caselines by the first applica nt without having been brought to
the attention of the Registrar of this Court for my attention. To the extent
that it may be considered that the first applicant has complied with the
provisions of the applicable rule, these reasons are provided against that
background.
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[5] In the application before me the applicants sought relief on an urgent basis
that:
“ 1) …
2) The judgment delivered by the Honourable Judge Du Plessis on 06
March 2025 be reconsidered, rescinded or recalled.
3) The administrative action of the 1st and 2nd Respondents reflected in their
agreement published in the media statement published on the 1st Respondent’s
website on 21 February 2025 (administrative action), be declared invalid,
unlawful and unconstitutional to the extent that it violated the rights of the of
the 2nd Applicant and her peers to equality and just administrative action.
4) The administrative action alluded at paragraph 3 above be reviewed, set aside
and corrected.
5) The administrative action alluded at paragraph 2 above be corrected to include
students or graduates of the 1st Respondent indebted to the 1st Respondent in
the amount less than R150 000.
6) If granted, the operation of the order to be granted in terms hereof shall not be
suspended by any leave to appeal or appeals.
7) A no costs order issues.”
[6] Although the application is titled “Reconsideration Application”, it is a hybrid
of no less than four applications, none of which is competent or compliant
with the Rules of this Court. As is apparent from the above extract from the
notice of motion, the applicants sought a reconsideration, rescission, a
review, and an application in terms of section 18 of the Superior Courts Act.
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[7] The reconsideration application itself fell short of the requirements of rule
6(12)(c) which permits a party against and in the absence of whom an order
was granted in an urgent application, to set the matter down for
reconsideration. The order for which r econsideration was sought by the
applicants was instituted by the applicants themselves, and made in the
presence of the applicants, particularly the first applicant. As already stated,
in that application, Du Plessis J struck the application from the roll .
[8] It is common cause that the application sought to be reconsidered was
opposed by the respondents. It is therefore not a course open to the
applicants to seek a reconsideration of an application brought by them
under rule 6(12(c) . Moreover, the merits of the application are yet to be
heard, and as the order of Du Plessis J intimates, in due course. The
application is no more than a re -enrolment of the same application , in the
urgent court, in circumstances where the application was struck off the roll
for lack of urgency. As such, rule 6(12)(c) does not find application.
[9] Another curious feature of the self -styled ‘reconsideration application ’ is
that it incorporates in it a rescission application. No grounds are set out for
the rescission of the judgment of Du Plessis J, which as I have already
stated, st ruck the application off the roll with costs. The application for
rescission is clearly a non -starter.
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[10] Similarly, the application for the review of the decision of the first and
second respondents is doomed to fail. Not only was the purported
application before Du Plessis J, it also does not even pass the starting
blocks for a review application. Naturally, the application in terms of section
18 of the Superior Courts Act that the order reviewing and setting aside the
decision of the respondents, if granted, should not be suspended by any
appeal, being dependent on the success of the review application by a ny
appeal , should also fail.
[11] In its answering affidavit, the first respondent contends that the application
already served before Du Plessis J, and as such the application constitutes
an appeal against the order of Du Plessis J, and importantly that the
application is fatally defectiv e.
[12] The fact of the matter is that Du Plessis J, not satisfied that the applicants
had satisfied the requirements for urgency, struck the matter from the roll.
The learned judge did not deal with the merits of the application. That being
so, the applicants ar e not entitled to re -enrol the matter in the urgent court.
The entire application is therefore nothing short of gross abuse of the
process of court.
[13] As in previous applications reflected in the judgments of Du Plessis and
Fisher JJ, the second applicant did not independently advance her case
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which for all intents and purposes, is steered by the first applicant. The
application itself consists of 254 volumes, running into thousands of pages,
and no less than seven judgments, for materially the same issues, and a
relentless effort by the applicants to encumber the record of this court, and
disregard any and all judgments issued against them .
[14] Moreover, Meyer AJ and Budlender AJ, in dismissing the application, as far
back as J une and J uly 2023, found the application to be without merit and
not urgent. It defies any logic why the applicants insist in enrolling the
application in the urgent court. I reiterate that despite the various
reincarnations of the application that was initially launched at the start of
this litigation, the essence remains the same.
[15] The incessant flouting of the Rules of this Court by the applicants is not
without consequences; the fact that the applicants, particularly the first
applicant, are unrepresented litigants notwithstanding. While the first
applicant may not necessarily be au fait with the Rules and procedure, and
only ha s a superficial understanding thereof, he rejected a suggestion by
this Court to obtain legal representation. The upshot of it is that having
chosen how to conduct his litigation, the first applicant should face the
consequences of his election.
[16] It thus appears reasonable that the respondents should not be put out of
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pocket by defending these ceaseless applications from the applicants,
seemingly without an appreciation of the consequences thereof. These
costs should be borne by the first applicant . As to the scale of costs, it is
evident that not only is the application not urgent, but there is also no basis
for it, or any of the applications encapsulated under the guise of a
reconsideration application. If regard is had to the course of litigation
embarked on by the applicants, all of which relate to virtually the same
underlying cause, it is not difficult to see that the present application is an
abuse of the process of Court . The fact that the applicants were ordered to
tender security for costs was in appreciation of this fact, and only serves to
exacerbate the applicant’s situation.
[17] It makes no difference that the first applicant avers that Fisher J’s order
directing them to p rovide security for costs is the subject of an appeal. The
fact of the matter is that the applicants cannot have both their cake and
their ice cream. If the applicants opt to pursue the appeal, they should bear
the consequences of that choice . If not, and if they choose, as it appears
to be the case, to proceed with the litigation, Fisher J’s order must be
complied with before further costs are expended. Having said that, I decline
to venture into the appealability or not of that order.
[18] There is simply no justification for the ongoing use of judicial resources to
entertain vexatious and meritless applications from the applicants. What is