Ramapuputla Attorneys Incorporated v South African Legal Practice Council National Office and Others (Leave to Appeal) (083524/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 576 (29 May 2025)

30 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Appeal — Application for leave to appeal — Grounds for leave to appeal — Applicant sought to review findings of the Gauteng Provincial Office's disciplinary committee, claiming procedural unfairness and bias — Court found that the proceedings did not constitute administrative action as they did not adversely affect the applicant's rights and had no external legal effect — Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs, as no reasonable prospects of success were established.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


Ramaputla Attorneys Incorporated v The South African Legal Practice Council: National Office and Others

Case Number: 083524-2023

Date: 3 March 2025


Reportability


This case is not reportable as it does not meet the criteria set out in the relevant legal framework. The judgment addresses an application for leave to appeal, which is significant in clarifying the standards for such applications under the Superior Courts Act. The case highlights the court's interpretation of what constitutes administrative action and the implications for legal practitioners facing disciplinary inquiries.


Cases Cited



  • Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and 18 Others 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC)

  • Van Heerden v Cornwnght & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T)


Legislation Cited



  • Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013


Rules of Court Cited



  • LPC Rule 54.12


HEADNOTE


Summary


The High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria, dismissed an application for leave to appeal filed by Ramaputla Attorneys against a previous judgment. The court found that the applicant's claims regarding procedural unfairness and bias in disciplinary committee proceedings were unfounded. The court emphasized that the findings of the disciplinary committee did not constitute administrative action as defined by law.


Key Issues


The key legal issues addressed in this case include the interpretation of administrative action, the standards for granting leave to appeal under the Superior Courts Act, and the procedural fairness of disciplinary proceedings within the legal profession.


Held


The court held that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed due to a lack of reasonable prospects of success. The findings of the disciplinary committee were not deemed to adversely affect the applicant's rights, and thus, the application was not reviewable under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).


THE FACTS


The applicant, Ramaputla Attorneys, sought to appeal a judgment that dismissed their application to review the findings of a disciplinary committee. The applicant argued that the committee's proceedings were procedurally unfair and biased. However, the court clarified that the committee's findings did not constitute a disciplinary inquiry and had no external legal effect, as they merely required the applicant to account for received funds as mandated by law.


THE ISSUES


The primary legal questions the court had to decide included whether the findings of the disciplinary committee constituted administrative action and whether the applicant had reasonable prospects of success in their appeal. The court also considered the implications of the Superior Courts Act regarding the threshold for granting leave to appeal.


ANALYSIS


In its analysis, the court emphasized that the applicant fundamentally misconstrued the nature of the disciplinary committee's findings. The court reiterated that the findings did not adversely affect the applicant's rights and therefore did not meet the criteria for administrative action. The court also noted that the threshold for granting leave to appeal had been raised under the Superior Courts Act, requiring a higher degree of certainty that another court would reach a different conclusion.


REMEDY


The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs, indicating that the applicant had not met the necessary criteria for such an appeal. The decision underscored the importance of adhering to procedural standards in disciplinary matters within the legal profession.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The case established key legal principles regarding the definition of administrative action and the standards for granting leave to appeal. It clarified that not all findings by a disciplinary committee constitute administrative action, particularly when they do not adversely affect the rights of the parties involved. Additionally, the case highlighted the increased burden on applicants seeking leave to appeal under the Superior Courts Act.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
Case Number: 083524-2023
(1) REPORTABLE : NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES· NO
(3) REVISED .
-oC\ \s:\~oa. s-
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
RAMAPUPUTLA ATTORNEYS IN CORPORA TED Applicant
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
and
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL :
NATIONAL OFFICE First Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL:
PROVINCIAL OFFICE Second Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE GAUTENG
PROVINCIAL OFFICE
(SITTING ON 15 JUNE 2023) Third Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
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RAMA ANNANDALE & MUNONDE ATTORNE YS Fourth Respondent
NOMBULELO MBULAWA (in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
Fifth Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
APPLICA TION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
AC SASSON , J
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order
granted by this court on 3 March 2025.
[2] The grounds for leave to appeal are listed In no less than 8 pages. I do not
intend restating the grounds save to point out that I have had regard to all the grounds.
I also had regard to the extensive heads of arguments filed on behalf of the applicant
and those filed on behalf of the respondents .
[3] In the judgment , the court summarized its f1nd1ngs as follows.
"[17] To recap: The applicant instituted an application to review and set aside the
findings and reasons of the second respondent. It is further claimed that the
"disciplinary committee proceedings " were procedurally unfair and biased It also
seeks an order that the "disciplinary committee proceedings were adm1nistrat1vcly
flawed and was not independent ". There is no merit in this argument , as already
pointed out: This was not a disciplinary inquiry, and no decision was taken that
could be said to affect the applicant adversely . Moreover , the findings of the report
have no external effect. The report does not even recommend disciplinary action
against the applicant As already pointed out the report merely calls upon the
applicant to account for the monies received as it Is obliged by law to do so In
terms of LPC Rule 54.12. Lastly, this finding does not amount to adm1nistrat1ve
action because it is not a decision that "adversely affects the rights of any person
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and which has direct external legal effect." The LPC also confirms that a
disciplinary committee has not yet been convened in the matter. Accordingly , this
report 1s not reviewable under the PAJA."
[4] The applicant fundamentally misconstrues the judgment. This court found that
the conduct sought to be reviewed do not constitute admInistratIve action for the
reasons set out in the judgment and therefore that the application was dismissed for
that reason.
The test for leave to appeal
[5] Section 17 of the Superior Court's Act1 regulates an application for leave to
appeal from a decision of the High Court. It provides as follows; -
"17. Leave to appeal -
(1) Leave to appeal may only be given whoro tho Judge o, Judges conc1.>111ud u1~
of the opinion that -
(a) (i) the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success. or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter under consIderatIon ;
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16(2)(a)
(a), and
(c) Where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in
the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues
between the parties."
[6] Prior to the Superior Court's Act, the test In an application for leave to appeal
was whether there were reasonable prospects that another court might come to a
different conclusion . Section 17(1) has raised the bar in this regard, and as
Bertelsmann J, held in Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and 18 Others2: -
"It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment
of a High Court has been raised in the new Act The former test whether
leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another
1 Act 1 o of 2013.
2 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para 6 (3 November 2014).
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court might come to a different conclusion , see Van Heerden v Cornwnght
& Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would'' in the
new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ
from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against."
(7] I am not persuaded that there are reasonable prospects that another court
might come to a different conclusion in respect of the order granted by this court. Cost
should follow the result. Therefore , I make the following order:
'The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.'
JUDGE A.C. SASSON
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Delivered: The reasons for the order was prepared and authored by the Judge whose
name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter
on Caselines . The date of the reasons is deemed to be ~May 2025 . .......lllliiii
A°\ ~ ~
Appearances:
For the applicant: Mr Ramaputla of Ramaputla Attorneys
For the first, second and third respondents . Adv Moolman
Instructed by: Damons Magardie Richardson Attorneys
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