REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
Case Number: 083524-2023
(1) REPORTABLE : NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES· NO
(3) REVISED .
-oC\ \s:\~oa. s-
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
RAMAPUPUTLA ATTORNEYS IN CORPORA TED Applicant
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
and
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL :
NATIONAL OFFICE First Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL:
PROVINCIAL OFFICE Second Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE GAUTENG
PROVINCIAL OFFICE
(SITTING ON 15 JUNE 2023) Third Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
1
RAMA ANNANDALE & MUNONDE ATTORNE YS Fourth Respondent
NOMBULELO MBULAWA (in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
Fifth Respondent
(in the Application for Leave to Appeal)
APPLICA TION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
AC SASSON , J
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order
granted by this court on 3 March 2025.
[2] The grounds for leave to appeal are listed In no less than 8 pages. I do not
intend restating the grounds save to point out that I have had regard to all the grounds.
I also had regard to the extensive heads of arguments filed on behalf of the applicant
and those filed on behalf of the respondents .
[3] In the judgment , the court summarized its f1nd1ngs as follows.
"[17] To recap: The applicant instituted an application to review and set aside the
findings and reasons of the second respondent. It is further claimed that the
"disciplinary committee proceedings " were procedurally unfair and biased It also
seeks an order that the "disciplinary committee proceedings were adm1nistrat1vcly
flawed and was not independent ". There is no merit in this argument , as already
pointed out: This was not a disciplinary inquiry, and no decision was taken that
could be said to affect the applicant adversely . Moreover , the findings of the report
have no external effect. The report does not even recommend disciplinary action
against the applicant As already pointed out the report merely calls upon the
applicant to account for the monies received as it Is obliged by law to do so In
terms of LPC Rule 54.12. Lastly, this finding does not amount to adm1nistrat1ve
action because it is not a decision that "adversely affects the rights of any person
2
and which has direct external legal effect." The LPC also confirms that a
disciplinary committee has not yet been convened in the matter. Accordingly , this
report 1s not reviewable under the PAJA."
[4] The applicant fundamentally misconstrues the judgment. This court found that
the conduct sought to be reviewed do not constitute admInistratIve action for the
reasons set out in the judgment and therefore that the application was dismissed for
that reason.
The test for leave to appeal
[5] Section 17 of the Superior Court's Act1 regulates an application for leave to
appeal from a decision of the High Court. It provides as follows; -
"17. Leave to appeal -
(1) Leave to appeal may only be given whoro tho Judge o, Judges conc1.>111ud u1~
of the opinion that -
(a) (i) the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success. or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter under consIderatIon ;
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16(2)(a)
(a), and
(c) Where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in
the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues
between the parties."
[6] Prior to the Superior Court's Act, the test In an application for leave to appeal
was whether there were reasonable prospects that another court might come to a
different conclusion . Section 17(1) has raised the bar in this regard, and as
Bertelsmann J, held in Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and 18 Others2: -
"It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment
of a High Court has been raised in the new Act The former test whether
leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another
1 Act 1 o of 2013.
2 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at para 6 (3 November 2014).
3
court might come to a different conclusion , see Van Heerden v Cornwnght
& Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would'' in the
new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ
from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against."
(7] I am not persuaded that there are reasonable prospects that another court
might come to a different conclusion in respect of the order granted by this court. Cost
should follow the result. Therefore , I make the following order:
'The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.'
JUDGE A.C. SASSON
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Delivered: The reasons for the order was prepared and authored by the Judge whose
name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter
on Caselines . The date of the reasons is deemed to be ~May 2025 . .......lllliiii
A°\ ~ ~
Appearances:
For the applicant: Mr Ramaputla of Ramaputla Attorneys
For the first, second and third respondents . Adv Moolman
Instructed by: Damons Magardie Richardson Attorneys
4