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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

Case Number: 46591/2021
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO

In the matter between:
LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK First Applicant
(A Voluntary Association without Gain)
REYNO DAWID DE BEER N.O.
(nomine officio as President of Liberty Fighters Network) Second Applicant
AND
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED First Respondent
LAZARUS SHOMGWE Second Respondent

NONTSIKELELO FELICIA MVENYA Third Respondent
[Application for Leave to Intervene]

In Re:
NONTSIKELELO FELICIA MVENYA Appellant

2
AND

STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED First Respondent

LAZARUS SHOMGWE Second Respondent
[Application for Leave to Appeal]


JUDGMENT

Van Aswegen AJ

INTRODUCTION:
[1] On or about 12 June 2024, the third respondent instituted an application for
leave to appeal the order for summary judgment granted on 7 May 2024 ("Application for Leave to Appeal"). The relief granted was in the following terms:
[1.1] Payment of the sum of R817 461.80, together with Interest thereon at
the rate of 11.140% per annum calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from 20 September 2017 to date of final payment, both dates inclusive;
[1.2] The immovable property is declared specially executable for the
said sum, interest and costs: Erf 3[ …] R[…] Township Registration Division
I.R., Province of Gauteng, measuring 495 (four hundred and ninety -five)
square metres subject to the conditions therein contained also known as: 1[…] H[…] Street, R […], Gauteng. ("Immovable Property");
[1.3] The Registrar is authorized and directed to issue a writ of execution
against the hypothecated property above in accordance with the terms of this
judgment; and
[1.4] A reserve price is set for the sale of the property in an amount of R950
000.00.

3
[2] On or about 12 June 2024, the Liberty Fighters Network (the "first applicant”)
and Mr Ryno De Beer ("the second applicant") s ought leave to intervene in the
Application for Leave to Appeal ("Intervention Application").

[3] In terms of the notice of motion to the Intervention Application, the first and
second applicants seek the following relief, inter alia :
[3.1] to be admitted as " intervening parties in all proceedings under case
number 46591/2021, in terms of Rule 12 of the Uniform Rules of Cour t"; and
[3.2] to be confirmed to act " in the interests of Ms Mvenya, as their member,
interests of the occupiers of the immovable property, which forms part of the
court proceedings under case number 46591/2021, and in the interests of the
public in accordance with section 38 (c) - (e) of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996."

[4] The intervention is sought in the interests of the third respondent as their
member, the occupants (the third respondent’s children who are all majors) of the
immovable property and the public at large.

[5] The applicants allege that the third respondent ’s rights have been infringed –
amongst other, her right to access to court , her right to adequate housing, dignity
and equality. In this regard reliance is placed upon section 38 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 which reads:
“Enforcement of rights

38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court
are—

(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
4

[6] The first applicant is described in its Founding Affidavit in the following terms:
“LFN is a well -known voluntary association, referred to as a common law
Universitas, 
 specialising in advancing social justice on the grassroots level,
operating as a non- 
governmental organisation with perpetual succession and
without an eye on gain, 
existence separate from its members and ability to
own property in its own name with a 
common cause amongst its members
clearly identified in its Constitution and both LFN and 
 I (second applicant)
have been credited in local, national and even international media via
newspapers, radio and television .”
“LFN has been, and continues to be, involved in various legal proceedings
against the Bank on behalf of its members, wherein it has developed a
comprehensive body of defences - such as those elaborated infra — against
the questionable practices allegedly employed by the Bank. It is on this basis,
and this basis alone, that the Applicants contend they hold a direct and
substantial interest in the present matter, not only on behalf of our member,
but also in the public i nterest at large. ”

[7] The applicants ’ direct and substantial interest in this matter is accordingly solely
reliant upon, as summarized in the second applicant’s own words:
[7.1] their involvement in litigation against the banks and
[7.2] the development of complete defences against the questionable
practices of banks.
[8] Addressing their interests in this matter the applicants voiced the following:
“The Applicants, through this intervention, seek to correct the record and bring
clarity to the issue, specifically that securing truly 
 impartial, independent,
affordable, and competent legal representation capable of 
 effectively
defending a consumer against a banking institution's claim is far from the 

straightforward process that the legal profession often portrays ” (my
underlining)
[9] The reason for the intervention is therefore to:
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[9.1] correct the record, bring clarity to the issue;
[9.2] to question the availability of legal representation.

[10] The greater part of the second applicant ’s argument concerned legal
representation in South Africa and indicated that the interest which he seeks to
protect is legal representation. The second applicant indicated that the Supreme
Court of Appeal was incorrect in its decision in Manong v Minister of Public Works (518/2008) [2009] ZASCA 110 (23 September 2009) pertaining to its findings on the
right to legal representation. The appeal court held as follows :

“It would thus be impermissible for a non- professional representative to take
any step in the proceedings, including the signing of pleadings, notices or
heads of argument (as occurred here), without the requisite leave of the court
concerned first having been sought and obtained.

[15] This approach, in my view, is consistent with the right enshrined in s 34 of the Constitution, which provides that everyone has the right to have any
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public
hearing before a court, or, where appropriate, another independent and
impartial tribunal or forum. Emphasising that the courts have a duty to protect
bona fide litigants and the importance of untrammelled access to the courts,
the right enshrined in s ection 34 has variously been described by the
Constitutional Court as ‘fundamental to a democratic society that cherishes
the rule of law’, ‘of cardinal importance that requires active protection’,
foundational for ‘the stability of an orderly society’, and a right that ‘ensures
the peaceful, regulated and institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes,
without resorting to self -help’ and serves as ‘a bulwark against vigilantism,
and the chaos and anarchy which it causes ’
1


1 Beinash and another v Ernst & Young and others 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) para 17; Moise v
Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council: Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development Intervening (Women's Legal Centre as Amicus Curiae ) 2001 (4) SA 491 (CC)
para 23; Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) para
22; First National Bank of South Arica Ltd v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa and
others; Sheard v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa and another 2000 (3) SA 626
(CC) para 6.
6
[11] The rule that a company cannot conduct a case in this court except by the
appearance of counsel on its behalf was laid down in Yates Investments (Pty) Ltd v
Commissioner for Inland Revenue.2 This second applicant argued that the rule is
outdated as it dates back to the seventeenth century .

[12] The Supreme Court of A ppeal in the Manong case held the following:

“It has been thought, somewhat cynically I dare say, that the rule is based on
some misguided attempt to preserve an unjustified monopoly for legal
practitioners. This is not the case. Litigation is based on the adversary
system . In determining a dispute, a court is dependent on the way in which
the case is presented. Factual admissions or denials are made from time to time and a course of conduct has to be chosen by the litigants. When a corporation instructs an attorney who in turn instructs an advocate the law recognises their authority to bind the corporation for the purpose of litigation. In those circumstances a court need not concern itself about authority. Litigation will become very difficult indeed if a court had to be concerned at every step of proceedings as to the authority of the person conducting the
litigation to make binding decisions…

Thus, apart from the fact that there are usually rules of court that preclude a
company from being represented by anyone other than a qualified
practitioner, a review of the cases in England, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand
and Canada shows that the courts, for pragmatic and policy reasons, have set
their face against unqualified persons presenting and conducting cases
unless they are doing so on their own behalf. So too in Zimbabwe3 and South
Africa …

[7] That a person in the position of Mr Manong has no right, such as counsel
and in certain circumstances attorneys have, to address this court on behalf of
the appellant is thus well settled. ” (my underlining)

2 1956 (1) SA 364A
3 Lees Import and Export (PVT) Ltd v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1119
(ZSC).
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[13] The second applicant furthermore argued that the Constitutional Court allows
informal legal representation by a natural unqualified person. It is however abundantly clear from Part 4 of the Constitutional Court Rules of 2003 relating to the
representation of parties that, unless otherwise directed by the Chief Justice, only
persons who are entitled to appear in the High Courts may appear on behalf of any
party to proceedings of the Court. It will accordingly be advocates and attorneys with
right of appearance.
[14] It was abundantly clear from the argument by the second applicant that he not
only harbours serious criticism towards the banks but that he believes that they
monopolize South African courts. His plight in court was for a unified court system and for natural people like himself to be allowed to legally represent litigants at
grassroot level. These services would be render ed for free and without the people
describing themselves as advocates or attorneys. The second applicant attempts to circumvents section 33 (1) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 by stating that he
renders legal services not in expectation of any fee, commission, gain or reward and that the Act only regulates the legal profession. He seeks that the legal profession
“open up”.

[15] It is prudent to emphasize that the third respondent never raised the issue of
legal representation during the summary judgment proceedings. To the contrary
despite enquiring about whether she sought legal representation she persisted to
conduct the matter on her own.

[16] After dismissing the application to allow the second applicant to legally
represent the third respondent , the court once again gave the third respondent an
opportunity to obtain legal assistance, which she refused.

[17] The crux of this matter is therefore not legal representation. It was never an
issue during summary judgment stage or in this matter . The first respondent’s cause
of action specifically relates to the breach of a loan agreement secured by a
mortgage bond. The parties to the said agreement were the first, second and third
respondents. An order was granted in the summary judgment proceedings in terms
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of rule 46A, allowing for the executability of the immovable property in the event of
failure to reinstate the agreement by paying the arrears.

[18] What is alarming and of the utmost concern to me is that the second applicant
explicitly informs the court that the applicants need to become involved in this matter
and that if he did not challenge the judgment disallowing him from legally
representing laypersons that he would be “ blocked”. He acknowledged that both
applicants have their own respective agendas and that the aforesaid judgment will
affect their work. The first respondent had “ pulled” the applicants into the litigation
and this was the applicants only opportunity to set the record straight. Notably
nothing is said about the third respondent’s interests. The silence speaks for itself.

[19] I had questioned the second respondent to ascertain whether it was his own
or the third respondent’s best interest that he had at heart. The second applicant was
evasive and left the court with no answer. I got the distinct and real impression that
the said applicant’s motives for intervening were to progress the argument as to legal
representation in South Africa by unqualified natural persons rather than pursuing
the third respondent’s case and acting in her best interest. This raises serious
concerns as there is no accountability.

[20] The second applicant had alleged that the third respondent had difficulty in
obtaining legal representation. That notwithstanding “ diligent and repeated attempts ”,
the third respondent has been unable to obtain 
the services of a competent,
affordable, and independent legal practitioner to assist her in defending the matter.
The silence raised by the evidence in this matter, on the attempts made by the third
respondent to procure legal representation and the inability to obtain same declares
the direct opposite stance. To the contrary , the third respondent on numerous
occasions voiced that she wanted to conduct her own matter .
[21] Despite the judgment handed down denying the second applicant the right to
legally represent the third respondent and the court’s explanation thereof to her , the
third respondent persisted that she would conduct her own defence with the help of
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the second applicant. The third respondent showed a total disinterest in obtaining
legal representation as she intended to rely on the second applicant.

[22] The second applicant wants to make out a case for the third respondent’s lack
of competent and impartial legal representation and that it affected her right to a fair
hearing entrenched in our Constitution. The record of this case however reflects the
absence of any complaint by the third respondent in respect of legal representation.
The Third Respondent indicated that she would proceed on her own placing reliance
on her documentation in this matter and the assistance of the second applicant.

[23] The applicants want to create a platform and establish an audience where
they can raise their own contentions about legal representation, that the legal
representatives in South Africa are ethically or contractually predisposed to protect
the banks ’ interests affecting access to justice and to deal with constitutional
challenges. The third respondent’s legal interests are left on the wayside and
become insignificant in the applicant’ greater pursuit of their own incentives. The third respondent as litigant is sacrificed on the altar by parties who have their own
hidden agendas .
[24] The applicants also only in reply , raise four points in limine. They are the
following:
[24.1] the first respondent filed one answering affidavit for two distinct
applications;
[24.1.1] the first respondent argued that the single affidavit follows the
fact that the intervention and recusal applications were to be heard on the same day. I find that acceptable.
[24.2] the invalidity of the representation judgment ;
[24.2.1] Annexure RA1 was not forwarded to me as alleged by the
second applicant as my email address is absent - it was to the registrar.
[24.2.2] On 4 April 2025 at 08:07 the second applicant sent an e-mail to
me and seven others stating:
“Kindly be advised that our member confirms her understanding that Justice
Van Aswegen has been duly informed of her inability to personally attend the
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MS Teams hearing at 12h00, and that the Court will proceed to consider the
incidental application on an unopposed basis .”
[24.2.3] The application had to be dealt with and considered on an
unopposed basis and this was done.
[24.3] the first respondent’s withdrawal of the rule 28 objections
[24.3.1] the first respondent confirmed that they withdrew the objection
and that it was fully opposed.
[24.4] the court provided substantive indications on the court’s approach to
the intervention and recusal applications.
[24.4.1] it is necessary for a court to regulate its own procedure to deal
with matters in the interest of justice and as expeditiously as possible. It is a matter of practicality.

[25] The second applicant indicated that if leave to intervene is granted he would
solely rely on the v ersion of the third respondent and that he would confine the
arguments to what has been placed before cour t.
4 He would rely on his abilities and
capabilities to do so.

EVALUATION OF INTERVENTION APPLICATION:

[26] In assessing the applicants’ intervention application I am mindful that it is
brought under rule 12 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The said rule specifically states:
“12. Intervention of persons as plaintiffs or defendants Any person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as a defendant
in any action may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff or a defendant . The court may
upon such application make such order, including any order as to costs, and give such directions as to further procedure in the action as to it may seem meet. ” (my underlining)
[27] It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid rule that the applicant for leave to
intervene must be a person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as a

4 Par 31 at 019- 23
11
defendant . The test to be applied in intervention application is whether the person
could have been joined as a party . Joinder can further take place as a result of :
i) convenience or
ii) on the basis that the party whose joind er is in question has a direct and
substantial interest in the subject matter of the proceedings .

[28] A person is entitled to intervene in three sets of circumstances :
[28.1] where the requirements of uniform rules 10(1) and 10(3) are satisfied ,
in that determination of the intervening part y’s matter or dispute depends
upon substantially the same question of law or fact as arises in the
proceedings in which leave is sought to intervene.5
[28.1.1] Several defendants may be sued in one action either jointly,
jointly and severally, separately or in the alternative, whenever the question
arising between them or any of them and the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
depends upon the determination of substantially the same question of law or
fact which, if such defendants were sued separately, would arise in each separate action.
[28.2] where wider considerations of convenience favour intervention;
6
[28.3] when the intervening party has a direct and substantial interest ( legal
interest ) in the proceedings .7 (A legal interest is an interest in the right which
is the subject matter of the litigation)8
[29] Rule 10(1) contemplates that persons joined in an action should each have a
claim under the right to relief of the person proposing to join ‘depends upon the
determination of substantially the same questions of law of fact which, if separate actions were instituted, would arise on each action. ’
9
[30] What constitutes determination of substantially the same questions of law of
fact?


5 1993(2) SA 737 (Nm) at 741A -F.
6 Under the common law several defendants may be joined on the grounds of convenience,
equality, the saving of costs and the avoidance of multiplicity of actions .
7 1953(2) SA 151 (O) at 169H
8 2007 (5) SA 391 (SCA) para 9
9 2004 (1) SA 618D at 622C -F.
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[31] In United Watch and Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd v Disa Hotels Ltd,10 Corbett J
highlighted the fact that the test of a direct and substantial interest in the subject -
matter of the action had been regarded as the decisive criterion in applications for
intervention.

[32] In the matter SA Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims
Commissioner11 it was held as follows:

"[10] If the applicant shows that it has some right which is affected by the
order issued, permission to intervene must be granted. For it is a basic
principle of our law that no order should be granted against a party without
affording such party a predecision hearing. This is so fundamental that an
order is generally taken to be binding only on parties to the litigation.
[11] Once the applicant for intervention shows a direct and substantial
interest in the subject matter of the case, the court ought to grant leave to
intervene. ”

[33] In Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental
Association and Another (Mukhwevho Intervening)
12, an application was made by
one of the Alexandra flood victims — who was offered temporary accommodation at
Leeuwkop — for leave to intervene as a party. Chaskalson P noted the applicant's
'direct and substantial interest in the proceedings' — the test articulated in the
caselaw surrounding Rule 12 of the Uniform Rules of Court — and determined that i t
entitled him to be joined in his own right to the proceedings .

[34] The applicants accordingly had to show the following:

[34.1] that they had an interest in the subject -matter of the proceedings and
[34.2] their rights may be prejudiced by not intervening.


10 1972 (4) SA 409 (C)
11 2017(5) SA 1 (CC) at paras 10 & 11
12 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC), 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC)
13
[35] The applicants allege that their legal interest arises from their involvement with
litigation against banks and that they “ have developed a comprehensive body of
defences against the questionable practices employed by the Bank .”13

[36] The applicants c an not join as parties to the action because they are not part
of the loan agreement secured by a mortgage bond. The breach concerns a private
law right. They can accordingly not have an interest in the subject matter of the
litigation.
[37] The prejudice which the applicants want to rely upon also does not stem from
the breach of the loan agreement, but flows from the judgment refusing the second applicant from legally representing the third respondent. I accordingly find that the
applicants failed to establish any prejudice flowing from the subject matter.
[38] The applicants’ intervention application is premised upon the third respondent 's
alleged lack of access to legal representation and the right to a fair hearing, as
contemplated in section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

[39] In Lawyers for Human Rights, Yacoob J noted that " the issue is always
whether a person or organisation acts genuinely in the public interest ".

"A distinction must however be made between the subjective position of the
person or organisation claiming to act in the public interest on the one hand,
and whether it is, objectively speaking, in the public interest for the particular
proceedings to be brought. It is ordinarily not in the public interest for
proceedings to be brought in the abstract. But this is not an invariable
principle. There may be circumstances in which it will be in the public interest
to bring proceedings even if there is no live case."

[40] The real concern which the applicants want to address is the reform of legal
representation relating to indigent people. The subject matter underlying this matter
and its evidence do not allow for the legal representation challenge. The Legal Aid

13 019-17 par 12
14
South Africa Act , Act 39 of 2014 is applicable when an issue is identified pertaining
to legal representation and any complaints can be addressed to the Legal Aid South
Africa. If the applicants are unsatisfied with section 25 of the Legal Practice Act 28 of
2014 defining the right of appearance of legal practitioners and candidate attorneys,
they can challenge it in an appropriate forum.
[41] The applicants further raise the effect of the summary judgment order on the
third respondent’s right to adequate housing. The requirements of rule 46A were
considered during judgment stage and a reserve price was set at R950 000.00 to
protect the third respondent ’s interest.
[42] Throughout the intervention application the applicants rely upon various
constitutional rights and their infringement. These infringements were never raised
and canvassed at summary judgment stage. If the third respondent had raised any
constitutional issues rule16A is more applicable.

[43] Rule 16A reads:

“16A. Submissions by an amicus curiae

(1)(a) Any person raising a constitutional issue in an application or action
shall give notice thereof to the registrar at the time of filing the relevant
affidavit or pleading.
(b) Such notice shall contain a clear and succinct description of the
constitutional issue concerned.
(c) The registrar shall, upon receipt of such notice, forthwith place it on a
notice board designated for that purpose.
(d) The notice shall be stamped by the registrar to indicate the date upon
which it was placed on the notice board and shall remain on the notice board
for a period of 20 days.

(2) Subject to the provisions of national legislation enacted in accordance with
section 171 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108
of 1996), and these Rules, any interested party in a constitutional issue raised
15
in proceedings before a court may, with the written consent of all the parties to
the proceedings, given not later than 20 days after the filing of the affidavit or pleading in which the constitutional issue was first raised, be admitted therein
as amicus curiae upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon in
writing by the parties. ”

[44] In the absence of the rule 16A notice one is left to question the genuineness
of the intervention application.
[45] Rule 16A was introduced to remedy the void in the law with an
acknowledgement that “ constitutional cases often have consequences which go far
beyond the parties concerned. ”
14 The role to be played by amici as envisioned in the
Uniform Rules is closely linked to the protection of the constitutional values and
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. This is shown in Rule 16A (2) which describes
an amicus as an “ interested party in a constitutional issue raised in proceedings ”.
The Court in Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court District of
Krugersdorp and Others CCT 69/12 held that Rule 16A specifically intended to assist
amici in their role of promoting and protecting the public interest .

[45.1] The difference between an intervening party and amicus curiae is that
the intervening party joins as a party to the proceedings whilst the amicus
curiae does not become a party.

[46] It is abundantly clear that the applicants raised several constitutional issues
and want a court to deal with the common law in respect of legal representation by
natural unqualified persons and what the second applicant labels as wrong
judgments by the Appeal court. A R ule16A notice would have been more appropriate
than an intervention application. These constitutional issues were not raised in the
summary judgment proceedings and did not form part of the factual matrix which the
court had to consider. The issues raised by the applicants solely serve the
applicants’ causes and not those of the third respondent. The only party who is

14 Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court District of
Krugersdorp and Others CCT 69/12 [2012] ZACC 25
16
prejudiced is the third respondent whilst the applicants cannot be held accountable
as they are not regulated by any specific statutory or other regulatory body.

[47] The first respondent’s counsel reasoned, and I agree with counsel, that the
second and third respondents and the occupants of the immovable property are not
vulnerable members of society. The third respondent is an assistant -nurse whilst the
occupants ’ economic status was not advanced ( the occupants are 27 and 31 years
old respectively).

[48] The applicants ’ arguments pertaining to reform in respect of legal
representation for vulnerable members of society are not applicable in the matter
before court as the third respondent had never raised legal representation as a
concern. The applicants want an opportunity to voice their disapproval of legal
representation in South Africa and to argue that representation should not only be
limited to legal practitioners in terms of the L egal Practice Act but should also include
unqualified natural persons. These arguments do not arise and align with the facts
presented during summary judgment stage. It is not the subject matter between the
first –and third respondents and cannot be entertained. The applicants’ cause for
intervention is ill- founded.

[49] The applicants seeking leave to intervene had to establish prima facie proof of
the interest and the right to intervene.

[50] As alluded to here in befor e the applicants’ direct and substantial interests in
this matter is described by themselves in the following words:
“LFN has been, and continues to be, involved in various legal proceedings
against the Bank on behalf of its members, wherein it has developed a
comprehensive body of defences - such as those elaborated infra — against
the questionable practices allegedly employed by the Bank. It is on this basis,
and this basis alone, that the Applicants contend they hold a direct and
substantial interest in the present matter, not only on behalf of our member,
but also in the public i nterest at large. ”

17
[51] The involvement of the applicants in numerous legal proceedings against the
bank and the development of a comprehensive body of defences against the alleged
questionable practices employed by the bank are not tantamount to a direct and
substantial interests in this matter. Their interest should have resulted from the
breach of the loan agreement and secured by a mortgage bond. This interest does
not exist as the applicants were never a party to the agreement. I am of the firm
opinion that the applicants do not have a legal interest in the third respondent’s
matter . The applicants can accordingly, in terms of rule 12, never be joined as
parties to the litigation between the first – and third respondents. The test to be
applied in intervention applications namely whether a person could have been joined
as a party to the litigation, must fail in the matter before me.

[52] The intervention application must furthermore be seriously made and not be
frivolous .15 The second applicant argued that they must intervene because of the
judgment , rejecting the second applicant from legally represent ing the third
respondent as a natural person, which “block ed” them. If they didn't challenge the
proceedings the applicants remain ‘blocked’. The second applicant furthermore
acknowledged that the applicants had their own agendas. He indicated that the
judgment affected their work . He also indicated that the first respondent “ pulled ”
them into the application, and it was: “ our only chance to set the record straight .” An
intervention application does not serve that purpose.
[53] The intervention application is, accordingly , having regard to the absence of a
direct and substantial interest not seriously and genuinely made in the third respondent’s best interest, but with ulterior motives, namely the furtherance of the applicants’ own objectives.
[54] The first respondent argued that the cause of action is dependent on a breach
of the loan agreement between the respondents and that the breach does not affect third parties . The applicants can clearly not show a direct and substantial interest in
the br each of the loan agreement , and they can also not be joined as parties to the

15 1991 1 SA 677 (Tk) at 679A.
18
litigation in terms of rule 12. The absence of these two requirements for intervention
is fatal to the applicants’ application.
CONCLUSION:
[55] Having regard to the above it is clear that the applicants failed to prove and
establish a direct and substantial interest in the matter before me. The applicants’
agendas are clear ly to further their own objectives . They specifically want to deal
with the judgment disallowing the second applicant from legally representing the third respondent a natural person. It is clearly not pursuing the third respondent’s best interest and in conflict therewith.
[56] The intervention application cannot succeed.
[57] The way in which the applicants conducted themselves in this matter is to be
criticized . The applicants acted contrary to the best interests of the third respondent
in actively pursuing their own agendas. They therefore created a conflict of interests which is inconceivable with a fair hearing. The second applicant had launched t hree
interlocutory applications. The first application was to allow him (not legally trained)
to legally represent the third respondent in the court. T he second applicant has
knowledge of the fact that he would not have been allowed to legally represent a
natural person ( being unqualified as a legal practitioner ) hence his reference to the
Manong Supreme Court of Appeal case supra. Yet , the applicants persisted with
launching the application incidental to the leave to appeal , to seek the court’s
approval in respect of his representation of the third respondent . The intervention
application is the second application to be launched followed by a recusal application. The applicants launched these applications mounting the legal costs of
the third respondent. The applicants are circumventing the LPC Act to further their own objectives at the third respondent’s costs without any accountability to a
statutory body. This intervention application is also to circumvent my judgment
disallowing the second applicant to legally represent the third respondent. The application is insincere and improper.
[58] In conclusion, I make the following order:
19

Order
[58.1] The intervention application is dismissed with costs.

S VAN ASWEGEN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For the Applicant s: The second applicant in person

For the First Respondent: Adv Nkosi instructed by SBM ATTORNEYS

For the Third Respondent: In person