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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: 11365/ 2022
In the matter between:
THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED Applicant
(Reg No. 1962/000738/06)
and
MELISSA BLOOMBERG Respondent
(ID No. 8[...])
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other judges: No
(3) Revised: Yes
Date: 29 May 2025
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or
their legal representatives by email and by being uploaded onto CaseLines. The
hand -down date is deemed to be 29 May 2029.
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________
DU PREEZ, AJ
INTRODUCTION
1. The applicant, THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA [‘Standard
Bank ’], and the respondent, MELISSA BLOOMBERG [‘Bloomberg ’], are in
turn the plaintiff and the defendant in the main action under case number
11365/2022.
2. In this interlocutory application under section 130(4)(b) of the National Credit
Act 34 of 2005 [‘ the NCA ’], Standard Bank seeks leave to re -serve its Letter of
Default & Not ice under section 129(1) (read with section 130) of the NCA [‘ the
section 129 notice ’].
3. Bloomberg opposes the application on various technical grounds discussed in
paragraph 17 below.
THE ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED
4. The court has to determine whether Standard B ank should be granted leave
to re -serve the section 129 notice after , in summary judgment proceedings,
the court granted Bloomberg leave to defend the main action because the
section 129 notice was not properly served on Bloomberg’s chosen domicilium
citandi et executandi [‘address for service ’], despite it being served on her
husband who concealed it from her.
BACKGROUND
5. In its particulars of claim in the main action, Standard Bank al leges, among
other things, that:
5.1 On 4 December 2020, Standard Bank and Bloomberg concluded a
written instalment sale agreement [‘the credit agreement ’] under
which Standard Bank sold to Bloomberg, who purchased from
Standard Bank, a 2017 Hyundai H -1 A/T 2. 5 EL [‘the vehicle ’];
5.2 The principal debt Standard Bank advanced to Bloomberg under the
credit agreement was R469,475.50, and the total cost of the credit
agreement was R647,620.56, repayable in 71 consecutive monthly
instalments of R8,994.73 each, commencing on 1 February 2021,
and thereafter one final payment of R8,994.73 on 1 January 2027;
5.3 The N CA applied to the credit agreement;
5.4 Standard Bank remained the owner of the vehicle until Bloomberg
had repaid the amounts owed to Standard Bank under the credit
agreement;
5.5 If Bloomberg failed to make payment of any amount payable to
Standard Bank under the credit agreement on the due date, it will be
a default under the credit agreement;
5.6 If Bloomberg were in default under the credit agreement, Standard
Bank would be entitled to give Bloomberg written notice of such
default, requesting her to rectify the default within ten business days,
and propose Bloomberg refers the credit agreement to a debt
counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer cour t, or
ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the parties resolve any
dispute under the credit agreement, or develop and agree on a plan
to bring Bloomberg’s repayments up to date;
5.7 If Bloomberg failed to respond to the written notice or rejected the
proposals set out therein, and/or remained in default for ten business
days after the date of the written notice, Standard Bank was entitled
to commence legal proceedings against Bloomberg and, among
other things, to cancel the credit agreement and claim t he return of
the vehicle;
5.8 Bloomberg chose 6 [...] O[...] Avenue, Val -De-Grace, Pretoria, as her
address for service ;
5.9 Standard Bank had complied with its obligations under the credit
agreement and delivered the vehicle to Bloomberg;
5.10 Bloomberg was in default of her obligations under the credit
agreement for a period of at least twenty business days since the
date the default commenced;
5.11 On 27 October 2021, Bloomberg was in arrears in the amount of
R51,693.56 and was indebted to Standard Bank under the credit
agreement in the amount of R614,460.59 plus interest;
5.12 On 17 November 2021, Standard Bank addressed the section 129
letter to Bloomberg informing her that, among other things, that:
5.12.1 Bloomberg had failed to pay the full monthly instalment
due under the credit agreement and thus breached the
credit agreement;
5.12.2 She had to remedy her breach of the credit agreement by
paying off the arrears and all overdue amounts under the
credit agreement to Standard Bank; and
5.12.3 If she failed to remedy the breach and pay the arrear s,
Standard Bank would be entitled, among other things, to
cancel the credit agreement and to recover from
Bloomberg the full balance outstanding to date of final
payment, as well as Standard Bank’s legal costs and other
reasonable costs incurred in enforc ing its rights under the
credit agreement, and recovering any amount due and
payable to Standard Bank under the credit agreement.
5.13 Standard Bank sent the section 129 notice to Bloomberg by serving it
by sheriff at the address for service on Bloomberg’s husb and, on 26
November 2021;
5.14 On 22 February 2022, Standard Bank informed Bloomberg in a letter
sent by registered post to the address for service that she failed to
pay the arrear amount as stated in the section 129 notice , and that it
was cancelling the cred it agreement as it was entitled to do; and
5.15 Standard Bank has complied with section 130 of the NCA in that:
5.15.1 Bloomberg was in default under the credit agreement for
at least 20 business days;
5.15.2 At least ten business days have elapsed since Standard
Bank sent the section 129 notice to Bloomberg;
5.15.3 Bloomberg has not responded to the section 129 notice ;
5.15.4 There was no matter arising under the credit agreement
pending before the National Credit Tribunal which would
result in an order affecting the issues to be determined by
the court; and
5.15.5 Bloomberg has not approached the court during the time
the matter was before a debt counsellor, alternative
dispute resolution agent, ombud with jurisdiction, or
consumer court.
6. In the prayers, Standard Bank sought judgment against Bloomberg as follows:
6.1 Confirmation of the credit agreement’s cancellation;
6.2 An order directing Bloomberg to restore to Standard Bank
possession of the vehicle;
6.3 Standard Bank retaining all monies paid by Bloomberg; and
6.4 Leave be granted to Standard Bank to apply for:
6.4.1 Damages, if any, in an amount to be calculated by
subtracting the vehicle’s current m arket value from the
balance outstanding (if applicable); and
6.4.2 Interest on the said damages.
6.5 Costs on an attorney and client scale calculated on the Magistrates’
Court tariff to be taxed; and
6.6 Further and/or alternative relief.
7. Bloomberg delivered a notice o f intention to defend Standard Bank’s claim on
25 August 2022 , and after being placed under bar, her plea on 17 May 2023.
8. Apart from two special pleas of a compromise and overindebtedness,
Bloomberg pleaded on the merits, among other things, that:
8.1 Her surn ame is De Beer, and her address for service is 3 [...] E[...]
Street, Murrayfield, Pretoria;
8.2 She did not receive the section 129 notice , and if she had received it,
she would have sought alternative relief; and
8.3 Standard Bank had not served the section 129 notice to rectify any
alleged breach of the alleged compromise.
9. Standard Bank then brought an application for summary judgment , and in its
affidavit in support of summary judgment asserted that the sheriff served the
section 129 notice on Bloomberg’s husband at 6 [...] O[...] Avenue, Val -De-
Grace, on 26 November 2021. The chosen address for service is thus of no
consequence, as the section 129 notice was serv ed on her husband
personally.
10. In her “answering affidavit in opposition to application made for summary
judgment”, Bloomberg alleged, among other things, that:
10.1 She had not seen the section 129 notice until the service of the
summons on her;
10.2 Her husband is overprotective of her, and due to various financial
difficulties that they experienced at the time, he did not want to
burden her with the fact that Standard Bank had served the section
129 notice;
10.3 Bloomberg’s husband contacted Standard Bank directly to make
alternative arrangements or to beg for an indulgence; and
10.4 Consequently, she did not seek legal advice and did not realise that
Standard Bank threatened to cancel the credit agreement and that
she had alternative legal avenues at her dispo sal.
11. Hassim, J, who heard the application for summary judgment, granted
Bloomberg leave to defend and held that :
11.1 It is irrelevant that the section 129 notice was served on her
husband, who deliberately concealed it from her ;
11.2 The section 129 notice was no t delivered at the address Bloomberg
had designated;
11.3 It would have been a different matter if the section 129 notice had
been served on Bloomberg’s husband at her designated address ,
and then he decided to conceal it from his wife;
11.4 Non-compliance with sec tion 129 of the NCA is a defence valid in
law; and
11.5 Bloomberg had demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the
defence advanced may succeed on trial.
12. Hassim, J, granted Bloomberg leave to defend and ordered that the cost of
the summary judgment applicatio n will be costs in the cause , but did not make
any determination under section 130(4)(b) of the NCA.
STANDARD BANK’S INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION
13. After the court granted Bloomberg leave to defend the main action in the
summary judgment application, Standard Bank brought this interlocutory
application for an order:
13.1 Granting Standard Bank leave to re -serve the section 129 notice in
compliance with its obligations under the NCA as follows:
13.1.1 Upon Bloomberg’s attorneys of record, being Roos Van
Dyk Attorneys Inc, by email and recorded as r[...], being
the email address having been utilised between Standard
Bank and Bloomberg’s attorneys of record, respectively,
and under circumstances where the parties have
consented to service of all documents, pleadings, and
notices via email in terms of the Rules of Court;
13.1.2 Alternatively, service by Standard Bank’s attorneys upon
the service address of Bloomberg’s attorneys of record.
13.2 That Bloomberg must pay the costs of the interlocutory application if
she opposes the interlocutory application; and
13.3 Granting Standard Bank such further and/or alternative relief as the
court may deem fit and proper.
14. In the founding affidavit to the interlocutory application , Standard Bank, among
other things:
14.1 Asserts that Standard Bank is required to re -serve or re -deliver the
section 129 notice after the court granted Bloomberg leave to defend
the mai n action because the sheriff served it on Bloomberg’s
husband at her address for service, who withheld it from her;
14.2 Concedes non -compliance with the section 129(1) of the NCA ;
14.3 Asserts that upon receipt of the interlocutory application, the court
must adjou rn the main action and issue the necessary directive once
it has been established that there has been non -compliance with
section 129(1) of the NCA;
14.4 Submits that it would be prudent to remedy Standard Bank’s non -
compliance without further delay and before proceeding with the next
step in the legal process to avoid prolonging the court proceedings
due to technicalities and incurring unnecessary legal costs; and
14.5 Asserts that Bloomberg’s defence of non -compliance with section
129 of the NCA is not fatal to St andard Bank’s main action, but
dilatory.
15. Initially, Bloomberg did not oppose the interlocutory application, and it was
enrolled on the unopposed motion court roll of 9 October 2024
16. However, on 1 October 2024, Bloomberg delivered a notice of intention to
oppose the interlocutory application.
17. In her answering affidavit, Bloomberg raise s various technical defences,
among other things:
17.1 As a first point in limine , the founding affidavit is not a proper affidavit
because:
17.1.1 The commissioner of oaths’ certificate refers to the
deponent as “he” while she is female, which means that
the deponent was not present when the founding affidavit
was commissioned; and
17.1.2 The affidavit was commissioned in Johannesburg, while
the commissioner of oaths’ rubber stamp in dicates that the
commissioner of oaths is based in Pretoria.
17.2 As a second point in limine :
17.2.1 Section 130(4)(b) of the NCA does not explicitly authorise
nor require the launching of an application for direction of
service ; and
17.2.2 Standard Bank attempts to sneak in an appeal against the
order in the summary judgment application ; or
17.2.3 Standard Bank attempts to procure substituted service
while the founding affidavit does not contain the required
averments for substituted service .
17.3 On the merits, Bloomberg alleges tha t:
17.3.1 Standard Bank complains that Hassim, J, erred and ought
to have granted an order under section 130(4) of the NCA;
and
17.3.2 She will be prejudiced if the court allows Standard Bank to
amend or elaborate on Hassim, J’s order because she will
lose her costs in the summary judgment application (which
costs are dependent on her being successful in the main
action), and her costs in the main action because her
defence of non -compliance with section 129 of the NCA
will be rendered moot , and the matter will be steere d away
from the trial court .
18. Bloomberg did not file her heads of argument as provided for under paragraph
25.1.2 of the Gauteng Division’s Revised Consolidated Practice Directive 1 of
2024 (as amended).
19. Under paragraph 25.1.4, Standard Bank was entitled to enrol the interlocutory
application on the opposed motion court roll of 26 May 2025 .
20. However, during the afternoon of Friday, 23 May 2025, Bloomberg delivered
her heads of argument and list of authorities. She did not deliver a practice
note and chronolog y.
21. Bloomberg also did not apply for condonation for the late filing of her heads of
argument.
22. This conduct, together with the fact that she opposed the interlocutory
application only six court days before it was to be heard on the unopposed
roll, demonstr ates delaying tactics and Bloomberg’s disregard for the court
processes , rules , and directives.
23. Despite Bloomberg’s conduct , the court allowed the application to proceed
and her legal representative to argue her case. This was done in the interest
of justice, to avoid an unnecessary postponement , not to burden future court
rolls, and to prevent wasted legal costs and the need for another court to be
seized with the matter and to reread the court papers .
DISCUSSION
24. In the main action, Standard Bank relies on the credit agreement, which is
subject to the provisions of the NCA. The following two provisions are
relevant:
24.1 Section 129 (1) of the NCA provides as follows:
“129. Required procedures before debt enforcement.
(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the
credit provider —
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer
in writing and propose that the consumer refer the
credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative
dispute resol ution agent, consumer court or ombud
with jurisdiction, with the intent that the parties
resolve any dispute under the agreement or develop
and agree on a plan to bring the payments under the
agreement up to date; and
(b) subject to section 130 (2), may n ot commence any
legal proceedings to enforce the agreement before —
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as
contemplated in paragraph (a), or in section
86 (10), as the case may be; and
(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in
section 130. ”
24.2 The relevant parts of s ection 130 provide as follows :
“130. Debt procedures in a Court.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a credit provider may approach
the court for an order to enforce a credit agreement only
if, at that time, the consumer is in default and has been in
default under that credit agreement for at least 20
business days and —
(a) at least 10 business days have elapsed since
the credit provider delivered a notice to the
consumer as contemplated in section 86 (10),
or section 129 (1), as the case may be;
(b) in the case of a notice contemplated in section
129 (1), the consumer has —
(i) not responded to that notice; or
(ii) responded to the notice by rejecting the credit
provider’s proposals; and
(c) in the case of an instalment agreement, secured
loan, or lease, the consumer has not surrendered the
relevant property to the credit provider as
contemplated in section 127.
(2) …
(3) Despite any provision of law or contract to the contrary, in
any proceedings commenced in a court in respect of a
credit agreement to which this Act applies, the court may
determine the matter only if the court is satisfied that —
(a) in the case of proc eedings to which sections
127, 129 or 131 apply, the procedures required
by those sections have been complied with;
(b) there is no matter arising under that credit
agreement, and pending before the Tribunal,
that could result in an order affecting the is sues
to be determined by the court; and
(c) that the credit provider has not approached the
court —
(i) during the time that the matter was before
a debt counsellor, alternative dispute
resolution agent, consumer court or the
ombud with jurisdiction; or
(ii) despite the consumer having —
(aa) surrendered property to the credit
provider, and before that property
has been sold;
(bb) agreed to a proposal made in terms
of section 129 (1) (a) and acted in
good faith in fulfilment of that
agreement;
(cc) complied with an agreed plan as
contemplated in section 129 (1) (a);
or
(dd) brought the payments under the
credit agreement up to dat e, as
contemplated in section 129 (1) (a).
(4) In any proceedings contemplated in this section,
if the court determines that —
(a) the credit agreement was reckless as described
in section 80, the court must make an order
contemplated in section 83;
(b) the credit provider has not complied with
the relevant provisions of this Act, as
contemplated in subsection (3) (a), or has
approached the court in circumstances
contemplated in subsection (3) (c) the court
must—
(i) adjourn the matter before it; and
(ii) make an appropriate order setting
out the steps the credit provider must
complete before the matter may be
resumed .”
25. If these statutory provisions are interpreted to attribute meaning to the words
used,1 and having regard to the principles laid down in the case law, the legal
position regarding the interlocutory application may be summarised as
follows:2
25.1 The purpose of the NCA is, among other things, to protect
consumers (such as Bloomberg) and promote a fair and non -
discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit , and
ensure consumers (such as Bloomberg) can exercise the rights
afforded to them under the NCA.
25.2 Standard Bank may not have commenced with the main action
without first p roviding the section 129 notice (or a notice
contemplated in section 86(10)) and meeting any further
requirements under section 130 of the NCA;
25.3 The section 129 notice must have notified Bloomberg of her rights to
refer the credit agreement to a debt counse llor, an alternative dispute
1 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 20212 (4) SA 593 (SCA) [18].
2 FirstRand Bank Ltd of South Africa v Phiri & Others [2013] ZAGPHC 90 (4 April 2013) ; Investec
Bank Ltd v Zouzoua (21/44429) [2023] ZAGPJHC 131 (10 February 2023).
resolution agent, a consumer court , or an ombud with jurisdiction; the
purpose of which is to facilitate the parties to resolve their dispute
under the credit agreement or develop and agree on a plan to bring
the payments under the credit agreement up to date ;
25.4 If Standard Bank failed to comply with the provisions of section
129(1) (a) of the NCA, it would not render the main action void
(because the proceedings have life) , but the court must adjourn the
main action and make an ap propriate order requiring Standard Bank
to complete specified steps before resuming the main action; the bar
on proceeding with the main action is thus not absolute, but only
dilatory;3
25.5 If a court should find that Standard Bank did not comply with the
provisions of section 129(1)(a), t he court must adjourn the main
action and make an appropriate order setting out the steps Standard
Bank must complete before the main action may resume;
25.6 A failure to comply with section 129(1) of the NCA is manifestly a
proce dural step which can and should be remedied at the earliest
opportunity ;
25.7 There is nothing in the NCA which :
25.7.1 Requires that an order under section 130(4)(b) should be
made at the hearing of the main action because it is
nonsensical for the parties to set th e main application
down for hearing on the opposed roll in circumstances
where an order under section 130(4)(b), including the
postponement of the main action, will be the inevitable
consequence; or
25.7.2 Precludes a court from granting an order under section
130(4)(b) when hearing an application for default
judgment4 or summary judgment, an opposed application,
3 Sebola & Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd & Another 2012 (5) SA 142 CC [140].
4 Standard Bank of SA v Bekker & Four Similar Cases 2011 (6) SA 111 (WCC) [35] & [36].
the trial, or any other proceedings (such as an
interlocutory application) .5
25.8 It is convenient and practicable to address compliance with section
129(1) at an interlocutory stage .
26. Standard Bank brought the interlocutory application after Ha ssim, J’s order in
the summary judgment application , and on its concession that the section 129
notice did not comply with the provisions of the NC A.
27. This was the sensible , convenient, and practical thing to do because it
attempts to rectify a flawed procedural step at the earliest opportunity and
before the main action has proceeded to trial, where an order under section
130(4)(b) and a consequent postponement will be the inevitable outcome.6
28. To seek an order under section 130(4)(b) at an interlocutory stage not only
saves time, manpower, resources, and costs, but also attempts to give effect
to the NCA’s provisions and to inform Bloomberg of her rights under the NCA.
29. Bloomberg’s opposition to the interlocutory application is thus not only
surprising under the circumstances but purely technical and without merit , as
may be gleaned from the following:
29.1 Even if Standard Bank’s founding affidavit has not been prope rly
commissioned and Hassim, J, has not made a final determination
under section 130(4)(b) of the NCA, this court is privy to the following
facts:
29.1.1 In her plea on the merits, Bloomberg raised Standard
Bank’s non -compliance with section 129 of the NCA and
the fact that she did not receive the section 129 notice as
a defence;
5 FirstRand Bank Ltd of South Africa v Phiri & Others (above ) [21]; Investec Bank Ltd v Zouzoua
(above) [15].
6 Investec Bank Ltd v Zouzoua (above) [17].
29.1.2 In her opposing affidavit in the summary judgment
application, Bloomberg relied on Standard Bank’s non -
compliance with section 129 of the NCA to procure leave
to defend;
29.1.3 In her answering affidavit filed in this interlocutory
application, Bloomberg insisted that the trial court in the
main action must decide on her defence of non -
compliance with section 129 of the NCA, which confirms
that she is still relying on her defence in this regard;
29.1.4 In paragraph 9.2 of the challenged founding affidavit,
Standard Bank conceded that there was non -compliance
with section 129 of the NCA in the main action;
29.1.5 During his argument, Standard Bank’s counsel conceded
that in the main action, Standard Bank did not comply with
section 129 of the NCA; and
29.1.6 During his argument, Bloomberg’s attorney insisted that
the trial court in the main action must determine whether
Standard Bank has complied with section 129 of the NCA,
which confirms that Bloomberg still relies on this defence.
29.2 On these facts (even though the founding affidavit may not have
been properly commissioned), this court must determine that
Standard Bank has not complied with section 129 of the NCA and
must therefore act as stipulated in section 130(4)(b)( i) & (ii) of the
NCA.
29.3 In any event, in its replying affidavit supported by an affidavit by the
commissioner of oaths, who commissioned the founding affidavit,
Standard Bank explained that the reference to “he” instead of “she” in
the commissioning certific ate is a bona fide typing error . It is apparent
from the founding affidavit that the deponent is female. The court
accepts Standard Bank’s explanation and, insofar as the founding
affidavit has not been properly commissioned, condones non -
compliance.
29.4 Furth ermore, there is no requirement that a commissioner of oaths
must commission an affidavit at the commissioner’s office. It follows
that Bloomberg’s complaint that the founding affidavit was
commissioned in Johannesburg while the commissioner of oaths’
office is in Pretoria is of no consequence.
29.5 Bloomberg’s first point in limine must be dismissed.
29.6 The same applies to her second point in limine . The interlocutory
affidavit does not constitute a disguised appeal to Hassim, J’s order
because it confirms, to the benefit of Bloomberg and the detriment of
Standard Bank, the ground upon which Hassim, J, granted
Bloomberg leave to defend and Bloomberg’s version on the papers .
It is also not an application for substituted service.
29.7 Bloomberg will not be prejudiced if the court grants the relief claimed
in the interlocutory application because:
29.7.1 She will still be able to argue and get an order for the
reserve d costs in the summary judgment application and
the costs for the main action;
29.7.2 The fact that her defence of Standard Bank’s non -
compliance with section 129 of the NCA may no longer be
pursued in the main action if the relief sought in the
interlocutory app lication is granted, is no ground to
disregard the provisions of section 130(4)(b) of the NCA or
to dismiss the interlocutory application. Her position is
comparable to an amendment to a pleading, which will
lead to the other party losing its case.
29.7.3 If Bloo mberg decides to exercise her rights under the NCA
after receipt of the section 129 notice, her decision will
cause the main action not to proceed and have an impact
on her right to claim costs in the main action. This is no
reason not to grant an order un der section 130(4)(b) of the
NCA.
30. During argument of the interlocutory application, Bloomberg’s attorney
confirmed that if the court granted the relief sought in the interlocutory
application, Standard Bank may deliver its 129 notice by email to the
attorney’s address and his email address mentioned above.
31. The court considered the following aspects regarding an order as to the costs
of the application:
31.1 The interlocutory application was necessitated by Standard Bank
proceeding with the main action while Bloomberg had not received
the section 129 notice;
31.2 Standard Bank did the sensible, convenient, and practical thing to
seek the relief claimed in the interlocutory application;
31.3 Standard Bank only sought costs in the event of Bloomberg opposing
the relief sought in the interlocutory application;
31.4 Bloomberg caused the interlocutory application, which should have
been unopposed, to become opposed by notifying Standard Bank of
her intention to oppose and raising technical defences that had no
merit in her answering affidavit; and
31.5 Bloomberg disregarde d the court processes, rules, and directives in
opposing the inter locutory application and employing delaying tactics,
among other things, giving notice of her intention to oppose and
delivering her heads of argument and other documents late.
32. It follows th at Bloomberg unreasonably caused the interlocutory to become
opposed.
33. In the circumstances, the court grants the following order:
1. The court determines that the applicant, THE STANDARD BANK OF
SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED , has not complied with the relevant
provisions of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 [‘ the NCA ’] before it
instituted its action against the respondent, MELISSA BLOOMBERG ,
under case number 11365/2022 [‘the main action ’];
2. The main action is adjourned under section 130(4)(b) of the N CA;
3. The applicant shall deliver a notice in terms of section 129(1) of the
NCA by:
3.1 Service per Sheriff on the respondent’s attorneys, ROOS VAN
DYK ATTORNEYS , at their offices, Suite 3, Monpark Building,
76 Skilpad Avenue, Pretoria, Reference: TR/DEB3/4 un der Rule
4 of the Uniform Rules of Court; and
3.2 Emailing a copy of the section 129 (1) notice to the respondent’s
attorneys at r[…].
4. The main action will resume ten days after:
4.1 The applicant has co mplied with paragraph 3 above as
contemplated in section 130(4)(b) of the NCA; and
4.2 The respondent has not responded to the section 129 notice as
contemplated in section 130(1)(a) of the NCA; or
4.3 The respondent has responded to the section 129(1) notice by
rejecting the applicant’s proposals as contemplated in section
130(1)(b) of the NCA.
5. The provisions of section 86(2) of the NCA will not be applicable for the
period up until the resumption of the main action as envisaged in
paragraph 4 above, i.e., the res pondent may exercise the rights
afforded to her under terms section 129(1)(a) of the NCA up until the
date of resumption of the main application.
6. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of opposition to
this application on Scale A.
_________________________
DB DU PREEZ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Date of Hearing : 27 May 2025
Date of Judgment: 29 May 2025
Appearances:
For Applicant/Plaintiff: W Bava
Instructed by: Vezi & De Beer Inc
For the Respondent/Defendant: T Roos
Instructed by: Roos Van Dyk Attorneys Inc