REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG OtVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2024-014083
11 J REPO I ABLE YES J NO
121 OF INTEREST TO 0TH R JU GES ES! 0
REVISED YES/NO ___ __
DATE
In matter between
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTS HEALTHCARE (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
INANI PROP HOLDING Responden
Delivered: This Judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflec ed and Is handed down electronically by c1rculat1on to the parties/their legal
representatives by e-mail and by uploading it o the electronic file of th1 matter on
Caselines The date for hand-dow 1s eemed to be ;:).. 3 -j -d 'j
JUDGMENT ON LEAVE TO APPEAL
LESUFI AJ
Introduction
[1] Thu:, :1n ,u)plic-i:ahnn for l,;,.:,ivp tn ;ippF>;il A :iinst mv ludaement and court ord r
handed on the 24 January 2025 The appeal is brought in terms of Rule 49 of the
Uniform Rules read with section 17 of the Superior Act. The notice for leave to appeal
was filed with the Registrar of this court on the 10 February 2025.
[2] The leave to appeal is brought by Knowledge Objects Healthcare (hereinafter
referred Applicant) . lnani Prop Holding opposes the leave to Appeal (hereinafter
referred to as the Respondent)
Background Facts
[3] During August 2020 the Applicant and the Respondent entered into a written
lease agreement in respect of a business premises. In terms of the lease inter alia the
Applicant leased from the Respondent certain premises of a commercial nature and
let for the purposes of conducting a business The Applicant would pay the
Respondent monthly. The Applicant failed to pay and withheld the rental payment in
the amount of R 1 404, 206. 87.
[4] The Applicant in its particulars of claim communicated its election to cancel the
lease in consequence of the breached agreement. The Respondent filed for summary
Judgement and the Applicant opposed the application and raised the defences to the
Respondent 's claim. The essence of its defence Is that the Respondent failed to
comply with its reciprocal obligations in terms of the lease agreement.
Applicant's grounds of Appeal
(5] The grounds of appeal are set out as follows:
1. The court erred in finding that the affidavit deposed to by Mr Preshaan
Ramsamy complied with rule 32(2) of the Uniform Rules of court.
2. The court erred by finding that Mr Ramsamy 's position as a Senior
Assets Manager by implication means he had considered the lease
agreement and reconciling statements
3 The court erred in finding that Mr Ramsamy had in fact considered the
lease agreement and reconciling statements by virtue of his position and
respons1b1l1ties as Senior Assets Manager in circumstances wnere none
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of the duties and responsibilities as assets ma nag er of the applicant were
sets out in the affidavit in support of the summary judgement
4. The court erred in finding "all the documents relevant to this matter is
under my control "means that the deponent , Mr Ramsamy . had
considered the lease agreement and reconc11ing statements relevant to
this matter and that he was satisfied that the amount was correctly
calibrated , where this is not set out in the affidavit.
5 The court erred by finding that on the facts there were good grounds to
believe that the deponent, Mr Ramsamy , had personal knowledge of the
facts.
6. The court erred by finding from the facts as set out in Mr Ramsamy 's
affidavit that he was in fact able to swear positively to the facts alleged
in the summons , annexures attached thereto, as well as the amount
claimed, and whether there was a bona fide defence in circumstances
where Mr Ramsamy failed to furnish particulars as to how the knowledge
was acquired by him to enable the court to assess the evidence before
it.
7. The court erred in failing to find that the affidavit deposed to by Mr
Ramsamy lacked the necessary evidential material from which the court
could make a finding that suffices as far as Rule 32(2) (a)requires .
8. The court erred in finding that there was sufficient information contained
in the affidavit of Mr Ramsanmy that would allow the court to make a
factual finding that Mr Ramsamy is a competent deponent in the matter.
9. The court erred in failing to deal with the judgement of FirstRand Bank
Ltd v Beyers 2011 (1) SA 196(GNP) when considering whether the
applicant complied with Rule 32(2)(a).
1 o. The court failed to follow the decision of FirstRand Bank Ltd v Beyers
2011 (1) SA 196(GNP) of the same division, alternatively , fallecJ to set out
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reasons why a decIsIon of the same division based on the same point
was not followed in this matter
11. The court failed to set out why the Judgement of FirstRand Bank Ltd v
Beyers 2011 (1) SA 196(GNP) was clearly wrong and should not be
followed and clearly failed to consider the decision of Ex Parte
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, in re certification of the
Amended Text of the constitution of the Republic of South Africa
, 1997(2) SA 97(CC) that affirmed the principle that a court should adhere
to its own previous decIsIons
Respondent 's opposition to the Application for leave to appeal
[6] The application is vigorously opposed by the Respondent. The basis for
opposing Is that none of the grounds listed in the notice of the application for leave to
appeal have any ment and the Judgement handed down is a well-reasoned judgement
that cannot be faulted. That all the grounds listed are of a technical nature. The
Respondent is of the view that none of the grounds listed by the Applicant indicates
the Applicant has a bona flde defence The Respondent contends the fact that it must
appear from the verifying affidavit that the deponent has personal knowledge . This
does not mean that the deponent must set out detailed facts demonstrating his
personal knowledge. He therefore does not have to disclose the means or source of
his knowledge . There was also no need for the court to provide reasons for not
following the FirstRand Bank Ltd v Beyers Judgement as the court clearly followed
SCA judgements Therefore , leave to appeal application must be dismissed as it is
based purely on techrncaht1es
Issues for determination
[7] 1.
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The Law Whether this appeal has prospects of success.
Whether there is compliance with Rule 32(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules
of the court
[8] Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Court dictates the form and process of an
application for leave to appeal and the substantive law pertaining thereto is to be found
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in section 17 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013( the Act). The latter Act raised the
threshold for the granting of leave to appeal, so that leave may now only be granted if
there is a reasonable prospect that the appeal will succeed. The possibility of another
court holding a different view no longer forms part of the test. There must be a sound,
rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal. The
interpretation of the Rules and the Law has evolved in case law since 2013. In
numerous cases, the view is held that the threshold for the granting of leave to appeal
was raised with the inauguration of the 2013 legislation (Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013). The former assessment that authorization for appeal should be granted if "there
is a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion " is no
longer applicable.
[9} The words in section 17(1) that: "Leave to appeal may only be given ... " and
section 17(1 )(a)(i) that: "The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success"
are peremptory . "If there is a reasonable prospect of success" is now that: "May only
be given if there would be a reasonable prospect of success." A possibility and
discretion were therefore, in the words of the legislation and consciously so, amended
to a mandatory obligatory requirement that leave may not be granted if there Is no
reasonable prospect that the appeal will succeed. It must be a reasonable prospect of
success; not that another Court may hold another view.
[1 OJ The Court a quo may not allow for one party to be unnecessarily put through
the trauma and costs and delay of an appeal. In Four Wheel Drive v Rattan N.O.,1 the
following was ruled by Schippers JA (Lewis JA, Zondi JA, Molemela JA and
Mokgohloa AJA concurring) :
·'[34) There Is a further principle that the court a quo seems to have overlooked -leave
to appeal should be granted only when there is 'a sound, rational basis for the
conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal'. In the light of its findings
that the Plaintiff failed to prove locus standi or the conclusion of the agreement, I do
not think that there was a reasonable prospect of an appeal to this court succeeding
that there was a compelling reason to hear an appeal. In the result, the parties were
put through the inconvenience and expense of an appeal without any merit."2
An@lys,s
1 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA).
2 Id at para 3'1.
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[ 11] Rule 32(2)( a) of the Uniform Rules requires the plaintiff to deliver a notice of
application for summary judgement within 15 days after the defendant delivers their
plea, the plaintiff shall deliver a notice of application for summary judgement, togett,er
with an affidavit made by the plaintiff or any other person who can swear positively to
the facts. The application must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying the cause of
action and the amount claimed, and explaining why the defendant's defence does not
raise tnable issue. The purpose of this rule is to streamline the process and ensure
that plaintiffs can obtain judgements efficiently when the defendant has no genuine
defense.
[12] What is required in terms of Rule 18 of the Uniform Rules of the court is that
pleadings must provide a clear, and concise and contain statement of material facts
upon which the pleader relies on. It ensures that all parties are informed of the case
they have to meet. The deponent must confirm that he or she can sear positively to
the facts, verify the cause of action and the amount claimed and Identify any point of
law relied upon which the plaintiff's claim is based and explain briefly why defences
as raised does not raise any Issue for trial.
[13] In the case of Compensation Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Compensation
Commissioner and Other,3 the court said the following·
"A person's ability to swear positively to the facts is essential to the effectiveness of the
affidavit as a basis for summary judgment ; and the Court entertaining the application therefore
must be satisfied, prima facie, that the deponent is such a person. Generally speaking, before
a person can swear positively to facts in legal proceedings they must be within his personal
knowledge . For this reason, the practice has been adopted, both in regard to the present Rule
32 and in regard to some of its provincial predecessors of requiring that a deponent to an
affidavit in support of summary judgment , other than the plaintiff himself, should state. at least,
that the facts are within his personal knowledge (or make some averment to that effect), unless
such direct knowledge appears from other facts stated".4
[14] The Applicant Is relying heavily on FirstRand Bank Ltd v Beyers 5 The FirstRand
Bank Ltd v Beyers judgement Is distinguishable from the present case in that in Mr
3 (2023] ZAGPPHC 253.
4 Id at para 12
5 2011 (1) SA 196(GNP) .
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Beyers's case the bond or loan agreement existed between him and Boe Bank and
not FirstRand Bank. The person who deposed the affidavit was not employed by Boe
Bank and did not fully explain her focus standi and how he gained access to the Boe
Bank records Clearly In that case the affidavit of the deponent lacked pertinent issues.
It 1s my view that FirstRand Bank case does not find any application in this matter
Prospects of success
[15] In conclusion I find that the affidavit deposed by Mr Ramsamy on behalf of he
Respondent in support of the application for summary complied with Rule 32(2)(a) of
the Uniform Rules. It cannot therefore be faulted in anyway. I therefore find that there
are no prospects of success on appeal.
[16] I therefore make the following order
1 Application for leave of appeal is dismissed
2 Applican to pay costs on Scale A
Appearances
For the Applicant/ Plaintiff'
Instructed by.
For the Respondent/ Defendant:
Instructed by B LESUFI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Adv Carien van der
Knowles Huisain Lindsay Inc.
Adv W Wannenburg Linde
Fourle van Pletzen Inc. Attorneys
4 April 2025 Date of the hearing.
Date of judgement· 'd.?, ~C\j d-O 'a5
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