IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
In the matter between:
ANNA MOLOI
and Reportable / Not
reportable
Case no: 1713/2025
Applicant
THABISILE KESSIA MAVIS NKOSI (BORN MAKHUBU) First Respondent
THABISILE KESSIA MAVIS NKOSI N.O Second Respondent
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS Third Respondent
MASTER OF HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG Fourth Respondent
Neutral citation: XXX
Coram: Deane, AJ
Heard: 15 May 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-1
down is deemed to be 11 :15 on 27 May 2025.
Summary: Disputes relating to the validity of customary marriages being brought by
way of motion proceedings, will attract the application of the P/ascon-Evans principles. 2
ORDER
The application is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale.
Deane,AJ
Introduction: JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application in terms of s 4(7) read with s 2(1) of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (the RCMA) for an order declaring the civil
marriage between the deceased and the first respondent to be invalid. Alternatively, the
applicant seeks an order that the said marriage should not be recognised as a valid
marriage in community of property.1
[2] An order sought in the notice of motion2 is to direct as follows:
'2.1 Directing the Minister of Home Affairs and Department of Home Affairs to register
the marriage between the applicant and the deceased, Mthandeni Elphas Nkosi, as a
valid customary marriage and to issue the applicant with a marriage certificate by
attesting to the said registration within 30 days of this order.
2.2 Declaring the marriage concluded between the deceased and the first
respondent invalid.
2.3 Directing the fourth respondent to remove the first respondent as executrix in the
estate of the late Mthandeni Elphas Nkosi estate number 030471/2024, and to appoint
the applicant executrix of the aforesaid estate.
2.4 As an alternative to paragraph 2.1 above, declaring that the marriage between
the deceased and the first respondent is not a marriage in community of property as
contemplated in section 22(6) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.
2.5 As an alternative to paragraph 2.3 above, directing the third respondent to
1 Founding Affidavit at 2.
2 Index at 1-2. 3
appoint the applicant as the co-executrix in the estate of the late Mthandeni Elphas
Nkosi estate number 030471/2024.'
Submissions by the applicant:3
[3] The applicant and the deceased met in 1978 at Robertsham, Johannesburg
South Africa whilst they worked in Gauteng. The applicant and the deceased entered
into a romantic relationship in the year that she attained 19 years of age. Thereafter,
they started living together renting a place in Robertsham.
[4] In 1981, the deceased asked the applicant to marry him and advised that he
intended to send a delegation to her home in QwaQwa to ask for her hand in marriage.
Both parties were already at the age of majority and the applicant consented to the
marriage.
[5] On 11th April 1981 the applicant's family was informed that the deceased's family
would go to negotiate and pay /obola. On the said day, the deceased's family attended
the applicant's family home and following negotiations an agreement was reached that
the deceased's family would pay, and did pay, lobo/a in the sum of R6000 to the
applicant's family.
[6] Pursuant to that, on the same day the two families, together with the community,
celebrated the conclusion of the marriage between the deceased and the applicant at
Thabana-Tsoana village, in QwaQwa . A sheep was slaughtered; food and alcohol were
shared. A bottle of alcohol, a blanket for the applicant's late mother and a jacket for the
applicant's late father were given as gifts by the deceased's family. Following the
celebration, the applicant was formally handed over to the deceased's family. However,
since the deceased and the applicant were already living together in Gauteng, they
returned to their home in Gauteng. It was agreed that a further celebration would be
scheduled on a future date to take place at the deceased's family home in KwaZulu
Natal.
[7] The /obo/a letter was lost by the applicant's father when he relocated from the
Free State to Vosloorus. A letter attesting that the said marriage took place and that he
3 Founding Affidavit at 4-11. 4
was present at the celebration of the marriage was provided by one Chief Leabua
Abimael Mopeli, the traditional leader of the Thabana-Tsoana Village and chairperson of
the Matsieng Traditional Council.4 The applicant further annexes affidavits deposed to
by the deceased's aunt, and her two brothers, also attesting that the marriage took
place, that they were present at the celebration of the marriage and that the marriage
was celebrated in accordance with traditional rites. 5
[8] In January 1983, the applicant learned that in 1982, without her knowledge or
consent, a marriage between the deceased and the first respondent was arranged. The
deceased and the first respondent concluded a civil marriage on 21 December 1982.
The applicant contends that the reason for the marriage between the respondent and
the deceased was due to her coming from the Sotho tribe whereas the deceased is
Zulu, and the deceased's family was of the opinion that the deceased ought to also
marry a wife from the Zulu tribe.
[9] During the periods of the two aforementioned marriages, the deceased fathered
ten children: four children with the applicant and six with the respondent. The children
between the deceased and the first respondent were conceived during the times when
he would visit his family home and later his farm. The deceased lived with the applicant
until he passed away on 6 August 2024.6 He left a valid will dated 5 August 2024 with
ASSA Bank Limited, in which he bequeathed his 50% share of the joint estates by virtue
of the marriage in community of property to two of his sons, including one child as born
between himself and the applicant.
[1 0] There are three fixed properties, two of which are residential properties. 7 Before
he passed away, the deceased and the applicant, together with their children, lived on
the property situated at 8 Erica Street, Leondale, Germiston, whereas the first
respondent, together with her children, lived on the property situated at Eskom 1012
Dannhauser, KwaZulu Natal. In his will, the deceased had nominated ABSA Trust
Limited (ASSA), to be appointed as the executor of his estate upon his death. However,
ABSA renounced this nomination, and the first respondent was appointed executrix by
4 Annexure AM1.
5 Annexures AM2, AM3 and AM4.
0 Annexure AM6.
7 Annexure AM7. 5
the Master of the High Court (fourth respondent)6 based on the fact that the marriage
between the applicant and the deceased was not registered and that the first
respondent was married in terms of a civil marriage.
[11] The applicant submits that on 6 February 2025, she consulted with MKI
Attorneys to assist her, stating that the documents submitted by the first respondent
misrepresented to the fourth respondent inter alia that she was the only spouse of the
deceased and that the deceased had died intestate. It was further submitted that the
first respondent had failed to obtain her nomination from all major heirs of the estate.
Accordingly, the applicant lodged an objection against the nomination and appointment
of the first respondent as executrix, alternatively, a request that the fourth respondent
appoint the applicant and the first respondent as co-executrix of the deceased's estate.
The objection was lodged with the fourth respondent on 20 February 2020.9 However,
the fourth respondent, despite the objection lodged, proceeded to appoint the first
respondent as the executrix of the deceased estate.
[12] At the time of the deceased's death, the marriage between the deceased and the
applicant had not been registered. The applicant submits that she was not aware that
the marriage was not registered nor that it was required to be registered. Upon the
advice of her attorneys on 6 February 2025, the applicant proceeded to make
arrangements to have the marriage registered. One month later, on 6 March 2025, the
applicant went to the Department of Home Affairs' offices in Phuthaditjhaba
(Department) and stated that, despite having all the information sought (in terms of the
valid requirements for registering a customary marriage entered into before the
application of the RCMA), the registering officer refused to assist the applicant and
advised that she should refer the matter to the High Court. The reason proffered for the
refusal to register the applicant's marriage with the deceased was that the Department
already had in its records the civil marriage between the deceased and the first
respondent.
[13] The applicant further submits that since the marriage between the applicant and
the deceased took place in 1981, prior to the RCMA the only requirements therefore, for
a valid customary marriage were:
0 Annexure AM8.
9 Annexure AM9. 6
(a) the consent of the bride and bridegroom (spouse);
(b) consent of the bride's father or guardian (parents);
(c) payment of lobolo; and
(d) handing-over of the bride.
The applicant submits that these requirements have been duly met and accordingly , her
marriage to the deceased is a valid marriage as contemplated in s 2(1) of the RCMA.
[14] Furthermore, the applicant insists that at the time the marriage was concluded,
the provisions of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (BAA), specifically s 22, was
applicable . Therefore, it is submitted, the marriage between the first respondent and the
deceased is invalid for want of compliance with the requirements of s 22 of the BAA.
The First and Second Respondents Submissions:
[15] The first and second respondents (the respondent) got married on 21 December
1982 in community of property. A copy of the marriage certificate is attached.10 They
met in 1980 and the deceased paid lobola for the first respondent in 1981. He did not
pay any lobolo or marry another woman customarily before and during the subsistence
of their marriage.
[16] When the deceased and the respondent got married, both the deceased's
maternal grandmother and his aunt who raised him, were still alive. There was no other
woman whom the deceased was married to. In support thereof, an affidavit of the aunt
who brought him up with his late maternal grandmother is attached.11 In addition, the
respondent was informed by the deceased about all the children that were born
between him and the applicant. However, he only referred to the applicant as his
girlfriend and not his wife. After he passed away, the deceased was buried by the
respondent and their children in KwaZulu Natal and the funeral took place in their
common home.
[17] The respondent denies that any member of her or the deceased's family had any
knowledge about lobola being paid for the applicant. She applied to the fourth
respondent and was appointed as an executor in the deceased estate. She was
appointed because of her being married to the deceased and she being the only wife of
10 Annexure 'C'.
11 Annexure 'B'. 7
the deceased.
Analysis:
[18] The existence of a prior civil marriage has direct legal consequences for the
applicant's claim, as it affects the validity of any alleged customary union. Section 10(4)
of the RCMA expressly prohibits a spouse in a civil marriage from entering into another
marriage, rendering any subsequent union invalid while the civil marriage subsists.
Before the RCMA, customary marriages were governed by indigenous African
customary law, which varied across different communities and lacked uniform
codification. The absence of statutory regulation meant that the validity of a customary
marriage was assessed based on traditional practices, which were often subject to
interpretation and dispute.
[19] In casu, the applicant contends that a valid customary marriage existed between
herself and the deceased prior to the civil marriage with the first respondent. However,
the first respondent disputes this claim, asserting that she was lawfully married to the
deceased in terms of civil law. The fourth respondent refused to register the applicant's
purported customary marriage, citing a lack of documentary proof and official records
reflecting the existence of a civil marriage between the deceased and the first
respondent. Given the nature of the dispute, the matter turns on whether the applicant
can establish the existence of a valid customary marriage, despite the official records
reflecting a civil marriage.
[20] The determination of whether a valid customary marriage existed prior to the
enactment of the RCMA is inherently complex, particularly where conflicting versions
• are presented by the parties. The applicant has elected to bring the present dispute
before this Court by way of motion proceedings. It must be noted that cases of this
nature, where the existence of a valid customary marriage is contested, are inherently
difficult to resolve without oral evidence. Once the answering affidavit was filed, it
should have been apparent to the applicant that the factual disputes presented posed a
significant risk to the success of her claim in continued motion proceedings.
[21] In the present matter, the dispute is not confined merely to the conflicting
versions regarding whether a valid customary marriage was concluded between the
applicant and the deceased prior to the enactment of the RCMA. It is further 8
compounded by the submission of contradictory affidavits supporting each party's
respective position, including affidavits deposed to by relatives of the deceased, which
present divergent accounts concerning the deceased's marital status. The existence of
such discrepancies reinforces the material nature of the factual disputes, necessitating
careful scrutiny in determining the validity of the alleged customary marriage.
[22] South African case law has consistently recognised that the validity of a
customary marriage prior to the RCMA must be assessed in accordance with
established customary law principles. In Manwandu v Manwadu and Others12
(Manwadu), the Supreme Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the essential requirements for
a customary marriage before the RCMA included consent of the spouses, consent of
the bride's guardian, payment of lobolo, and the formal handing over of the bride.
However, the absence of documentary proof does not necessarily invalidate a
customary marriage, provided that the requisite customs were observed.
[23] Similarly, in MM v MN,13 the court emphasised that a customary marriage
contracted before the RCMA would only be recognised if it was valid at the time the Act
came into operation. If a purported customary marriage did not comply with the
applicable customary law requirements, it remained invalid despite the enactment of the
RCMA. Furthermore, s 10(4) of the RCMA explicitly prohibits a spouse in a civil
marriage from entering into another marriage, reinforcing the legal consequences of an
existing civil union.
[24] Given the conflicting versions presented in this matter, the court is faced with the
challenge of determining whether the applicant has discharged the burden of proving
that a valid customary marriage existed before the RCMA. The procedural constraints of
motion proceedings further complicate this inquiry, as the absence of oral evidence
prevents the court from assessing credibility, testing inconsistencies, and making factual
determinations beyond the limitations of affidavits.
[25] Ultimately, the difficulty in ascertaining the legal requirements for recognition of a
customary marriage prior to the RCMA underscores the necessity of a thorough
evidentiary inquiry. Where substantive factual disputes exist, courts have traditionally
12 Manwadu v Manwadu and Others [2025) ZASCA 10; [2025) 2 All SA 27 (SCA) para 56.
13 MM v MN [2010) ZAGPPHC 24; 2010 (4) SA 286 (GNP). 9
required oral testimony to resolve such conflicts.
[26] The submissions in the affidavits submitted by the parties reveal substantive
discrepancies regarding the deceased's marital status. These factual disputes are
central to the determination of the relief sought and are not merely incidental issues.
Ordinarily, where motion proceedings involve material disputes of fact, courts must
resolve such disputes in accordance with the principles as enunciated in Plascon Evans
Paints v Van Riebeeck Paints14 (Plascon Evans) where the Court held:
' ... These principles are, in sum, that the facts as stated by the respondent party together with
the admitted or facts that are not denied in the applicant party's founding affidavit constitute the
factual basis for making a determination, unless the dispute of fact is not real or genuine or the
denials in the respondent's version are bald or not creditworthy, or the respondent's version
raises such obviously fictitious disputes of fact, or is palpably implausible , or far-fetched or so
clearly untenable, that the court is justified in rejecting that version on the basis that it obviously
stands to be rejected .. .'
This rule dictates that final relief may only be granted on the version of the respondent,
unless that version is demonstrably far-fetched or untenable. In the end, therefore, the
applicant must stand or fall on the basis of how these kinds of factual disputes are
ordinarily resolved in motion proceedings.
[27] In Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd tla Metrorail and
Others, 15 the Court added another dimension to the enquiry in applying the Plascon
Evans principle, where the Court said:
'Ordinarily, the Court will consider those facts alleged by the applicant and admitted by the
respondent together with the facts as stated by the respondent to consider whether relief should
be granted. Where, however, a denial by a respondent is not real, genuine or in good faith, the
respondent has not sought that the dispute be referred to evidence, and the Court is persuaded
of the inherent credibility of the facts asserted by an applicant, the Court may adjudicate the
matter on the basis of the facts asserted by the applicant.'
[28] As to when a denial (factual dispute) by the respondent party may not be
considered to be real or genuine, the Court in Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare
Administrators (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight
14 Plascon Evans Paints v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-635C (Plascon-Evans). 10
15 Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd tla Metrorail and Others [2004] ZACC 20; 2005 (2)
SA 359 (CC) para 53.
Industry and Another16 provided the following guidance:
' ... the dispute is not real or genuine or the denials in the respondent's version are bald or •
uncreditworthy, or the respondent's version raises such obviously fictitious disputes of fact, or is
palpably implausible, or far-fetched or so clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting
that version on the basis that it obviously stands to be rejected ... '
[29] In Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another17 the Court
explained:
'A real, genuine and bona tide dispute of fact can exist only where the court is satisfied that the
party who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously
addressed the fact said to be disputed. There will of course be instances where a bare denial
meets the requirement because there is no other way open to the disputing party and nothing
more can therefore be expected of him. But even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred lies
purely within the knowledge of the averring party and no basis is laid for disputing the veracity or
accuracy of the averment. When the facts averred are such that the disputing party must
necessarily possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or countervailing
evidence) if they be not true or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his case on a bare or
ambiguous denial the court will generally have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied ... .'
[30] Furthermore, there are judgments in which the Court made it clear that disputes
relating to the validity of customary marriages being brought by way of motion
proceedings, would attract the application of the Plascon-Evans principles.18 In Mawandu
the Court was critical of a case concerning the validity of a customary marriage being
brought by way of motion proceedings where there were several material factual
disputes. The Court had the following to say:19
'Bearing in mind that there are a vast number of disputes of fact in this case, and that there are
two mutually exclusive versions, this Court must weigh the probabilities to determine which
version is most probable. This case falls squarely within the ambit of the Plascon-Evans rule. The
respondent, being the original applicant. had the onus to prove her case that she and the
deceased were married by customary law .... If the appellant's version was not clearly untenable
(which it was not), the application must be determined on her version. Not only did the appellant 11
16 Thebe Ya Bophelo Healthcare Administrators (Ply) Ltd and Others v National Bargaining Council for the Road
Freight Industry and Another (2009] ZAGPHC; 2009 (3) SA 187 (W) para 19.
17 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another (2008] ZASCA 6; 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA)
para 13. See also Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Jose and Another (2020] ZASCA 152; 2021 (6) SA 369
(SCA) para 20.
18 See Malatjie v Sekgobela and Others 2025 JDR 0295 (GP) at para 29; Tsambo v Sengadi (2020] JOL 47138
(SCA) at para 19; Sikhosana v Kabini and Others 2023 JDR 2964 (GJ) at paras 22 -25.
19 Footnote 12 paras 61-62.
raise genuine and bona tide disputes of fact. but her version was more probable. It was
corroborated by numerous members of both her and the deceased's family, whereas the
respondent's version is filled with inaccuracies and patent nondisclosures and failures to provide
admissible evidence and/ or corroboration.'
[31] Given that the fourth respondent's records confirm the existence of a civil marriage
between the deceased and the first respondent, and in light of the applicant's own
concession that no documentary proof of a customary marriage exists, these disputes
cannot be resolved on affidavits alone. It is well established in South African
jurisprudence that where material factual disputes exist in motion proceedings, referral to
oral evidence or trial ~ay be necessary to allow for cross-examination and proper
interrogation of conflicting versions. As already mentioned above, the absence of oral
testimony prevents the court from assessing credibility, testing inconsistencies, and
making factual determinations beyond the limitations of affidavits.
[32) However, the applicant has consistently denied that there is a dispute of fact and
indicated, even during oral submissions, that the applicant would not be in a better
position at a trial than she is at present. This assertion reinforces the procedural dilemma
the applicant faces. The applicant has elected to proceed by way of motion, despite the
presence of significant factual disputes and has not sought a referral to oral evidence.
Consequently, the applicant must accept the constraints imposed by the Plascon-Evans
rule and the implications of motion proceedings. Without oral evidence to address the
contradictions between the parties' versions, the matter must be determined in
accordance with the respondent's version, unless the court finds sufficient grounds to
reject that version as untenable .
[33] The conflicting affidavits submitted in support of the parties' respective claims do
not take the applicants case any further. The applicant contends that affidavits confirm
the existence of a customary marriage between herself and the deceased, one of which
was deposed to by a relative of the deceased. However, the respondent counters this
assertion by submitting that affidavits from another relative confirm that the deceased
was married only to the respondent, and that no other customary union existed.
[34] Regardless of whether these affidavits originate from the same relative/s, the
contradiction presents a direct factual dispute requiring proper evidentiary scrutiny. The 12
reliability of the affidavits, the circumstances under which they were obtained, and the
credibility of the deponents cannot be adequately tested in motion proceedings.
Ordinarily, in instances where affidavits contain substantive contradictions concerning
core issues in dispute, the matter would require oral evidence to allow for cross
examination and assessment of witness reliability.
[35] In this case, the first respondent's reliance on official records maintained by the
fourth respondent, as well as affidavits supporting her claim of a civil marriage,
strengthens her contention that no other marriage existed.
[36] Ultimately, this dispute reinforces the difficulty of resolving the matter on
affidavits alone and underscores the procedural limitations inherent in motion
proceedings where substantive factual conflicts exist. Despite this, the applicant
proceeded without seeking a referral to oral evidence, even though counsel conceded
during oral submissions that no documentary evidence exists to substantiate the alleged
customary marriage. The lobolo certificate, which might have supported her claim, was
lost. Indeed, there exists a fundamental dispute as to whether any celebrations took
place, whether lobolo was duly paid, and the composition of the delegation sent to the
applicant's home. Specifically, the identity of the individuals forming such delegation,
their number, and their relation to the deceased remain contested .20
[37] When one further considers the answering affidavit filed by the first and second
respondents , I do not believe it can be said that the factual disputes raised are not real
or not genuine. In the answering affidavit, the first respondent submits at para 39 that:
'AD PARAGRAPH 17 13
... My late husband was brought up by his maternal grandmother and maternal aunt. The dates that
are stated by the applicant of this alleged marriage, they were still alive, and they do not know
anything about this alleged la Bola payment and celebrations. His aunt even deposed to affidavits
confirming that there is no other woman that was married to my late husband other than myself .. .'
[38] At para 41, the first respondent further submits that:
'AD PARAGRAPH 19
The contents of this paragraph are denied. The affidavits of individuals mentioned are made with
intent to mislead the court and are tantamount to the criminal offense of perjury, reason being that
20 Answering Affidavit, para 38.
14
there were no such celebrations that took place. I know for the fact that Busisiwe Elizabeth Mdaki met
the applicant for the first time in 1994 March 21 in a funeral of my late husband's brother by the name
of Mshiyeni Nkosi. My late husband introduced the applicant to Busisiwe Elizabeth Mdaki on that
particular day as his girlfriend whom he had children with. When Busisiwe Elizabeth Mdaki says that
she was present in celebrations that did not take place, she is misleading the court for reasons that
are only known to her and the applicant. And the reason the applicant attended that funeral was
because her and the wife of the late Mshiyeni Nkosi knew each other as they were working together.'
[39] Furthermore, at para 42 the first respondent states that:
'AD PARAGRAPH 20
It is unfathomable as to who the family of the applicant agreed with that further celebrations will take
place in my late husband's family home in KwaZulu Natal as there was no member of my late
husband's family at the alleged celebrations. Contents of this paragraph are denied, and the applicant
is therefore put to proof.'
[40] The averments advanced by the first respondent are corroborated by confirmatory
affidavits from individuals closely associated with the deceased, including his maternal aunt,
Julia Yoyo Nkosi. In arguments, the applicant disputes the nature of the relationship between
Nkosi and the deceased, further exacerbating the factual contestations in this matter. These
are clearly material disputes of fact that cannot be disregarded. There is no basis upon which
to conclude that the first respondent's assertions in the answering affidavit are fictitious,
palpably implausible, far-fetched or otherwise untenable.
[41] Considering the relevant principles and different judgments warning against motion
proceedings in such matters, I do not see any reason why this matter should not be decided
on the basis of the admitted facts, together with the version as contained in the answering
and supplementary affidavits of the first respondent. In the end, as it was held in TIBMS (Ply)
Ltd tla Halo Underground Lighting Systems v Knight and Another:21
' ... Credibility is only capable of being addressed on paper when the assertions are palpably absurd
or demonstrably false. The threshold that had to be cleared is 'wholly fanciful and untenable'.
Moreover, the appetite to resolve paper contests by reference to the probabilities, though ever
present, is not appropriate.'
[42] Accordingly, this court finds that the disputes are not merely incidental or bare denials,
21 TIBMS (Ply) Ltd tla Halo Underground Lighting Systems v Knight and Another [2017] ALAC 59; (2017) 38 ILJ
2721 (LAC) para 29.
15
but it goes to the heart of the applicant's claim. It is not a matter capable of resolution through
affidavits alone, as it requires a thorough evidentiary inquiry, which motion proceedings do
not ordinarily allow. The applicant, having chosen to proceed via motion proceedings, must
stand or fall within the constraints imposed by this procedural mechanism. In light of the
material disputes of fact and the evidentiary deficiencies in the applicant's case, the
application cannot succeed.
Costs
[ 43] There is no compelling reason why the costs should not follow the result. The general
principle in cost orders is that costs are awarded to the successful party unless exceptional
circumstances justify a departure from this rule. No such circumstances have been
demonstrated in this matter.
Order:
[44] Accordingly, the following order is granted:
The application is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale.
DEANE AJ
Appearances:
Attorney for the Plaintiff:
Instructed by/ c/o
Attorney for 1 st & 2nd Defendant:
Instructed by/ c/o TM Kanyane
Lovius Block Incorporated
Bloemfontein
M Khumalo
Chauke N.B Attorneys
Bloemfontein 16