SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Not reportable /Reportable
Case no: A211 /2024
In the matter between
MBUTI PAUL SEDI APPELLANT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Sedi v The State (A211/2024) [2025]
Coram: Van Zyl J, et Deane A J
Heard : 19 May 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for
hand -down is deemed to be 14:30 on 29 May 2025 .
____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
____________________________________________________________________
The following order is made:
1 The appeal against both conviction s and sentence s are dismissed.
2 The conviction s and sentence s imposed by the regional court on the appellant are
confirmed.
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________
Deane AJ (Van Zyl J concurring)
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal against both conviction and sentence as handed down by
the regional court magistrate on 8th May 2023 , on two counts of rape read with the
provisions of section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 .
[2] The appellant's grounds for challenging his conviction and sentence can be
briefly summarised as follows :1
(a) The court a quo erred in finding that the State proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(b) The court a quo erred in finding that there were no improbabilities in the
State’s case and that the State witnesses gave evidence in a satisfactory
manner .
(c) The court a quo erred in not properly evaluating the State witnesses ’
evidence .
(d) The court did not properly evaluate the contradictions found in the State
witnesses ’ evidence .
(e) The court a quo erred in accepting the version of the State and rejecting
the version of the appellant and by finding that the contradictions between the
1 Notice of Appeal , pp. 307-309.
appe llant and his witness were material .
(f) The court a quo erred in finding that the sentence of life imprisonment is
the only appropriate sentence.
(g) The court a quo erred in not finding that there are substantial and
compelling circumstances present for the deviation from the minimum
sentence .
(h) The court a quo did not properly consider the appellants’ personal
circumstances or the element of rehabilitation .
(i) The court a quo erred in over emphasising the seriousness of the offence,
interest of society, the prevalence of the offence, the deterrent and retributive
effect of the sentence and the effect of the offence on the complainant .
Factual background
[3] It is not in dispute that the appellant had sexual intercourse on the da tes
mentioned in both the complainant’s evidence .2 It is also common cause that the
appellant met with the complainants at different places and taverns and on different
days. In both instances before the appellant met with the complainants, he did not
know them, and they also did not know the appellant. It is also not disputed that the
appellant had multiple intercourse with both complainants on each occasion .3
[4] The issue in dispute was whether or not there was consent .
Evidence
[5] Complainant 1 testified that , on 23 -26 February 2017, she was at the tavern
in Botha ville drinking when she saw the appellant sitting with a friend .
[6] Complainant 1 approached the appellant and asked for a cigarette from the
appellant . After chatting casually with the appellant, the complainant went back to
where she had been sitting. Complainant 1 left the tavern around 21h00 to board a
taxi to go home . While still in the taxi, but before it left , the appellant arrived and
2 Judgment, p 255.
3 Judgment, p. 256 -257.
boarded the same taxi which then left. Complainant 1 was the first to disembark. As
she did, the appellant asked her if the location was her home, to which she
confirmed .
[7] A few days later, the complainant was at home at night while others wer e
asleep when the appellant and another man arrived, knocking forcefully on the door.
They entered the residence and forcibly removed her, taking her to a shack where
the appellant repeatedly raped her. He later allowed her to leave but threatened to
kill her if she reported the incident. The complainant did not report the matter to the
police but disclosed it to her partner, who took no action.
[8] Complainant 1 further testified that, days later, the appellant again arrived at
her place with another man. He forcefully opened the door and took her by force to
the same place he had taken her before. He also raped her, but this time, he raped
her only once. The appellant and his companion then threatened the compl ainant
with violence, locked her inside the place, and left her there. Later that day, she
escaped through the window and proceeded directly to the police, where she laid
charges against the appellant . She further testified that the appellant did not use a
condom at any stage during sexual intercourse.
[9] In brief, Complainant 2 testified that, on the night of 25 to 26 March 2017,
she was at the tavern in Bothaville with a friend who later disappeared. She then
went outside to look for him but was unable to f ind him. While searching for her
boyfriend, the appellant approached her and told her that they must go. As she did
not know the appellant , she refused and asked why she should go with him. The
appellant then took out a knife, threatened her, and insisted that she must go. He
then forcibly took her to his place, where he led her into his shack and repeatedly
raped her until the next morning. At all times, the appellant never used a condom .
[10] The appellant's version is that he met the two complainants at different
taverns on different days and at different times. According to the appellant, the two
complainants were friendly towards him. He then proposed to each complainant, and
both accepted h is proposals. The appellant further testified that all was well between
him and the complainants on both occasions, and he even purchased some items for
them. He admitted that he had sexual intercourse with each complainant several
times, but he asserted t hat it was with their consent and denied having raped them.
[11] The State called four witnesses , two in each count. For the defence , the
appellant testified and called one witness who is his mother . Thereafter, the defence
closed its case.
Ad conviction
[12] It is trite law that the onus rests on the State to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. If the accused ’s version is reasonably possibly true, he is
entitled to his acquittal.4
[13] The guilt of an accused must be prove d beyond reasonable doubt.5 It is also
putative that the State bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. There exists no burden on the accused to prove his version or his
innocence. The accused’s version only has to be reasonabl y, possibly true.6
[14] In S v Mbuli , the Court, making reference to Moshephi and Others v R ,7 and
S v Hadebe and Others ,8 held that:9
‘The question for determination is whether, in the light of all the evidence
adduced at the trial, the guilt of the appellants was established beyond
reasonable doubt. The breaking down of a body of evidence into its
component parts is obviously a useful aid to a proper understanding and
evaluation of it. But, in doing so, one must guard against a tendency to focus
too intently upon the separate and individual part of what is, after all, a mosaic
of proof. Doubts about one aspect of the evidence led in a trial may arise
4 S v V 2000 (1) SA CR 453 (SCA) at 455A-C.
5 Ibid.
6 S v Sithole and Others 1999 (1) SACR 585 (W) at 593F ; S v Van Der Meyden 1999 (2) SA CR 79
(W) at 82C and S v Mattioda 1973 (1) PH H24 (NPD) .
7 Moshephi and Others v R (1980 -1984) LAC 57 at 59F -H.
8 S v Hadebe & Others [1997] ZASCA 86; 1998 (1) SACR 422 (SCA) at 426F -H.
9 S v Mbuli [2002] ZASCA 78; 2003 (1) SACR 97 (SCA) para 57 .
when that aspect is viewed in isolation. Those doubts may be set at rest when
it is evaluated agai n together with all the other available evidence. That is not
to say that a broad and indulgent approach is appropriate when evaluating
evidence. Far from it. There is no substitute for a detailed and critical
examination of each and every component in a b ody of evidence. But, once
that has been done, it is necessary to step back a pace and consider the
mosaic as a whole. If that is not done, one may fail to see the wood for the
trees. ’
[15] In considering the judgment of the court a quo , this court has to be mindful
that a court of appeal is not at liberty to depart from the trial court’s findings of fact
and credibility, unless they are vitiated by irregularity, or unless an examination of
the record reveals that those findings are patently wrong .10
[16] It is further trite law that the evidence of a single witness must be
approached and evaluated with the necessary caution.11 However, the exercise of
such caution should and ought not to displace the exercise of common sense.12 All
the contradictions, inconsiste ncies and probabilities must be weighed up to arrive at
a conclusion that the State has prove d its case beyond reasonable doubt.
[17] A court of appeal will be extremely reticent to interfere with the credibility
findings of the trial court as well as the eval uation of the oral testimony, given the
better position of the trial court in hearing and appraising the evidence of the
witnesses. It will, however, interfere if it is convinced that the credibility findings
made by the trial court are patently incorrect.13
[18] The appellant argues that the court did not properly evaluate the evidence of
the complainant and the State witness in that:14
10 S v Francis [1991] 2 All SA 9 (C) ; 1991 (1) SACR 198 (A) at 198J -199A and S v Hadebe and
Others 1997 (2) SACR 641 (SCA) at 645E -F.
11 S v M 1992 (2) SA CR 188 (W) at 194H-I; J v S [1998] ZASCA 13; [1998] 2 All SA 267 (A); 1998 (2)
SA 984 (SCA).
12 S v Aardman and Ander 1968 (3) SA 339 (A).
13 S v Mkhohle 1990 (1) SACR 92 at 100 E.
14 Appellants Heads of Argument, p. 6.
(a) The State called the complainant in count 2 , Ms D[...] E[...] M[...] , and her
witness , Ms M[...] A[...] K[...] to prove the case pertaining to count 2 .
(b)The complainant, Ms M[...] , was a single witness with regard to the charge.
The evidence of a single witness must be evaluated with caution. The court a
quo did not properly evaluate the complainant’s evidence.
(c) The complainant’s evidence was that the appellant took her as she was
leaving the tavern . However, it’s improbable that , at that stage , there were no
people outside the tavern. She testified that the re were a lot of people in and
outside the tavern while she was there.
(d)The complainant conceded that she was moderately intoxicated at th e stage
that the appellant took her from the tavern . At no stage , at or near the tavern , did
she try to alert anyone’s attention for help .
(e)It is further strange that the complainant did not try to complain to the mother
of the appellant and inform her that she was there against her will . The reason
for her not telling the mother about the rape is improbable. Why , if the mother
feared the appellant , would she (the mother ) still confront the appellant over a
tent and accuse him of stealing her items .
(f) It is therefore more probable that Ms M[...] was with the appellant out of free
will and that no rape occurred. The complainant testified that she did not want
the mother ’s help .
(g)The complainant never made a report to Ms K[...] that the appellant raped her
and neither did she inform the police. It is submitted that it's more probable that
the appellant never raped her and that's why she did not make her report .
(h)According to the complainant ’s evidence , the appellant told Ms K[...] that he
will not rape the complainant again . However, Ms K[...] never testified that the
appellant mentioned anything about rape. It is submitted that the complainant
was tailored in her version .
[19] The heads of argument of the appellant levels various other criticisms of the
court a quo including a finding by the court that the J88 of the complainants neither
supported or disputed the allegations , contradictions in the evidence of the State
witnesses pertaining to count 2 , the credibility of the evidence by the State
witnesses , the court ’s failure to properly evaluate the improbabilities in the State's
case and that the court a quo erred in rejecting the version of the appellant .15
[20] The State on the other hand submitted, and correctly so, that the appeal
against conviction is void of merit s and that the trial court did not misdirect itself
because it had properly evaluated the evidence before it to come to a just decision.
[21] From a conspectus of the judgment , one can clearly see that the trial court
carefully assessed the reliability and consistency of witness testimonies, determining
that their accounts were credible and corroborated by other evidence. The court held
as follows:
‘. . . looking at N[...] S[...]’s version, she never deviated therefrom, and she
struck me as a reliable witness. She was so traumati sed by what she said
accused did to her and was so emotional when she gave account of what
happened. She testified and was cross -examined at length by the defence
long after the incident happened but never deviated from her version.”16
The court further wrote that :
‘. . . despite her emotions she could narrate clearly and in full details how and
where she met with the accused. She explained how the accused arrived at
her place, where he took her and how the accused sexually abused her. Her
evidence could not be faulted that the accused had no choice but to build his
version around her testimony and only say there was consent. ’17
[22] Looking at the second complainants’ evidence , the court held that :
‘. . . the complainant in count 2, just like N[...] she also stuck to her version
and never deviated. She also impressed me as an honest and reliable witness
whose evidence could not be faulted. I have no reason not to believe that she
15 Appellants Heads of Argument, pp. 7-9.
16 Judgment, pp. 258-259.
17 Judgment, p. 258-259.
was with her boyfriend and the boyfriend disappeared. ’18
The court also noted that the complainants’ versions were consistent with the various
medical reports of both complainant s.19
[23] The State further submits that single witness es’ evidence must be
satisfactory , not perfect . In dealing with acceptance of single witness testimony the
court in S v Artman and Another (S v Artman) ,20 followed the case of R v Mokoena21
and stated that ‘[w]hat was required was that her testimony should be clear and
satisfactory in all material respects . . .’. Further , in S v Artman , the court stated
that:22
‘. . . while there is always a need for caution in such cases, the ultimate
requirement is proof beyond reasonable doubt; and courts must guard against
their reasoning tending to become stifled by formalism. In other words, the
exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common
sense . . .’
[24] It is apparent from the evaluation of the evidence presented that the trial
court was indeed alive to the fact that this was single witness testimony in respect of
the rape and was alert to the danger’s attendant thereto.23 The record indeed
evinces that the evidence of the complainant was properly scrutinised and that the
cautionary rule was properly applied in the appraisal of her evidence as a single
witness.24 The court held that ‘both complainants in both counts 1 and 2 being Notice
(sic) S[...] and E[...] M[...] gave satisfactory account in all material aspects as
required by section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ’.
[25] The court further h eld that :
18 Judgment, p. 259.
19 Judgment, p. 263.
20 S v Artman and Another 1968 (3) SA 339 (A) (S v Artman ) at 34 1A-B.
21 R v Mokoena 1956 (3) SA 81 (AD) at 85-86 .
22 S v Artman at 341B -C.
23 Judgment, p. 258.
24 Judgment, p. 259.
‘. . . looking first at N[...] S[...]’s version, she never deviate d therefrom, and
she struck me as a reliable witness . . . her evidence could not be faulted that
accused (sic) had no choice but to build his version around her testimony and
only say there was consent . . .’25
[26] The court also found that both complainants were single witnesses regarding
the sexual intercourse. However, a reading of the transcript and the judgment
highlights that the two other witnesses in each case materially corroborated the
complainants, and the ir versions remained consistent with those of the complainants.
Both witnesses in both accounts testified that the appellant was violent towards the
complainants. They further testified that the appellant , not only threatened the
complainants , but also tho se who attempted to intervene. The court further held that
is no doubt from the evidence that everyone around the appellant was afraid of
him.26
[27] Whilst the court was alive to the fact that there were contradictions in the
State witnesses’ testimonies , it eventually found these contradictions to be
immaterial . The threats of violence and the trauma of events must be considered in
the evaluation of all the evidence .27 The court wrote :
‘. . . in cross -examination to Teboho , the defense just stated that he
contradicted N[...] however I disagree with this. One should bear in mind that
there are two incidents where the accused took N[...] by force from her home.
Teboho however testified only on one incident. The incidents happene d a long
time ago, so Teboho could not exactly say what the date was and if it was the
first or the second incident, and could therefore in any way suggest that he
contradicted N[...] as his version was materially consistent with the events of
one of the in cidents (sic) . . . Another discrepancy highlighted by the defense
in cross examination was what weapons did the accused and his companions
use, or what weapons they were carrying . Whether these were knives or
screwdrivers. This discrepancy in my opinion is immaterial because at the end
25 Judgment, pp. 258 -259.
26 Judgment, p 259.
27 Judgment, p.255.
of the day both N[...] and Teboho corroborated each other that the accused
was wild and that he used violence and threats of violence which caused N[...]
to go with him. ’28
In reaching this decision, this court cannot find that t here are any signs of
misdirection or procedural errors in the court’s handling of evidence.
[28] Indeed, regarding the violence , the court wrote that the two witnesses in both
counts testified that the appellant was violent towards the complainants and they
further testified that the appellant , not only threaten ed the complainants , but also
those who tried to intervene . The court found that there was no doubt , from the
witnesses ’ evidence , that everyone around the appellant was afraid of the
appellant .29
[29] In this matter , the complainant s and other State witnesses provided
testimony which proves beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed rape
offence s against the complainant s.
[30] In evaluating the totality of the evidence before it , the court a quo correctly
regarded the appellant ’s version as false, improbable, and not consistent with the
truth and therefore not reasonably possibly true .30 The court specifically wr ote that ‘if
one looks at the accused, he on the other hand was not a reliable witness as his
version was not reasonably possibly true .’31 On the basis of the improbabilities in the
appellant’s version, the court found that the State’s witnesses were credible and their
evidence was accepted as true. The court further determined that these witnesses
were honest and reliable, with no apparent reason to doubt their testimony or
suggest that they had falsely implicated the appellant .32
[31] The court a quo correctly weigh ed up all the probabilities and improbabilities
of the State’s case and that of the defence and found the appellant ’s version to be
28 Judgment, 260.
29 Judgment, 259.
30 Judgment, p p. 258-259.
31 Judgment, p. 264.
32 Judgment, pp. 263 -264.
improbable.33 The court a quo , accordingly, evaluated the evidence of the State and
correctly concluded that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.34
Ad sentence
[32] The cardinal principle governing an appeal against sentence is that
punishment of an offender is pre -eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial
court. It is putative that the court hearing an appeal against sentence should be
vigilant not to erode the sentencing discretion entrusted to the trial court. It is well
established that interference by the appellate court is warranted only if the discretion
of the trial court was not judicially and properly exercised or if there exists a marked
disparity b etween the sentence imposed by the trial court and the sentence that the
court of appeal would have imposed had it been the trial court .35 The test to be
surmounted in every appeal against sentence is whether the sentence is vitiated by
irregularity or misdirection or disturbing inappropriateness.36 This was seamlessly
captured in S v Malgas37 which articulated the principle as follows:
‘A court exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot, in the absence of material
misdirection by the trial court, approach the question of sentence as if it were
the trial court and then substitute the sentence arrived at by it simply because
it prefers it. To d o so would be to usurp the sentencing discretion of the trial
court. Where material misdirection by the trail court vitiates the exercise of
that discretion, an appellate court is of course entitled to consider the question
of sentence afresh. In doing s o, it assesses the sentence as if it were a court
of first instance and the sentence imposed by the trial court has no relevance.
As it is said, an appellate court is at large. However, even in the absence of
material misdirection, an appellate court may yet be justified in interfering with
the sentence imposed by the trial court. It may do so when the disparity
between the sentence of the trial court and the sentence which appellate court
33 Judgment, p. 264.
34 Judgment, p. 255 -278.
35 S v Pillay 1977 (4) SA 551 (A) at 535E -G; see also S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 857D -F; S v
Shapiro 1994 (1) SACR 112 (A) at 119 J-120C; and S v Anderson 1964 (3) SA 494 (A) at 495D -E.
36 S v Makondo [2001] ZASCA 121; [2002] 1 All SA 431 (A) ; see also S v Mothibe 1977 (3) SA 823
(A) at 830D.
37 S v Malgas [2001] ZASCA 30; [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA); 2001 (1) SACR
469 (A) para 12.
would have imposed had it been the trial court is so marked that i t can be that
it can properly be described as ‘shocking’, ‘startling’ or ‘disturbingly
inappropriate’. It must be emphasised that in the latter situation the appellate
court is not at large in the sense in which it is at large in the former. In the
latter situation, it may not substitute the sentence which it thinks appropriate
merely because it does not accord with the sentence imposed by the trial
court or because it prefers it to that sentence. It may only do so where the
difference is so substantial th at it attracts epithets of the kind I have
mentioned. ’
[33] It is trite law that the sentence of an accused person must be balanced
between the interest of society, the nature, seriousness and the prevalence of the
offence and the personal circumstances of the accused.38 The seriousness of the
crime that the appellant has been convicted of was given prominence in S v S :39
‘The essence of the crime is an assault on the bodily integrity of a woman’s
femininity. If it is a function of the criminal law to protect members of society
from those who would employ illegal means to prey on those less able to
defend themselves, then rape is rightly regarded as a crime of the utmost
gravity .’
[34] In S v Ncheche ,40 the court expounded upon the gravity of the offence as
follows:
‘Rape is an appalling and utterly outrageous crime, gaining nothing of any
worth for the perpetrator and inflicting terrible and horrific suffering and
outrage on the victim and her family. It th reatens every woman, and
particularly the poor and the vulnerable. In our country, it occurs far too
frequently and is currently aggravated by the grave risk of the transmission of
Aids. A woman’s body is sacrosanct and anyone who violates it does so at hi s
peril and our Legislature, and the community at large correctly expect our
38 S v Banda and Others 1991 (2) SA (BGD) at 355A.
39 S v S 1995 (1) SACR 50 (ZS) at 61 D.
40 S v Ncheche [2005] ZAGPHC 21; 2005 (2) SACR 386 (W) para 35 .
courts to punish rapists severely. ’
[35] The interests of the community were properly enunciated in S v Chapman :41
‘Woman in South Africa are entitled to protection of these rights. They have a
legitimate claim to walk peacefully on the streets, to enjoy their shopping and
their entertainment, to go and come from work, and to enjoy the peace and
tranquility of their hom es without fear, the apprehension and the insecurity
which constantly diminishes the quality and enjoyment of their lives. The
courts are under a duty to send a clear message to other potential rapists and
to the community. We are determined to protect the equality, dignity and
freedom of all women and we shall show no mercy to those who seek to
invade those rights. ’
[36] On sentencing , the court a quo stated that :
‘. . . society depends on courts for protection of the vulnerable. Courts are
expected by the com munities to appropriately deal with the offences which
are rife and serious. One way of doing this is to impose proper sentences that
fit the offences to deter not only the perpetrators, but other would be
offenders. We are all aware that somewhere , somehow , daily, members of the
society are protesting in an effort to express their dissatisfaction with the
lenient ways offenders are treated by the courts. It is for these reasons that
minimum sentences, in offences like these, were ordained by the
legislature. ’42
Taking this into consideration the court properly considered , the appellant’s personal
mitigating factors , including that the appellant was married with a child,43 the
prevalence of the crime44 and the interests of society,45 the gravity and type of
41 S v Chapman [1997] ZASCA 45; [1997] 3 All SA 277 (A); 1997 (3) SACR 341 (A) at 345A -DC.
42 Judgment, p. 283.
43 Judgment, p, 284.
44 Judgment, p. 283.
45 Judgment, p. 284.
offence , the way in which the offence was committed,46 the seriousness of the
offence ,47 and the trauma and injuries suffered by the complainant . Accordingly, it
cannot be said that the court a quo failed to exercise judicial discretion in a manner
that ensures a fair and just sentencing determination. Moreover, the court observed
that the appellant demonstrated a lack of remorse, which adversely af fects his
prospects for rehabilitation.
[37] The court further considered the appellant’s established pattern of violent
conduct towards women, as evidenced by his prior convictions, in determining the
appropriate sentence .
[38] Upon a comprehensive assessment of the evidence, the court determined
that the aggravating factors significantly outweighed the mitigating considerations.
Consequently, the court correctly concluded that no compelling or substantial
circumstances exist ed to warrant a deviation from the prescribed sentence .
[39] It is also correct that a court hearing an appeal in which the minimum
sentence legislation has application ‘does not possess the proverbial clean slate on
which to scribble its preferred sentence ’.48 The sentencing discretion of the trial
court is circumscribed by law. It is further required that the finding of substantial and
compelling circumstances must be able to stand scrutiny and not be based on the
whim of the presiding officer.49 The trial court correctly took the various factors into
account and rightly so imposed what it considered to be a just and appropriate
sentence.
[40] Notwithstanding the personal and mitigating factors tendered for
consideration, the prescribed minimum senten ce was, in the totality of the
circumstances encountered here , the only fair and just sentence. The trial court
correctly found that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances present.
I am of the view that the manner in which the complainant s were taken advantage of
and the inhumane and degrading treatment they were subjected to under the
46 Judgment, pp. 284 -285.
47 Judgment, p. 284.
48 Ncango v S [2018] ZAFSHC 108 para 45.
49 S v Matyiti [2010] ZASCA 127; 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) ; [2010] 2 All SA 424 (SCA) para 23 .
circumstances cannot justify a deviation from the imposition of the applicable
minimum sentence.
[41] Having said that, I am content that the trial court did not err or misdirect itself
in any manner. Nor does there exist a disparity between the sentence imposed by
the trial court and the one which this court would have imposed if it were the trial
court. There thus exists no reason that warrants tampering with the sentence
imposed by the trial court.
Order
In the result, the following order is made:
1 The appeal against both conviction s and sentence s are dismissed.
2 The conviction s and sentence s imposed by the regional court on the
appellant are confirmed.
_______________
Deane AJ
I concur
_______________
Van Zyl J
Appearances
For the appellant: V Abrahams
Instructed by: Legal Aid S outh Africa, Bloemfontein
For the respondent: D Pretorius
Instructed by: National Director of Public Prosecutions , Bloemfontein.