M.A.H and Another v Minister of Correctional Services and Others (7472/13 ; 12199/13) [2025] ZAWCHC 220 (26 May 2025)

81 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Negligence — Duty of care — Parents of toddler seeking damages for drowning incident at Mandela House — Plaintiffs alleging negligence on part of Minister's employees for failing to secure premises and swimming pool — Minister denying liability, asserting that premises were not open to the public and that plaintiffs' son had no authorization to enter — Court finding that Minister's employees failed to take reasonable steps to secure premises and prevent access to swimming pool, constituting negligence — Minister held liable for damages suffered by plaintiffs.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


Case Name: M[...] A[...] H[...] (Plaintiffs) v THE MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (First Defendant)

Citation: Case Numbers 7472/13 and 12199/13

Date: The judgment reflects proceedings with key events on 13 August 2010 and an in loco inspection on 3 June 2024


Reportability


This case is reportable due to its exploration of the boundaries of the duty of care owed by state-controlled public institutions. The judgment examines whether a government body, through its employees, can be held liable for negligence where failures in security measures allegedly led to the tragic drowning of a child at a site of significant national heritage.


The matter is significant because it addresses the intersection of public safety, administrative responsibility, and the standard of care required in maintaining premises that have both historical and public interest attributes. The case highlights the challenges of delimiting legal duty under unusual circumstances.


Furthermore, the consolidation of separate actions and the separation of issues concerning liability and quantum underscore the complexity of negligence claims in government-related contexts, thereby making the case of public interest and legal import.


Cases Cited


No specific precedent cases are provided in the excerpt of the judgment that require reference with full citations. The judgment focuses on the factual matrix and the application of common law principles rather than relying on detailed case references.


Legislation Cited


The judgment as provided does not explicitly list any statutory provisions or legislation. Instead, it concentrates on common law principles related to negligence and the tort of wrongful omission.


Rules of Court Cited


The judgment makes explicit reference to Rule 33(4) of the applicable Rules of Court. This rule was central in the procedural arrangement whereby the issue of the merits (liability) was separated from that of quantum (the extent of damages).


HEADNOTE


Summary


The case arises from a tragic incident at the internationally renowned Mandela House, where on 13 August 2010 a toddler drowned in the swimming pool located at the property. The plaintiffs, the parents of the child, claim damages for serious psychological injuries, alleging that the defendants’ employees negligently failed to secure the premises to prevent public access. This negligence reportedly included not locking the property or the gate leading to the swimming pool and not taking reasonable steps such as providing an adequate cover for the pool.


The judgment considers the facts surrounding the management and security of the Mandela House, a property with a prominent historical standing as the place from which Nelson Mandela was released. It further scrutinizes the legal duty imposed on the state, via its employee-controlled department, to ensure safe conditions on the premises despite the property’s status as not being entirely open to the public by its controlled nature.


In addressing the claims, the court narrowed the issues to purely questions of negligence and wrongfulness, thus postponing discussions concerning the actual injuries and their quantum. The analysis in the judgment highlights the potential foreseeability of risk and examines the conduct of both the defendants’ employees and the plaintiffs in relation to the tragic incident.


Key Issues


The central issues in the case include whether the state, through its designated employees, owed a legal duty to secure the Mandela House and its swimming pool against the risk of public access. The court had to consider if the alleged failure to secure the premises amounted to negligence and wrongful omission. It was also necessary to assess whether any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, particularly the failure to adhere to entry restrictions, played a role in the occurrence of the tragic incident.


Held


The court’s decision, as reflected in the judgment, was confined to establishing whether the defendants’ actions met the requisite threshold for negligence and wrongfulness under common law. The judgment indicated that, during the trial on the merits, the question of liability would be determined separately from the issue of damages. Although the defendants contended that the first plaintiff’s own negligence in permitting unauthorized entry mitigated their liability, the court’s detailed analysis of the evidence and legal duty suggests that the matter of liability rests on a balanced consideration of both parties’ conduct.


The court underscored that the separation of liability from quantum is an important procedural outcome, and while the decision on negligence was central, the issue of causation and legal remedy remained to be resolved in subsequent proceedings.


THE FACTS


The Mandela House, historically significant as the location from which Nelson Mandela emerged to freedom, is situated adjacent to the Drakenstein Correctional Centre, formerly known as Victor Verster Prison. On the afternoon of 13 August 2010, a tragic incident occurred when a toddler, H[...] H[...], fell into the swimming pool located in the house’s backyard. This event not only disrupted the serenity of an international landmark but also resulted in the loss of a young life, leading to serious claims of negligence against the state.


At the time of the incident, control and possession of the premises, including the swimming pool, were held by the Department of Correctional Services under the authority of the Minister. The plaintiffs contended that the premises were left unlocked and unsecured, thereby inviting unauthorized access. They alleged that appropriate safety measures, such as locking the gate and installing a cover over the pool, were neglected by the defendants’ employees.


The matter was further complicated by the defendants’ alternative narrative, which placed responsibility on the conduct of the first plaintiff, who allegedly failed to secure the premises following his own unauthorized entry. This factual dispute between the parties framed the trial’s focus on determining whether the negligence on the part of the defendants or contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs was the proximate cause of the incident.


THE ISSUES


The legal questions presented in this case revolve around the existence and breach of a duty of care owed by the state to the public on premises under its control. The court had to decide if the failure to secure the Mandela House and its swimming pool constituted a breach of that duty, thereby rendering the state liable for the tragic drowning of a child.


A further issue was whether any contributory negligence existed on the part of the first plaintiff by permitting or facilitating unauthorized entry into the premises. The extent to which the defendants’ dismissal of their own liability in favor of fault on the part of the plaintiff could influence the overall determination of negligence was also a matter of legal inquiry.


Finally, the separation of the issue of liability from that of quantum—the measurement of damages—was a procedural question of importance in ensuring that the merits of the negligence claim could be examined independently before addressing the extent of injury-related loss.


ANALYSIS


The court’s reasoning involved a careful evaluation of both documentary and oral evidence. In reviewing the site layout plans, photographs, and witness affidavits contained in Exhibit A, the court sought to establish the factual status of the Mandela House and the surrounding premises as they existed on 13 August 2010. This evidence provided context for understanding whether the security deficiencies alleged by the plaintiffs were indeed present at the time of the incident.


In its analysis, the court considered the foreseeability of the risk that young children might access an unsecured swimming pool in a property of national significance. The legal duty of care was examined in light of the fact that the premises, although under state control, were not automatically open to the public without prior authorization. The court weighed the competing narratives, including the defendants’ assertion that any negligence was attributable to the plaintiff’s failure to secure the entry points, thereby contributing to the tragic event.


The comprehensive scrutiny of both the physical evidence and testimonial recollections—albeit affected by the passage of time—helped the court distill the essential factors. The procedural decision to separate the issues of liability and damages allowed for a focus solely on whether the defendants’ omission or wrongful act demonstrated a breach of the duty of care owed to persons on the premises.


REMEDY


The relief sought by the plaintiffs was for compensation covering past and future expenses, loss of earnings, and general damages for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities of life. While the trial limited its scope to the merits of the negligence claim, a procedural order was granted by agreement under Rule 33(4) to separate the issues of liability and quantum.


This remedial strategy allowed the court to first decide on whether the defendants’ alleged negligence was sufficient to establish liability without the distraction of quantifying damages. It also ensured that detailed assessment concerning the extent of injury and financial recompense would be addressed in a subsequent phase of the proceedings.


By segregating the issues, the court aimed to maintain clarity in its judgment and preserve a structured approach to resolving the complex interrelated questions of duty, breach, causation, and damage assessment in cases involving public institutions.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment reaffirms the principle that a duty of care may arise for entities or employees responsible for premises that could invite public entry, particularly where a foreseeable risk exists. The duty to secure such premises is underscored by the requirement that reasonable steps must be taken to prevent unauthorized access when such access might lead to serious harm.


It also highlights the importance of contributory negligence as a factor in the overall determination of liability. The court’s analysis indicates that if a party’s own actions facilitate or contribute to an incident, this may mitigate or even preclude the imposition of full liability on the other side.


Moreover, the case exemplifies the procedural utility of separating the determination of liability from the assessment of damages. This approach, as demonstrated through the invocation of Rule 33(4) of the Rules of Court, allows for a focused consideration of the legal and factual issues underpinning the duty of care, independent of the eventual quantum of compensation.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy








IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, C APE TOWN

Case Number: 7472/13
12199/13

In the matter between:

M[...] A[...] H[...] First Plaintiff

A[...] H[...] H[...] Second Plaintiff

and

THE MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES First Defendant

THE MINISTER OF ARTS AND CULTURE Second Defendant

THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS Third Defendant

JUDGMENT


MAGARDIE AJ

Introduction

1. The Drakenstein Correctional Centre , previously known as the Victor Verster
Prison, is located midway between Paarl and Franschoek in the rolling hills and
valleys of the Cape Winelands. Adjacent to and some distance from the high walls
and gates of the prison complex, lies a three-bedroom house.

2. The house is shaded in the front by some fir trees , with a garden and a swimming
pool in the back yard. Th e house is internationally famous . It was here that that our
late former President Nelson Mandela spent the last 14 months of his 27 years of
imprisonment . On 11 February 1990 he walked through the prison gates to
freedom.

3. On the afternoon of 13 August 2010, the tranquil surrounds of the Mandela House
were shattered . The h ouse became the scene of a tragedy. H[...] H[...] , a toddler
who was then 18 months old, fell into the swimming pool in the back yard of the
Mandela House . He drowned.

4. The plaintiffs in this action are H[...] ’s parents. They claim damages for serious
chronic major depressive mood disorder and severe post -traumatic stress disorder
which they claim to have suffered as a result of the drowning of their so n at the
Mandela House . The plaintiffs seek to hold the defendants liable for what they
allege to be the wrongful and negligent failure of their employees to take
reasonable steps to prevent H[...] ’s drowning .

5. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants ’ employees were negligent in that they
failed to lock and secure the Mandela House premises and failed to lock and
secure the gates leading to the swimming pool . They further allege that the
defendant’s employees failed to take steps to ensu re that the swimming pool was
covered with appropriate covering to prevent young children from falling into the
swimming pool and drowning.

6. The plaintiffs’ instituted two separate actions against the defendants. The actions
were later consolidated . At the commencement of the trial , the plaintiffs withdrew
their claims against the second defendant and the third defendant . The claims
proceeded only against the first defendant (“the Minister”). The parties agreed that
the issues for determination would be limited to the questions of negligence and
wrongfulness.

7. The issue of whether the incident had caused certain injuries to the plaintiffs would
stand over for later adjudication together with the issues of quantum, should the
plaintiffs be successful on the merits. An order by agreement was granted
separating the issue of the merits and quantum in terms of Rule 33(4).

8. On 3 June 2024 an inspection in loco was held at the premises where the incident
occurred. The trial then proceeded solely on the merits.

The pleadings

9. It is common cause that on the day of the incident on 13 August 2010, the control
and possession of the Mandela House premises and the swimming pool itself,
vested in the Department of Correctional Services, (“the Department”) . The
Department resorts under the Minister.

10. The Minister initially raised a defence that the premises and swimming pool were
in the possession and und er the control of an independent building contractor,
Nolitha (Pty) Ltd (“Nolitha”) . He pleaded that at on the day of the incident Nolitha
was conducting renovations and repairs to the swimming pool. Nolitha had thus
assumed liability for any injury, loss or damage caused whilst the premises and the
swimming pool were in its possession and control. The Minister did not persist with
the Nolitha defence at the trial.

11. The plaintiffs claim in their amended particulars of claim, that at all material times,
the premises and the swimming pool at the Mandela House were unlocked,
unsecured and open to members of the public. The first defendant alternatively the
second and third defendants , according to the plaintiffs, owed the public a t the
premises a legal duty to take reasonable steps against the occurrence of events
such as the one that resulted in the drowning of their son .

12. These reasonable steps , as pleaded in the plaintiffs ’ amended particulars of claim,
entailed inter -alia ensuring that the premises were locked and secured, that the
gate to the swimming pool was locked and secured and that the swimming pool
was covered with appropriate covering so as to prohibit young children from falling
into th e swimming pool. The plaintiffs plead that the defendants ’ legal duty entailed
that young children were prohibited from entering the premises and getting access
to the swimming pool. The y claim that the incident was caused by the sole
negligence and/or wro ngful omission of the defendants ’ employees , who
wrongfully failed to take one or more of these reasonable steps which required by
their legal duty to the public at the premises.

13. The plaintiffs plead that a reasonable person in the position of the defendants ,
could or should have foreseen th e reasonable possibility that failure to take
reasonable steps to guard against the occurrence of the incident, could cause a
member of the public a t the premises to fall into the swimming pool, causing such
member of the public to drown. Both plaintiffs, according to their particulars of
claim, have suffered damages in the form of past and estimated future hospital,
medical and expenses, past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity and
general damages for loss of amenities of life and pain and suffering. The sequelae
of the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs their nature, effects and duration and
whether the incident had caused them to suffer these injuries, did not however
feature in the trial , given the formal separation of the issues of liability and
quantum.

14. The defendants den y each element o f delictual liablity asserted by the plaintiffs .
Firstly, the defendants deny that the premises including the swimming pool were
open to members of the public and were unlocked and unsecured . Members of the
public who wished to have access to the premises, according to the defendants,
were required to seek and obtain authorization from the Area Commissioner or his
delegate. The plaintiffs did not obtain such authorization and their son, so the
defendants plead, had no authority to enter the premises, which includes the
swimming pool.

15. The existence of the legal duty to the public alleged by the plaintiffs is denied . So
too are the plaintiffs ’ allegations relating to wrongful omissions and negligence on
the part of the defendants.

16. With regard to negligence, the defendants plead that the incident was caused by
the sole negligence of the first plaintiff in that h e inter-alia failed to seek and obtain
permission to enter the premises including the swimming pool and accessed the
premises without having obtained authorization to do so. The defendants plead
that after having left the premises including the swimming pool, the first plaintiff left
an entrance or entrances to the premises open and/or failed to secure that the
entrance(s) to the premises were closed and secured . This enabled members of
the public and his minor son to enter the premises. The first plaintiff, the
defendants plea d, failed to supervi se his minor son and ensure that his minor son
did not access the premises and the swimming pool.

The Mandela House and its surrounds

17. I commence with an overview and description of the main features of the Mandela
House and the areas surrounding it. At the commencement of the trial, the parties
by agreement introduced a bundle of documents which was marked as “Exhibit A”.
The parties agreed that the documents contained in Exhibit A would serve as
evidence of what they purpo rt to be without admitting the contents thereof. The
status of these documents has also been recorded in an agreed pre-trial minute
dated 29 August 2023 .

18. The minute records that the parties had agreed that documents or copies of
documents in the bundl e to be used at the hearing of the trial, will without further
proof, serve as evidence of what they purport to be. The documents contained in
Exhibit A included a 2008 site layout plan of the Mandela House and an adjacent
house thereto, various photograph s of the premises, witness affidavits and records
from the inquest proceedings held subsequent to the incident.

19. The parties’ witnesses were largely testifying about events which had occurred on
13 August 2010, some 14 years ago. This understandably created some difficulties
in the accuracy of their recollections of certain events. In addition, it became clear
from the evidence that various physical aspects of the Mandela House, for
example the location of gates on the premises , had changed since the incident on
13 August 2010. The documentary evidence in Exhibit A as well as the oral
evidence does however give some indication of the situation which pertained at
the Mandela House on 13 August 2010.

20. The Mandela House and its immediate surrounds lie off a winding gravel road
which is reached from the main Schuurmansfontein Road across the road from the
prison complex . There is a nearby farm, referred to as “Kellerman Plaas” , situate d
in an area off Sch uurmansfontein Road and across the road from the area where
the Mandela House is located .

21. According to the 2008 site layout plan, the Mandela House at that stage comprised
of three bedrooms, a bathroom, study, dining room, kitchen and a family room.
The swimming pool where the incident occurred is situated at the back of the
house. It is not enclosed by a fence. The external features of the Mandela H ouse
as depicted in the layout plan , include a double garage and a brick wall extending
along the front of the house. There is a further house adjacent to the Mandela
House. This house was referred to in the evidence as “the Botha House” due to its
occupation by Mr. Eben Botha, a Correctional Services employee, and his family.

22. The 2008 site layout plan depicts two pedestrian gates in the front area of the
Mandela House. The first pedestrian gate is located on the southern and left had
side of the Mandela house . This gate is a metal gate with a latch and attached to
two metal poles and a wire fence in front of the Mandela House. It was referred to
in the evidence as “Gate 4”. Gate 4 is the pedestrian gate which provides an
entrance to the Mandela House from the gravel road in front of the house.

23. The second pedestrian gate is depicted in the 2008 site layout plan as being
located on the northern side of the Mandela H ouse. This gate is a large oval
shaped double metal gate . It was referred to in the evidence as “the Freedom
Gate”. The 2008 site layout plan depicts a further gate on the southern and left -
hand side of the Mandela House. This gate was referred as “Gate 2”.

24. Gate 2 is depicted in the photographic evidence as a large solid black metal gate
attached to the side wall of the Botha House . It is depicted in the 2008 site layout
plan as being part of an “existing 1 800m vib wall”. The reference to “vib” refers to
Vibracrete is a precast concrete product made from a mixture of sand, cement and
stone . It is commonly in slabs for boundary walls. The 2008 site layout plan depicts
Gate 2 as being part of an existing vibracrete wall which served as the border
between the Mandela House and the Botha House. It appears that the Botha
House was at some stage occupied by an individual who prepared Presiden t
Mandela’s meals during his incarceration at Drakenstein . Hence it is referred to in
the 2008 site layout plan as “the chef ’s house.” As stated earlier, a t the time of the
incident th e chef’s house was occupied by Mr . Eben Botha, a Correctional
Services employee, and his wife.

25. The Botha House is depicted in the 2008 site layout plan as having an existing
wire fence in the front with a small pedestrian gate (“Gate 1” ) which provid es the
entrance to the front yar d of the Botha House. A concrete or stone pathway lies on
the other side of Gate 1 and leads to the front door of the living room of the Botha
House.

26. The photographs depict a further gate at the back of the Botha House (“Gate 7”) .
This gate leads directly to the swimming pool area at the back of the Mandela
House.

27. Lastly, and at the area close to the Schuurmansfontein Road, the property is
bordered by wire fencing with a steel entrance gate . This gate is the entrance to
the gravel road which leads to the Mandela House and the adjacent Botha House.

Factual evidence

Mr V Colyn

28. Mr Colyn was the plaintiffs ’ first witness. He is a forensic investigator by profession
and has practised as such for the last 40 years. He was instructed by the plaintiffs
attorneys to take photographs of the Mandela House premises and its surrounds,
including the gates at the Mandela House and the Botha House. He was also
instructed to locate witnesses such as children and adults who had made use of
the swimming pool at the Mandela House.

29. Mr. Colyn testified that he attended at the Mandela House on 17 April 2 024 and
took various photographs of the premises. His colleague, Mr. Rudi Raaths, had
previously attended at the premises during 2011. Mr. Raaths took photographs of
certain aspects of the house , which were pointed out by Mr. H[...] . Mr. Colyn
identified the wphotographs he had taken and those which had been taken by Mr.
Raaths.

30. In relation to the vibracrete wall referred to as “existing vib wall” in the 2008 site
layout p lan, Mr. Colyn confirmed that th is vibacrete wall was depicted in a
photograph taken by Mr. Raaths during 2011 . Gate 2 and the vibracrete wall
bordering the Mand ela House , were both present when he attended at the
premises during April 2024.

31. He took various measurements depicted in a photograph in Exhibit A. These
distances were taken with a measuring wheel . Mr. Colyn testified that there was
another metal gate situated 22 metres from Gate 2 which leads to the swimming
pool at the back of the Mandela House. This gate was referred to as “Gate 3”.
Gate 3 is depicted in the photographs as a small black metal swing gate fitted with
a metal sliding bolt gate latch , with the metal bolt sliding into a hole drilled into the
wall supporting Gate 3 . The swimming pool is situated 10 metres away from Gate
3.

32. The total distance from Gate 2, next to the Botha House, to the swimming pool is
32 metres. According to Mr. Colyn , Gate 3 was open when he atte nded at the
premises during April 2024. With regard to Gate 4, the pedestrian gate at the
entrance to the Mandela House, Mr. Colyn testified that according to his
photographs of this gate, the latch of th is gate was not aligned to its metal support
pole.

33. Mr Colyn identified a photograph in Exhibit A taken by Mr. Raaths during 2011 .
The photograph depicts Mr. H[...] pointing to the swimming pool being covered by
a safety net over the water surface. The photograph depicts the safety net secured
in place by fittings on the side of the wall of the swimming pool. He identified a
further photograph he had taken on 17 April 2024 . This photograph depict s the
swimming pool without the safety net over the water surface.

34. According to Mr. Colyn, he had to ma ke prior arrangements for access to the
Mandela House premises when he attended there in April 2024. On a previous
occasion he had not been allowed access to the premises. The entrance gate at
the road to the premises was closed at the time. T here w here se curity personnel at
the entrance gate . He testified that a ll of the gates i.e. Gate 1, Gate 2, Gate 3,
Gate 4, Gate 5 and Gate 6 , were open. The Freedom Gate was however closed.

35. Mr. Colyn conceded that when he attended at the premises in mid - April 2024, the
Botha House was no longer occupied and that security guards were present at the
Botha House. He was extensively questioned regarding why he had not mentioned
the presence of the security guards at the Botha Hous e in is evidence in chief.

36. He said that he had not been asked about the presence of security guards in April
2024 . He has however stated in his evidence in chief that he had to make prior
arrangements for his visit to the premises and that there was security at the
entrance gate. Mr Colyn had testified that the locking mechanism for Gate No.2
was not aligned and the other gates were in a worn state. C ounsel for the Minister
put it to him that the Mandela House was a historical buildin g and that it would
defeat its purpose and detracts from its ambience for renovations to be done to the
extent that the house was unrecognizable . Mr. Colyn did not dispute this.

37. He confirmed that most of the gates opened from the Mandela House side n ot the
Botha House side. With regard to Gate No 3, he accepted that the locking
mechanism for this gate was at the bottom of the gate on the side which directly
faces the swimming pool. He also accepted that one would have to be quite tall to
lean over and open this gate from the other side of the gate to which its locking
mechanism was attached.

Ms Luane Miriscia September

38. Ms. Luane September was the plaintiff’ s second witness. She is 25 years old. She
grew up on and previously lived a nearby farm in the Schuurmansfontein Road,
which was opposite the area where the Mandela House is located. There were
approximately 10 to 12 houses on the farm occupied by farm wo rkers and their
families. There were about 12 other children on the farm

39. She knew the Mandela House because when she was around 9 or 10 years old ,
she and her friends had as children often swam in the swimming pool at the
Mandela House. Some of the ot her children who swam at the pool, were younger
than her. She testified that they swam at the Mandela House pool because
although there was a nearby public swimming pool, it would cost them R5.00 each
as entrance fees . She and the other children gained acc ess to the Mandela House
area by climbing through a hole or opening in the fence surroun ding the premises.

40. They would walk from their homes on the farm to the fence surrounding the
premises and to a point in the fence where there was an opening . She called this a
“gaaitjie”. After climbing through this opening, they walked on the gravel road to
the Botha House and entered thro ugh the pedestrian gate, Gate 1, in fr ont of the
Botha House. From there they proceeded to Gate 2, the large black gate in the
border wall between the Mandela House and the Botha House . She said that Gate
2 was very rusty ( “baie stram ”). It could actually not close properly. She said that
because of this, Gate 2 had always been open because once it was closed , the
gate could not easily be opened again.

41. From Gate 2 , she and the other children , normally a group of 3 to 5 children, would
walk along the pathway on the side of the Mandela House and to the back yard
area where the swimming pool was located. They entered to the swimming pool
area through Gate 3 . Gate 3 , she said, could easily be opened as it was half -open .
According to her, Gate 3 had never been locked with lock at the time when she
and the other children swam in the Mandela House swimming pool . The gate was
either half open or pushed closed .

42. They w ere easily able to push this gate open to go through t o the swimming pool .
There were however times when Gate 3 was pushed closed . She said that this
could have been done by persons cleaning the swimming pool. When the gate
was closed, her older nephew would reach over and open the gate from the
bottom slid ing bolt mechanism fitted on Gate 3. She was not aware of the gate
behind Mr. Botha’s house.

43. She stated that there were three occasions when she and the other children swam
in the Mandela House swimming pool . At all of these times , there was never a
safety net or a safety cover over the swimming pool. She was referred to a
photograph taken after the incident depicting a safety net over the swimming pool.
She did not know when this safety net had been installed but she was sure that it
was after H[...] had drowned in the pool .

44. She and her friends had never been stopped by anyone when they were on their
way to the Mandela House from the Schuurmansfontein R oad area or at the Botha
House. She stated that her grand -father and Mr. Eben Botha often braaied
together and that Mr. Botha was aware that she and the other children were going
to the Mandela House and swimming in the swimming pool. Mr. Botha , she said,
had never stopped them from doing so. She testified that Mr. Botha was at times
at home when she and the other children would walk past his house on the ir way
to the swimming pool .

45. Her evidence was that a t no stage before the incident had she and her friends
sever been chased away from the pool by any Correctional Services staff. She and
the other farm children swam in the Mandela House swimming pool often during
the summer months and on most occasions after they returned from school. She
said that there that was no -one at the Mandela House monitoring or guarding the
house and no -one from the Department of Correctional Services performing this
function.

46. Ms. September testified that after the drowning incident, the farm children were
forbidden to do anything at the Mandela House premises . She said that a strict
security guard was then attending at the premises. During cross -examination, Ms.
September was asked whether she knew that the Mandela House was being kept
as “…a type of museum”. Her answer was yes. It was also repeatedly put to Ms .
September whether she knew that the Mandela House was private property and
that she was committing the crime of trespass. She agreed.

47. She was questioned about whether she had ever informed her mother or father of
the swimming at the Mandela House . She said that her mother had not been living
with her and that her father was dead. She s tated that her grandfather, Mr .
Johannes September , was however aware of her swimming at the Mandela
House. She testified that there was an occasion when she had received a hiding
from her grandfather because of the Mandela House swimming but there were
other reasons for the hiding as well. She said that i t was also because she had
been playing in the bushes.

48. With regard to the gates at the Mandela House, she stated that there had
previously been a further pedestrian gate in the front of the house but that her and
her friends had not used these gates to reach the swimming pool . This was
because it was easier for them to go through the gates at the Botha house. In
relation to Gate 2, she confirmed that the locking mechanism for this gate was on
the Mandela House sid e and that this gate was rusty and could not open easily.
She stated that Gate 2 was always open on the days that she and her friends went
swimming at the Mandela House.

49. Regarding Gate 3, she agreed that if this gate was closed, a tall person would
need to lean over and open it from the slide bolt locking mechanism on the other
side and at the bottom of the gate. She stated that her nephew would do this but
the children were also able to simply climb over the Gate 3 itself. She further
stated that she had n ot used the Freedom Gate to enter the Mandela House
premises or the other gates in the front of the Mandela House , as these gates had
been closed.

50. It was put to Ms. September that that Mrs . Botha was looking after a young child
and that because of this the Botha’ s were very careful to make sure that Gate 2
was always closed. She was not aware of this and had never seen a child at the
Botha’s house. It was put to her that Mr. Botha would testify that Gate 2 was
always kept closed because of the small child that Mrs . Botha was looking after. It
was also put to her that Mr. Botha himself did not know that children were
accessing and swimming in the pool at the Mandela House.

51. She was questioned as to how she and her friends would know when there would
be people a t the Botha house before they would go to the swimming pool . Her
answer was that on the occasions when she went with her grandfather to visit Mr.
Botha, she would eavesdrop on the adults conversations in order to hear who was
working or out of the house on certain days . She would then know that these days
would be “safe” to go swimming at the Mandela House.

52. In re -examination, she reiterated that Mr. Botha was aware of the children
swimming at the Mandela House as he and her grandfather had often braai ed
together and he had been present when the children were swimming in the pool.
She further testified that her and her friends had swam at the Mandela House pool
on 5 occasions and on weekends.

Mr Johannes Jacobus September \

53. Mr. Johannes Jacobus S eptember is Ms. Luane September’s grandfather. He
previously lived at on the Schuurmans farm opposite the Drakenstein Prison for
some 40 years . He testified that he knew the Mandela House and the adjacent
house occupied by Mr. Botha, who he often used to visit at his home. He was able
to easily reach the Botha House by climbing over the nearby fence and regularly
used this as a route to reach the Botha House.

54. Mr. September testified that he was aware of the swimming pool at the Mandela
house because the children from the farm used to regularly swim there during the
summer months. There were also occasions when he was present while the
children were swimming but on other occasions , he was not present. The children
would access the swimming pool by going through the gate at the Botha House
and then to the swimming pool at the back of the Mandela House. His evidence
was that when he accompanied th e children to the swimming pool, the black metal
gate next to the Botha House, Gate 2, was never closed and the front gate at the
Botha House was always open.

55. As his grand -daughter Luane stated in her evidence, h e also testified that Gate 2
was consi stently open because it was always very rusty ( “baie stram” ). With regard
to Gate 3, he testified that this gate was not originally there at the times he used to
visit Mr. Botha and that instead of Gate 3, there was a type of flat gates ( “plat
hekkies” ) of a different type to that depicted in the witness bundle as Gate 3.

56. At the times that he visited Mr. Botha, no -one had informed him that he should not
be there. He testified that there was however a Mr. Burger, whom he stated was a
Correctional Servic es security manager, who would arrive and when he did , the
children who were swimming at the pool would run away. He testified that Mr.
Botha was aware of the children accessing and using the swimming pool at the
Mandela House and had never stopped them fr om doing so. He stated that after
H[...] ’s drowning, a number of gates had been installed at the Mandela House but
that the children from the farm were still able to easily access and use the
swimming pool.

57. He confirmed that there had never been a sa fety net over the swimming pool at
any time before H[...] ’s drowning.

58. Mr. September accepted under cross -examination that he had no personal
knowledge of the events on 13 August 2010 which resulted in H[...] ’s drowning. He
was cross -examined extensive ly on his evidence regarding the absence of Gate 3 .
He conceded that he was somewhat unsure and a bit confused about the photos
depicting Gate 3 . He said that he had poor eyesight as a result of diabetes.

59. It was put to Mr. September that he had omitted to mention his poor eyesight in his
evidence in chief. H e respon ded that he had not been asked anything about his
eyesight . He re -iterated that Mr. Botha was aware of the children accessing and
swimming at the pool at the Mandela House. He acc epted however that he did not
have permission from the Area Commissioner to be at the Mandela House and the
swimming poo l. Mr. September stated that everyone from the Department in the
area however knew h im and that he regularly had met them at the prison “kroeg”,
this being the staff bar apparently used by the Department’s officials at
Drakenstein . He agreed that when Mr. Burger arrived and the children ran away
from the swimming pool area , this was because the children did not have
permission to be swimmi ng in the pool at the Mandela House. It was put to Mr.
September that Mr. Botha did not give permission for the children to swim in the
pool at the Mandela House and he could not give such permission. Mr. September
said that he could not argue with this.

A[...] H[...] K[...] (nee H[...] )

60. Mrs. A[...] K[...] is the second plaintiff and the former spouse of Mr. H[...] . At the
time of the incident, she, Mr . H[...] and their three sons lived in a house provided
by the Department as employee housing, at 2 [...] K[...], Mandela Street . This was
about 500 meters down the road from the Mandela House. There were
approximately 6 families on the street and about 50 houses on the prison property .
The h ouses were all occupied by families of employees of the Department who
were work ed at the Drakenstein Prison.

61. She was aware of the Mandela House as she would drive past and sometimes
walk past the house on her way to church on Sundays. Her route to c hurch would
include walking past the Mandela House and the Botha House to a nearby broken
fence on the outskirts of the prison property . She would climb through the fence,
cross the main road and then walk the remaining distance to church. She would
take t his route to church on 3 Sundays a month and on other occasions for choir
practice.

62. She had lived on the property for 8 years between 2004 and 2012 and had
regularly taken this route to reach her church. She testified that anyone could
move freely th rough the fence and that she had never observed any security or
security post at the fence area bordering the prison property on which the Mandela
House is situated.

63. With regard to the gates at the Botha House, her evidence was that Gate 1, the
front gate at the Botha House, was open most of the time. In respect of Gate 2, the
black gate in the vibacrete wall bordering the Mandela House, she stated that this
gate was not there at the time of H[...] ’s drowning and had only been installed after
the inci dent. Gate 3, according to Mrs. K[...], was also not there either at the time
of the incident. She stated that this gate was not present when she was at the
Mandela House with journalists from the Paarl Post on 17 August 2010. The same
applied to Gate 4, w hich she maintained was installed after her son’s drowning on
13 August 2010.

64. On the afternoon of 13 August 2010, she was asleep a t home . A vehicle suddenly
drove up to the house at a high speed. Mr. H[...] , her two other sons and the
second plaintiff’s brother , Mr. C[...] H[...] , were in the car . Her son Leroy ran inside
the house and shouting, “ H[...] has drowned !”. She went outside the house and
saw H[...] lying on the ground outside the house on the grass.

65. He was soaking wet and not conscious. She tried cardio -pulmonary resuscitation
(“CPR”) on him but he was just lying there, lifeless.

66. A number of people and neighbors rushed over to the house. H[...] was taken to
hospital in Paarl. When she arri ved at the Paarl Medi -clinic, she was told by a
doctor that H[...] had not made it and had died.

67. She was asked during her evidence in chief about Mr. H[...] ’s condition at the time
when he arrived outside the house with H[...] . She said that he was al so extremely
distressed and disturbed at the time and was running up and down in a very
distressed and agitated state . She stated that her whole life changed after the
drowning of her son on 13 August 2010. She suffered severely psychologically and
was dia gnosed with depression. Her marriage suffered terribly as Mr. H[...] was
always drinking after the incident and there was constant blaming and fighting in
their relationship .

68. During cross -examination she was asked whether Mr. H[...] was up early on the
day of the incident. She said that he was up early and that his b rother Mr. C[...]
H[...] , arrived at their home at about 6.15 am. After he arrived, he and Mr. H[...] left
and came back a round an hour later. She s aid that when they came back, she saw
that Mr. H[...] had with him a bottle of Olaf Berg brandy. She was annoyed by this
as the plan was that they were going to town to do the monthly shopping that day .
According to her , Mr. H[...] said that he was only having a “klein doppie” . She said
that he poured himself a small amount of the brandy in a glass with some Coke
and ice.

69. Mrs. K[...] was extensively cross -examined on these events, which had not been
mentioned in her evidence in chief. She said that Mr. H[...] was sober when he
came back with his brother at around 7.30 . The bottle of Olaf Berg brandy , she
said, was not full. I t only had about 3cm of liquid in it. She was asked whether she
knew what had happened to the rest of the brandy. She s aid that Mr. H[...] had in
the past had a ““skuld boekie ” at the prison staff bar . She had previously
complained about this to the official in charge of the bar, a certain Mr. Daniels.

70. She however insisted that Mr. H[...] was clearly sober when he came back with his
brother at around 8.30am . She knows him very well. To her, there were no signs
that he was inebriated and had been drinking between the time that he left and
when he arrived back home at around 8.30 am.

71. Mrs. K[...] was cross -examined extensively on a st atement which she had made to
Melissa Melnick, a clinical psychologist, who interviewed her and conducted an
assessment on 14 August 2014. Ms . Melnick had prepared a medico -legal
psychological assessment report . In the report Ms . Melnick records that on 14
August 2014 , Mrs. K[...] reported to her that on morning of 13 August 2010, Mr.
H[...] and his brother had “ …went to a guy to buy wine. That guy opened the bar to
have him buy wine. He was drinking, then we went to town and when we got to
town he wanted to buy a cellphone from someone on the street.”

72. She responded that what she had told Ms. Melnick was many years after the
incident . During that time, she was in very bad psychological state, had attempted
suicide and had been admitted to hospital with depression. She stated that what
was recorded in Ms . Melnick’s report regarding Mr. H[...] having gone to buy wine,
was not accurate . She herself had Mr. H[...] ’s bank cards and he would not have
had money to buy alcohol without his bank card. She insisted that Mr. H[...] was
not drunk or under the influence of alcohol when he returned with his brother .

73. Mrs. K[...] was further questioned about an affidavit which she had deposed to as
the SAPS: Paarl station on 10 September 2013. In that affidavit, she stated inter -
alia that when Mr. H[...] later came back home with his brother, H[...] and the other
children a fter the tragic events at the Mandela House, “… ek kon sien da t hy onder
die invloed van drank was. E k ken hom goed en volgens my was hy ooglopend
dronk.”

74. She confirmed having made this affidavit to the police. She however stated she
could see that he did have something to drink but according to her , he was not
drunk . She also stated that s he had not written affidavit herself . It had been written
out by a SAPS official and she had signed it.

75. She was questioned further on an additional part of her affidavit where she stated
that “… Ek het toe vir M[...] gesoebat om vir H[...] na die hospita al te neem. Hy wou
nie ry nie en gesê dat die polisie hom gaan kry en sal toesluit vir dronk ry ”. Her
respo nse was that she would never have asked Mr. H[...] to drive if she thought
that he was drunk. Further cross -examination of Mrs H[...] related to an affidavit by
a certain Jolene De Beer dated 17 August 2010. In her affidavit, Ms De Beer
stated inter -alia t hat when she arrived at the H[...] home, Mr H[...] “…was baie
oproerig en het na alkohol geruik .” Ms. De Beer was however not called as a
witness.

76. Mrs. K[...] stated that on the day of the incident, it was clear to her that Mr. H[...]
was in an extremely confused , distressed and panicked state . This she said was
worse because Mr. H[...] had previously been diagnosed with bi -polar disorder.
She stated that he was “ in heel in ‘n ander wêreld ”. While H[...] was being taken to
hospital, he had even gone to a shop to buy H[...] some toys . This , she said ,
demonstrated his confused and irrational mental state at the time.

77. She was repeatedly questioned again on why, as recorded in her affidavit of 10
September 2013, she had pleaded with Mr. H[...] to drive H[...] to hospital when
she knew that Mr. H[...] did not have a licence and according to her affidavit, she
could that he was “ ooglopend dronk ”. Mrs. K[...]’s response to this was “… want ek
wil hé my kind se lewe moet gered word ! Ek wil hé my kind moet gespaar word !
Dis die rede. Ek wou net hom help .” At this point, Mrs H[...] became extremely
emotional . She broke down in the witness box and could not continue. The hearing
of her evid ence was adjourned for a short period.

78. On resumption of the proceedings, she was cross -examined regarding the various
gates at the Mandela House . She stated that again that Gate 3 was not there on
the date of the incident and had been installed by the prison authorities on 18
August 2010 after the incident. A prisoner by the name of “Gaddafi” had come to
her house after the incident and informed her that gates were being installed at the
Mandela House. She had complained about this to the Area Commissi oner and
asked why gates were only being installed after the drowning of her son. Her
complain ts were not entertained and she was sent away.

79. She stated that safety was never a priority at the Mandela House and there was
never any security or guards t o keep people away from the Mandela House. She
was questioned in cross -examination regarding why she had not mentioned the
installation of security gates after her son’s drowning in any of her affidavits . She
stated that she had only been interviewed regarding the incident itself and had
only explained the events that took place on that particular day.

Mr M[...] H[...]

80. Mr. M[...] H[...] is the first plaintiff. He was employed by the Department as a prison
warder for 18 years before resigning in August 2014. He is presently unemployed.

81. Mr. H[...] testified that he became sick with major depression after H[...] ’s death on
13 August 2010 and was diagnosed wit h post -traumatic stress disorder . He
suffered memory loss and would sometimes have fits at night. He had already
been under psychiatric treatment for bipolar disorder before H[...] ’s death and his
symptoms became worse after that. The last occasion he had received treatment
was at Worcester Hospital about 5 or 6 years ago.

82. Mr. H[...] testified at the time of the incident , he had been living with his family in
staff accommodation at the Drakenstein Correctional Facility since 2006.

83. He met Mr. Botha at Drakenstein and knew him through his brother, who was also
from Worcester.

84. He was familiar with the Mandela Hous e as he had often walked past the house
when on his way to church on the nearby farm. He testified that in all the years that
he had walked past the Mandela House, everything at the house was dead quiet
and he had never seen anyone at the Mandela House. He had also never
observed any security guards at the house and according to him, nothing was ever
happening at the house.

85. He stated that in the years that he had walked past the Mandela H ouse, the
Freedom Gate was sometimes closed and sometimes left o pen. He did not know
who had left this gate open. On one occasion he was on his way to church and
saw children from the local farm playing in the swimming pool at the Mandela
House. He saw them through the Freedom Gate , which was open at the time. He
did n ot see any adults with the children at the time.

86. He visited Mr Botha at his house on various occasions. They would socialise , and
watch rugby. He would generally just go to his house and would not make
arrangements to visit beforehand.

87. As to the gates at the Mandela House, he testified that Gate 2 , the gate adjacent
and on the wall border of the Mandela House, was closed when he was at Mr.
Botha’s house. He had never seen people going through Gate 2.

88. Mr. H[...] testified that i n the day of the incident, he was at home that morning and
heard a knock at the door. He went to see who it was. It was his brother, C […]
H[...] . That day was pay day. He asked C[...] if they could all go to town with C[...] ’s
vehicle and do their monthly shopping . C[...] agreed. They all left at around 9am
and drove to town in Paarl . He drove the car. They first went to the Shoprite in
Paarl. While they were at Shoprite, h e and his wife had an argument over money .
She left and went hom e. She left H[...] with him. At around 1pm , he and C[...]
drove to pick up his two other sons , L[...] (then aged 7) and W[...] (then aged 6),
from school. He had been paid and wanted to take his children out for a treat.

89. After collecting L[...] and W[...] from school, they all drove to Mr. Botha’s house. He
drove past Mr. Botha’s house from the right hand side of the road, if one is
observing the road from the Botha House. He drove past and made a U -turn at the
trees in front of the Mandela House . He then drove a short distance back to park
outside Mr. Botha’s house . He parked in front of Gate 1. He said that he made the
U-turn first in order for them to easily drive the vehicle straight off when they left
Mr. Botha’s house after the visit . After parking the vehicle, they exi ted the vehicle
and went up to Mr. Botha’s house along the pathway leading from the gate at the
fence sur rounding the house. He stated that at the time he had in his hand a
“dumpie” of beer, which he had opened and taken two sips of before going through
to Mr. Botha’s house.

90. When he arrived at the house, Mr. Botha was there, as was his wife and a certain
Angela. They were sitting in the lounge. Mr. Botha was seated on a couch and
watching television at the time. He greeted Mr. Botha and wanted to talk to him.
He said that Mr. Botha was his friend and that he intended confid ing in him about
things not being good at home at the time. He had planned to take the children
home and then returning later to Mr. Botha’s house with C[...] . He testified that he
was talking to Mr. Botha and his wife and that he was at the time standing just
inside the house next to the front door.

91. The children were playing outside on a cement patch close to the house. He
testified that the children were within his eyesight at the time. He saw that Gate 2
was closed. His brother C[...] was standing outside.

92. A short while later a certain Mr. Meerai, who was a fish vendor, drove past . He
went to him to buy some fish and avacodos for his brot her. The children were still
playing outside the Botha house. He gave the fish and avacado to C[...] , who then
went and sat down to eat at the stairs on the other side of the Botha House. He
went back to the lounge area where he had been standing on the sid e of the door
talking to Mrs Botha.

93. He testified that a t that point, he was approached by his son Leroy who came to
him and said that he wanted some cooldrink. He told Leroy that he could fetch the
cooldrinks which were in the boot of the car . He testified that L[...] then went
together with H[...] to the car and he saw them walking down the pathway leading
to the gate , where the car was parked. Mr. H[...] then carried on talking to Mr.
Botha. He testified that at a c ertain point while talking to Mr. Botha, he needed to
relieve himself and use the toilet. He proceeded to the bathroom inside the Botha
house and was in the toilet for about 2 or 3 minutes. He washed his hands and
then went back to continue his conversatio n with Mr. Botha.

94. As he entered the lounge, he saw L[...] walking up towards the house with a
cooldrink in his hands. He asked him where was H[...] . L[...] said that H[...] was just
with him at the car. He testified that he immediately started looking a nd calling out
for H[...] .

95. He looked all around the Botha House, in the area where the gate was and calling
and shouting H[...] ’s name throughout. He could not see H[...] anywhere. He
started panicking and ran down towards the gates outside the Mande la House. He
ran towards and pushed open Gate 4, the pedestrian gate outside the Mandela
House , which he stated was open at the time. This gate was not locked.

96. He then ran up along the cement path in the Mandela House garden and to the
backyard of the house where the swimming pool was located. It was here that He
found H[...] , floating in the swimming pool. He jumped into the swimming pool fully
clothed and grabb ed H[...] in his arms. Panic stricken and in shock, he ran back to
the Botha house with H[...] in his arms, crying and shouting “kyk, my seun is dood,
my seun is dood!”

97. When he got to the Botha house, Mr. Botha attempted CPR on the child. His
brother C[...] was just standing there in shock. He took H[...] into his arms again
and he, the other two boys and C[...] then ran to the car and drove off.

98. He was driving the car at the time. When they all arrived at his home, he put H[...]
on the grass outsi de and started shouting out for help. A neighbour, Mr Piet
Visagie and his wife heard his shouts and attempted CPR on H[...] . Later that day
and after H[...] was taken to Paarl Hospital, a doctor came to him and said that
H[...] had been declared deceased.

99. Mr. H[...] was asked about photographs depicting a safety net over the swimming
pool at the Mandela House. He stated that the safety net had only been installed a
week after H[...] was buried. He said that before H[...] ’s drowning, there had never
been any safety measures at the pool such as a safety net, there were no warning
signs stating that people were forbidden to be at the Mandela House and that
there were never any security guards around the house to keep people a way.

100. Mr. H[...] was cross -examined extensively regarding Mrs . K[...]’s evidence re lating
to his consumption of alcohol on the morning of the incident . He denied that he
and his brother had left home early to go out and buy alcohol. He stated that he
did not have money to do so and in any event, there w as no bar that would
possibly be open so early in the morning. It was put to him that Mrs . K[...] had
testified that early on the morning of 13 August 2010, he had wanted to go and buy
alcohol and the person in charge of the prison employees bar, Mr. Daniels, had
opened up the bar in order for him to do so.

101. Mr. H[...] vehemently denied this . He stat ed that s omething like that was expressly
prohibited by prison procedures . From around 7am in the morning, prison staff
would be busy with food service for prisoners . He stated that under no
circumstances could the prison staff bar be opened at that time by Mr. Daniels
without the permission of the Area Commissioner. He asked if Mr. Daniels could
be brought to court to confirm this.

102. Mr. H[...] was then questioned regarding the evidence by Mrs. K[...] that she had
observed that he was under the influence of alcohol when he brought H[...] back
home after the drowning incident at the Mandela House. He denied that he was
drunk or under the influence of alcohol. He also denied that Mrs. K[...] had pleaded
with him to take H[...] to ho spital and that he had refused to do so because he was
scared of being arrested by the police for drunk driving . He stated that this
evidence was completely untrue and that he had asked his friends to take H[...] to
hospital.

103. He was questioned about why he had stopped Mr. Botha from continuing with
CPR. He answered that he could see that the CPR was not having any effect on
H[...] . He could see that his child was dead and he wanted to go home and find
H[...] ’s mother. As to an affidavit by Jolene De Beer who sta ted that she had also
performed CPR on H[...] and that Mr. H[...] was being unruly , he stated that the
incident had happened 14 years ago . He could not recall if she had performed
CPR on H[...] .

104. He said that he was traumatised, hysterical and extremely confused and
distressed at the time. He gave a similar answer when questioned as to why he
had not driven H[...] to hospital himself. He stated that his son had just drowned
and that his mental state at the time was such he was in no condition to drive to
the hospital in Paarl.

105. It was put to Mr. H[...] that Mr. Botha had seen the car in which C[...] , the children
and Mr. H[...] were in , drive past and that the car had stopped at the Mandela
House. It was put to him that a ccording to Mr. Botha, they had all exited the car
and gone into the Mandela House property. A short while later, they all came to
Mr. Botha’s house. Mr. H[...] denied this.

106. Regarding his evidence in chief that he had gone to the toilet at the Botha house
for about 2 or 3 minutes, Mr. H[...] was questioned as to why he had not asked the
Botha’s or his brother C[...] to watch the children while he went to the toilet. His
answer was that he had gone quickly to the toilet and that at t he time the children
were outside playing.

107. He was then questioned regarding why he allowed H[...] to go to the car with his
brother who was also very young. Mr. H[...] responded that he was watching both
children and could see them walking to the ca r. He denied having fabricated a
story about his son asking to go to the car to get a cooldrink.

108. He further denied that he had at any point talked to the children about the Mandela
House swimming pool, as stated in an affidavit by his brother C[...] H[...] . It was put
to Mr. H[...] that he had taken his brother to the Mandela House to show him the
place and that he was now scared to admit this. Mr. H[...] denied that this was the
case. Regarding the gates at the Mandela House, he stated that Gate 3 was not
there on the day of the in cident. He stated that Mr. Botha had informed him that
this gate was installed after the incident.

Hylton J umaats

109. At the time of the incident, Mr. Jumaats was employed by the Department in the
position of Area Co -ordinator : Development & Care. He s tarted working at
Drakenstein in February 2010. He is responsible for co -ordination of rehabilitation
and education programmes. He has also chaired disciplinary hearings. He was
requested by the then Area Commissioner, Mr . Jeremy Mat thysen to conduct a
preliminary investigation into what had transpired at the Mandela House on 13
August 201 0. He stated that his mandate was to only look at the issue of access to
the Mandela House. According to him, he was not at liberty to deal with whether
anyone was at fault.

110. On 14 August 2010, he went to the Mandela House . He first observed the area
and the external features of the house, these being the areas that provide access
to the swimming pool. He stated that the Mandela H ouse itself was locked and he
did not go inside. He observed that Gate 2 was present when he visited the scene
on the morning of 14 August 2010 . This gate was closed at the time.

111. He then walked to the swimming pool by entering through Gate 4 then through
Gate 3 . Both these gates were closed at the time . He also observed that the
Freedom Gate was c losed. He stated that the locking mechanism for the Freedom
Gate was on the inside of the gate .

112. After his observations at the Mandela House, he proceeded to meet Mr Botha at
his house. He had a discussion with Mr. Botha who completed and signed an
affidavit which he then commissioned. He stated that that this affidavit, which he
commissioned on 14 Au gust 2010, was written out by Mr. Botha himself. He
commissioned an additional affidavit by Mr. Botha on 17 August 2010. He stated
that this affidavit was a confirmation by Mr. Botha that he had seen Mr. H[...] , his
brother and the children going into the Mandela House. He stated that this
“…didn’t come out clearly” in Mr. Botha’s first affidavit . He therefore he had to do
“…an additional confirmation in respect thereof”. He had also obtained other
affidavits in the course of his investigation .

113. Mr. J umaats stated that access to the Mandela House was not open to the public .
Anyone seeking to visit the house was required to apply in writing to the Area
Commissioner or his delegate . Mr. Manfred Jacobs would be assigned to deal with
the application. Visits to the Mandela House by individuals were generally not
allowed but group visits could be accommodated. He stated that such visits were
in the interests of the broader public given the history of the house. He stated that
the swimming pool at the Mandela House however was merely “…something to
observe and not the essence of visits to the house.” According to Mr. J umaats , all
Correctional Services o fficials at Drakenstein were aware that the Mandela House
was off limits for casual visits.

114. With regard to the house occupied by Mr. Botha, Mr . Jumaats explained that Mr.
Botha and his family lived there due to a shortage of staff accommodation at the
prison facility . He stated that Mr. Botha did not however have any particular role
with rega rd to the Mandela House . For example , he was not for example
responsible for security or guarding the Mandela House.

115. Following the completion of his investigation, Mr. J umaats reported his findings to
the Area Commissioner. He did so after visiting w itnesses and obtaining affidavits,
which included attempts to engage with Mr . and Mrs . H[...] , however they refused
to engage with him.

116. His conclusion was that the H[...] family had no authorisation to enter the Mandela
House. He had further concluded that in his observation, the only way in which a
young child such as H[...] would have been able to reach the swimming pool was
through the pedestrian Gate 1 at the front of the Botha House, then through Gate 4
in front of the Mandela House , around the house and then through Gate 3 adjacent
to the swimming pool . He had sketched this route in pencil on a copy of the 2008
site layout plan. He considered that this route was the o nly possible way that a
child as young as H[...] could reach the swimming pool, if the se gates had not
been closed shut.

117. Mr. J umaats was asked why he did not consider Gate 2 as the route which had
been taken by H[...] to the swimming pool. He stated that Mr. Botha had told him
that they had a small child in the house and that for this reason Gate 2 was always
kept closed. He also stated that this gate was a heavy metal gate and that he did
not consider that it was possible for a toddler of H[...] ’s age to open this gate.

118. Mr. J umaats was questioned during cross -examination regarding exactly what his
position at Drakenstein entailed. He stated that he was responsible for the
management of all education programmes for offenders, rehabilitation, and
offender agricultural work. He was also responsible for managing staff .

119. He was an educator by profession. He was asked why he he had been assigned
the responsibility for the investigation requested by the Area Commissioner . He
stated that he had a history of involvement and experience in labour matters. The
Area Commissioner had identified him as the person with the skills for th e job. \

120. He was asked whether he had ever really been involved in criminal matters, active
investigations relating to deaths and whether this was the first time he had
conducted such an investigation. His response was that he had been i nvolved
before in cases of domestic violence.

121. He conceded that it was his first time investigating a matter such as the deat h of a
child on the premises of the Department. He stated that his role was merely to
gather the facts, to forward his observations to the Area Commissioner and that
the SAPS was responsible for criminal investigations. He confirmed that he had
not been required to produce a written report of his investigation.

122. He accepted that he himself did not have anything to do with the Mandela House .
His visit on 14 August 2010 might have been only the second time that he had
actually ever been there. He had however conducted a staff team -building
exercise at the Mandela House. The staff told him that the experience was
amazing.

123. He had no actual knowledge of any comings and goings of people at the Mandela
House before he started working at the Depar tment. He was asked if he had any
knowledge of security arrangements at the Mandela House at the time of the
incident . He stated that that there was no security arrangements or security guards
in place at the Mandela house.

124. Mr. J umaats was referred t o various photographs depicting a safety net over ing
the water surface of the swimming pool at the Mandela House. He confirmed that
when he visited the Mandela House on 14 August 2010, the day after H[...]
drowned, there was no safety net over the pool . He stated that this net had only
been installed afterwards.

125. Mr. Jumaats stated that Gate 3 was in place when he visited the scene. He was
asked whether he knew whether any of the gates at the Mande la House could be
locked shut with a lock . He stated that he was not going to speculate . He was
asked whether he knew whether the gates at the Mandela House were locked shut
with a lock at the time of the inciden t.

126. He said that he did not know and that Mr. M anfred Jacobs was the only person
that could confirm this. It was put to Mr. J umaats by the plaintiffs’ counsel, that
none of the gates at the Mandela House were actually locked shut with a lock. He
was asked to comment on this . He said that he was unable to really comment ..

127. Mr. J umaats stated that that the idea of the Mandela House was that it had to be
kept in the same position as it was and not changed. There h ad however been
repairs carried out to the swimming pool . He stated that in 2009 there h ad been a
Government Gazette Notice that the Department of Arts and Culture was
responsible for maintenance of the Mandela House and the appointment of service
providers to keep the swimming pool clean. He stated that that the swimming pool
was being kept clean on a regular basis . Repairs to the swimming pool had been
carried out about 3 weeks before the incident .

128. Mr Jumaats was asked whether he was aware of local farm children going through
to the Mandela House and swimming in the pool. He stated tha t this was never
reported to him.

129. He was then questioned regarding the affidavits by Mr. Botha which he had
commissioned. He repeated that it was Mr. Botha who himself wrote out his first
affidavit . He stated that this because the Department promotes the idea of people
writing out their own statements. He could not recall whether he obtained any
other statements from people on 14 August 2010, apart from Mr. Botha.

130. He stated that the second affidavit which he commi ssioned on 17 August 2010 and
which had been signed by Mr. Botha, was written in his (Mr. Joemats) handwriting.
He had gone back to Mr. Botha himself and that Mr. Botha had not contacted him
regarding a second statement. He was asked why he had gone back t o Mr. Botha .
His answer was that when statements are written, there are always questions.

131. He wanted to get some clarity from Mr. Botha in respect of the matter. This is
normal because the Department does an assessment and asks questions. It was
his duty to go back to Mr. Botha, he said.

132. Counsel for the plaintiffs pressed him further on this. Mr Jumaats stated that the
reason why he had gone back to Mr. Botha was because Mr. Botha had not
explained or indicated in his affidavit what had happened to Mr. H[...] and his
entourage when they parked in front of his house. Mr J umaats stated that he
wanted clarity on whether Mr. Botha saw them moving towards his house or
whether they had gone anywhere else. He could not recall exactly why he himself
had decided to write out the second affidavit by Mr. Botha. He said that it was
maybe because the environment was not conducive. He had commissioned both
affidavits at Mr. Botha’s house.

Mr Eben Botha

133. Mr Eben Botha He has been employed by the Department since 1988. At the time
of the incident he and his wife resided in the house adjacent to the Mandela
House.

134. He testified that the day of the incident, 13 August 2010, was a Friday, which is
normally the day that employees of the Department are paid their salaries if the
15th falls on a weekend. He had been paid his salary . He made arrangements with
his wife to go to Paarl to do their monthly grocery shopping. They returned from
Paarl at around mid -day. It was his day off and he had hired some films to
watch. While he sitting down in the living room watching a film on his televis ion, he
observed a red vehicle driving past on the gravel road in front of his house and the
Mandela House.

135. He was able to see the vehicle as the front door of his house was open at the time
and he was sitting in the l iving room. He stated that he s tood up from his chair to
have a look and was standing at the front door of the living room at this time, as he
wanted to make sure who were the people in the vehicle He saw the red vehicle
drive past and park just next to the Mandela House.

136. He stat ed that he saw that it was Mr. H[...] and observed him, another male person
who he was later introduced to as Mr. C[...] H[...] and three children, getting out of
the vehicle and opening the front gate of the Mandela House. He saw them all
moving in towards the area around the Mandela House. He could not see exactly
what they were doing but because he knew Mr. H[...] , he turned around and went
back to sit down and continue watc hing his films. After about three to five minutes,
Mr. H[...] , his brother C[...] and the children came back into the yard of the house
where he was sitting in the living room. Mr. Botha testified that as they were
approaching and coming up the pathway to h is house, he saw that Mr. H[...] and
his brother each had a single “ dumpie ” of beer in their hands.

137. He said that he was also enjoying some alcohol at the time . He was relaxing and it
was his day off. He did not say what alcohol he was enjoying.

138. Mr. Botha testified that Mr. H[...] walked up to the house where he was sitting in
the living room , watching his films. Mr. H[...] introduced him to his brother C[...] . Mr.
C[...] H[...] was standing outside while Mr. H[...] was standing by the side of the
front door, talking to Mr. Botha’s wife.

139. Mr Botha stated that Mr. H[...] was standing at the door in order for him to keep
sight of the children, who at the time were playing outside the house. He stated
that a fter about 10 minutes, one of Mr. H[...] ’s children came inside the house and
said something to Mr. H[...] . He did not hear what the child said.

140. He stated that Mr. H[...] then immediately turned around and left from where he
was standing by the door . He said that he was not really noticing all of this
because he was busy watching his films. He testified that a short while later, Mr
H[...] rushed back carrying H[...] in his arms and shouting “…kyk, my kind is dood,
my kind is dood!”. Everyone inside the house was shocked. He took the child from
Mr. H[...] and began to give him mouth to mouth resuscitation. While he was doing
so, the child twice spewed some water from his mouth. H e turned the child over on
his side .

141. While he was doing so, Mr. H[...] came over and picked up H[...] in his arms. All of
them, Mr. H[...] , his brot her and the children then rushed towards the car, which
was parked in front of his gate, got inside the car and sped off at a very high
speed.

142. The following day, Mr . Jumaats came to see him to obtain an affidavit, which he
provided. He was shown a number of the photographs in exhibit A during his
evidence in chief. He identified Gate 3 as being the gate between his house and
the Mandela House. He identified Gate 4, the pedestr ian gate in front of the
Mandela House, as having been present on the day of the incident. He stated that
at the time there was also another gate present, which was a double gate allowing
for a vehicle to go through and park on the side of the Mandela Hous e.

143. He stated that Gate 3, the gate leading to the swimming pool, was also present on
the day of the incident. He no longer lives in the house he occupied next to the
Mandela House. He had continued living in the house for about two years after the
incident.

144. During cross -examination, Mr Botha confirmed that although he lived next to the
Mandela House, he was not responsible for any security or oversight functions in
relation to the Mandela House. He was asked about security at the Mandela
House. He stated that there were no security guards or personnel around the
Mandela House that were responsible for oversight of the house or performing
guarding or security functions at the house.

145. Mr. Botha was then questioned extensively regarding the vibacrete wall forming
the border between the Botha House and the Mandela House. He stated that th e
vibracrete wall was not there on the date of the incident. This answer,
unsurprisingly, led to a series of questions being put to Mr. Botha by the plaintiffs
counsel . It was put to Mr. Botha hat he was the first person who had testified that
the vibacrete was not present on the day and that Mr. J umaats had himself
testified that the vibacrete wall was present on th e day of his inspection on 14
August 201 0.

146. It was put to Mr Botha that according to the 2008 site layout plan, the vib racrete
walls runs down the whole length of the property and between the Mandela House
and the Botha House. Mr. Botha insisted that the wall was not there on the day of
the incident.

147. Mr. Botha stated that on the day in ques tion, he was s eated in his the living room
facing his television set which was on the other side of the room. He conceded that
seated inside in this position, his line of sight outside could only see small areas of
what was outside. He was questioned further regarding vehicles which would drive
past his house and whether , when viewed from his house and looking at the road,
they would drive past from the left-hand side or the right-hand side. He stated that
looking out from his house , the vehicles would come from the right-hand side,
drive past and then make a U -turn to go back out.

148. He stated that he could not say whether Mr. H[...] had done a U -turn in the vehicle
on the day in question . He was also uncertain where exactly he had seen Mr. H[...]
park the car in front of the Mandela House. He stated that when they all left with
H[...] , the vehicle sped off. Mr. Botha was asked whether the Mandela house
looked abandoned as there was no one living there, there were no locks and
nobody was keeping watch over the house. He agreed that that this was how it
appeared around the house itself , but not inside the house. He further agreed that
although the swimming pool was cleaned every now and again, the grass around
the house was cut, but that apart from this there was not much else that was going
on around the Mandela House itself.

149. Mr Botha was further asked whether it was correct that there w ere no lock s on any
of the gates at the Mandela House. He agreed that this was correct. He confirmed
that various people w ere able to move around t he prison property where his house
and the Mandela House were located and that they did so along the gravel road in
front of the two houses . He agreed that t hese people were not just employees of
the Department.

150. He conceded that these people include d people living on the nearby farm, children
taking short cuts to school and informal sellers of goods and food (“smouse”). He
conceded that there was no actual control over who could come in and out of the
areas of the property where his house and the Mandela House were located.

151. With regard to the evidence of Ms September relating to her and her friends
accessing the swimming pool through the gate at the Botha House, Mr. Botha
confirmed that he was aware of this. He stated that that it was “baie maklik ” for
them to get on to the M andela House premises.

152. Mr. Botha was then cross -examined extensively on the various affidavits he had
deposed to and which were commissioned by Mr. J umaats. Mr. Jumaats had
testified that although he had commissioned the first affidavit of Mr. Botha dated
14 August 2010, the affidavit itself had been written out by Mr. Botha himself.

153. When questioned as to whose handwriting appeared in the 14 August 2010
affidavit, Mr. Botha stated the handwriting in the affidavit was not his handwriting .
He sa id that the affidavit was in Mr. J umaats handwriting but that it was his
signature at the end of the affidavit. He stated that he had only initialed and signed
the first affidavit and that the handwriting in the body of the affidavit was not his but
that o f Mr. J umaats. With regard to the second affidavit which was commissioned
by Mr. J umaats on 17 August 2010 and deposed to by Mr. Botha, Mr Botha
confirmed that the handwriting in that affidavit was not his and that he had also
only signed and in itialled thi s affidavit.

154. He stated that he could not recall why he had deposed to two affidavits. Mr. Botha
was cross -examined as to the contents of his first affidavit . It was put to him that
aspects thereof were inconsistent with his oral evidence. He was asked why his
very first affidavit did not include any reference to him standing up after seeing the
red car drive past and looking out to see who was in the car . He state d that it was
a traumatic event on the day in question.

155. In his second affidavit, Mr Botha stated that he saw Mr. H[...] , his guest and
children climbing out the car, moving to the Mandela House and opening the gate
and going to the back of the Mande la House. He was questioned as to why this
aspect was not included in his first affidavit or in his affidavit to the police in the
inquest proceedings . He answered that the events on 13 August 2010 were
traumatic for him.

156. It was put to Mr. Botha that if he was standing at the front door of his living room,
as stated in his second affidavit and in his evidence in chief , he could not possibly
have seen anyone opening gates at the Mandela House, due to the presence of
the vibacrete wall. In other words, it would have been impossible for him to see
through the vibacrete wall and see what was happening at the front of the Mandela
House. Mr. Botha responded hat the vibracrete wall was not there at the time. He
conceded that if the vibacrete wall was in fact there at the time of the incident , it
would not have been possible for him to observe, by standing at the front door of
his living room, anything happening in front of the Mandela House.

157. Mr. Botha was questioned as to what Gate 2 was attached to if there was no
vibacrete wall. H e said that that it was attached to a pillar. At this stage, counsel
for the defendant interjected that that Mr . Botha had testified that Gate 2 was
attached to a f ence. Counsel for the plaintiffs disagreed. I shall deal later with this
dispute in the evidence. Mr. Botha confirmed that Mr. H[...] was clearly not himself
at the time of the drowning incident. He further confirmed that he knows him well
and according to him, Mr. H[...] was not drunk at the time of the incident.

Requirements for d elictual liability

158. A plaintiff seeking to establish delictual liability is required to establish five
conceptually separate elements or requirements in order to succeed. These are
(a) conduct in the form of the commission or omission of an act; (b) which is
wrongful or unlawful; (c) that was committed negligently or with particular intent;
(d) which causes or results in harm and (d) that such harm, inj ury or loss has been
suffered by the plaintiff. For present purposes, elements (a), (b) and (c) are in
issue.

Omissions by the first defendant’s employees

159. The plaintiffs ’ claims are founded on conduct in the form of allegedly wrongful and
negligent omissions by the first defendant ’s employees to take reasonable steps to
guard against the occurrence of the incident. The plaintiffs are required to
establish these omissions or harm causing conduct on on a balance of
probabilities. The omis sions, as pleaded in the plaintiffs’ amended particulars of
claim are alleged to be failure by the Minister’s employees to take reasonable
steps in one or more of the following respects:

159.1 they failed to lock and secure the premises;

159.2 they failed to prohibit young children from entering the premises;

159.3 they failed to secure and lock the gate to the pool;

159.4 they failed to cover the pool with appropriate covering so as to prohibit
young children from falling into the pool.

160. The defendants in their plea denied any wrongful omissions on their part in the
respects alleged above or at all. Each of the alleged omissions set out above are
therefore disputed. In what follows I address the evidence in respect of the alleged
omissions underpinning the plaintiffs cause of action

Failure to lock and secure the premises and gates to the pool

161. Mr. Jumaats was asked if he knew whether any of the gates at the premises could
be locked shut with a lock . His answer was that he was not going to speculate. As
to whether he knew whether the gates were locked shut with a lock at the time of
the incident, he stated that he did not know . He said that Mr. Manfred Jacobs was
the o nly person that could confirm this. It was put to Mr. J umaats that none of the
gates at the Mandela House were actually locked shut with a lock. He was hesitant
to conceded this and stated said that he was unable to really comment.

162. I find Mr. Jumaats hesitance in this regard difficult to understand. His mandate
from the Area Commissioner and t he express purpose of his visit on 14 August
2010 was to observe and inspect the premises and the gates providing access to
the swimming pool . Whether he observed that there were locks present on the
gates on the day that he visited the scene, is a question of fact. Either he observed
on 14 August 2010 that the gates were locked shut with locks or he did not. It is
not an interpretive exercise requiring him to speculate.

163. It does not assist Mr . Jumaats to answer a question about what he had personally
observed, by saying that Mr. Manfred Jacobs was the only person that could
answer t hat question. Mr. Manfred Jacobs was in any event not called as a
witness by the first defendant. Mr. J umaats’ s prevarication , rather, is in my view
suggestive of hesitance on his part to admit objective facts .

164. It bears mentioning that in his evidence in chief, Mr. J umaats was at clearly at
pains to emphasize that when he visited the Mandela House , all the gates
surrounding the premises were closed. H owever, he at no point s uggested that
these gates in addition to being closed, were locked shut with a lock or some other
secure locking mechanism . Mr. Jumaats also testified that he had walked to the
swimming pool by entering through Gate 4 in the front of the Mandela House and
that he had then proceeded to Gate 3, the small metal gate providing access to the
swimming pool area.

165. He stated that both these gates were closed at the time and that he could also see
that the Freedom Gate was also closed. He did not indicate that when he passed
through Gate 4 and Gate 3, he or Mr. Jacobs had to unlock any locks on these
gates or that the Freedom Gate was not just closed, but securely locked shut with
a lock .

166. With regard to the Freedom Gate, it was submitted on behalf of the Minister that
Mr. J umaats had confirmed that on his visit on 14 August 2010, the Freedom Gate
was locked. This is not correct. Mr. J umaats stated in his evidence in chief that the
Freedom Gate was closed. H e did not s tate that the Freedom Gate was locked .

167. In my view, the probabil ities are that when he attended at the premises on 14
August 2010, Mr. Jumaats did not observe any locks securely locking shut the
gates at the Mandela House premises .

168. Mr. Colyn conceded during cross -examination that the locking mechanism for Gate
3 was at the bottom of the gate facing the swimming pool . Counsel for the
defendants did not put to him that Gate 3 had at any stage been securely locked
shut with a lock as opposed to merely being closed. Th e photographic evidence
also makes it clear that G ate 3 is fitted with a metal sliding bolt gate latch which
would allow for the use of a lock to be fitted on this gate to securely close and lock
the gate shut.

169. It was not put to Mr. Colyn or any of the plaintiffs’ witnesses that this gate or any
particular gate at the premises , was designed in such a way that they were not
capable of being securely locked shut with a lock..

170. Counsel for the Minister relied on aspects of Ms. September’ s evidence that she
and the other children did not access the Mandela premises through the front
gates . This, so the argument went, is indicative that those gates must have been
more secure and did not permit access. I do not consider this to be a correct
interpretation of Ms. September’s ev idence , viewed in its totality .

171. I am also not persuaded by the inference sought to be drawn that Ms. September’s
failure to use the front gates at the Mandela House to access the premises, is
indicative of these g ates having been more secure and not permitting access.Ms.
September testified during cross -examination that they had not used the Freedom
Gate to enter the Mandela House premises or the other gates in the front of the
Mandela House, as these gates were closed. She stated that they did not do so
because it was easier for them to gain access to the swimming pool by entering
through the front gate at the Botha House (Gate 1), then through Gate 2, which
she stated was generally always open because it wa s rust y and then finally, to
Gate 3 , the gate adjacent to the swimming pool.

172. It is correct that Ms. September conceded that she could not get access from the
front gates of the Mandela House . She did not however state that she saw any
locks on these gates . It was also not put to her that she had not used these gates
because they were not only closed, but securely locked shut with a lock.

173. Even if Gate 4 and the Freedom Gate had not permitted access to the Mandela
House at the time when Ms . September and the children swam there, the
swimming pool was in any event easily accessible to the children through Gate 2
and Gate 3 . Ms. September’s evidence was emphatic that she and the other
children accessed the swimming pool by proceeding through Gate 2 , which she
stated was generally always open because it was rusty .

174. They then went through Gate 3, which had no lock on it and could easily be
opened even when it had been pushed closed. Insofar as Gate 2 is concerned,
Ms. September testified that i t was correct that th e bolt locking mechanism for this
gate was on the Mandela House side. She agreed with counsel for the Minister
that notwithstanding this, Gate 2 could be opened by a person pushing their hand
through the gate and opening the gate by sliding open the bolt mechanism on the
other side of the gate.

175. It is clear from this that even on occasions when Gate 2 could have been closed, it
could be opened by a person merely reaching their hand through the gate and
opening the bolt locking mechanism on the Mandela House side of the gate. There
is no evidence that Gate 2 had ever been securely locked shut with a lock
attached to its bolt locking mechanism on the Mandela House side of the gate.

176. I deal next with whether it is probable that Gate 4 was securely locked shut with a
lock on the day of the incident. Mr. H[...] testified that when he started panicking
after looking for H[...] outside the Botha House, he started running outside and ran
to Gate 4, the pedest rian gate in front of the Mandela House. He ran through this
gate which he stated was open. During cross -examination, he stated that he had
pushed this gate open.

177. Counsel for the first defendant criticized Mr. H[...] ’s evidence in this regard and
submitted that he had adjusted his version regarding the manner of his entry
through Gate 4. But irrespective of whether Mr. H[...] was able to run through Gate
4 because it was open or whether he had just pushed it open, I consider it
improbable that he wou ld have been able to do so easily and then run through
Gate 4 if that gate had been securely locked shut at the time with a lock or some
other secure locking mechanism. If Gate 4 had been securely locked shut with a
lock at the time, Mr. H[...] would either have had to jump over the gate itself or
somehow and with great force pull or yank the locked gate open . Or he would
have to find another means or gate to go through to reach the swimming pool in
the back yard of the Mandela House.

178. That however was not Mr. H[...] ’s evidence. His evidence was that Gate 4 was the
only gate in the front of the Mandela House that he ran through to reach the
swimming pool in the backyard of the Mandela House. The first defendant sought
to argue that Gate 4 was probably open and that it was likely that this was
because Mr. H[...] had forgotten to properly close this gate on their way out from
the Mandela House.

179. The probabilities of that having occurred, is a different issue . I will address it later
when addressing the issue of negligence. I consider that the probabilities are that
Gate 4 was not securely locked shut with lock on the day of the incident.

180. Lastly, there is the evidence of Mr. Botha . He resided next door to Mandela House
for years. He would have been familiar with the gates on the premises. Indeed, h e
was specifically led in his evidence in chief , on his knowledge of the gates at the
Mandela House. Mr. Botha con firmed duri ng cross -examination that it was very
easy to gain entry to the Mandela House premises . He said that there no lock s on
any of the gates at the Mandela House .

181. The evidence conclusively establishes that none of the gates surrounding the
exterior of the Mandela House were securely locked s hut with locks . The plaintiffs
have in my view established that on the day of the incident, the Minister’s s
employees had failed to take steps to lock and secure the Mandela House
premises and the gates on the premises which provided access to the swimmin g
pool.

Failure to prohibit young children from entering the premises

182. Ms. September testified that she and her friends had at no stage been stopped by
anyone employed by the Department when they were on the prison property and
on their way to the swimming pool at the Mandela House from the farm near
Schuurmansfontein Road. She stated that at no stage before the incident had she
or her young friends ever been chased away from the pool by any Correctional
Services staff.

183. She further stated that there was no -one at the Mandela House monitoring or
guarding the house and no -one from the Department of Correctional Services
performing this function. The evidence of Ms. Septemb er in this regard was not
seriously disputed.

184. Mr. Botha confirmed that there was never any security guards present at the
Mandela House while he lived next door or on the date of the incident. He stated
that various people, including children taking short cuts to school, were able to
freely move around the area and that it was very easy to gain access to the
Mandela House premises.

185. Ms. September’s grandfather, Mr. September, testified that there was a Mr.
Burger, an employee of the Department who was a security manager, who would
arrive and that when he did, the children who were swimming at the pool would run
away. Mr. Burger was not called as a witness on behalf of the first defendant. No
evidence was led on behalf of the first defendant rega rding any specific steps it
had taken to prohibit members of the public and young children from gaining
access to the Mandela House premises. There is no evidence of any warning or
no-entry signs put up by the Department which were present anywhere on the
premises.

186. Mr. J umaats made a laconic statement that all Correctional Services officials at
Drakenstein were aware that the Mandela House was off limits for casual visits. He
did not provide any further detail , for example, how, when or in what manner this
had been communicated to Correctional Services official s or anyone else for that
matter . Mr. J umaats did not suggest that the Department had taken any steps to
ensure that members of the public visiting Departmental staff on the property or
passing through the property, would be aware that access to the Mandela House
premises was strictly prohibited.

187. Mr. Manfred Jacobs, the delegate of the Area Commissioner was responsible for
considering written applications for access to the Mandela House . He was not
called as a witness with regard to any steps taken by the Department to prohibit
members of the pu blic or young children from entering the Mandela House
premises.

188. Ms September ’s evidence was challenged on the basis that she knew that when
she and her friends swam at the pool , they were committing a criminal offence and
trespassing on the propert y. In my view , it can hardly be argued that young
children who were able to easily access the swimming pool and did so repeatedly
without being stopped by any adults or persons in authority , would have been
deterred from doing so because they knew that tre spassing was a crime. To my
mind , this would amount to putting an old head on young shoulders.

189. Ms. September was about 9 or 10 years old when she and her friends swam at the
pool at the Mandela House. Some of the other children were younger than her. It
has long been the experience of our law that “… although children may be able to
distinguish between right and wrong, they will often not be able to act in
accordance with that appreciation; they became so engrossed in their play that
they become oblivious of other considerations and acted impulsivel y.”1

190. The evidence , in my view , demonstrates that at the date of and preceding the
incident, measures by the Department to effectively control entry and egress to the
area surrounding the Mandela House and the house itself, were manifestly absent.
Members of the public including young ch ildren were freely able to walk on and
through the property from the nearby road and through holes in the fencing
surrounding the property.

1 Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 (1) SA 381 (A) at 400B -E.

191. Gaining access to the Mandela House premises was very easy , as Mr. Botha
himself testified . The evidence by the plaintiffs’ witnesses that there was no
security guards present anywhere on the Mandela House premises or at the fence
near the road leading to the Mandela House , was uncontroverted . The re is no
evidence of warning or prohibition signs having been put up at the premises and
no evidence of locks on the gates of the Mandela House premises secure ly locking
the gates shut.

192. The plaintiffs have in my view established that the first defendant’s employees
failed to take steps to prohibit you ng children from entering the Mandela House
premises.

Failure to take steps to cover the pool with appropriate covering

193. Ms. September testified that there was at no stage a pool safety net cover on the
pool w hen she and her friends, some younger than 9 years old, swam at the pool.
Her evidence in this regard was not challenged.

194. Mr. H[...] ’s evidence was that on 13 August 2010 , there was no safety net over the
swimming pool when he found H[...] floating in the pool, lifeless. He stated that the
Department installed a safety net over the swimming pool after H[...] ’s burial. This
evidence was not disputed.

195. Mr. Jumaats confirmed that when he inspected the premises on 14 August 2010,
there was no safet y net over the swimming pool.

196. Exhibit A contains p hotographs of the scene of the incident taken by the SAPS on
19 August 2010, just under a week after H[...] ’s death . These photographs depict a
safety net cover installed over the swimming pool. This is consistent with Mr. H[...]
and Mr. J umaats’ evidence.

197. The first defendant’s employees had failed to take steps, prior to and at the date of
the incident, to cover the swimming pool with appropriate covering such as a
safety net or safety cover in order to prevent young children from falling into the
pool. They only did so after H[...] had drowned in the swimming pool. The evidence
of this is essentially uncontested.

Conclusions regarding omissions by Minister’s employees

198. I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have established on the facts each of the omissions
by the first defendant’s employees pleaded in their amended particulars of claim.

199. Were these omissions however negligent ? I consider this issue next.

Negligence

200. The test for negligence as an element of delictual liability is well -known and has
been applied in countless cases. The test was formulated by Holmes JA in Kruger
as follows:

“For the purposes of liability culpa arises if:

(a) A diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant -

(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring
another in his person or property and causing him patrimonial loss;
and

(ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and

(b) the defendant failed to take such steps.”2

201. Assessing the issue of negligence in various stages is however only a guideline.
The true criterion for determining negligence is whether in the particular
circumstances the conduct complained of, fell short of the standard of the
reasonable person.3 The SCA has in this regard and with apparent approval,
referred to academic writings where the learned authors J C Van Der Walt and J R
Midgley in LAWSA, make the following observations:

“In assessing negligence, the focus appears to have shifted from the
foreseeability and preventability formulation of the test to the actual standard:
conduct associated with a reasonable person . The Kruger v Coetzee test, or
any modification thereof, has been relegated to a formul a or guide that does not
require strict adherence. It is merely a method for determining the reasonable
person standard, which is why courts are free to assume foreseeability and
focus on whether the defendant took the appropriate steps that were expected
of him or her.”4 (own emphasis)

202. The question of whether a reasonab le person in the position of the defendant
would take guarding st eps and what steps would be reasonable, is a fact specific
enquiry. The test for negligence articulated in Kruger “…offers considerable scope
for ensuring that undue demands are not placed up on public authorities and
functionaries for the extent of their resources and the manner in which they have
ordered their priorities, will necessarily be taken into account in determining
whether they acted reasonably.:5 As to the issue of what is reasonable
foreseeable, it is recognised that while the precise or exact manner in which the

2 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430E -F.
3 Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd and
Another 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA); [2000] 1 All SA 128 (A) para 21 (‘Sea H arvest’).
4 Pick 'n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd v Pillay (900/2020) [2021] ZASCA 125 (29 September 2021) at para 15.
5 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (209/2001) [2002] ZASCA 79; [2002] 3 All SA 741
(SCA); 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (22 August 2002) at para 23 (‘Van Duivenboden’).
harm occurs need not be foreseeable, the general manner of its occurrence must
be reasonably foreseeable.6

203. The standard of a reasonable person, however, applies in the context of the
delictual liability of private persons. Different considerations apply, as they do in
this case, as what is reasonable in the context of an organ of state. The
Department of Correctional Services is a department of state in the national
sphere of governmen t. The first defendant is a functionary in the national sphere of
government exercising power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution.
They are both organs of state as defined in section 239(a) and section 239(b)(i) of
the Constitution.7

204. The Constitutional Court has in Mashongwa determined test for negligence in
respect of an organ of state to be the following:

“The real issue on this aspect of the case is not whether the pos ting of a single
guard, or three guards, could have prevented the attack. It is whether the
steps taken by PRASA could reasonably have averted the assault.

Crucial to this inquiry is the reasonableness of the steps taken. However, it
must be emphasise d that owing to the fact that PRASA is an organ of state,
the standard is not that of a reasonable person but a reasonable organ of
state.

Organs of state are in a position that is markedly different from that of an
individual. Therefore, it does not f ollow that what is seen to be reasonable
from an individual’s point of view must also be reasonable in the context of

6 Sea Harvest at para 21 - 22
7 Section 239 of the Constitution defines “organ of state” as (a) any department of state or administration
in the national, provincial or local sphere of g overnment; or (b) any other functionary or institution - (i)
exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislatio n, but does not
include a court or a judicial officer”.
organs of state. That approach would be overlooking the fundamental
differences between the state and an individual. It would also be lo sing sight
of the fact that the standard of a reasonable person was developed in the
context of private persons.

The standard of a reasonable organ of state is sourced from the Constitution.
The Constitution is replete with the phrase that the state mus t take reasonable
measures to advance the realisation of rights in the Bill of Rights. In the
context of socio ‑economic rights the availability of resources plays a major part
in an enquiry whether reasonable steps have been taken. I can think of no
reason in principle or logic why that standard is inappropriate for present
purposes. Here, as in the case of socio ‑economic rights, the choice of steps
taken depends mainly on the available resources. That is why an organ of
state must present information to the court to enable it to assess the
reasonableness of the steps taken .”8 (own emphasis).

205. I have concluded earlier that the plaintiffs have established, on the facts. that the
first defendant’ s employees at the Drakenstein Correctional Centre failed to lock
and secure the Mandela House premises, failed to prohibit young children from
entering the premises and failed to secure and lock the gate to the pool. They also
failed to cover the pool wit h appropriate covering so as to prohibit young children
from falling into the pool.

206. It bears mentioning that that at the time of the incident on 13 August 2010, the
control of the Mandela House premises and the swimming pool itself, vested in the
Department. The Department not only was in control and possession of the
swimming pool, but it was also aware that the swimming pool was being
continually maintained and repaired by external contractors.


8 Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa [2015] ZACC 36; 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC); 2016 (2)
BCLR 204 (CC) at paras 40 -41 (‘Mashongwa’).
207. This is apparent from the evidence of Mr. Jumaat s and the first defendant’s
abandoned Nolitha defence which it initially pleaded. The swimming pool was
however not being maintained for the use of an occupant of the Mandela House,
as had been the case when President Mandela lived at the house. It is comm on
cause that nobody was residing in or had occupied the Mandela House for years.
This is also not a case of a public authority such as a municipality who has
constructed and made available a swimming pool to the public as a public amenity.
Mr. Jumaats tes tified that the swimming pool at the Mandela House was merely
“…something to observe and not the essence of visits to the house.” Th at being
the case, I find it difficult to und erstand what rational purpose was being served by
the Department maintaining control of a swimming pool filled with water which, on
the Department’s version, was not a public pool, which nobody was allowed to
swim in and which was off -limits to Departmenta l staff for casual visits.

208. It was not suggested or argued by the Minister that swimming in the pool was
allowed for formally approved persons or groups visiting the Mandela House. Mr.
Jumaats, for example, did not suggest that the Departmental offic ials who
attended his team -building workshop at the Mandela House, were also allowed to
go for a swim in the pool.

209. The evidence makes it clear that the first defendant’s employees failed to take
preventative measures to prevent young children from ga ining access to the
swimming pool. The plain absence of effective measures to control entry and
egress to the area surrounding the Mandela House is in my view plainly relevant to
the question of foreseeability of harm. The evidence demonstrates that childr en
from the local farm where able to easily climb through a hole on the fence on the
outskirts of the prison property. They were very easily able to access the
swimming pool at the Mandela House, as Mr. Botha testified. Members of the
public including ven dors and children from the nearby farm taking short cuts to
school, were able to freely move about the Mandela House surrounds on the
gravel road in front of the house.

210. There were no security guards or Departmental employees present at the Mandela
House to prevent or deter access on the day of the incident or on any of the
occasions when Ms. September and the other children were able to access the
swimming pool. The evidence indicates that Department’s official, Mr. Burger, was
aware of the children swimming at the pool at the Mandela House. He was not
called as a witness to explain or elucidate on any measures taken by the
Department to prevent young children from gaining access to the pool. The
evidence also demonstrates that Mr. Botha was aware of young children gaining
unauthorized access to and swimming in the pool at the Mandela House.

211. A reasonable employee of the Department would have in my view have foreseen
the possibility of a child drowning or being injured in a swimming pool:

211.1 which was located at a house which appeared from the outside to be
abandoned , was unoccupied and was being used for no other purpose
other than as a type of museum;

211.2 which was completely unfenced and surrounded by gates which could
simply be opened and had no actual locks;

211.3 to which children, to the knowledge of officials such as Mr. Burger, were
gaining regular access to and;

211.4 which had no safety cover or safety net over the swimming pool.

212. I am of the view that there were a number of practical preventative measures
available to the first defendant’s employees which would most likely have
prevented young children such as H[...] from falling into the swimming pool and
drowning. Gate 3, the gat e immediately adjacent to the swimming pool, was fitted
with a sliding bolt mechanism allowing for the attachment of a detachable lock
which could securely lock this gate shut. Such a lock could easily be attached to
Gate 3 allowing it be securely closed s hut.

213. The uncontested evidence of Ms. September was that Gate 3 gate had never been
securely shut with a lock . It was open on occasions and when it was closed, it had
simply been pushed closed and could be opened by reaching over and sliding the
bolt open from the other side.

214. The issue of absence of secure locks on the gates at the Mandela House
premises, such as Gate 3, Gate 4 the front pedestrian gate and Gate 2, the gate
attached to the Botha house, was raised repeatedly with witnesses at the trial. It
was not put by the Minister’s counsel or any of these witnesses, such as Mr.
Colyn, the plaintiff’s and Ms. September, that because of their design, these gates
could not be fitted with secure locks which enabled them to be securely shut
closed instead of just pushed closed or closed with a bolt slide without an actual
lock.

215. It was argued by the first defendant that the gates at the Mandela Hous e were
fitted with bolts and that it was not a requirement for the gates to be fitted with
locks. I disagree. As Ms. September testified, even the gates with bolts such as
Gate 3 and Gate 2 could simply be opened if they were not securely locked shut
with a lock. If the purpose of a gate is to securely prevent entry through that gate, it
is difficult to see how that that purpose can realistically be achieved if the gate is
merely closed and not securely locked shut with a lock.

216. One need not be a lock smith to know that the purpose of a securely locked gate is
to prevent and deter unauthorized entry through that gate. A householder who, for
example, closes his house doors and gates at night and does not lock them or
even have locks fitted on the doors a nd gates, runs an obvious risk. If his house is
burgled and insured possessions stolen , he is unlikely to receive shrift which is
anything other than short if he informs his insur ers that closing the doors shut and
not locking them securely shut, was suffi cient.

217. An obvious preventative measure would be the installation of a safety covering net
over the swimming pool. No steps were taken by the Department to do so until a
week after H[...] had already drowned in the pool. The fact that such a pool safe ty
covering net was eventually installed by the Department, is to my mind a
recognition on its part of the inherent risks of a swimming pool and the need for a
preventative measure to guard against the risk of people falling into the pool and
drowning. Aft er all, why otherwise install a swimming pool safety covering net after
a child ha s already drowned in the pool?

218. It was however put to certain of the plaintiff’s witnesses such as Mr. Colyn and Ms.
September, that the Mandela House was being kept a s a type of museum or
historical building. Mr. Colyn had testified that when he visited the premises, the
gates were worn and the gate alignment of Gate 4 was in a state of disrepair. It
was put to Mr. Colyn that for renovations to be done to the extent th at the
ambiance and historical features of the building were unrecognizable, would defeat
the historical purpose of the Mandela House.

219. The argument is untenable. The installation of effective locks on gates at the
Mandela House, especially in respect of gates which provide access to parts of the
house which present a risk to children, such as the swimming pool, can hardly be
equated to re novations which detract from the historical character of the house.
Nor for that matter can it sensibly be suggested that the installation of a pool safety
net on the swimming pool of a heritage protected house, is consonant with
alteration or destruction of the heritage value of the house. The Department in any
event installed just such a pool safety cover net, albeit after H[...] had already
drowned in the pool.

220. The Minister led no evidence about the extent of any financial or administrative
burden the Department would have to bear in relation to preventive measures
such as access control at the premises, secure locks on all the gates and a
covering net over the swimming pool. There was no evidence advanced on its
behalf that such measures were even considered prior to H[...] ’s death, let alone
implemented.

221. The Minister was under a constitutional obligation to present information to the
court to enable it to assess the reasonableness of the steps the Department hds
taken or considered to preven t children, who his officials knew where gaining
access to the swimming pool at the Mandela House, from falling into the pool and
drowning.9 I do not consider that the expense of a few secure padlocks locks on
gates surrounding the Mandela H ouse and leading to the pool , would have be en
financially prohibitive for the Department.

222. I hasten to add that the Department in control of the premises at issue in this case,
is the Department of Correctional Services. It is the Department whose very
business is safeguarding prison complexes , their surrounds and the public from
unauthorized access to its facilities and ensuring that persons and property under
its control, are secured effectivel y under lock and key.

223. The omissions by the Department’s employees as set out above were
unreasonable. Prophetic foresight was not required from a reasonable organ of
state and its employees to see that the situation at the Mandela House swimming
pool was an accident waiting to happen. Practical preventative s teps, such as
locking the gates surrounding the pool shut with a padlock10 and installing a pool
net, were required to avert harm to children who may gain entry to the swimming
pool. Not taking such steps was in my view, unreasonable.

9 Mashongwa at para 41,
10 The term ‘lock’ is a generic term which may refer to any type of locking mechanisms. A padlock, on the
other hand is a specific type of portable and detachable lock which is generally opened or closed with
keys.

224. Instead, the Department continued maintaining the swimming pool and kept it filled
with water at a house which was unoccupied, appeared abandoned a nd lacked
effective measures preventing access thereto by members of the public and young
children. The Department e xpend ed public funds on repairs to the pool when the
same funds could have been spent on low -cost practical preventative measures
such as a pool safety net and effective locks for the gates surrounding the pool.

225. This in circumstances where the swimming pool itself served no real purpose other
than its apparent aesthetic value. And an aesthetic value at that , which was in my
view entirel y purposeless , because actually swimming in the pool , that being the
very function of a swimming pool , was forbidden to the public and of f limits to
Departmental staff. Mr. Jumaat’s statement that the swimming pool was not the
essence of the Mandela House and merely something to observe , rings true. One
may then rhetorically ask , what rational purpose was being served by the
continued operation , maintenance and keeping filled with water a swimming pool,
which on the Department’s own version, no -one was allowed to swim in , and which
was merely something to observe?

226. I am of the view that the Department and its employees’ failure to take
preventative measures to guard against the risk of children drowning in the
swimming pool at the Mandela House, was unreasonable and negligent.

Negligence of the first plaintiff

227. I turn now to consider the first central plank of the first defendant’s defence on the
merits . It is the defence that the incident was caused by the sole negligence of Mr.
H[...] .

228. The first defendant pleads that Mr. H[...] failed to seek and obtain permission to
enter the premises including the swimming pool and accessed the premises
withou t having obtained authorization to do so. It is further pleaded that after
having left the premises including the swimming pool, Mr. H[...] left an entrance or
entrances to the premises open and/or failed to secure that the entrance(s) to the
premises were closed and secured. This, according to the first defendant, enabled
members of the public and H[...] to enter the premises. The first defendant in
addition pleads that Mr. H[...] , failed to supervise his minor son H[...] and ensure
that H[...] did not acc ess the premises and the swimming pool.

229. In addition to the defence pleaded above, a significant part of the cross -
examination of Mrs . K[...] in particular, was directed at ostensibly demonstrating
that Mr. H[...] was intoxicated on the day of the in cident. It is important to note that
the Minister’s plea on any reading does not raise a defence alleging that Mr. H[...]
was intoxicated on the day in question and failed to keep H[...] under proper
supervision as a result.

230. No such allegations were made in the Minister’s plea notwithstanding the
defendants being in possession of the very affidavits by Mrs K[...] and Ms Jolene
De Beer , on the basis of which the issue of the alleged intoxication of Mr. H[...]
was raised. I will nonetheless consider this issue after addressing the evidence
relating to Mr. H[...] allegedly entering the Mandela House and leaving entrances
open at the premises.

231. The Minister’s defence in relation to Mr. H[...] ’s negligence be ing the sole cause of
the incident, in my view rests entirely on the evidence of Mr. Botha and the
credibility thereof, with regard to the probabilities. In order to determine this aspect,
it is necessary to rehearse Mr. Botha’s evidence regarding Mr. H[...] entering the
Mandela House premises on the day in question.

232. It will be recalled that in his evidence in chief, Mr. Botha testified that on the day in
question, he had observed a red vehicle driving past on the gravel road in front of
his house an d the Mandela House. He stated that was able to see the vehicle as
the front door of his house was open at the time and he was sitting in the living
room. He stood up, went to the front door and the red vehicle drive past and park
just next to the Mandela House. He testified that he saw that it was Mr. H[...] . He
stated that he ob served him, Mr. C[...] H[...] and the three children, getting out of
the vehicle and opening the front gate of the Mandela House.

233. He stated that he saw them all moving in tow ards the area around the Mandela
House. He could not see exactly what they were doing but because he knew Mr.
H[...] , he then turned around and went back to sit down and continue watching his
films.

234. He testified that a fter about three to five minute s, Mr. H[...] , his brother C[...] and
the children came back into the yard of the house where he was sitting in the living
room.

235. Mr. Botha was questioned at length regarding the vib racrete wall forming the
border between the Botha House and the Mande la House. He stated that the
vibracrete wall was not there on the date of the incident. It was put to Mr. Botha
that he was the first person who had testified that the vib racrete was not present
on the day and that Mr. Jumaats had himself testified that the vib racrete wall was
present on the day of his inspection on 14 August 2010.

236. The evidence of Mr. Jumaats with regard to the presence of Gate 2 and the
vibracrete wa ll on 14 August 2010, is important. In his evidence in chief, Mr
Jumaats was in the first place referred by the Minister’s counsel, to photographs of
Gate 2 which appeared at page 13 of exhibit A. These photographs were taken by
Mr. Raaths during 2011. The photographs clearly depict a vibracrete wall adjacent
to Gate 2. The following exchange ensued:

‘Adv Jacobs: “now the first photograph on page 13, it says the heading ‘ H[...]
H[...] – building plan with gates and it says there pedestrian gate 2 – entran ce
Eben Botha’s House (Chef’s House) and the Mandela House, now at the back
there is a number 2 with a circle and next to that there is a black gate, can you
comment on that for us?

Mr. Joemats: “ the gate was there on the time of the incident. The morning
when I visited the Mandela House as well as Mr. Botha, that gate was closed
and not open as it is in the picture.”

Adv Jacobs: “so, just so that we get a clear understanding, that particular gate
that we see on that photograph, where is it located in relation to the Mandela
House and Mr. Eben Botha’s house?”

Mr Joemats: “ The hinges, if I may say, its attached to Mr. Botha’s house. So it
is the gate that is adjacent to the Mandela House, counsel .”

Adv Jacobs: “So, if we look at the photograph for example, that particular gate,
the black gate if I may call it that, is on the border between the Mandela House
and Mr. Botha’s house? ”

Mr Joemats: “ That’s correct .” (own emphasis).

237. As is evident f rom the above exchange, Mr. Jumaats had been shown
photographs of Gate 2 which depict the gate and the vibracrete wall adjacent to it.
Mr. Jumaats confirmed that this gate was present on the day that he visited the
scene. He at no point indicated or sugges ted in his evidence that the vibracrete
wall depicted in the photographs of Gate 2, was not present when he attended at
the Mandela House and the Botha House on 14 August 2010.

238. Mr. Jumaats was specifically questioned in cross -examination regarding th e
presence of Gate 2 and the vibracrete wall bordering the Mandela House and the
Botha House. He confirmed that both Gate 2 and the vibracrete wall were there
when he attended at the scene on 14 August 2010. His evidence was the
following:

Adv Du Toit: “… Let’s quickly look at the gate situation. I am going to take you
first to that. If you look at that bundle in front of you, We understand now if you
look at page 8, you testified that you were the one that drew this pencil line in
to indicate what you thou ght in your mind happened. Ok, clearly the vib racrete
wall between Botha’s house and the Mandela House was there at the
time…You must just please say yes .”

Mr Joemats: “ Yes”

Adv Du Toit: “Thank you.”

239. In my view, Mr. Botha was unable to proffer a coherent explanation for why all the
other witnesses including Mr. J umaats would have made a mistake regarding the
presence of the vibracrete wall on the day of the incident. The following exchange
ensued durin g his cross -examination:

Adv Du Toit: “So u se daar was nie ‘n muur nie. Maar u sal met my saamstem
indien die muur wel daar was, dan is u getuienis met betrekking tot wat u kon
sien, wat se hekke oopgemaak, dit kan mos nie wees nie want jy kan nie deur
daardie vibracrete muur kan sien nie ?”

Mr. Botha : “Soos ek se, wat ek gesien het daar so.”’

Adv Du Toit: “ Ja, ek gaan net vir u se. Ek hoor wat u vir my se, maar ek se vir
u. As die vibracrete muur nie daar was nie. Dis mos voor die hand liggend, u
gaan nie kan sien wat gebeur agter die groot vibracrete muur. Is dit korrek ?”

Mr. Botha: “ As hy nou daar gewees het?”

Adv Du Toit: “ As hy daar was. Soos wat die ander mense getuig het .”

Mr. Botha: “ Ja.”

Adv Du Toit: “ Dan kan jy nie gesien het nie . Ok, kom ons los dit net daar, ek
sal later terug kom daar toe.”

240. As is evident from the above, i t was put to Mr. Botha that due to the presence of
the vibacrete wall , it would not be possible for him to observe, as he claimed, Mr.
H[...] and the children entering the Mandela House area. The line of sight from
where he c laimed he was standing and the presence of the vibracrete wall itself,
would make that impossible. After some hesitation, he conceded that if the
vibacrete wall was in fact there at the time of the incident i.e. 13 August 2010 , it
would not have been possi ble for him to observe, by standing at the front door of
his living room, anything happening in front of the Mandela House.

241. This concession by Mr. Botha was rightly made. In my view it puts paid to the
credibility of his evidence insofar as it relates to him allegedly observing, from his
front door, Mr. H[...] , the children and C[...] H[...] opening the gate at the front of
the Mandela House and entering the premises. Unless vested with s uper-human
powers to see through concrete , he simply w ould not been able to make that
observation when his line of sight was obscured by an approximately 6ft high
existing vibracrete walling running the full length of the border between the Botha
House and the Mandela House.

242. Mr Botha was also, unsurprisingly, questioned as to what Gate 2 was attached to if
there was no vibacrete wall. He said that that it was attached to a pillar. He then in
re-examination, stated that there was a wire fence attached to Gate 2 and there
was no vibracrete wall at the time of the incident.

243. Mr. Botha however did not say anything about a wire fence in his evidence in chief.
That aside, his oral testimony regarding the vibracrete wall in any event runs
counter to the objective documentary evidence.

244. The 2008 site layout plan refers to an “existing” vibracrete wall on the border
between the two houses. Photographs taken in 2011 by Mr Raaths and in 2024 by
Mr. Colyn depict a vibracrete wall adjacent to Gate 2. Mr J umaat’s evidence
confirmed that the vibracrete wall was present on 13 August 2010. If Mr. Botha’s
evidence is to be believed, it would mean that a vibracrete wall was depicted on
2008 architectural layout plans as “existing” at th at time, was present again on the
premises in 2011, somehow disappeared in 2013 and then re -appeare s again in
2024.

245. Mr Botha, h aving testified and stated in his second affidavit that he observed Mr.
H[...] enter the Mandela House premises , was then confronted with the
inconvenient fact of the presence of the vibracrete wall which would such an
observation physically impossible . Unable to explain this , he was driven to
irrelevancies, denying the existence of the vibracrete wall and then resorting to
stating that there was wire fence attached to Gate 2 in 2013 . Unfortunately, his
evidence in this regard flies in the face of the objective evidence depicted in the
photographs of the vibracrete wall.

246. It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that th e evidence by Mr. Botha that Mr.
H[...] , his brother and the children, did not immediately come to him until the
elapse of about 2 to 3 minutes, was crucial. It was contended that this supports Mr
Botha’s evidence that Mr H[...] and his brother C[...] as we ll as the children had
first gone to view the Mandela House premises. The submission is unavailing. As
anyone who would have had anything to do with parenting and young children
would k now, securing the alighting from a small vehicle of three young childre n
including an 18-month -old, is not the quickest form of movement .

247. I fail to see how a 2 or 3 minute delay in Mr. H[...] reaching Mr. Botha’s house after
walking up a pathway with 2 young children and a toddler, supports an infere nce
that during that time, they instead must have been at the Mandela House
premises.

248. In the result, I am not satisfied with the credibility of Mr. Botha’s evidence
regarding his observations of Mr. H[...] entering the Mandela House property on 13
August 2010, either in its content or the manne r in which he gave it. I reject his
version regarding the absence of a vibracrete wall at the premises on 13 August
2010 as well as his evidence that he saw Mr. H[...] and his family entering the
Mandela House p remises, as being wholly improbable.

249. This conclusion strictly speaking makes it unnecessary for me to deal in detail the
challenge to Mr. Botha’s evidence on the basis that the allegations in his second
affidavit added details which he did not observ e and which were not included in his
first affidavit. I will nonetheless address the issue briefly as it bears on the
credibility of Mr. Botha and Mr Jumaat’s evidence in this regard.

250. I find it necessary d to express my dis quiet with the testimony of Mr. Jumaats and
Mr. Botha with regard to the two affidavits which Mr. Jumaats procured from Mr.
Botha. I gained the distinct impression from Mr. Jumaats’s evidence that either he
or his superiors , were not entirely pleased with Mr. Botha’s first affidavit , which
made no mention of the H[...] family entering the Mandela House. As stated
earlier, Mr. Jumaats testified that when statements are written, there are always
questions. The Department, he sa id, does an assessment and asks questions. Mr.
Jumaats was not approached by Mr. Botha to do a second affidavit. He took it
upon himself to obtain the second affidavit.

251. He testified that he went back to get a second affidavit from Mr. Botha because the
entry of Mr. H[...] and his children to the Mandela House, “…didn’t come out
clearly” in Mr. Botha’s first affidavit . He therefore he had to do “…an additional
confirmation in respect thereof”.

252. Mr. Jumaat’s statement in cross -examination that the alleged entry to the Mandela
House by Mr. H[...] “…didn’t come out clearly”, in Mr. Botha’s first affidavit, is
revealing. Mr. Botha had not said anything in his first affidavit about Mr. H[...]
entering the Mandela House premises. And that first affidavit, according to Mr.
Botha, had not been written out by him but by Mr. Jumaats in his own handwriting,
who pres umably recorded exactly what Mr. Botha told him.

253. There is of course also Mr. Jumaat’s evidence that Mr. Botha’s first affidavit was
written out by Mr. Botha because the Department encourages people to write out
their own affidavits. Only for Mr. Bot ha, during c ross-examination, to emp hatically
deny that it was his handwriting in that very affidavit.

254. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that Mr. Botha’s second affidavit, written out
conveniently by Mr. Jumaats, was clearly deposed to absolve the Department and
place any blame squarely on Mr. H[...] . The evidence and the testimony of Mr.
Jumaats and Mr. Botha lends some force to this submission. I need not however
decide the point conclusively. As I have concluded earlier, Mr. Botha’s evidence in
this regard in any event falls to be rejected as being in direct conflict with the
objective documentary evidence in the 2008 site layout plan and the photographs
taken at the premises in 2011 and 2024.

255. In written argument, counsel for the Minster, w isely in my view, did not seek to rely
on Mr. Botha’s evidence regarding the vibracrete wall. Rather, a different line of
attack was posited based on the evidence of Mr. H[...] regarding his route to the
swimming pool after he discovered H[...] was missing . It was submitted on behalf
of the Minister that Mr. H[...] had given contradictory evidence regarding Gate 4,
which he testified that he had entered through when going to look for H[...] .

256. It was submitted that Mr. H[...] had amended his versions b ecause, so it was
argued, he had first testified in his evidence in chief that Gate 4 was open but then
during cross -examination, he testified that he had opened the gate further.

257. These contradictions also formed the basis of the first defendant’s a rgument that
Mr. H[...] and his brother, C[...] H[...] could have left the gates to the Mandela
House open when they went to Mr. Botha afterwards. Counsel for the Minister
submitted that on the probabilities, it is more likely that Mr H[...] had shown C[...]
H[...] the premises and that on their way out to Mr Botha , they had forgotten to
properly close the gate to the Mandela House premises. It was argued that this
would explain why this gate was open at the time when Mr H[...] became alarmed
and went to look for H[...] and discovered the gate which gives access to the
Mandela House premises , was open.

258. Mr. H[...] , it was argued, had adjusted his version in order to avoid the implications
of him, or someone else who he was with when he went to the Mandela House,
having left the gate open. Counsel argued that Mr. H[...] had given three versions
in this regard. First , it was argued, he testified that he found the front gate of the
Mandela House premises open when he was looking for H[...] . Then, he adjusted
his evidence in cross -examination t say that he pushed the gate further open. The
third version , it was argued, was that Mr . H[...] had opened the gate.

259. I have carefully considered the evidence of Mr. H[...] in this regard. I n my view , the
criticism of his evidence on the basis set out above is overstated. I am furthermore
not persuaded as to the inference so ught to be drawn, that the apparent
contradictions in Mr. H[...] ’ evidence regarding Gate 4, are indicative of him having
left the gate open after visiting the Mandela House.

260. In the first place, it must be remembered that Mr. H[...] was testifying a bout
traumatic events which occurred some 14 years ago. He was testifying about a
particular moment in time when he was running around the Botha House
premises, panic -stricken and frantically calling out for his missing 18 -month -old
child, who a few second s later he found floating lifeless in a swimming pool.

261. In his evidence in chief, Mr. H[...] stated that when he could not find H[...] , he
started panicking and ran down towards the gates outside the Mandela House. He
ran towards and through Gate 4, the pedestrian gate outside the Mandela House,
which he stated was open at the time. This gate was not locked. In cross -
examination, he stated with regard to Gate 4, “… ek het hom oopgestoot , daai hek,
hy was oop, ek stoot hom verder oop .”

262. I do not consider there to be any significant contradictions in Mr. H[...] ’s evidence
regarding how he entered through Gate 4. To the extent that there are any, they
are in my view immaterial. It needs no authority to state that it is not every
contradiction in the evidence of a witness which renders his evidence untruthful.
Mr. H[...] ’ evidence regarding his entry through Gate 4 while searching for H[...] ,
does not in my view support the inference that he had visited the Mandela House
and left the gates open . The only eye -witness evidence proffered by the Minister in
support of the allegations that Mr. H[...] entered the Mandela House, is the
evidence of Mr. Botha. I have already concluded that Mr. Botha’s evidence in that
regard is improbable and lacking in credibility, for the reason set out above.

263. I turn briefly to the contentions as pleaded that the incident occurred due to the
sole negligence of Mr. H[...] , in that he failed to exercise proper supervision of
H[...] .

264. It was put to Mr. H[...] that he had essentially fabricated a story about goin g to the
toilet for a few minutes and that this was the only time that he did not have H[...]
under his sight. Counsel argued that Mr. H[...] was unable to explain why the
evidence relating to his visit to the toilet was never included in his affidavit tha t he
had given to the police on 13 September 2010.

265. It was also argued that an affidavit by Mr. C[...] H[...] , in which he stated that the
two older children were playing next to the tractor tyre , suggested that Mr. H[...] did
not have his eye on H[...] at all times. In addition, it was submitted that his version
regarding the cooldrink requested by L[...], was an afterthought in order to deal
with the fact that Mr H[...] did not keep H[...] under his supervision at all times.

266. I am not persuaded b y the submission that the evidence establishes that the sole
cause of H[...] ’s drowning was due to negligence by Mr. H[...] in failing to keep
H[...] under his supervision.

267. Firstly, the question here is not one of contributory negligence, which has not been
pleaded. Secondly, and i nsofar as the negligence enquiry is concerned, I consider
that while parental supervision of a child may notionally be relevant to the question
of foreseeability by a defendant of harm to the child, it is not determinative of the
question. The question and focus in the present case is on the conduct of the first
defendant and whether it, not Mr. H[...] , took the steps which were required of a
reasona ble organ of state to prevent harm to children gaining access to the
swimming pool at the Mandela House.

268. Thirdly and a s I shall explain later, t he present facts are significantly different to
those which pertained in Stedall11, where the SCA held that a homeowner can
reasonably expect that a child will be supervised and guarded from harm by its
supervising parent, and would not for esee that the parent would be distracted
whilst caring for its child. In Stedall , the mother of a 30 month old child (‘C’ ) had left
C to her own devices while visiting a friend and went to a parking lot behind the
house in order to transfer a baby -seat from the car in which they had arrived to the
motor vehicle that was to take them home. The exercise did not go smoothly and
after a while, she became nervous and went back to the house to see what C was
up to. C was found lying face down in a swimming pool. C sustained severe brain

11 Stedall and Anot her v Aspeling and Another (1326/2016) [2017] ZASCA 172; 2018 (2) SA 75 (SCA) (1
December 2017) .
damage as a result. Notably, t he SCA while upholding the appeal, noted that its
findings did not imply that C’s mother was negligent in the tragic affair.

269. I do not accept that organ of state wrongdoer, who is plainly negligent and which
negligence results in harm to or death of a child, can be allowed to entirely escape
liability by foisting s ole negligence on to the parent, who for a split second or
momentarily takes his eyes off the child and the child is harmed by the negligence
of the wrongdoer. The responsibility of a parent to supervise a young child cannot,
in my view, be used as impenet rable shield against liability of negligent organs of
state who fail to take the most elementary reasonable and low -cost precautions to
safeguard children from harm by the very risks which they have themselves
created . Such as, in this case, the continued operation of a wholly unsecured
swimming pool on premises which are unoccupied, and which do not have a single
lock on the gates providing easy access to the swimming pool.

270. The Minister’s defence that H[...] drowned because of the sole negligence of Mr.
H[...] , is without merit.

271. I lastly on this aspect of the negligence enquiry address the contentions by the first
defendant relating to alleged intoxication of Mr. H[...] .

272. Mr. Botha, the person who was with Mr. H[...] on the day of the incident and at the
place where it occurred, testified that he knew Mr. H[...] well and that he was not
intoxicated on the day in question.

273. Mrs. K[...], while admitting the statements that she had made in her a ffidavits
regarding his consumption of alcohol, clearly stated that he was not intoxicated
when they left that morning to do the shopping. Mr. H[...] expressly denied her
allegations that he had consumed Olaf Berg brandy that morning and that he had
obtain ed alcohol from the prison bar. He stated that he did not drink cheap brandy
such as Olaf Berg . Brandy . Secondly, he stated that there was no possibility that
Mrs. K[...] would have allowed drinking by him and his brother at home that early in
the morning .

274. He stated that if something such as that had happened on the day they were
planning to go to town to buy groceries, “… sy sal skel, dan is my hele dag suur .”
Having observed Mrs. K[...] in the witness box, I am inclined to agree . I consider it
improbable that Mrs. K[...] would have permitted consumption of strong drink by
Mr. H[...] and his brother in her home that early in morning , while she was getting
ready to go with Mr. H[...] to town in Paarl to do the monthly shopping at Shoprite.
She herself stated “... ek gaan nie dorp toe nie met dronk mense nie.”

275. Furthermore and had Mr. H[...] indeed obtained alcohol from Mr. Henry Daniels,
who was in charge of the prison bar, the Minister would surely have called Mr.
Daniels as a witness. He was not called as a witness. Nor did the first defendant
call as a witness Ms Jolene De Beer, who in an affidavit dated 17 August 2010
alleged that when she arrived at the H[...] home, Mr H[...] had sm elt of alcohol.

276. I find no basis to conclude that Mr. H[...] ’s behaviour when he reached h ome with
H[...] , can fairly be equated with intoxication or drunkenness. Mr. H[...] had just
jumped into a swimming pool and taken out his son who was was floating there,
lifeless. Mrs K[...]’s unchallenged evidence was that he was clearly not himself and
was running up and down in a highly agitated, emotional confused and erratic
state. In m y view , understandably given the magnitude of the tragedy which had
just befallen him.

277. It is so that a witness , whether expert or not , may say that he thought that a person
was drunk.12 However, a bare assertion to t hat effect does not carry much weight
without a detailed description of the facts on which it is based.13 There is no in my

12 R v Brorson 1949 (2) SA 819(T) .
13 S v Adams 1983 (2) 577 (A) .
view no a cceptable evidence that Mr. H[...] was intoxicated or inebriated on the
day of the incident.

Conclusion on negligence

278. I conclude that Minister’s employees could reasonably have foreseen that there
was a risk of young children gaining access to and drowning or being injured in the
unsecured swimming pool at the Mandela House. The Minister’s officials failed to
take any reasonable preventative steps to this from happening and H[...] drowned
in the swimming pool because of their negligent failure to do so.

279. The Minister has in my view not established that H[...] ’s drowning was solely due
to the negligence of the first plaintiff.

Wrongfulness

280. Omissions to act, unlike positive conduct which causes harm, are not prima facie
wrongful. As Brand JA explained in Hawekwa14:

“…Negligent conduct which manifests itself in the form of a positive act
causing physical harm to the property or person of another is prima
facie wrongful. By contrast, negligent conduct in the form of an
omission is not regarded as prima facie wrongful. Its wrongfulness
depends on the existence of a legal duty.

The imposition of this legal duty is a matter for judicial determi nation
involving criteria of public and legal policy consistent with constitutional
norms. In the result, a negligent omission causing loss will only be
regarded as wrongful and therefore actionable if public or legal policy

14 Hawekwa Youth Camp and Another v Byrne (2010 (6) SA 83 (SCA) at para 22 (‘Hawekwa’).
considerations require that suc h omission, if negligent, should attract
legal liability for the resulting damage.”

281. Wrongfulness is a self -standing and independent element of delictual liability which
must be established in order for the plaintiff to succeed.

282. A court determi ning whether an omission is wrongful in essence asks the following
question: assuming that all the other elements of delictual liability are present, is it
reasonable to impose liability on a defendant for the damages flowing from specific
conduct? In this regard, c aution is required not to conflate the question of
reasonableness in the wrongfulness assessment with the question of
reasonableness in the negligence assessment.15

283. The purpose of concept of delictual wrongfulness in our constitutional era is thus
effectively that of a safety valve against arbitrary and limitless extension of
delictual liability . Khampepe J put it thus in Country Cloud Trading :16

“Wrongfulness is an element of delictual liability. It functions to
determine whether the infliction of culpably caused harm demands the
imposition of liability or, conversely, whether “the social, economic and
others costs are just too high to justify the use of the law of delict for the
resolution of the particular issue”. Wrongfulness typically acts as a
brake on liability, particularly in areas of the law of delict where it is
undesirable or overly burdensome to impose liab ility.”

284. Wrongfulness essentially arises from the fundamental duty to respect rights and
not to cause harm .17 Moral indignation with a defendant’s omission to act does not

15 Za v Smith and Another (20134/2014) [2015] ZASCA 75; 2015 (4) SA 574 (SCA); [2015 ] 3 All SA 288
(SCA) (27 May 2015 ) at para 19.
16 Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC Department of Infrastructure Development [2014] ZACC 28 ; 2015 (1)
SA 1 (CC) at paras 20-21 (‘Country Cloud’).
17 Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZACC 4 ; 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC) at para 53
(‘Loureiro’).
in itself establish wrongfulness . Wrongfulness arises when the policy and legal
convictions of the community, constitutionally understood, require that the
omission be regard ed as wrongful and that the plaintiff’s loss be made good by the
defendant. To put it differently and in a negative sense, an omission will not be
regarded as wrongful if public or legal policy considerations determine that there
should be no liability and that notwithstanding his or her fault, the potential
defendant should not be subjected to a claim for damages .18

285. Whether a particular set of circumstances gives rise to a legal duty act positively to
prevent harm to the plaintiff, therefore involves not only weighing competing norms
and interests but the identification of those established norms or standards which
can be balanced against each other.19 The Bill of Rights is in my view the lodestar
for the identification of th ese norms, standards and values. Societal norms and
values, to be sure, are dynamic, fluid and perpetually change over time. The legal
convictions of society and whether they demand that harm causing conduct be
regarded as wrongful , are however by necessity underpinned and informed by the
norms and values embodied in the Constitution.20 One of these norms and values,
enshrined in section 2 8(2) of the Constitution, is that a child’s best interest is of
paramount importance.

286. I consider the following factors to be significant on the question of wrongfulness.
Firstly, the constitutional norm of the best interest of the child which must b e taken
into account in every matter concerning a child. Secondly, the continued presence
and maintenance of a swimming pool at the Mandela House which created a
potential risk of harm to children. Thirdly, the constitutional norm of accountability.

287. The determination of wrongfulness requires the balancing and consideration of a
number of factors. The question then, as stated in Country Cloud21, is whether the

18 Country Cloud at para 20 – 21.
19 Minister of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) at para 21 .
20 Loureiro at para 34 .
21 Country Cloud at para 20 – 21.
public and legal policy considerations, informed by cons titutional norms and
values, would not regard the omissions by the Minister’s employees as attract
liability for damages notwithstanding their negligence. Or to put it differently, public
and legal policy considerations justify a conclusion that the Depart ment acted as a
reasonable organ of state should act and therefore should not be subjected to a
claim for damages .

288. In considering reasonableness by an organ of state, context is important. The
concept of reasonableness places context at the centre of the enquiry and permits
an assessment of context to determine whether a government programme or
conduct is indeed reasonable.22 In Loureiro for example, the Constitutional Court
considered the wrongfulness enquiry in the conte xt of historical material and
statistical crime data demonstrating a community plagued by high levels of violent
crime.23

Child mortality from preventable drownings

289. The question of w rongfulness in this case arises in the context of society , both
locally and globally, being afflicted by endemic levels of fatal drowning incidents,
particularly amongst young children. A recent study by researchers from the
National Sea Rescue Institute and the University of Cape Town records that 2755
fatal drowning incidents of children under 4 years of age occurred in South Africa
between 2016 and 2021. The under 4 years age group was identified as being of
the highest risk, with a cumulative drowning incidence of 2755 fatal drownings or
one drowning per day.24


22 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28; 2010 (3) BCLR
239 (CC) ; 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (8 October 2009) at para 59.
23 Loureiro at paras 2 -4, 34.
24 Fortuin, J, Karaganwa, I, Mahlelela, N, Robertson, C ‘ A South African Epidemiological Study of Fatal
Drownings: 2016 -2021 ’ Internat ional Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, available at
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9690020/
290. Studies have also found that 70 % of fatal drownings in children aged under 4
occur in or around the home in buckets, bathtubs and swimming pools . In respect
of non -fatal drowning or immersion injuries, 60% of admissions of children at the
Red Cross Children ’s War Memorial Hospital in Cape Town are reported to be for
non-fatal drowning injuries of children under the age of 5.25

291. The World Health Organisation (“WHO”) is a specialized United Nations agency
established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) . The
WHO has recogniz ed the global prevalence of fatal drownings as a major public
heath concern. The 2024 WHO global status report on drowning records that there
were an estimated 300 000 drowning deaths in 2021, this being equivalent to more
than 30 people losing their lives to drowning every hour of every day. The report
records that globally, drowning is the fourth leading cause of death for children
under 4 years of age and the third leading cause of death for children aged 5 to 14
years.26

292. The Consti tutional Court has held that reference may be made to both binding and
non-binding international law when interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights. Non -
binding international law includes resolutions adopted by the United Nations and
guidelines adopted by international agencies such as the WHO.27

293. South Africa is a member state of the U nited Nations a nd the WHO. On 29 April
2021 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 75/273 on Global Drowning
Prevention (“UNGA Res.75/273”) . The resolution notes that drowning prevention
represents an effective me asure which contribu tes to the prevention of child
deaths and can protect investment in child development. The resolution further

25 C Saunders, D Sewdath, N Naidoo ‘ Keeping our heads above water: A systematic review of fatal
drowning in South Africa’ South African Medical Journal, 2018 Vol 108 January 2018, available at
https: //scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0256 -95742018000100017
26 World Health Organisation ‘Global Status Report on Drowning Prevention: 2024’, available at
https://www.who.int/teams/social -deter minants -of-health/safety -and-mobility/global -report -on-drowning -
prevention
27 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391 at para
35.
affirms that previous WHO resolutions have recognized that drowning is a leading
global cause of injury -related child deaths t hat requires preventive measures,
including awareness -raising.28

Best interests of chi ldren are paramount

294. Organs of state are obliged to protect the best interests of children and their rights
not to be subjected to harm. The duty of an owner of property on which a potential
danger exists thus has a higher duty towards young children than towards adults.
A reasonable organ of state would have regard to the vulnerability of the person
likely to be brought in contact with a p ossible danger, when determining the
amount of care to be exercised. As Mogoeng CJ stated in Mashongwa , the
principle that wrongfulness in the case of positive conduct is prima facie wrongful,
applies equally to negative conduct, where there is a pre -existing duty, such as the
failure to protect a vulnerable person from harm.29

295. A sparkling swimming pool is an obvious attraction to young children. Its
aesthetically pleasing appearance belies the clear danger that it presents to young
children and adults who, unable to swim, are at risk of drowning. It is precisely for
those reasons that the WHO called on UN member states to put in place
mandatory legislative imposition of barriers and fencing requirements for public
and private p ools.30


28 UNGA Resolution 75/2023 ‘Global Drowning Prevention’ adopted on 28 April 2021, available at
https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default -source/documents/social -determinants -of-health/unga -resolution -
75-273-global -drowning -prevention.pdf?sfvrsn=1c154b70_3
29 Mashongwa at para 19.
30 World Health Organisation ‘Global Status Report on Drowning Prevention: 2024’ at p 47. In South
Africa, safety at private swimming pools is regulated by the National Building Regulations Standards Act
103 of 1997. Regulation D4 of the Regulations published in terms of that Act in Government Notice
R1081 of 10 June 1988, as amended by Government Notice R1726 of 26 August 1988.states “… (1) The
owner of any site which contains a swimming pool shall ensure that access to such swimming pool is
controlled and (2) Any owner who fails to comply with the requirement of sub -regulation (1) shall be guilty
of an offence .’
296. By continuing to retain control of and maintaining a swimming pool at the Mandela
House filled with water, the Department in my view created a potential risk of harm
to others, in particular young children who were able to gain access to the
swimming pool area at the back of the Mandela House. It was under a duty to
prevent this risk from materializing.31

Accountability

297. The constitutional norm of accountability is also relevant to the question of
wrongfulness. Where there is no other effective remedy available to hold the state
accountable other than a private law damages action, a legal duty should be
recognized unless t here are public policy imperatives not to do so. Nugent JA
explained this as follows in Van Duivenboden :

“Where the conduct of the State, as represented by the persons who
perform functions on its behalf, is in conflict when its constitutional duty
to pr otect rights in the Bill of Rights, in my view, the norm of
accountability must necessarily assume an important role in
determining whether a legal duty ought to be recognised in any
particular case .

The norm of accountability, however, need not always translate
constitutional duties into private law duties enforceable by an action for
damages, for there will be cases in which other appropriate remedies
are available for holding the State to account. W here the conduct in
issue relates to questions of the State policy, or where it affects a broad
and indeterminate segment of society, constitutional accountability
might at the time be appropriately secured through the political process

31 Van Vuuren v eThekwini Municipality (1308/2016) [2017] ZASCA 124; 2018 (1) SA 189 (SCA) (27
September 2017) at para 20 .
or through one of t he variety of other remedies that the courts are
capable of granting

There are also cases in which non -judicial remedies, or remedies by
way of review and mandamus or interdict, allow for accountability in an
appropriate form and that might also provide further grounds upon
which to deny an action for damages.

However, where the State's failure occurs in circumstances that offer no
effective remedy other than an action for damages the norm of
accountability will, in my view, ordinarily demand the recogn ition of a
legal duty unless there are other considerations affecting the public
interest that outweigh that norm .”32

298. In disputing that the element of wro ngfulness has been established, the Minister
relied extensive ly on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Stedall . In
this case, the SCA held that given the circumstances under which the accident had
occurred, where the child had been in the care and under the supervision of its
mother while visiting the appellants’ home and had come to be injured mainly as a
result of her mother having been distracted for a s hort period, it would be over -
burdensome to impose liability upon the appellants, regard been had to public and
legal policy consistent with constitutional norms.

299. The SCA further held that the appellants had not been negligent in that they were
entitled to expect that the child would be looked after by her mother whilst at their
home, and there had been nothing to alert either of them to the fact that the child
had been left unattended by her mother for a brief period. The respondents having
held to have failed to prove that the appellants conduct had either been wrongful

32 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (209/2001) [2002] ZASCA 79; [2002] 3 All SA 741
(SCA); 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (22 August 2002) at para 21.
or negligent, the appeal was in the result upheld and the court a quo’s order set
aside.33

300. It was submitted on behalf of the Minister hat the conclusi on in Stedall was
dispositive of the plaintiff’s claim. The facts of the present matter, so it was argued,
apply with equal force to the ratio decidendi in the Stedall matter. In my view, the
view, the facts of the present case and those in Stedall are materially
distinguishable . So too, in my respectful view, are a number of the legal principles
which militated against the imposition of liability in Stedall on the basis that it would
be overly burdensome to impose liability on a private home -owner for a near
drowning accident in a private home.

301. Firstly, the swimming pool in the Stedall case was situated on a private residence
to which C had been taken by her mother. In the present case, no persons
resided in the Mandela House and house and swimming pool were under the
control of the Department, an organ of state.

302. The SCA itself distinguished the facts before it from the situation in Van Vuuren
where there had been public access to potentially dangerous places by children
who might not be in the custody and care of a supervising adult.34

303. Secondly, there are significant factual differences between the premises at issue in
Stedall and the Mandela House premises in the present case. The swimming pool
in Stedall was fully fenced and in fact more secure than the swimming pool in the
present cas e. In addition, unlike in Stedall , in the present case H[...] had without
adult supervision had ventured onto an adjacent property with an unsecured
swimming pool. The swimming pool in Stedall was on private property and not
accessible to members of the pu blic, such as young children who in the present
case had repeatedly gained access to the Mandela House swimming pool.

33 Stedall at para 35 – 36.
34 Stedall at para 26.

304. It was in this regard submitted on behalf of the Minister that the plaintiffs had
sought to label the Mandela House swimming pool a s a public swimming pool. The
argument is without merit. The evidence was not that the swimming pool at the
Mandela House was a public swimming pool. The evidence was that members of
the public including children as young as 8 years old, had repeatedly and on
numerous occasions gained access to the swimming pool at the Mandela House .
They were able to do so d ue to the absence of reason able measures by the
Department, such as security guards, effective entry and egress control and
securely locked gates, to prohibit and prevent unauthorized access to the
swimming pool.

305. Thirdly, the SCA in Stedall evaluated the element of negligence from the
perspective of a reasonable private homeowner who could not be expected to
guard against all harm that might befall a young child who is brought to the private
premises of the homeowner in the custody and supervision of her parent. In the
present case, the standard applicable in the determination of negligence is not that
of a reasonable person but that of a reasonable organ of state.

306. For these reasons, I am of the view that the decision in Stedall is distinguishable
on the facts and the law.

307. The plaintiffs in my view have no other effective or equitable remedy available to
them for the harm they have suffered. I am of the view t hat the constitutional norm
of accountability demands that the Minister be held accountable for the conduct of
his employees by way of a private law action for damages.

308. I do not consider that there any compelling public policy considerations that
militate against a finding that it is reasonable for the Minister to be held liable in
delict for the harm causing omissions of his employees in this case. Drownings of
young children, as the WHO has emphasized, are one of the leading causes of
child mortali ty globally and are entirely preventable through low cost, practical and
reasonable measures . I consider this to be an important public policy
consideration.

309. No justification was advanced by Minister against the imposition of liability on the
basis that it would result in unacceptably high social or economic costs. I see
none.

310. The imposition of delictual liability is also a fact specific enquiry. The finding of
wrongfulness in this case deals with and is particular to the unique acts and
circumstances of this case and not any other cases . Such cases will any event
have to establish the elements of delictual liability on the ir specific facts..

311. The evidence establishes that the Department of Correctional Services failed to
take reasonable preventive measures to guard against the potential risk of young
children drowning in the swimming pool at the Mandela House. I agree with Mr. Du
Toit, counsel for the H[...] ’s parents, that the Department in fact took no
preventative measures whatsoever to prevent children from drowning in the
swimming pool.

312. A set of padlock s and chain s, equipment familiar to the Department of Cor rectional
Services, would in all likelihood h ave secured the gates effectively and prevented
unauthorized across to the swimming pool through the gates at the Mandela
House. The Minister has not placed information before the C ourt regarding why
such a simp le preventive meas ure was not taken. The Department’s belated
installation of a pool safety net after H[...] ’s burial, wa s in my view and as the
adage goes, too little, too late.

313. The Department’s failure to take any reasonable steps to guard against the risk of
children drowning in the swimming pool at the Mandela House , in my view evoke s
moral indignation . The evidence establishes that the Department’s employees
were aware that young children were regula rly able to access the unsecured
swimming pool at the Mandela House. No steps were taken to control access to
the swimming pool by securing the gates around the Mandela House to install a
pool safety net over the pool.

314. The legal convictions of the community in my judgment demand that the Minister
be held accountable by way of a private law action for damages by H[...] ’s parents.
The failure of the Department’s employees at the Drakenstein Correctional Centre
to take reasonable measures to guard agai nst the risk of children drowning in the
swimming pool at the Mandela House, is serious, wrongful and in my view,
actionable.

315. It is indeed ironic that these failures by an organ of state to comply with their
constitutional duties to act in the best interests of children and to protect the rights
of children to life and freedom from preventable harm, occurred at the very place
where President Mandela began his own long walk to freedom.

Conclusion

316. The plaintiffs suc ceed on the merits.

317. I hold that the Minister is liable for the agreed or proven damages suffered by the
plaintiffs following the drowning of H[...] H[...] at the Drakenstein Correctional
Centre on 13 August 2010.

318. The Minister sought a costs or der against the plaintiffs arising from the withdrawal
of their claims against the second and third defendants at the commencement of
the trial. I agree with the submissions by the plaintiffs’ counsel that the question of
which defendant was responsible fo r and in control of the Mandela House
premises , was unclear and that the institution of actions against all three
defendants was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

319. It lastly remains for me to express to the parties my regret for the delay in the
delivery of this judgme nt. The parties and their legal representatives are thanked
for their helpful submissions and forbearance in what was at times a difficult and
emotiona lly charged trial.

Order

320. I make the following order:

320.1 The first defendant held liable for the agreed or proven damages suffered
by the plaintiffs following the drowning of H[...] H[...] at the Drakenstein
Correctional Centre on 13 August 2010.

320.2 The first defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs including
counsel’s costs on scale C.


---------------------------
S G MAGARDIE
Acting Judge of the High Court
Western Cape Division


Appearances:

For the plaintiffs: Adv A J Du Toit

Instructed by: Simpsons Attorneys

For the defendants: Adv D Jacobs SC

Instructed by: State Attorney (Cape Town)

Date of hearing: 3, 4 5, 18, 26 June 2024; 12 August 2024

Date of judgment: 26 May 2025