THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case No: 2025 -022233
In the matter between:
LOWVELD PACKAGING (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED Applicant
and
JUAN HEINE First Respondent
SAMI VAN ZYL Second Respondent
OUROPACK DISTRIBUTION (PROPRIETARY LIMITED) Third Respondent
Heard: 19 March 2025
Delivered: 05 May 2025
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
MAFA -CHALI , AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an urgent opposed application in terms of which the Applicant seeks,
by way of final interdict to interdict and restrain the First Respondent until 31
May 2026, whether a s a proprietor, partner, director, shareholder, member,
employer, consultant, contractor, financier, agent, represe ntative, assistant or
otherwise, from directly or indirectly carrying on or being interested in or
engaged in or concerned with or employed by any business, trade, firm,
undertaking or concern carried on in the Mpumalanga Province or the
Kingdom of Eswatini which sells prescribed goods or renders prescribed
services or in the course of the business of which prescribed goods are sold
or prescribed services are rendered.
[2] The Applicant also seeks an order interdicting and restraining the Second
Respondent unti l 30 November 2025 from soliciting customers of the
Applicant, directing business from the Applicant to the Third Respondent and
or any other person selling prescribed goods and or rendering prescribed
services.
[3] Further , an order interdicti ng and restraini ng the First Respondent and
Second Respondent from divulging the Applicant’s confidential information ,
including but not limited to the Applicant’s customers, suppliers ’ costing, new
developments, patents, innovations and methods of conducting business to
the Third Respondent or any other person.
[4] Furthermore , directing the First Respondent and Second Respondent to
forthwith return the Applicant’s confidential information , including but not
limited to the Applicant’s customers, suppliers ’ costing, new devel opments,
patents, innovations and methods of conducting business to the Applicant.
[5] The Applicant also prayed that the First and Second Respondent s pay the
costs of this application jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved.
[6] On 12 March 2025, the Applicant filed a notice of withdrawal against the
Second Respondent . This application will therefore only be determined
against the Fi rst Respondent.
[7] The urgent application was enrolled for hearing in this Court on 19 March
2025 and was opposed by the First Respondent and Second Respondent ,
who also raising three points in limine for lack of urgency, non -compliance
with Rules 38 and 39 of the Labour Court Rules1 and improper commissioning
of Makasi’s affidavit on behalf of the Applicant.
[8] I will have to consider , based on the facts placed before this Court, whether
over and above the points in limine raised by the First respondent , I am
satisfied that the application is an urgent one to be dealt with as such and
whether the application has met the requirements of a final relief to be
granted.
Factual background
[9] The Applicant is a company located in Ne lspruit conducting business in the
provision of packaging corrugated boxes, packaging of pouches, bags and
film thermoformed packaging, custom packaging solutions tailored to the
unique requirements of its customers, provision of food spices , range of
cleaning materials, packaging of food, beverage industry, manufacturing
sector, retail sector, hospitality sector, pharmaceutical and healthcare industry
and logistics in Mpumalanga and Kingdom of Eswatini.
[10] The First Respondent was previ ously employed by the Applicant as its Sales
Representative until his resignation effective 31 May 2024 and is presently
employed by the Third Respondent.
1 GN 4775 of May 2024: Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Labour Court .
[11] The Second Respondent was also previously employed by the Applicant
initially as a Bookkeeper and lat er as its General Operations Manager , and
resigned effective 30 November 2024.
[12] The Third Respondent is cited as an interested party , and no relief is sought
against it.
Rule 47 notice
[13] On 12 March 2025, t he Applicant made an application in terms of Rule 47 of
the Labour Court Rules for an order in accordance with paragraph 8 of the
First Respondent’s answering affidavit to be his consent to the order, made in
writing on 05 March 2025, signed by the First R espondent and witnessed by
Robin Peter Gerhold. This application was opposed by the First applicant ,
arguing that the consent he made is not consent to make an order in terms of
Rule 47 of the Labour Court Rules .
[14] I agre e that the consent by the First Respo ndent is the consent in terms of
Rule 47 of the Labour Court Rules , as correctly argued by the Applicant , as it
meets the requirement stipulated in Rule 47 (2) of the Labour Court Rules .
Jurisdiction
[15] The Applicant submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the
application as the relief sought arises from the employment relationship
between the F irst and Second Respondents and is a matter concerning a
contract of implement contemplated in section 77 of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act2 (BCEA) ; and furthermore , the First Respondent is employed
by the Third Respondent, a competitor of the Applicant and is alleged to have
breached his contract of employment.
2 Act 75 of 1997 as amended .
[16] It was further submitted by the Applicant that the Second Respondent is
responsible for spiriting away from the Applicant in breach of fiduciary duty
owed by her to the Applicant as a co nsequence of the senior position she
holds at the Applicant; whereas the First and Second Respondents are
alleged to be in breach of their confidentiality undertakings furnished in terms
of their respective contracts of employment with the Applicant.
[17] The p rovisions of section 77(3) of the BCEA provides the following:
‘The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil Courts to
hear and determine any matter concerning a contract of employment,
irrespective of whether any basic condition of employme nt constitutes a
term of that contract.’
[18] In Rand Water v Stoop and Another3, dealing with the contention that the
Labour Court’s jurisdiction in terms of section 77(3) is limited in terms of
employment expressly pr ovided for therein, the L abour Appeal Court held
conclusively that:
‘… the argument that s 77(3) of the BCEA only permits the Labour
Court to interpret the terms of an employment contract and enforce it,
is neither reasonable nor logic al. This is demonstrably clear that when
regard is ha d to s77A (e) of the BCEA which sets out the remedy the
Labour Court may grant in respect of a dispute referred to it in respect
of a dispute arising out of an employment contract. Secondly, the
meaning ascribed to the word “concerning” in the relevant phra se in s
77(3) is acceptable save that attributing “having proximity to” to the
word “concerning” cannot be correct. The word “concerning” while
conveying a cause and effect does not convey a meaning that some
causes and effects are acceptable and others no t or that there has to
be a direct or indirect link between the contract of employment and the
claim .’
3 (2013) 34 ILJ 576 (LAC) .
[19] In the circumstances, the Court is clothe d with the necessary jurisdiction to
hear the present matter.
Urgency
[20] The Applicant submitted that matters involving restraints of trade are , by their
very nature , urgent. It was submitted that after it came to the attention of
senior management of the Applicant concerning the Second Respondent and
after having done an investiga tion, it revealed that the Second Respondent
disseminated confidential information to the First Respondent which has
seemingly been given to the T hird Respondent, the competitor, whom it is
alleged is using to the disadvantage of the Applicant to unlawfull y compete
with the Applicant.
[21] The Applicant further submitted that the First and Second Respondents were
discovered acting in concert and engaging with clients of the Applicant. The
First Respondent , being in breach of the restraint provisions included in his
contract of employment , and the Second’s Respondent ’s conduct on the other
hand also in breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the Applicant and in breach
of the confidentiality undertakings furnis hed by her in her contract of
employment ; the entire process being facilitated by the Second Respondent
together with the First Respondent to disseminate confidential information
regarding sale s contracts , sales figures, sales process and with an effort fo r
customers to move their businesses from the Applicant to the Third
Respondent.
[22] It was argued that as the breaches complained of had already caused harm to
the Applicant, t he Applicant instructed its attorneys to dispatch letter s on 15
January 2025 to bot h the First and Second Respondents , reminding them of
their obligations and to desist from breachin g those obligations , but neither of
them responded.
[23] It was not in d ispute that the First Respondent entered into an employment
contract with the Applicant on 21 December 2022 as a Sales Representat ive;
and that such employment contact contains provisions (in particular clause
11) with undertakings for the First Respondent not to disclose confidential
information and trade secrets to competitors for a period of two years after
termination of such employment contracts in Mpumalanga and the Kingdom of
Eswatini.
[24] The First Respondent disputed that he conducted any of the prohibited
activities to which the restraint relates in terms of the geographical area of the
Kingdom of Eswatini , and also denied the breach of the restraint and
confidentiality agreement as it exceeds 12 months reasonable to protect
proprietary interests both in confidential information a nd customer
connections. The First Respondent however conceded that she was with the
Second Respondent in the Kingdom of Eswatini in January 2025, but she did
not participate in the formal discussions with the Spar Store Manager, Johan
Lues, but rather the y dis cussed a boat Lues wanted him to go look at in
Benoni, which he did as he wanted to buy it, and Lues eventually bought that
boat.
[25] The First Respondent has no difficulty consenting, in terms of prayer 2 of the
Applicant’s notice of motion for the perio d until 31 May 2025, but prays for the
dismissal of the application if the Applicant seeks the relief until 31 May 2026.
[26] However, the First Respondent argued that the Applicant has failed to comply
with Rules 38 and 39 of the Labour Court Rues in that it delayed in launching
the application as the application was filed nearly seven months after
allegedly becoming aware of any purported breach of the restraint of trade in
that the Applicant became aware in July 202 4 but on ly enforced it on January
2025; thereby failing to make a case for urgency. The set of affidavits were
not files in compliance with the Rules, there was not proper pagination of the
notice of motion in terms of Rule 39(7) of the Labour Court Rules and the
Rules 39(9), (10) and (11) were not complied with proper calculation of time
periods for the parties to file opposing affidavit s and heads of arguments .
[27] The First Respondent further submitted and argued that the commissioner of
oaths, who administered Makasi’s affidavit for the Applicant i s an employee of
Modern Packaging Distribution, a company of which Makasi is also a director,
therefore the commissioner of oaths was conflicted and in contravention of the
Justice of the Peace and Commiss ioners of Oaths Act4 (Oaths Act) , in that a
commissioner of oaths who attests to the affidavit is required to be impartial,
unbiased and entirely independent of the office where an affidavit is drawn up
or signed.
[28] The First Respondent further argued that the application was re ceived on 18
February 2025, 3 weeks after the Applicant allegedly instructed its counsel to
draft the application. No factual foundation was laid for urgency.
Appli cable legal principles
[29] Rule 38 of the Labour Court Rules provides for urgent applications. An
applicant that approaches the Court on an urgent basis essentially seeks an
indulgence and to be afforded preference, in order to prevent the prejudice
and harm that may materialise or persis t if the conduct complained of
continues. Central to a determination of whether a matter is urgent is whether
the applicant has, in the founding affidavit, set forth explicitly the
circumstances which render the matter urgent and the reason why substantial
relief cannot be attained at a hearing in due course. Thus, it is required of an
applicant to set out adequately in his or her founding affidavit the reasons for
urgency and to give cogent reasons why urgent relief is necessary.
[30] Restraint of trade clauses in employment contracts are essential for protecting
an employer’s proprietary interests. These clauses restrict former employees
from engaging in activities that directly compete with the employer for a
specified period of time and within a defined geogr aphical area after the
termination of their employment. The proprietary interests typically protected
4 Act 16 of 1963 .
by a restraint of trade include the employer’s trade secrets, trade connections,
and confidential information.
[31] In Boomerang Trade CC t/a Border Sheet Metals v Groenewald and
another5, the Court emphasised the principle that ‘proceedings for the
enforcement of a restraint of trades are by their very nature , urgent . They
invariably seek to interdict ongoing unlawful action in respect of w hich an
applican t continues to suffe r financial losses’.
[32] Notwithstanding the trite urgency of restraint of trade applications, our courts
have established that employers are still required to meet the legal
requirements for urgent relief. Our law acknowledges the urgent n ature of
restraint of trade applications, employers remain obligated to justify the
urgency of their application and bring such application in a timeous manner.
[33] In Flowcentric Mining Technology (Pty) Ltd v Smit and Others6, the court
outlined several key factors that should be considered when assessing
urgency in restraint applications, as set out below:
’18.1 The applicant must show that it will not otherwise be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing in due course.
18.2 “Urgency of commercial interests may justify the invocation of
Uniform Rule of Court 6(12) no less than any other interests ”.
18.3 An applicant cannot rely on urgency that was self -created
through its earlier inaction.
18.4 When an applicant first seeks compliance from the respondent
prior to lodging the application, it cannot be said that the
applicant had delayed bringing the application or that the
urgency was self -created.
18.5 An application based on a breach of restraint of trade is
inherently urg ent.’
5 [2012] JOL 29426 (ECG) at para 36.
6 2023 JDR 2577 (GP)
[34] In Radebe v The Aurum Institute 7, the court held that the employer must,
within their founding affidavit, establish the background circumstances which
make the matter urgent and the reasons why substantial relief cannot be
sought through the normal court processes.8 In light of the aforesaid
precedent, an employer cannot merely assert that the matter is urgent. It is
imperative for an employer to establish that, if the matter is not addressed
expeditiously, their business will be adversely af fected by the employee’s
interference with trade connections or the disclosure of the employer’s
confidential information. The court will also consider whether the urgency of
the matter was self -created.9 Employers must act timeously upon becoming
aware o f an employee’s breach of the restraint of trade clause, as any delay
may lead the court to conclude that the urgency was manufactured .
[35] In Jiba v Minister: Department of Justice & Constitutional Development and
Others10, the court applied the then -Rule 8 of the Labour Court Rules as
follows:
‘Rule 8 of the rules of this court requires a party seeking urgent relief to
set out the reasons for urgency, and why urgent relief is necessary. It is
trite law that there are degrees of urgency, and the degree to whi ch the
ordinarily applicable rules should be relaxed is dependent on the
degree of urgency. It is equally trite that an applicant is not entitled to
rely on urgency that is self-created when seeking a deviation from the
rules.’
[36] It was succinctly described by the court in Maqubela v SA Graduates
Development Association and Others11 that:
‘Whether a matter is urgent involves two considerations. The first is
whether the reasons that make the matter urgent have been set out
7 (2024) 45 ILJ 876 (LC) .
8 Ibid at para s 12 and 19 .
9 Ibid a t para 20.
10 (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) at para 18.
11 (2014) 35 ILJ 2479 (LC) at para 32.
and secondly whether the applicant seeking relief will not obtain
substantial relief at a later stage. In all instances where urgency is
alleged, the applicant must satisfy the court that indeed the application
is urgent. Thus, it is required of the applicant adequately to set out in
his or her founding affidavit the reasons for urgency, and to give cogent
reasons why urgent r elief is necessary…’
[37] The factors the Applicant must show are set out in Mojaki v Ngaka Modiri
Molema District Municipality and Others12, in which the court re ferred with
approval to the following dictum from East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and
Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others13:
‘… An applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he
avers render the matter urgent. More importantly, the Applicant must
state the reasons why he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial
redress at a hearing in due course. The question of whether a matter is
sufficiently urgent to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is
underpinned by the issue of absence of substantial redress in an
application in due course. The rules allow the court to come to the
assistance of a litigant b ecause if the latter were to wait for the normal
course laid down by the rules it will not obtain substantial redress. ’
[38] Given the context of this matter, the Applicant communicate d with the First
Respondent , reminding him of the obligations and to desist f rom breaching
those obligations rather than rushing to court as a first option , but no response
was re ceived.14 It cannot , therefore , be said that under the circumstances of
this matter that the urgency is self -created.
[39] Before burden ing myself with the merits of the application itself, I must ,
however , deal with the two other points in limine raised by the First
12 (2015) 36 ILJ 1331 (LC) at para 17.
13 (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) at para 6.
14 See: Continuous Oxygen Supplies (Pty) Ltd t/a Vital Aire and Another (J2013/11) (2011) ZA LCJHB
150
Respondent on non-compliance with Rules 38 and 39 and the commissioning
of the Applicant’s founding affidavit.
[40] The First Respondent submitted that the Applicant has not complied with
Rules 38 and 39 of the Labour Court Rules, in that it has not made provision
in its notice of motion for the exchange of four sets of affidavits in terms of
Rule 39(2), has not described the ti me periods that the parties were to adhere
to for the filing of the affidavits in terms of Rule 39(3) but rather filed a short
form of the notice of motion, has not paginated its notice of motion nor its
founding affidavit before launching the application in terms of Rule 39(7) and
lastly, has not calculated the date of the enrolment properly in relation to the
time periods that the parties should have been afforded to file their affidavits
in the application nor the period for the parties to file heads if arguments in
term of Rules 39(9), (10) and (11).
[41] On that basis , the First Respondent prayed that the application be dismissed
on the basis of non -compliance alone with costs.
[42] Rule 38 is the general filing of urgent applications procedure, whereas Rule
39 is for applications in restraint of trade. The interpretation of Rule 39 (1) is
that the procedure outlined in the Rule 39(1) to Ru le 39(11) is applicable only
in instances the restraint of trade application is not brought on an urgent
basis, then the Appl icant can only enrol the application only once the
procedure outlined has been strictly adhered to by the Applicant. That
proce dure is the exchange of four set of affidavits, seven days to file
answering affidavit, five days for the Applicant to file its replying affidavit and
five days for the respondent to file the fourth affidavit , indexing and
pagination, simultaneous service of heads of arguments within five days from
the date of delivery of the index or upon the ex piry of dies or filing thereof and
lastly , the final enrolment of the matter. If it is an urgent application, it will
follow the Rule 38 urgent applications procedure . Due to the non -compliance
of the Applicant to file the replying affidavit, it has conseq uently waived its
rights to do so. This does not , however , render the application itself defective ,
and the application cannot be dismissed.
[43] As I have already made a finding above that this application has met the
requirements to be entertained on an urgen t basis, there is therefore no need
for this application to be in compliance with Rule 39. The application cannot
stand to be dismissed on this ground.
Commissioning of the affidavit
[44] It was furthermore submitted by the First Respondent that the Commissioner
of Oat hs, Lazarus Chakadzingwa , who admin istered the affidavit of Reginald
Makasi on behalf of the Applicant , is ostensibly an employee of Modern
Packaging Distribution in Tswane , Pretoria West, a company of which Makasi
is also a director. Th erefore, Chakadzingwa is conflicted , and the
commissioning of the o ath is in contravention of the Oaths Act, in that a
commissioner of oaths who attests an affidavit is required to be impartial,
unbiased , and entirely independent of the office where the af fidavit was drawn
up or signed .
[45] The affidavit of Reginald Makasi shows that he i s the Director of the Applicant,
which is Lowv eld Packaging (Proprietary) Limited , based in Nelspruit,
whereas Lazarus Chakadzingwa indicated that he is the CA(SA) of Modern
Packaging Distribution, Tshwane , Pretoria West. The First Respondent has
not been able to successfully show the conflict of interest of the commissioner
of oaths, but merely alleged that Makasi is ostensibly the e mployee of Modern
Packaging Distribution without any substantiatio n to the allegations.
Ostensibly means it appears , though not necessarily so or apparently. This is
not factual and therefore cannot stand the certainty test of such facts.
[46] Therefore, the ru le of impartiality, unbias edness , and independence of the
commissioner of oaths will not apply under the circumstances. S uch
submissions are therefore dismissed as they have not been proven by the
First Respondent in any manner .
Analysis
[47] It is trite that restraint of t rade agreements is valid and enforceable in South
Africa and that such agreements should be honoured in their terms, unless
such restraint of t rade provisions unreasonably restrict a person’s right to
trade or work or are in conflict wit h public policy.
[48] A party that chal lenges the enforceability of a restraint of t rade agreement
bears the burden of alleging and proving that the restraint of trade provision is
unreasonable or unconstitutional. Restraint of t rade agreements are enforced ,
having regard to the c onstitutional dispensation, but the mere fact that section
22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , 1996, confers a right to
work does not prevent restraint of t rade agreements from being enforced. The
right t o work must be balanced with the right to enter in to a contract which
contains a r estraint of trade provision, on a free and voluntary basis.
[49] The reasonableness or otherwise of a restraint of t rade has been considered
in many cases, and it was held that re asonableness should be determined
with reference to the following four considerations:
1. Is there an interest deserving of protection at the determination of the
agreement?
2. Is that interest being prejudiced?
3. If so, how does that interest weigh up qualitative ly and quantitatively
against the interest of the other party not to be economically inactive
and unproductive?
4. Is there any other facet of public policy not having anything to do with
the relationship between the contracting parties which requires that th e
restraint should either be enforced or disallowed?
[50] The protectable interest of the Applicant in this matter consists of its client
base, list of clients, and other confidential information and trade secrets
confidential information including but not limi ted to the Applicant’s customers,
suppliers ’ costing, new developments, patents, innovations and methods of
conducting the business of the Applicant. Clearly , the First Respondent had
access to the Applicant ’s full database, including the confidential information
and trade secrets such as its client lists and tariffs , which he can potentially
use for the best interests of his new employer, the Third Respondent.
[51] It not in dispute that t he Applicant does have protectable interests in the form
of customer connections and confidential information, and the First
Respondent have not proven the unr easonableness of the restraint and its
period, and in fact , it has been esta blished by his concession that he has
acquired a significant personal knowle dge of, or influence over, the
Applicants’ customers, and confidential information. It is eviden t that the First
Respondent had very close personal relationships with clients or customers of
the Applicant in his capacity as Sales Representative , and he is t herefore in a
position to persuade and solicit such clients to follow him to the only
competitor, the Third Respondent .
[52] The restraint provisions are unequivocal and contain explicit protection of
confidentiality and intellectual proper ty rights. The First Respondent is bound
by these provisions and not entitled to unlawfully utilize the Applicant’s
confidential information and trade secrets. The Applicant does not seek to
deny the First Respondent the opportunity to work at the Third Respondent
but seeks to prevent the unlawful soliciting of the Applicant’s clients and the
unlawful use of its confidential information.
[53] I find that t he restraint of trade contract agreement in this matter is valid and
enforceable, except that it was challenged by the First Respondent in respect
of its duration, being the period of two years after the termination of contract
of employment. In fac t, the First Respondent has conceded to prayer 2 of the
Applicant’s notice of motion and has no difficulty consent ing to the Applicant’s
notice of motion for the period until 31 May 2025. It is , however , my
considered view that the First Respondent has not successfully discharged
his onus to prove that the restraint of undertaking for a period of two years is
unreasonable and against public policy.
[54] The court in Emlink (Pty) Ltd and Others v Matthee and Others15, referred with
approval to the dictum appearing in Experian SA (Pty) Ltd v Haynes and
Another16 and Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk and Another17
and held that there are two kinds of proprietary interests that can be protected
by a restraint of trade undertaking:
‘The first is ‘the relationship with customers, potential customers,
suppliers and others that go to make up what is compendiously
referred to as the “trade connections” of the business, being an
important aspect of its incorporeal property known as goodwill’. And the
second is ‘all confidential matter which is useful for the carrying on of
the business and which could therefore be used by a competi tor, if
disclosed to him, to gain a competitive advantage. ’
[55] I find that the First Respondent has not proven the unreasonableness of the
restraint, has not established that he has never acquired any significant
personal knowledge of, or influence over, the Applicants’ customers, nor that
he had no access to confidential information. By all accounts, the First
Respondent, through his position as a salesperson since 1 December 2022,
developed relationships with a numb er of the Applicant’s customers . A
busines s’s customer connections are a proprietary interest that can be
protected by a restraint of trade undertaking.
[56] An employee has the knowledge of the id entity and requirements of the
Applicant ’s customers and has had regular and repeated contact with t he
customers , and so has built up a connection in the course of trade with them.
[57] For all of these reasons, it can be concluded that there can be no doubt that
customer con tacts exist and the First Respondent could exploit these
connections as he is now emplo yed by a competitor , and these customer
connections form a part of the Applicant ’s goodwill. It is therefore this interest
15 (2023 -103550) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1276 (1 November 2023) at para 16.
16 (2013) 34 ILJ 529 (GSJ) .
17 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) .
that the Applicant is entitled to protect by enforcing the restrai nt of trade. On
that basis , the restraint should be enforced.
[58] I find that t he Applicant has made out a case for the interdictory reli ef sought
in this application, the requirement s for a final interdict are met, there is a
clear right, an injury is reasonably apprehended, and there is no other re medy
available to the Applicant. The application is urgent , and thus an interdict is
granted .
Costs
[59] The A pplicant sought a cost orde r against the First Respondent, and the First
Respondent prayed for the application to be dismissed with costs .
[60] It is trite that a rule of practice that costs follow the result does not apply in
labour matters , but the Court has a wide discretion in respect of costs in
consideration of the requirements of law and fairness. In my view, this is a
case where the interest of justice wi ll be best served by making no order as to
costs . The Court will , therefore , make no order as to costs.
[61] In the premises , I make the following order:
Order
1. The First Respondent is interdicted and restrained until 31 May 2026,
whether a s a proprietor, part ner, director, shareholder, member,
employer, consultant, contractor, financier, agent, representative,
assistant or otherwise, from directly or indirectly carrying on or being
interested in or engaged in or concerned with or employed by any
business, trad e, firm, undertaking or concern carried on in the
Mpumalanga Province or the Kingdom of Eswatini which sells
prescribed goods or renders prescribed services or in the course of the
business of which prescribed goods are sold or prescribed services are
rendered.
2. The First Respondent is interdicted and restrained until 31 May 2026
from soliciting customers of the Applicant, directing business from the
Applicant to the Third Respondent and or any other person selling
prescribed goods and or rendering prescribe d services.
3. The First Respondent is interdicted and restrained until 31 May 2026
from divulging the Applicant’s confidential information , including but not
limited to the Applicant’s customers, suppliers ’ costing, new
developments, patents, innovations and methods of conducting
business to the Third Respondent or any other person.
4. There is no order as to costs.
______________
G. Mafa -Chal i
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applic ant: Advocate Darryl Williams
Instructed by: Malherbe Rigg & Ranwell Inc
For the First and Second Respondent s: Advocate C J Bekker
Instructed by: Pottas Attorneys