IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE ST ATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable / Not reportable
Case no: 3953/2024
In the matter between
ABSA BANK LIMITED
and Applicant
LLOYD PAKISO TSHABALALA Respondent
Coram:
Heard:
Delivered:
Summary: Opperman J
28 November 2024
16 May 2025. This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for hand down is deemed to be 16 May 2025
at 15h00.
Application for summary judgement- special pleas of res judicata and
non-joinder
ORDER
The relief sought in the notice of application for summary judgment is granted and as
2
follows:
CLAIM A: SURETY AGREEMENT
1. Payment in the amount of R 13 778 311. 79 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
2. payment in the amount of R4 497 765.92 plus interest at the rate of 12.55% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
3. payment in the amount of R732 704.85 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
4. payment in the amount of R777 926.70 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
5. payment in the amount of R493 598.53 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
6. payment in the amount of R1 244 762.17 plus Interest at the rate of 11.50% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
7. payment in the amount of R1 355 866.22 plus interest at the rate of 11.50% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
8. payment in the amount of R667 4 77 .57 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
9. payment in the amount of R659 333.91 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
10. payment in the amount of R738 323.91 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
3
included;
11. payment in the amount of R676 418.61 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
12. payment in the amount of R622 700.42 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included.
CLAIM B: DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL MORTGAGE LOAN ACCOUNT
13. Payment in the amount of R876 948.57;
14. interest on the amount of R876 948.57 at a rate of 11.57% per annum, capitalized
monthly from 9 November 2023 to date of payment, both days included.
COSTS
15. Costs of suit on attorney and own client scale.
Opperman J
Introduction JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for summary judgment against the respondent as per the
action instituted. The claim is for payment of monies in accordance with prayers 1 to 15
of the notice of application for summary judgment.
[2] It is not for an order declaring immovable property executable as per the action
instituted. The amounts payable were proven here in accordance with the contracts
between the parties and by way of certificates signed by manager(s) of the applicant.
[3] The respondent has entered appearance to defend the action and on 16
4
September 2024 delivered a special plea and plea over. This is after a notice of bar was
filed by the plaintiff on 5 September 2024. The original action was instituted on 17 July
2024. This application was issued on 7 October 2024.
[4] It is the case for the applicant that the plea delivered to the applicant's particulars
of claim failed to cause any defence that would raise an issue for trial. Reading of the
papers shows that the only issues to be adjudicated are two special pleas of exceptio rei
judicatae and non-joinder.
The parties and the involvement of the respondent
[5] The applicant (ABSA) is a company that is also registered as a financial service
provider and credit provider in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA). The
NCA is not applicable to the application for summary judgment.
[6] The respondent is an adult male that has his domicilium in the jurisdiction of this
court. The first cause of action is premised on a written suretyship agreement concluded
by the respondent acting personally. In terms of the written suretyship on 14August 2014
he bound himself in favour of the applicant as surety and co-principal debtor in solidum
together with Lezmin 2815 CC (Lezmin) for payment on demand of all the amounts which
Lezmin may at any time owe the applicant and arising from whatever cause.
[7] The contract is that the respondent and each party that stood surety for Lezmin
would be jointly and severally liable as surety and co-principal debtors for the
indebtedness owed to the applicant.
[8] The applicant and Lezmin also concluded a written overdraft facility and 11 written
mortgage loan agreements. However, Lezmin failed to comply with the terms of these
agreements , which resulted in ASSA and Lezmin concluding two written repayment
agreements in August 2017 and July 2018. The respondent was also a signatory of these
agreements . He acknowledged his indebtedness to the applicants as being due and
payable. It appears, however, that the two repayment agreements were not honoured and
complied with.
5
[9] The applicant instituted an application for the winding-up of Lezmin in this Court in
case number 3612/2021 and litigation was finally concluded by a settlement agreement
being made an order of court. It was expressly admitted in this agreement that Lezmin is
indebted in terms of the erstwhile agreements; the respondent is similarly indebted in the
amounts reflected in the settlement agreement and the applicant is entitled to claim
payment of the full outstanding balances together with interest which the amounts
attracted. The liability of the respondent would be jointly and severally in regard to the
other parties involved.
[1 O] The respondent has not at any stage denied the conclusion of the suretyship
agreement and he admitted that he was a party to the repayment agreements. The
settlement agreement, now an order of court, did not negate the liability of the respondent ,
rather, it confirmed it.
[11] It is trite law that an application for an order for payment by the respondent as
surety and co-principal debtor for the indebtedness of Lezmin cannot be the same as an
application for the winding-up of Lezmin. It is a legal fact that the winding-up litigation was
finally concluded and has no residual legal consequence that can affect this claim against
the respondent.
[12] The implication of para 1 of the settlement agreement is that the respondent is
jointly and severally accountable to the applicant: a claim against him in solidum is legally
unrelated to Lezmin and one Samuel Matlabe Tshabalala (SM Tshabalala). They were
not cited in the action and they have no interest or prejudice to suffer in the application
for summary judgment. In any event, the respondent has shown none in their defence of
the case.
[13] The second claim is based on the written mortgage loan agreement concluded
with the respondent in his personal capacity. He does not deny the terms, the breach of
the agreement nor that the amount due was proven in terms of the contract. The mortgage
loan was not part of the settlement agreement in the liquidation application that has been
concluded.
6
[14] The respondent did not direct the court to any facts that the National Credit Act 34
of 2005 is applicable or that the amounts due were incorrectly calculated. The general
wide defence of the issues is not legally sufficient in the instance. Rule 46A of the Uniform
Rules of Court deals with the execution of judgments against property, particularly
residential property. It specifically addresses the process of declaring immovable property
executable and the procedures for sale in execution. The rule aims to ensure that
execution against a debtor's primary residence is only authorized after a court has
considered all relevant factors and determined that such execution is warranted. It is not
applicable to the relief claimed here and now in the summary judgment and is an issue
for another day in separate litigation.
Doctrine of pacta sunt servanda
[15] The foundation of the application is the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda; legal and
moral compliance with contracts. It was noted in Vleissentraal Bloemfontein (Pty) Ltd v
Jansen1 that:
'[1 O]
14. From the above and the nature of the disputes that often presents in our courts, it is clear that
there is a tug-of-war between commercial certainty and prompt remedies in law for non­
compliance with contracts on the one hand; and the right to access to courts on the other hand.
In Basson v Chi/wan and others [1993] ZASCA 61; 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) at 762H Eksteen JA
referred to contractual freedom as:
"The paramount importance of upholding the sanctity of contracts, without which all trade would
be impossible ... "
Further,
"If there is one thing that is more than public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting , and that their contracts when entered
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice.
Therefore , you have this para-mount public policy to consider -that you are not lightly to interfere
with this freedom of contract."
Justice Ackermann in Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at
paragraph 26 described it as "a central consideration in a constitutional state". These statements
1 Vleissentraal Bloemfontein {Pfy) Ltd v Jansen (5476/2022) (2023) ZAFSHC 173 (16 May 2023).
7
aim for reasonable certainty, so that parties can go about their business knowing the rules of the
game; constitutional economic integrity is vital.
Moseneke J (as he then was) pointed out in his dissent in Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5;
2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at paragraph 98 that:
"Public policy cannot be determined at the behest of the idiosyncrasies of individual contracting
parties. If it were so, the determination of public policy would be held ransom by the infinite
variations to be found in any set of contracting parties."
[11] At the heart of the above is the basic principle that commercial transactions, freely and
honestly entered into, and not vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation , duress or public policy, should
be respected and enforced .... '
Summary judgment
[16] In Toyota Financial Services (South Africa) Limited v Waste Partners Investment
(PTY) Limited2 it was aptly concluded that summary judgment proceedings are:
1. Regulated by Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
2. It was designed to prevent a plaintiffs3 claim, based upon certain circumstances ,
from being delayed by what amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.
3. The law allows a plaintiff to apply to the court for judgment to be entered summarily
against the defendant ,4 thus disposing of the matter without putting the plaintiff to the
expense of a tria I.
4. However, a defendant can escape a summary judgment by showing that there exists
a bona fide defence to the action.
5. The defendant must disclose fully the nature and grounds of the defence, and the
material facts on which it is based.
2 Toyota Financial Services (South Africa) Limited v Waste Partners Investment (PTY) Limited (9578/2020)
(2022] ZAGPJHC 771 (29 August 2022) paras 10 to 14. Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA
418 (A) 426, Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T) 228 D -E.
3 Applicant in casu.
4 Respondent in casu.
8
6. A defendant may successfully resist summary judgment where the opposing affidavit
shows that there is a reasonable possibility that the defence advanced may succeed on
trial.
7. The court must determine whether on the facts disclosed the respondent (defendant)
appears to have, as to either the whole or part of the claim, a defence which is also good
in law.
8. The defendant need not deal exhaustively with the facts and the evidence relied
upon to substantiate them but must at least disclose his defence and the material facts
upon which it is based with sufficient particularity and completeness.
9. In summary ; the law shows that the defendant must meet four requirements : he must
disclose the nature of grounds of his defence, he must disclose the facts on which he
bases his defence, the defence must be bona fide, and the defence must be good in law.
The facts provided must be such that if proven at trial, it will constitute an answer to the
plaintiff's claim.
10. Lastly; considering the extraordinary and drastic nature of summary judgment , if the
court has any doubt as to whether the plaintiffs case is unanswerable at trial such doubt
should be exercised in favour of the defendant and summary judgment should accordingly
be refused.
[17] In NPGS Protection and Security Services CC and Another v FirstRand Bank Ltd5
it was decided that:
'[11] Rule 32(3) of the uniform rules requires an opposing affidavit to disclose fully the nature
and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied upon, therefore. To stave off summary
judgment, a defendant cannot content him or herself with bald denials, for example, that it is not
clear how the amount claimed was made up. Something more is required. If a defendant disputes
the amount claimed, he or she should say so and set out a factual basis for such denial. This
could be done by giving examples of payments made by them which have not been credited to
their account.
5 NPGS Protection and Security Services CC and Anotherv FirstRand Bank Ltd (314/2018) (2019) ZASCA
94; (2019) 3 All SA 391 (SCA); 2020 (1) SA 494 (SCA) (6 June 2019).
9
[12) In this case, if monies in terms of the credit facility were not advanced and extended to
NPGS, as alleged by the respondent , it would have been easy for the appellants to say so and
unequivocally deny the allegation . One expects a defendant in the appellants ' position to know
whether or not they received money from a bank and if so, in what amount.' (Accentuation added.)
[18] The respondent is not entitled to raise defences in his answering affidavit or heads
of argument not contained in his plea.6
[19] The case of Jili v FirstRand Bank Ltd tla Wesbank7 investigated the discretion of
the court here. It ruled that:
'[27] The simple answer to this argument is, of course, that a court's discretion to refuse
summary judgment is limited to those cases where there may be some doubt as to the defendant's
liability. There is no such doubt in this case. It is not disputed that the respondent is entitled to the
order that it seeks if the debt re-arrangement order earlier granted by the magistrate does not bar
the respondent's claim which, for the reasons already given, it does not.
[28] Moreover, as this court stressed in Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 (3) SA
581 (SCA) para 2, a passage cited with approval by the Constitutional Court in Sebo/av Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC) para 40, notwithstanding the objective of the NCA
to protect consumers, there has to be a careful balancing of the competing interests sought to be
protected and further that the interests of creditors should 'also be safeguarded and should not
be overlooked' .
[29] The appellant has already enjoyed the considerable benefit afforded by a debt re­
arrangement order that substantially reduced her monthly instalments and at the same time
increased the period available to her to effect repayment. ..
[30] To allow the appellant, who has spurned the advantages flowing from the magistrate 's order
of 4 November 2011 by defaulting in her payments , a yet further opportunity to attempt to get her
affairs in order at the expense of the respondent who is entitled to the relief it seeks, would not
be in the interests of justice. To refuse summary judgment would be to afford the appellant a
6 Nedbank Limited v Uphuhliso Investments and Projects (Pty) Limited and Others (2021/6604) [2022)
ZAGPJHC 723; [2022) 4 All SA 827 (GJ) (22 September 2022) paras 24 and 36.
7 Jili v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank (763/2013) [2014) ZASCA 183; 2015 (3) SA 586 (SCA) (26
November 2014).
10
further advantage not envisaged by the NCA -and a second bite at the cherry, so to speak -to
the detriment of the clear rights of the respondent.' (Accentuation added.)
[20] On the mere face of the above and the facts, the summary judgment must be
granted. The issues are now res judicata and non-joinder raised by the respondent.
Res Judicata
[21] The doctrine of res judicata gives effect to the finality of court judgments. There
must be an end to litigation and in this regard, it must be borne in mind that the doctrine
may not be mechanically and rigidly applied. The doctrine can be relaxed where
significant and severe injustice will result.8 However, it is not the case in casu.
[22] In Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd and Others9 the principle that came to
light was that a court must have regard to the object of the exceptio res judicata. It was
introduced with the endeavour of putting a limit to needless litigation. The recapitulation
of the same thing in dispute in diverse actions must be prevented. The concomitant
deleterious effect of conflicting and contradictory decisions that may flow from not
applying the principles may follow. This principle must be carefully delineated and
demarcated in order to prevent hardship and actual injustice to parties. There is a tension
between a multiplicity of actions and the palpable realities of injustice. A plea of res
judicata must be determined on a case-by-case foundation without rigidity and the
overriding or paramount consideration being overall fairness and equity.10
[23] In the matter of Consol Ltd tla Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd and
Another, 11 the following was said:
The gist of the defence of res judicata is that the matter or question which is being raised by an
adversary has previously been finally adjudicated upon in proceedings between the same parties
and cannot be raised again. A matter is res judicata when the prior judgment was given (1) with
6 Molaudzi v S (CCT42/15) (2015) ZACC 20; 2015 (8) BCLR 904 (CC); 2015 (2) SACR 341 (CC} (25 June
2015).
9 Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd and Others 1999 (3) SA 517 (BHL).
10 Ibid at 566.
11 Consol Ltd tla Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pfy) Ltd and Another (2) 2005 (6) SA 23 (C).
11
respect to the same subject matter, (2) based on the same ground, and (3) between the same
parties.
In determining whether the prior judgment was based on 'the same ground', regard must be had
not only to the express judicial declaration in the earlier proceedings, but also to points that should
have been raised but were omitted in the earlier proceedings. Where a matter becomes subject
to litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the
parties to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit
the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been
brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not. The plea of res iudicata
applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by
the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly
belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might
have brought forward at the time. '12 (Accentuation added)
Joinder
[24] The law on joinder is reflected in the case of Ross and Another v Nedbank
Limited13 (Ross). Imperative is the fact that if parties are jointly and severally liable, the
plaintiff can choose to sue any of them, and they don't need to include all of them in the
same action. The respondent in casu admitted being jointly and severally liable and the
contracts confirm this. The respondent likewise renounced the benefits of excussion
and division and expressly agreed that any admission of indebtedness by the principal
debtor, being Lezmin, is binding on the respondent.14 This is what was depicted in the
12 Ibid para 47.
13 Ross and Another v Nedbank Limited (10029/2020) [2023] ZAGPJHC 949 (17 August 2023).
14 Record, POC 11 paras 6 and 10, p 169. In Liberty Group Limited v Warren Patrick Broughton /I/man
(1334/2018) [2020] ZASCA 38 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider whether sureties who bind
themselves as co-principal debtors become co-debtors with the principal debtor, and with each other. The
court answered the issue in the negative. The legal position in relation has been the established
jurisprudence of the court, where it was emphasised in Ki/roe-Daley v Barclays National Bank 1984 (4) SA
609 (A) that the surety's liability was accessory to that of the principal debtor, despite it being based on a
different contract: the addition of the words "co-principal debtor" in a suretyship did not transform the
contract into any contract other than one of suretyship . Consequently , if the principal debt became
prescribed , the surety's debt also became prescribed and ceased to exist. The SCA also considered the
case of Neon and Cold Cathode Illuminations (Pty) v Ephron 1978 (1) SA 463 (A), where it was held that
the sole consequence of a surety binding himself as a co-principal debtor is that, as regards to the creditor,
he renounces the benefits such as excussion and division available to him, and he becomes liable with the
principal debtor jointly and severally. It did not make him a co-debtor .
See in this regard: L Rhoodie 'Do sureties who bind themselves as co-principal debtors become co-debtors
with the principal debtor and each other?' Dispute Resolution Alert. Available at:
12
Ross case:
'7. The relevant principles pertaining to non-joinder were conveniently summarised by T olmay J
in Myeni, as follows:
"[63] ... In the common law a defendant 's right to join other parties are narrowly confined.
[64] Non-joinder arises where another party has a direct and substantial interest in the matter,
which is determined by the relief that is sought. A party can only be said to have a direct and
substantial interest in the matter if the relief cannot be sustained and carried into effect without
prejudicing their interests.
[65] In Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Appellate Division explained further that "[t]he
question of ioinder should ... not depend on the nature of the subiect-matter of the suit ... but ...
on the manner in which, and the extent to which, the Court's order may affect the interests of third
parties."
[66] This means that the relief is decisive, not the facts or issues in dispute. Even where a Court
may be called on to make findings that are adverse to another party this does not establish
grounds for non-joinder if the relief sought does not adversely impact on that party's interests.
[67] In this instance the Respondents seek relief only against the Applicant and not against the
other Board Members. The relief claimed therefore does not impact on the other director[s] ... at all
and as a result they do not have a direct and substantial interest in this matter.
[68] That does not mean that they may not be called as witnesses and that their evidence may
be determinative of the success of the Respondents claims against the Applicant.
[69] The other directors do not have a direct and substantial interest in the relief sought even if
the evidence ultimately reveals that they were complicit in any unlawful conduct that may be
proved.
[70] In any event a Plaintiff is entitled to choose their defendant from a group of wrongdoers ."
https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/news /publications/2020 /dispute/dispute -resolution -29-april-Do­
sureties-who-bind-themselves -as-co-principal-debtors-become-co-debtors-with-the-principal-debtor-and ­
each-other.html. Accessed 14 May 2025.
13
8. More recently, in South African History Archive Trust v South African Reserve Bank and
another 2020 (6) SA 127 (SCA) para 30, Gorven AJA (writing for a unanimous bench) recognised
and applied the test for joinder of necessity as it was restated by Brand JA in Bowring NO v
Vrededorp Properties CC and Another 2007 (5) SA 391 (SCA) ([2007] ZASCA 80) para 21,
namely, that 'The substantial test is whether the party that is alleged to be a necessary party for
purposes of joinder has a legal interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, which may be
affected prejudicially by the judgment of the Court in the proceedings concerned .... '. Gorven AJA
went on to clarify that 'The question is therefore whether Messrs Hill and Palazzolo might be
prejudicially affected by a judgment on the application. As has been clarified, the application does
not reach the point where any relief granted could have a prejudicial effect on
them ... ' (Accentuation added)
9. The learned author Harms, summarised the legal position thus:
"a) If a party has a direct and substantial interest in any order the court might make in
proceedings, or if such order cannot be sustained or carried into effect without prejudicing that
party, he is a necessary party and should be joined in the proceedings unless the court is satisfied
that he has waived his right to be joined.
b) The mere fact that a party may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation does not
warrant a non-joinder objection.
c) The term "direct and substantial interest" means an interest in the right, which is the subject-
matter of the litigation, and not merely an indirect financial interest in the litigation.
d) An academic interest is not sufficient. On the other hand, the joinder of joint wrongdoe rs as
defendants is not necessary , although advisable .
e) Likewise, if parties have a liability, which is joint and several. the plaintiff is not obliged to
join them as co-defendants in the same action but is entitled to choose his target.
f) A mere interest is also insufficient. A litigation funder may be directly liable for costs and
may be joined as a co-litigant in the funded litigation. This would be the case where the funder
exercises a level of control over the litigation or stands to benefit from the litigation."' (Emphasis
added.)
Conclusion
[25] The two defences in limine of res judicata and non-joinder cannot succeed and
must be dismissed having regard to the facts and law. Rule 46A is not applicable since
this is not an application to order property specially executable and the amounts that form
the claim have been proven in accordance with the contract. The respondent did not raise
any answer or defence to the applicant's claim that would raise an issue for trial and the
summary judgement as per prayers 1 to 15 of the notice of application for summary
judgment shall thus be granted.
Costs
[26] Costs must follow the cause and be in accordance with the terms of the written
surety agreement. It is to be on the scale as between attorney and own client.15
Order
The relief sought in the notice of application for summary judgment is granted and as
follows:
CLAIM A: SURETY AGREEMENT
1. Payment in the amount of R13 778 311.79 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
2. payment in the amount of R4 497 765.92 plus interest at the rate of 12.55% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 Septembe r 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
3. payment in the amount of R732 704.85 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
4. payment in the amount of R777 926.70 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
15 'ABSA BANK'S HEADS OF ARGUMENT' dated 19 November 2024 at para 3.
2
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
5. payment in the amount of R493 598.53 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
6. payment in the amount of R1 244 762.17 plus Interest at the rate of 11.50% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
7. payment in the amount of R1 355 866.22 plus interest at the rate of 11.50% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 12 September 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
8. payment in the amount of R667 477.57 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
9. payment in the amount of R659 333.91 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
10. payment in the amount of R738 323.91 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
11. payment in the amount of R676 418.61 plus interest at the rate of 11. 75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included;
16
12. payment in the amount of R622 700.42 plus interest at the rate of 11.75% per
annum, capitalized monthly from 4 August 2023 to date of payment, both days
included.
CLAIM B: DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL MORTGAGE LOAN ACCOUNT
13. Payment in the amount of R876 948.57;
14. interest on the amount of R876 948.57 at a rate of 11.57% per annum, capitalized
monthly from 9 November 2023 to date of payment, both days included.
COSTS
15. Costs of suit on attorney and own client scale.
Appearances
For the applicant:
Instructed by:
For the respondent:
Instructed by: S Tsangarak is
Tim du Toit & Attorneys
c/o Symingon De Kok
S Ngombane
Thebe Attorneys Inc.