IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
( , REPORT ABLE ¥+-5/NO
(2) OF INTCREST T OTHER JUDGES. ¥ES/NO
(3) REVISED
DA ff: 13 May 2025
SIGNATUR : • 1
Case No. 043089/2023
In the intervention application between:
COETZER, CASPER NICOLAAS First Applicant
MNCUBE, VICKQUS NKOSIKHONA Second Applicant
VAN NIEKERK , YVONNE Third Applicant
ZA SQUARE CONSUL TING (PTY) LTD Fourth Applicant
and
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE Responden t
In the main application between:
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
THOMSON REUTERS (PROFESSIONAL) UK LTD
NATIONAL TREASURY
STATE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGENCY
sac LIMITED
THE AUDITOR-GENERAL
Coram: MillarJ
Heard on: 12 May 2025 2
First Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Delivered: 13 May 2025 -This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H00 on 13 May 2025.
JUDGMENT
MILLAR J
3
[1] This is an application brought by the applicants for an order permitting their
intervention in an application for self-review of a tender awarded by the Office of
the Chief Justice (OCJ) to Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd (TR).
[2] Pursuant to the award of the tender and signature of a contract between OCJ and
TR, it emerged that the first to third applicants , former employees of the OCJ had
established the fourth applicant and had then submitted and been awarded a sub
contract in terms of the main tender. During the currency of their employ with the
OCJ, the first to third applicants had in some way been involved in the
adjudication and award of the tender or had knowledge of it.
[3] After the sub-contract had been awarded by TR to the fourth respondent , the OCJ
had become aware of this. This all occurred after the signature of the contract
but before the first to third applicants, who had tendered their resignations and
were now working their notice periods, had finished doing so.
[4] The OCJ initiated an application for self-review of the tender awarded to TR. This
is the main case which is set down for hearing in this Court on 27 May 2025. In
the filing of its papers for the self-review certain technical grounds were raised as
to why the award of the tender should be set aside. Additionally , the OCJ through
its then Secretary General, also filed an affidavit in which certain allegations and
concerns about the role of the first to third applicants in the award of the tender,
and subsequently thereto, in consequence of their establishment of the fourth
applicant and its award of the sub-contract were concerned .
[5) The applicants in this application do not oppose the reviewing and setting aside
of the main tender. In addition, the sub-contract between the fourth applicant and
TR has also since been cancelled . Save for any historical role they played in
4
their erstwhile capacity as employees of the OCJ, they have no interest in the
proceedings , save in one respect.
[6] It is contended by the applicants that the allegations made regarding their conduct
while they were employees is false and defamatory and that the making of such
allegations , without what they contend is any basis, was done purely to bring
them into disrepute and to harm their reputations and future commercial
prospects . In this regard in particular, the suggestion that the OCJ would seek
an order 'blacklisting' the fourth respondent with national treasury so that it could
not do business with government in the future is of particular concern to them.
[7] The entire application for intervention is predicated on what are contended to be
the false allegations and the apprehension that the court hearing the review and
deciding it may well make findings against the applicants during its consideration
and ultimate decision of the matter.
[8] The basis for the intervention was succinctly expressed by the first applicant as
follows:
"Furthermore , the Applicants are not opposed to the reviewing and setting aside
of the impugned award and contract awarded to Thomson Reuters on other
grounds delineated in OCJ's founding affidavit except those grounds referred to
above which seek to blame the applicants and characterize their conduct as
criminal in the procurement process that led to the impugned award."
[9] In consequence of the grounds which the applicants assert cast their conduct in
a negative light, they say that they ought to be given leave to intervene to protect
their "rights to dignity and a right to be heard. 11
5
[1 0] The OCJ opposes the application for intervention on the basis that since it is
common cause between the parties that the tender is to be reviewed and set
aside, the applicants have no interest in any order that the court would make. It
is the case for the OCJ that the only interest that the applicants claim to have, is
in the reasoning that may (or may not) be adopted by the court hearing the review
application and only insofar as any characterization by that court of any of the
conduct of the first to third applicants while they were employees , may aggrieve
them.
[11] Rule 12 provides that "Any person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as
a defendant in any action may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings
apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff or a defendant. The court may upon such
application make such order, including any order as to costs, and give such directions
as to further procedure in the action as to it may seem meet." This rule also finds
application in motion proceedings such as the present by virtue of rule 6(14).
[12] The test for intervention is well established. In National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Zuma, 1 on all fours with the present case, it was held that:
"Nevertheles s, to be able to intervene in proceedings a party must have a direct
and substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, whether in the court of first
instance or on appeal. The basic problem with the application is that the applicants
have no interest in the order but only in the reasoning . They are in the position of
a witness whose evidence has been rejected or on whose demeanour an
unfavourable finding has been expressed. Such a person has no ready remedy,
especially not by means of intervention . To be able to intervene in an appeal,
which is by its nature directed at a wrong order and not at incorrect reasoning, an
applicant must have an interest in the order under appeal. The applicants do not
have such an interest."
1 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at para [85).
6
[13] The applicants have no interest in the order and have said so explicitly. They
have also not set out any basis, prima facie or otherwise upon which they would
be able to be of assistance to the review court.2
[14] To my mind, the main review proceedings will be decided based on the record of
the proceedings which are under review. This record sets out the conduct of the
applicants while they were employees of the OCJ. The court hearing the review
will decide the relevance if any, of the conduct of the applicants regarding whether
the review is to be granted or not and will consider the veracity and
appropriateness of any adverse statements made about them in its considerat ion
of the matter.
[15] For the applicants , insofar as their past conduct while employed by the OCJ is
concerned "The moving finger writes: and having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor
Wit shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it. 3" Their
position is no different to any past employee of any institution whose conduct
while employed is to be considered. The right to dignity is not in issue. Either the
grounds of review premised on the conduct of the applicants have merit or they
do not. The application to intervene , for the reasons I have given lacks any merit
and must be refused.
[16] This is however not the end of the matter. In the founding affidavit and
subsequently replying affidavit deposed to by the first applicant, allegations were
made calling into question the honesty and integrity of the Secretary General of
the OCJ who had deposed to the affidavits on its behalf in the review proceeding s.
The OCJ besides opposing the main application has also applied to strike out the
2 Peermont Global (KZN) (Pty) Ltd v Afrisun KZN (Pty) t/a Sibaya Casino Enterlainment Kingdom and
Others and a related matter [2020] 4 All SA 226 (KZP).
3 Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Translated by Edward Fitzgerald , Quatrain LI (51 ).
7
contents of a significant number of paragraphs of the founding affidavit which it
regards as scandalous and vexatious.4
[17] There is no point served in dealing and repeating each of the allegations that
were made. To do so would only serve to give them life. On a conspectus of the
allegations , none of them advance the case for intervention or for that matter the
review.
[18] Such allegations appear to have been made with the sole purpose of humiliating ,
demeaning and bringing the former Secretary General into disrepute by
suggesting that she was somehow involved with or abetted impropriety .5 There
is no evidence to support this at all.6
[19] The allegations which the OCJ has sought to have struck out span no less than
20 paragraphs in the founding affidavit. These are paragraphs 35 to 39, 41 to 50,
53 and 62 to 65. It bears mentioning that the founding affidavit only consists of
69 paragraphs so, almost a third of the total founding affidavit was devoted to
such allegations.
[20] I am persuaded that the allegations made in the paragraphs in question are
scandalous and vexatious and are to be struck out.
[21] This brings me to the question of costs. Regarding the scale of costs, it was
argued for the OCJ that a punitive order for costs was warranted insofar as the
applicants knew that they did not intend to challenge the review per se and for
4 In terms of rules 6(11) and 6(15).
5 See Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa; Glenister v President of the
Republic of South Africa 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paras [27] -[28].
6 The allegations were made ostensibly based on inadmissible hearsay evidence for which there was no
application made to have such evidence admitted, this notwithstanding the assertion in the replying
affidavit that such an application would be made at the hearing.
8
that reason had no real prospect of being granted leave to intervene. The OCJ
was put to entirely avoidable and unnecessary expense in having to oppose the
application and to deal also with the intemperate , vexatious and scandalous
allegations made against the former Secretary General.
[22] It was argued that since no evidentiary basis was laid for such allegations , they
were made gratuitously and with the improper motive as set out above. It is for
this reason that the OCJ argued that an order for costs as between attorney and
own client7 should be made as a mark of this court disapproval.
[23] I am of the view that a punitive costs order on the scale as between attorney and
own client is warranted in the circumstances and this is the order that I intend to
make. The OCJ engaged the services of two counsel and there is no reason that
the costs order should not include those costs.
[24] In the circumstances , I make the following order:-
[23.1]
[23.2] The application for intervention is dismissed.
Paragraphs 35 to 39, 41 to 50, 53 and 62 to 65 of the first applicant's
founding affidavit are struck out.
[23.3] The first, second, third and fourth applicants are ordered to pay the
respondent 's costs, jointly and severally, the one paying the others
to be absolved on the scale as between attorney and own client,
scale C, which costs are also to include the costs consequent upon
the engagement of two counsel.
7 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) at para [222].
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:
INSTRUCTE D BY:
REFERENCE: 9
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
12 MAY 2025
13 MAY 2025
ADV. LR MODIBA
CHITA INCORPORATED ATTORNEYS
MR. T CHITA
ADV. C STEINBERG SC
ADV. D SIVE
THE STATE ATTORNEY , PRETORIA
MR. D MPHEPHU