Coetzer and Others v Office of the Chief Justice (043089/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 507 (13 May 2025)

62 Reportability
Public Procurement

Brief Summary

Intervention — Application for intervention — Applicants seeking to intervene in self-review of tender awarded to Thomson Reuters by the Office of the Chief Justice — Applicants former employees of OCJ, alleging false and defamatory statements regarding their conduct — Legal issue of whether applicants have a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the review proceedings — Court holding that applicants lack interest in the order sought, as they only seek to challenge the reasoning of the court, and thus the application for intervention is dismissed; further, scandalous allegations made against the Secretary General of the OCJ are struck out, and a punitive costs order is granted against the applicants.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


This case involves an intervention application brought by former employees of the Office of the Chief Justice in relation to a main application for self-review of a tender awarded by the Office of the Chief Justice to Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd. The case is recorded as Case No. 043089/2023 and was delivered on 13 May 2025 in the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria).


The matter is significant due to its implications on tender processes and the conduct of former employees in public procurement. It also raises important questions regarding defamation, reputation, and the right to dignity during judicial proceedings.


The judgment was handed down by Justice Millar and forms part of an intricate dispute that includes multiple applicants, respondents, and associated government agencies.


Reportability


This case is reportable as it addresses the crucial issue of intervention in tender review processes. The applicants, who have raised concerns about allegations allegedly tarnishing their reputations, seek to have the record assessed in light of potential defamatory statements. The case is significant because it underscores the importance of ensuring fairness in public procurement auditing and that allegations are not allowed to unjustly prejudice individuals without a solid evidential basis.


Its reportability is further enhanced by the court’s detailed consideration of the scope of intervention as provided under the rules of court and the application of established principles from previous jurisprudence. The judgment demonstrates the balancing act between allowing participation in court proceedings and maintaining the integrity of the review process.


The decision also highlights the need for judicial restraint in dealing with inflammatory allegations that might otherwise serve to unfairly harm the reputation of those involved, thereby reinforcing the protections afforded to individual dignity within judicial proceedings.


Cases Cited


National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma, 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA)

Peermont Global (KZN) (Pty) Ltd v Afrisun KZN (Pty) t/a Sibaya Casino Entertainment Kingdom and Others and a related matter [2020] 4 All SA 226 (KZP)


Legislation Cited


No specific primary legislation was cited in the judgment. The focus was instead on the application of procedural rules.


Rules of Court Cited


Rule 12, which governs the process for seeking leave to intervene in an action

Rule 6(14), which extends the application of Rule 12 to motion proceedings


HEADNOTE


Summary


The judgment deals with an intervention application where the applicants, all former employees of the Office of the Chief Justice, sought to join the main application for self-review of a tender awarded to Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd. The applicants contended that allegations regarding their role in the procurement process were false, defamatory, and aimed at damaging their reputations and future commercial prospects. The intervention was sought to safeguard their rights to dignity and to ensure they had an opportunity to be heard.


The court carefully examined whether the applicants possessed a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, as required by established legal principles. In its analysis, the court referenced prior case law to emphasize that an intervention must be rooted in an interest in the order itself and not merely in the reasoning behind it.


Ultimately, the court found that the applicants’ sole interest was in the reasoning of the review and that they had already acknowledged no interest in any alternative order. This led to the conclusion that their application to intervene did not meet the necessary criteria set out by the rules of court.


Key Issues


The case primarily addressed the applicants’ standing to intervene in the tender review process and whether their alleged defamation claims provided a sufficient basis for intervention. The court also analyzed the broader implications of their past conduct as public officials and the relevance of such conduct to the merits of the review application. Furthermore, the judgment scrutinized the nature and admissibility of the scandalous allegations contained within the founding affidavit of the main application.


Held


The court held that the applicants lacked a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the main proceedings, as their concerns were limited to the reasoning of the decision rather than any potential order affecting them. Consequently, their application to intervene was refused. Additionally, the court determined that certain paragraphs of the founding affidavit, which were deemed scandalous and vexatious, should be struck out to prevent undue harm to reputations.


THE FACTS


The background of the case centers on a tender issued by the Office of the Chief Justice to Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd. It emerged that several former employees of the OCJ were involved in the procurement process and subsequently established a consulting firm that was awarded a sub-contract under the main tender. The OCJ later became aware of this connection and initiated a self-review of the tender award. In light of this development, the former employees sought to intervene to challenge allegations about their conduct during their period of employment.


These former employees argued that the negative allegations contained in the OCJ’s affidavit were baseless and intended solely to harm their reputations within the industry. They maintained that their past conduct should be considered within the context of routine employment scrutiny and not as evidence of any malfeasance in the procurement process. The facts also reveal procedural overlaps between the main tender review and the intervention application, which complicated the matters before the court.


The dispute further involves an ancillary application by the OCJ to strike out several paragraphs of its own affidavit, which it described as scandalous and vexatious due to the inflammatory nature of the allegations directed at its former Secretary General. This element of the case illustrates the complex interplay between internal accountability, reputational management, and adherence to judicial standards in public procurement processes.


THE ISSUES


The primary legal issue was determining whether the former employees had a sufficient and direct interest in the outcome of the tender review proceedings to justify their intervention. The court had to decide if an intervention on the grounds of safeguarding their reputation and dignity was appropriate when their interest was not linked to any potential order but rather to the reasoning behind the review decision.


Another critical question was whether the procedural rules, particularly Rule 12 and its application in motion proceedings under Rule 6(14), supported an intervention in cases where the applicant’s claim is based on the alleged defamatory nature of the record. More broadly, the court examined the appropriateness of allowing intervention in cases where the applicant’s alleged past conduct was already subject to the review process.


The juxtaposition of these issues raised concerns about the interplay between the integrity of the procurement system and the constitutional rights of individuals to a fair hearing and dignity, thereby compelling the court to scrutinize both procedural and substantive elements of law.


ANALYSIS


In its analysis, the court began by reaffirming the established test for intervention drawn from the decision in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma. The court underscored that a prospective intervener must demonstrate a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, not merely an interest in the judicial reasoning or ex post facto vindication. The applicants’ own acknowledgment that they had no interest in any order weighed heavily against their application.


The reasoning proceeded by emphasizing that the review proceedings would focus on the record concerning the conduct of the applicants while they were employed by the OCJ. The court highlighted that it was for the reviewing court to assess the veracity and relevance of any adverse statements and thus decide on the merit of the allegations against the applicants. This approach clearly placed the focus on the facts contained in the record rather than on extraneous intervention by parties with limited interests.


Furthermore, the court addressed the effect of the scandalous and vexatious allegations made concerning the former Secretary General. It noted that repeating such inflammatory claims without proper substantiation would serve no useful purpose and could only tarnish reputations further. The decision to strike out these paragraphs from the affidavit was seen as necessary to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process and prevent unnecessary reputational harm.


REMEDY


The remedy provided in this case was twofold. Firstly, the court refused the application for intervention by the applicants on the grounds that they did not have a direct and substantial interest in the review’s outcome. This refusal was based on a strict interpretation of the intervention rules and precedent from prior case law.


Secondly, the court granted the OCJ’s motion to strike out specific paragraphs of its own founding affidavit. These paragraphs, which were deemed scandalous and vexatious, were removed to prevent the perpetuation of unsubstantiated allegations that could unjustly prejudice the reputations of the involved parties. This remedy aimed to ensure that the proceedings would focus solely on substantiated evidence rather than on inflammatory assertions.


The dual approach taken by the court serves not only to dismiss an unmerited intervention but also to maintain the integrity of the judicial record in sensitive matters involving public procurement and reputational issues.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The case firmly establishes that an application to intervene in judicial proceedings must be predicated on a direct and substantial interest in the eventual outcome, particularly in terms of the order below. The ruling reinforces that an applicant’s interest based solely on a desire to challenge reasoning without a corresponding interest in the order is insufficient.


Moreover, the judgment illustrates the principle that allegations made in judicial affidavits, if found to be scandalous and vexatious, may be struck out to protect the reputations of individuals and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. This is especially pertinent when such allegations are unsubstantiated and primarily serve to demean.


Finally, the decision underscores the importance of a fair and balanced review process in public procurement, ensuring that each party’s past conduct is evaluated within its appropriate context. The judgment reinforces that the merits of a review proceeding should rest on the established facts and not on extraneous and inflammatory claims that risk undermining procedural fairness and individual dignity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
( , REPORT ABLE ¥+-5/NO
(2) OF INTCREST T OTHER JUDGES. ¥ES/NO
(3) REVISED
DA ff: 13 May 2025
SIGNATUR : • 1
Case No. 043089/2023
In the intervention application between:
COETZER, CASPER NICOLAAS First Applicant
MNCUBE, VICKQUS NKOSIKHONA Second Applicant
VAN NIEKERK , YVONNE Third Applicant
ZA SQUARE CONSUL TING (PTY) LTD Fourth Applicant
and
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE Responden t
In the main application between:
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
THOMSON REUTERS (PROFESSIONAL) UK LTD
NATIONAL TREASURY
STATE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGENCY
sac LIMITED
THE AUDITOR-GENERAL
Coram: MillarJ
Heard on: 12 May 2025 2
First Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Delivered: 13 May 2025 -This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H00 on 13 May 2025.
JUDGMENT
MILLAR J
3
[1] This is an application brought by the applicants for an order permitting their
intervention in an application for self-review of a tender awarded by the Office of
the Chief Justice (OCJ) to Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd (TR).
[2] Pursuant to the award of the tender and signature of a contract between OCJ and
TR, it emerged that the first to third applicants , former employees of the OCJ had
established the fourth applicant and had then submitted and been awarded a sub­
contract in terms of the main tender. During the currency of their employ with the
OCJ, the first to third applicants had in some way been involved in the
adjudication and award of the tender or had knowledge of it.
[3] After the sub-contract had been awarded by TR to the fourth respondent , the OCJ
had become aware of this. This all occurred after the signature of the contract
but before the first to third applicants, who had tendered their resignations and
were now working their notice periods, had finished doing so.
[4] The OCJ initiated an application for self-review of the tender awarded to TR. This
is the main case which is set down for hearing in this Court on 27 May 2025. In
the filing of its papers for the self-review certain technical grounds were raised as
to why the award of the tender should be set aside. Additionally , the OCJ through
its then Secretary General, also filed an affidavit in which certain allegations and
concerns about the role of the first to third applicants in the award of the tender,
and subsequently thereto, in consequence of their establishment of the fourth
applicant and its award of the sub-contract were concerned .
[5) The applicants in this application do not oppose the reviewing and setting aside
of the main tender. In addition, the sub-contract between the fourth applicant and
TR has also since been cancelled . Save for any historical role they played in
4
their erstwhile capacity as employees of the OCJ, they have no interest in the
proceedings , save in one respect.
[6] It is contended by the applicants that the allegations made regarding their conduct
while they were employees is false and defamatory and that the making of such
allegations , without what they contend is any basis, was done purely to bring
them into disrepute and to harm their reputations and future commercial
prospects . In this regard in particular, the suggestion that the OCJ would seek
an order 'blacklisting' the fourth respondent with national treasury so that it could
not do business with government in the future is of particular concern to them.
[7] The entire application for intervention is predicated on what are contended to be
the false allegations and the apprehension that the court hearing the review and
deciding it may well make findings against the applicants during its consideration
and ultimate decision of the matter.
[8] The basis for the intervention was succinctly expressed by the first applicant as
follows:
"Furthermore , the Applicants are not opposed to the reviewing and setting aside
of the impugned award and contract awarded to Thomson Reuters on other
grounds delineated in OCJ's founding affidavit except those grounds referred to
above which seek to blame the applicants and characterize their conduct as
criminal in the procurement process that led to the impugned award."
[9] In consequence of the grounds which the applicants assert cast their conduct in
a negative light, they say that they ought to be given leave to intervene to protect
their "rights to dignity and a right to be heard. 11
5
[1 0] The OCJ opposes the application for intervention on the basis that since it is
common cause between the parties that the tender is to be reviewed and set
aside, the applicants have no interest in any order that the court would make. It
is the case for the OCJ that the only interest that the applicants claim to have, is
in the reasoning that may (or may not) be adopted by the court hearing the review
application and only insofar as any characterization by that court of any of the
conduct of the first to third applicants while they were employees , may aggrieve
them.
[11] Rule 12 provides that "Any person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as
a defendant in any action may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings
apply for leave to intervene as a plaintiff or a defendant. The court may upon such
application make such order, including any order as to costs, and give such directions
as to further procedure in the action as to it may seem meet." This rule also finds
application in motion proceedings such as the present by virtue of rule 6(14).
[12] The test for intervention is well established. In National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Zuma, 1 on all fours with the present case, it was held that:
"Nevertheles s, to be able to intervene in proceedings a party must have a direct
and substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, whether in the court of first
instance or on appeal. The basic problem with the application is that the applicants
have no interest in the order but only in the reasoning . They are in the position of
a witness whose evidence has been rejected or on whose demeanour an
unfavourable finding has been expressed. Such a person has no ready remedy,
especially not by means of intervention . To be able to intervene in an appeal,
which is by its nature directed at a wrong order and not at incorrect reasoning, an
applicant must have an interest in the order under appeal. The applicants do not
have such an interest."
1 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at para [85).
6
[13] The applicants have no interest in the order and have said so explicitly. They
have also not set out any basis, prima facie or otherwise upon which they would
be able to be of assistance to the review court.2
[14] To my mind, the main review proceedings will be decided based on the record of
the proceedings which are under review. This record sets out the conduct of the
applicants while they were employees of the OCJ. The court hearing the review
will decide the relevance if any, of the conduct of the applicants regarding whether
the review is to be granted or not and will consider the veracity and
appropriateness of any adverse statements made about them in its considerat ion
of the matter.
[15] For the applicants , insofar as their past conduct while employed by the OCJ is
concerned "The moving finger writes: and having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor
Wit shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it. 3" Their
position is no different to any past employee of any institution whose conduct
while employed is to be considered. The right to dignity is not in issue. Either the
grounds of review premised on the conduct of the applicants have merit or they
do not. The application to intervene , for the reasons I have given lacks any merit
and must be refused.
[16] This is however not the end of the matter. In the founding affidavit and
subsequently replying affidavit deposed to by the first applicant, allegations were
made calling into question the honesty and integrity of the Secretary General of
the OCJ who had deposed to the affidavits on its behalf in the review proceeding s.
The OCJ besides opposing the main application has also applied to strike out the
2 Peermont Global (KZN) (Pty) Ltd v Afrisun KZN (Pty) t/a Sibaya Casino Enterlainment Kingdom and
Others and a related matter [2020] 4 All SA 226 (KZP).
3 Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Translated by Edward Fitzgerald , Quatrain LI (51 ).
7
contents of a significant number of paragraphs of the founding affidavit which it
regards as scandalous and vexatious.4
[17] There is no point served in dealing and repeating each of the allegations that
were made. To do so would only serve to give them life. On a conspectus of the
allegations , none of them advance the case for intervention or for that matter the
review.
[18] Such allegations appear to have been made with the sole purpose of humiliating ,
demeaning and bringing the former Secretary General into disrepute by
suggesting that she was somehow involved with or abetted impropriety .5 There
is no evidence to support this at all.6
[19] The allegations which the OCJ has sought to have struck out span no less than
20 paragraphs in the founding affidavit. These are paragraphs 35 to 39, 41 to 50,
53 and 62 to 65. It bears mentioning that the founding affidavit only consists of
69 paragraphs so, almost a third of the total founding affidavit was devoted to
such allegations.
[20] I am persuaded that the allegations made in the paragraphs in question are
scandalous and vexatious and are to be struck out.
[21] This brings me to the question of costs. Regarding the scale of costs, it was
argued for the OCJ that a punitive order for costs was warranted insofar as the
applicants knew that they did not intend to challenge the review per se and for
4 In terms of rules 6(11) and 6(15).
5 See Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa; Glenister v President of the
Republic of South Africa 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paras [27] -[28].
6 The allegations were made ostensibly based on inadmissible hearsay evidence for which there was no
application made to have such evidence admitted, this notwithstanding the assertion in the replying
affidavit that such an application would be made at the hearing.
8
that reason had no real prospect of being granted leave to intervene. The OCJ
was put to entirely avoidable and unnecessary expense in having to oppose the
application and to deal also with the intemperate , vexatious and scandalous
allegations made against the former Secretary General.
[22] It was argued that since no evidentiary basis was laid for such allegations , they
were made gratuitously and with the improper motive as set out above. It is for
this reason that the OCJ argued that an order for costs as between attorney and
own client7 should be made as a mark of this court disapproval.
[23] I am of the view that a punitive costs order on the scale as between attorney and
own client is warranted in the circumstances and this is the order that I intend to
make. The OCJ engaged the services of two counsel and there is no reason that
the costs order should not include those costs.
[24] In the circumstances , I make the following order:-
[23.1]
[23.2] The application for intervention is dismissed.
Paragraphs 35 to 39, 41 to 50, 53 and 62 to 65 of the first applicant's
founding affidavit are struck out.
[23.3] The first, second, third and fourth applicants are ordered to pay the
respondent 's costs, jointly and severally, the one paying the others
to be absolved on the scale as between attorney and own client,
scale C, which costs are also to include the costs consequent upon
the engagement of two counsel.
7 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) at para [222].
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:
INSTRUCTE D BY:
REFERENCE: 9
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
12 MAY 2025
13 MAY 2025
ADV. LR MODIBA
CHITA INCORPORATED ATTORNEYS
MR. T CHITA
ADV. C STEINBERG SC
ADV. D SIVE
THE STATE ATTORNEY , PRETORIA
MR. D MPHEPHU