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Majozi v Road Accident Fund (D10075/2023; D10076/2023) [2025] ZAKZDHC 31 (5 February 2025)

60 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund
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Brief Summary

Road Accident Fund — Claims — Compliance with s 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act — Applicants sought declaratory orders for the registration of their claims after the Road Accident Fund (RAF) rejected their lodgment documents for non-compliance with statutory requirements. Both applicants were involved in motor vehicle accidents and submitted claims that were returned by the RAF due to missing documentation. The RAF objected to the validity of the claims, asserting that the documents did not meet the necessary compliance standards. The court held that the applications were dismissed as the RAF's objections constituted valid administrative action under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, and the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the substantive requirements of the Act.

Comprehensive Summary

Case Note


This judgment relates to two consolidated applications before the High Court of South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal Local Division, Durban. The case names are Vincent Vusumuzi Majozi v Road Accident Fund, Case No. D10075/2023, and Nkosinethemba Hopewell Mtshali v Road Accident Fund, Case No. D10076/2023. The judgment was delivered by Justice Gajoo AJ. The precise date of the judgment is not provided in the text.


The judgment is significant as it addresses the procedural requirements imposed by the Road Accident Fund Act, No. 56 of 1996, specifically the requirements contained in section 24. It highlights the importance of complying with both the substantive and procedural elements before a claim for compensation can be duly lodged and investigated by the Road Accident Fund (RAF).


The judgment also discusses the application of administrative law principles under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000, when determining the validity of the RAF’s objection letters. This case is reportable due to its implications for both administrative procedure and claim registration protocols within the context of motor vehicle accident compensation.


Reportability


This case is reportable because it delves into the interplay between procedural compliance and substantive claims under the Road Accident Fund Act. It examines the RAF’s statutory authority to assess the validity of lodged claim documents and to object when essential supporting documentation is missing. This analysis is key in understanding how administrative actions and statutory requirements affect claimants’ rights.


The judgment offers insight into how the RAF is required to balance its statutory investigation obligations with strict procedural mandates as laid down in section 24 of the Act. It demonstrates that even where a claim might ostensibly have merit, failure to adhere to essential procedural requirements can render the claim ineligible for further investigation.


Furthermore, by referencing landmark decisions such as Thugwana v Road Accident Fund and Mautla and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others, the case establishes important precedents on the limited scope of remedies available when claims are procedurally deficient. This serves as a significant reminder for practitioners to ensure complete compliance with statutory rules when lodging claims.


Cases Cited


Thugwana v Road Accident Fund 2006 (2) SA 616 (SCA) is cited as a seminal case establishing that section 24(5) of the Road Accident Fund Act governs procedural matters only, and its purpose does not extend to reviving substantive deficiencies in a claim.


Mautla and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 1843 is also referenced, reinforcing that non-compliance with the document submission requirements prevents a claim from being considered valid and actionable.


Krischke v Road Accident Fund is mentioned in the judgment, underscoring the importance of adhering to the strict procedural framework set out under the Road Accident Fund Act even though a full citation was not provided.


Legislation Cited


The judgment discusses the Road Accident Fund Act, No. 56 of 1996, which sets out the requirements and procedures for lodging a claim for compensation arising from motor vehicle accidents.


It also considers the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000, particularly in relation to challenges regarding administrative action and the limits of the RAF’s statutory discretion when objecting to claim lodgments.


The statutory provisions elucidated in these Acts form the legal basis upon which the RAF’s assessments and subsequent objections to claim registrations are evaluated.


Rules of Court Cited


There are no explicit Rules of Court cited in the judgment. The focus remains on statutory provisions and case law precedent rather than on procedural rules specific to the court.


HEADNOTE


Summary


The judgment consolidated applications from two applicants who sought to have their claims for motor vehicle accident compensation registered by the RAF. Both claimants argued that despite missing some supporting documents, their lodgment documents substantially complied with section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act. They contended that the RAF had a statutory obligation to record the claims and investigate the merits of their compensation requests regardless of minor procedural deficiencies.


The court examined the RAF’s objection letters which stated that the required documentary evidence had not been submitted as stipulated by the Act and the accompanying Terms and Conditions. Through detailed analysis of statutory provisions and the precedents set in related case law, the court clarified that the RAF’s role was confined to evaluating the procedural compliance of a claim and not to remedy substantive deficiencies.


Ultimately, the judgment emphasized that the failure to include all the essential documents rendered the claims invalid under the procedural requirements of section 24(5). As a result, both applications were dismissed, underscoring the need for strict adherence to the prescribed claims process.


Key Issues


One of the key issues was whether the applicants’ lodgment documents met the procedural requirements set out in section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act.


Another important issue was the scope and nature of the RAF’s statutory obligation to record and investigate claims, particularly in determining if missing documents should prevent the claim from proceeding.


The judgment also considered whether the RAF’s refusal to accept the lodgment documents constituted an ultra vires administrative action in light of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and established case law.


Held


The court held that both applications must be dismissed because the lodgment documents did not comply with the mandatory document requirements specified under section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act.


The court found that the RAF’s objection to the claims, based on reasonable and clear procedural grounds as detailed in the objection letters, was lawful and within the bounds of its statutory mandate.


Accordingly, the claims were not accepted for further investigation or settlement, and the RAF was not obliged to proceed with an investigation into claims that were procedurally defective.


THE FACTS


Vincent Vusumuzi Majozi, a pedestrian, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 12 October 2021 while crossing Inwabi Road, Isipingo. Nkosinethemba Hopewell Mtshali, a driver, was similarly involved in a motor collision on 14 February 2021 on Mfule Mission Road involving an unidentified vehicle. Both individuals sustained injuries and subsequently lodged claims with the RAF for compensation.


In both instances, the applicants engaged legal representation to assist in the claims process. Majozi’s claim was submitted on 4 April 2023 and returned by the RAF on 2 May 2023 with an objection letter citing the absence of reports from an Occupational Therapist and an Industrial Psychologist. Mtshali’s claim, lodged on 1 February 2023, lacked several key documents including an Accident Report or Docket with a sketch plan, an RAF 4 Form with a medico-legal report, and other supporting documentation.


The RAF objected to both claims on the basis that they did not fulfill the procedural document requirements as prescribed by section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act and the accompanying Terms and Conditions. The absence of these documents rendered the claims insufficient for the RAF to commence its investigation and settlement processes.


THE ISSUES


The primary legal question was whether the applicants had met the substantial compliance requirement for lodging a claim under section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act. The court had to determine if the omission of specified documents could justify the RAF’s refusal to record the claims.


The issue extended to whether the RAF’s decision to object on procedural grounds amounted to an administrative action that could be challenged under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The court examined whether any deviation from the statutory requirements might render the RAF’s actions ultra vires.


Furthermore, the court addressed the broader implications for procedural rigor in claims for compensation, assessing whether the decision impacted the balance between administrative discretion and claimants’ substantive rights under the Act.


ANALYSIS


The court’s analysis centered on the clear separation between procedural compliance and substantive claim merits. In its reasoning, the court emphasized that the statutory requirements prescribed in section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act are strictly procedural in nature. The court reiterated that the purpose of these procedural steps is to afford the RAF sufficient time to assess a claim before proceeding with an investigation or settlement.


In evaluating the RAF’s conduct, the court scrutinized the objection letters, which detailed the specific documents that were missing from the lodgment packages. The court found that the RAF was within its statutory rights to reject claims that did not include reports from Occupational Therapists and Industrial Psychologists in Majozi’s case, and similarly, the absence of several key documents in Mtshali’s claim validated the RAF’s objections.


The analysis was further supported by precedent, notably in Thugwana v Road Accident Fund and Mautla and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others, which collectively underline that a failure to comply with the detailed document checklist results in a valid objection. The court therefore concluded that the RAF’s actions were an appropriate application of the law, leaving the applicants responsible for remediating the document deficiencies before a new submission could be considered.


REMEDY


The remedy provided by the court was to dismiss both applications for compensation on the grounds that the lodgment documents did not meet the statutory procedural requirements. The court did not grant the declaratory order sought by the applicants calling for the recording of their claims or the payment of attorney/client costs by the RAF.


The dismissal confirmed that the RAF’s decision, based solely on the failure to meet the documented requirements under section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act, was justified. The court’s ruling thereby reinforced the procedural safeguards embedded within the statutory framework.


As a consequence, the applicants were directed to address the identified deficiencies and ensure complete compliance with the statutory requirements should they wish to resubmit their claims in the future. The remedy served as a stern reminder of the strict compliance obligations imposed on claimants.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The key legal principle established in this judgment is that procedural compliance as outlined in section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act is paramount in determining a claim’s validity. Strict adherence to the statutory document checklist is compulsory prior to the RAF’s undertaking of its investigative and settlement obligations.


The judgment reinforces that the RAF’s objection, based on missing documentation, is a lawful exercise of its authority and does not impinge upon the substantive merits of the claim. Instead, the focus is on ensuring that all required procedures and documentation are duly followed.


Furthermore, the case affirmatively distinguishes between actions of administrative procedural regulation and substantive claims rights, emphasizing that the RAF’s role is limited to pre-assessment under procedural guidelines. This principle serves as a critical reminder to practitioners regarding the necessity of complete and thorough submissions when approaching statutory compensation claims.



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU -NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN

CASE NO.: D10075/2023

In the matter between:
VINCENT VUSUMUZI MAJOZI APPLICANT

and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT

AND

Case No.: D10076/2023
In the matter between:

NKOSINETHEMBA HOPEWELL MTSHALI APPLICANT
and

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT

ORDER

2


The following orders shall issue: In the matter of VV Majozi v Road Accident Fund, Case No.: D10075/2023 :
1. The application is dismissed.

In the matter of NH Mtshali v Road Accident Fund, Case No.: D10076/2023:
1. The application is dismissed.


JUDGMENT

Gajoo AJ
[1] This judgment addresses two applications brought by the applicants against the
Road Accident Fund (“the RAF”). These applications have been consolidated as the issues for determination in both matters are the same. The applicants
seek a declaratory order in the following terms:
(a) That the RAF is directed to record the registration of the applicants’
claims for compensation arising out of injuries sustained by them in a
motor vehicle accident;
(b) The applicants’ lodgment documents are declared to be substantially
compliant with the provisions of s 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act , No.
56 of 1996 (“the RAF Act”); and
(c) The RAF is to pay the attorney/client costs of the application.
[2] The applicants were both involved in the following motor vehicle collisions:
(a) Vincent Vusumuzi Majozi (“Majozi”) was a pedestrian involved in a motor
vehicle accident on 12 October 2021 while crossing Inwabi Road,
Isipingo. The driver of the vehicle was identified as Goolam Hoosen; and
(b) Nkosinethemba Hopewell Mtshali (“Mtshali”) was a driver involved in a
motor collision on 14 February 2021 on Mfule Mission Road (P574)
involving an unidentified motor vehicle.

3

[3] Both men suffered injuries as a result of the motor vehicle collisions, and on
this premise, they sought compensation from the RAF. They both engaged with
an attorney to aid them in pursuing their claim.
Lodgment
[4] On 4 April 2023, Majozi’s claim was lodged by registered post with the RAF
under the cover letter dated 31 March 2023. On 2 May 2023, the RAF returned the documents to Majozi’s attorney together with a letter.
[5] The letter advised that the documents lodged had been pre-assessed for
compliance with s 24 of the Act and the Stipulated Terms and Conditions Upon
Which Claims For Compensation Shall Be Administered, which were published by the RAF pursuant to s 4(1)(a) of the Act (“the Terms and Conditions”). The
letter advised further that the documents submitted did not meet the
requirements for a substantially compliant and valid claim as the reports of an
Occupational Therapist and Industrial Psychologist had not been included in the lodgment documents.
[6] Similarly, Mtshali’s lodgment documents were sent by registered post on
1 February 2023 under a cover letter dated 27 January 2023. In answer to the
documents were returned under the cover of a letter dated 13 February 2023.
[7] The letter advised that the documents lodged had been pre-assessed for
compliance with s 24 of the RAF Act and the Terms and Conditions. The letter
advised further that the documents lodged did not meet the requirements for a substantially compliant and valid claim, as the following documents had not
been included in the lodgment documents:
(a) Accident Report or Docket with sketch plan; (b) RAF 4 Form with medico-legal report; (c) Occupational therapy and industrial psychologist’s report;
(d) Documentation confirming any disability grant; and
(e) Copy of certified ID.

4

[8] Both objection letters explained that based on the failure to include these
specified documents, the RAF objects to the validity of the claims submitted in
accordance with s 24(5) of the Act. The RAF accordingly did not accept the
lodgment documents, which were returned together with the letters to the applicants’ attorneys.
[9] The applicants argue that the documents lodged met the substantial
compliance requirements set by the provisions of s 24 of the Act. They argue
that once they had substantially complied with the provisions of the Act, their claims should have been lodged and thereafter assessed and investigated further by the RAF.

[10] The RAF argued that it is mandated in terms of s 4 of the Act to investigate and
settle claims against it. The RAF explains that the claimants’/applicants’
lodgment documents did not, in their assessment, meet the requirements of s 24, which rendered the claims invalid as it did not enable the RAF to investigate
the claims and be in a position to settle the claims.

Point in limine: non-compliance with the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act
[11] The RAF raised a point in limine that it is an organ of state and that the objection
letters constitute an administrative action as defined in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”).
1 In the premises the RAF complains that
the applications should have been brought under the provisions of s 6(1) of PAJA.
[12] The applicants argue that the RAF under the provisions of s 24(1)(b) holds a
statutory obligation to acknowledge, in writing, receipt of the lodgment documents. This section must be read together with the provisions of s 24(5) which allows for an objection to the validity of the claim within 60 days the
documents being sent by registered post. The objection letters delivered

1 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
5

specifically provided that the documentation had been pre-assessed for
compliance with the provisions of s 24.
[13] The Applicants argue that any action contrary to the obligations contained in
the Act are ultra vires, inferring that the objection letters are an act by the Fund
acting outside the prescripts of the Act. They argue further that actions by the
RAF do not constitute administrative action. The Applicant however rightly
sibmits that the RAF is entitled to object to the validity of the claim in terms of s
24(5) of the Act.
[14] The purpose of s 24(5) is to regulate procedural matters. Considering the
function of s 24(5), the Supreme Court of Appeal (“the SCA”) in Thugwana v
Road Accident Fund
2 held as follows:
‘[6] In upholding the special plea, the Court a quo found that the purpose
of s 24(5) was to regulate the procedural matters set out in that section
and nothing further. The court found support for this view in Krischke v
Road Accident Fund. In that case the court (Jajbhay J) found that the
structure of s 24 entailed procedures for the completion and lodging of a claim form with the Fund. The purpose of the section was to afford the
Fund sufficient time to consider the claim and to decide whether to
contest or settle it. The learned judge then concluded that s 24(5) had no bearing on substantive law, and (in that case) could not be relied upon to revive a claim that had become prescribed.

[8]… On the other hand the purpose of s 24 is to ensure that, before the onset of litigation, sufficient particulars about the claim are placed before the Fund to enable it, timeously, to make a decision whether it resisted
or settled the claim. The section has nothing to do with issues not
specified therein. Simply put it is incapable of breathing life into a claim that failed to arise because of non-compliance with the substantive requirement found in reg 2(1)(c).’ (Footnotes omitted.)


2 Thugwana v Road Accident Fund 2006 (2) SA 616 (SCA).
6

[15] This view was reiterated in Mautla and Others v Road Accident Fund and
Others3 where the court found as follows:
‘[31] It must be emphasized at the outset that the submission or delivery
of a claim is a precursor to the RAF’s “investigation” obligations. The Act
specifically provides in section 24(5) that after receiving the claim, the RAF then has 60 days within which to object to the validity of the claim. If
there is no objection to the validity of the claim, this does not mean that
an otherwise invalid claim is then deemed to be valid. Section 24
however deals only with procedural matters and the deeming provision does not apply to the substantive requirements. This is well established in our law.’ (Footnote omitted.)
[16] The objection letters delivered by the RAF indicate that an evaluation of the
forms had been undertaken and the lodgment documents failed to comply with the requirements applicable at that time. The RAF objects to the validity of the
claims based on the procedural irregularities in the form of the missing
documents listed therein.
[17] The provisions of s 24 of the Act require the claimants to provide all the duly
completed forms and documents listed therein . The RAF made an assessment,
within the prescribed 60 days, that the applicants’ claims did not comply with
the requirements and therefore objected thereto under the provisions of s 24(5),
which allows for that decision and process to be followed . The obligation then
is placed on the applicants to remedy the issues and relodge their documents.

[18] The applicants argue that the requirements applied were overly onerous and
irregular. At the time the applicants’ lodgments were made, the prevailing guide
to the form in which the lodgment must be made was set out in the Terms And
Conditions Upon Which Claims For Compensation Shall Be Administered in Board Notice 271 of 2022 published, by the RAF, in Government Gazette No. 46322 on 6 May 2022 (“the Terms and Conditions ”). These Terms and
Conditions provided a schedule of documents which the RAF required to be

3 Mautla and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 1843 .
7

lodged with the lodgment of a claim. It is the same Terms and Conditions
referred to in the objection letters by the RAF, which it complains the applicants
fall foul of f.

[19] The amendment of the RAF 1 form was effected by the Minister of Transport in
terms of s 26 of the Act, when he published Board Notice 302 of 2022 in
Government Gazette No. 46652 of 4 July 2022. This new form stipulated that
any form that is not completed in its full particulars shall not be acceptable as a
claim and references s 24(4)(a) of the Act.

[20] The Terms and Conditions, new RAF 1 form and their implementation has come
under scrutiny in the Pretoria High Court in the matter of Legal Practitioners
Indemnity Insurance Fund NPC and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others.4
The court made an order that the Form RAF 1, prescribed by the Minister of
Transport in terms of s 26 of the Act and published in Board Notice 302 of 2022
in Government Gazette No. 46653 of 4 July 2022 was declared unlawful and
reviewed and set aside.
[21] The court made the same order in respect of the Terms and Conditions . Leave
to appeal has been granted against this part of the order, and the matter is pending a hearing before the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[22] The applicants argue that t he RAF is now obliged to accept the documents
lodged under the provisions of the old RAF 1 form. The applicants, having
complied with the provisions of the old RAF1 form, argue that the declaratory order should be granted. However, their applications fall short.

[23] Stydom AJ in the matter of Radebe v Road Accident Fund
5 considered an
application of a similar nature to the one before me, wherein she found:
‘[35] The framing of the relief sought as declaratory of nature, is a
proverbial renaming of a rose. It does not change the fact that the

4 Legal Practitioners Indemnity Insurance Fund NPC and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others
2024 (4) SA 594 (GP) .
5 Radebe v R oad Accident Fund [2024] ZAGPPHC 25.
8

Applicants essentially want this Court to find that the decision to object
was wrong or incorrectly taken. In the absence of a review application,
the Applicant’s arguments, regarding the lack of statutory foundation for
exercising of the RAF’s powers under Section 24(5), are, with respect,
irrelevant if the RAF exercised such powers within the prescribed 60
days.’

[24] In Mlamli v Johnstone NO and Another6 the court did grant a declaratory order,
but in circumstances where no objection letter was delivered together with the
lodgment documents. In that matter, there was no indication that the documents had been assessed, nor had the RAF entered a formal objection to the
documents at all. The declaratory order in those circumstances was
appropriate.
[25] Here the applicants both face a formal objection letter. I agree that in light of the
judgment of Legal Practitioners Indemnity Insurance Fund the underlying
premise of the decision may be flawed but the objections still stand.

[26] It is not permissible to rely in administrative law litigation directly on the common
law or s 33 of the Constitution where PAJA provides relief. PAJA is a codification of thes e administrative rights and must be used to give effect to them. PAJA is
intended to ensure that when the bureaucratic machinery of the State, in all its
various guises, is implementing policy it does so in a manner that is procedurally
fair.
7

[27] The question that arises is whether the objection letters evidence administrative
action by the RAF. The basic assessment of whether the action is considered administrative action is whether it adversely affects the rights of any person,
which these decisions by the RAF do, and whether it has a direct external legal

6 Mlamli v Johnstone NO and Another 2024 (4) SA 611 (ECMk).
7 TMT Services & Supplies (Pty) Ltd t/a Traffic Management Technologies v The MEC : Dep artment of
Transport, Province of KwaZulu Natal & Others (Case No.: 1059/2020) [2022] ZASCA 27 (15 March
2022) paragraph 8 ; Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others
2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA); P Van Blerk Precedents for Applications in Civil Proceedings ( 2018) at 229,
9

effect, which similarly it does, in refusing the applicants the opportunity to
timeously lodge their claims.

[28] In the matter of Road Accident Fund v Duma and Three Similar Cases ,8 the
SCA, considering the RAF’s approach to RAF 4 forms, held as follows:
‘[24] Recognition that the Fund's decision to reject the plaintiffs' RAF 4
forms constituted administrative action, dictates that until that decision
was set aside by a court on review or overturned in an internal appeal,
it remained valid and binding (see eg Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City
of Cape Town and Others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) ([2004] 3 All SA 1) para
26). The fact that the Fund gave no reasons for the rejection, or that the
reasons given are found to be unpersuasive or not based on proper
medical or legal grounds, cannot detract from this principle. The same
holds true for the respondents' argument that it appeared from
the medical evidence presented by them at the trial that the Fund was
wrong in deciding that their injuries were not serious. Whether the Fund's
decisions were right or wrong is of no consequence. They exist as a fact
until set aside or reviewed or overturned in an internal appeal. It was
therefore not open to the high court to disregard the Fund's rejection of
the RAF 4 forms on the basis that the reasons given were insufficient;
or that they were given without any medical or legal basis; or that they
were proved to be wrong by expert evidence at the trial.’


[29] The SCA held further as follows:
‘[19]… Appreciation of this basic principle, I think, leads one to the
following conclusions:
(a) Since the Fund is an organ of state as defined in s 239 of the
Constitution and is performing a public function in terms of
legislation, its decision in terms of regs 3(3) (c) and 3(3)(d),
whether or not the RAF 4 form correctly assessed the claimant's
injury as “serious”, constitutes “administrative action” as

8 Road Accident Fund v Duma and Three Similar Cases 2013 (6) SA 9 (SCA) .
10

contemplated by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 (PAJA). (A “decision” is defined in PAJA to include the making of a determination.) The position is therefore governed by
the provisions of PAJA.
(b) If the Fund should fail to take a decision within reasonable time,
the plaintiff's remedy is under PAJA..
(c) If the Fund should take a decision against the plaintiff, that
decision cannot be ignored simply because it was not taken within
a reasonable time or because no legal or medical basis is provided for the decision, or because the court does not agree with th e reasons given.
(d) A decision by the Fund is subject to an internal administrative
appeal to an appeal tribunal.
(e) Neither the decision of the Fund nor the decision of the appeal
tribunal is subject to an appeal to the court. The court’s control
over these decisions is by means of the review proceedings under
PAJA.’
[30] So, too, here in consideration of these applications , the RAF is an organ of
State and is performing a public function in terms of legislation; its decision to pre-assess and object to the lodgment documents in terms of s 24(5) constitutes administrative action as contemplated by PAJA.
[31] The RAF’s decision to object to the validity of the claims cannot be ignored
simply because it has no factual or legal basis or because the court does not
agree with the reasons given for the objection.

[32] The objection by the RAF is not subject to an internal appeal as there is no
provision for same in the Act or Regulations; however, it is open to the applicants to relodge their claims under the provisions of s 24 or in terms of the
order granted at paragraph (vii) in the matter of Legal Practitioners Indemnity
Insurance Fund.

11

[33] The RAF’s decision is not subject to an appeal to the court. The court’s control
over these decisions is by means of review proceedings under PAJA.

[34] In Nedbank Ltd v Mendelow and Another NNO9 Lewis JA held:
‘[25] Administrative action entails a decision, or a failure to make a
decision, by a functionary, and which has a direct legal effect on an
individual. A decision must entail some form of choice or evaluation.
Thus while both the Master and the Registrar of Deeds may perform
administrative acts in the course of their statutory duties, where they have no decision-making function but perform acts that are purely
clerical and which they are required to do in terms of the statute that so
empowers them, they are not performing administrative acts within the
definition of the PAJA or even under the common law. As Nugent JA said in Grey’s Marine: “Whether particular conduct constitutes administrative action depends
primarily on the nature of the power that is being exercised rather than
upon the identity of the person who does so . . .”’ (Footnotes omitted.)
[35] In the circumstances, both applications suffer the same flaw in terms of their
substantive premise. There was an evaluation by the Raf and an objection
entered which must be addressed before the documents are deemed properly lodged. I find that the applications do not support an exercise of my discretion
in favour of the declaratory relief sought and should have been brought under
the prescripts of PAJA. I find that the point in limine must be upheld.
Order
[36] The following orders shall issue:
In the matter of VV Majozi v Road Accident Fund, Case No.: D10075/2023:
1. The application is dismissed.

In the matter of NH Mtshali v Road Accident Fund, Case No.: D10076/2023:
1. The application is dismissed.

9 Nedbank Ltd v Mendelow and Another NNO 2013 (6) SA 130 (SCA).

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