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HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

CASE NO: 43012/2018
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 15 MAY 2025
SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL Applicant

and

MAMOLATELO ALFRED SELOTA Respondent

Summary: Legal practitioner – striking off. After offending conduct had been
established, the practitioner had been suspended from practice in 2020

pending final determination of the matter . Despite that order, the
practitioner committed further offending conduct. Cumulative effect
rendering practitioner no longer fit to practice. The sanction of a striking
off justified in the circumstances.


ORDER


1. The respondent, Mamolatelo Alfred Selota is struck from the roll of
legal practitioners of this Court and the Legal Practice Council is
directed to remove his name from the roll of attorneys.

2. The respondent is ordered to immediately surrender and deliver to the
Registrar of Court his previous certificate of enrolment as an attorney
of this Court.

3. In the event of the respondent failing to comply with the terms of
paragraph 2 above within one week from the date of service of this
order, the sheriff of the relevant district is authorised and directe d to
take possession of the certificate and hand it to the Registrar.

4. The respondent is prohibited from handling or operating on the trust
accounts as detailed in paragraph 5 hereof, from date of service of this
order.

5. Ignatius Wilhelm Briel, the Director of the Gauteng Provincial Office of
the applicant, is appointed as curator bonis (curator) to administer and
control the trust accounts of the respondents, including accounts
relating to insolvent and deceased estates and any deceased estate
and any estate under curatorship connected with the respondent’s
practice as legal practitione r and including, also, the separate banking
accounts opened and kept by respondent at a bank in the Republic of
South Africa in terms of section 86(1) & (2) of Act No 28 of 2014 and/or
any separate savings or interest -bearing accounts as contemplated by
section 86(3) and/or section 86(4) of Act No. 28 of 2014, in which
monies from such trust banking accounts have been invested by virtue
of the provisions of the said sub -section or in which monies in any
manner have been deposited or credited (the said accou nts being
hereafter referred to as the trust accounts), with the following powers
and duties:

5.1 Immediately to take possession of the respondent’s accounting
records, records, files and documents as referred to in
paragraph 7 and subject to the approval of the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control (hereinafter referred
to as the fund) to sign all forms and generally to operate upon
the trust account(s), but only to such extent and for such
purpose as may be necessary to bring to completion curr ent
transactions in which the respondents was acting at the date of
this order.
5.2 Subject to the approval and control of the Legal Practitioners’
Fidelity Fund Board of Control and where monies had been paid
incorrectly and unlawfully from the undermentione d trust
accounts, to recover and receive and, if necessary in the
interests of persons having lawful claims upon the trust
account(s) and/or against the respondents in respect of monies
held, received and/or invested by the respondents in terms of
section 86(1) & (2) and/or section 86(3) and/or section 86(4) of
Act No 28 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as trust monies), to
take any legal proceedings which may be necessary for the
recovery of money which may be due to such persons in respect
of incomplete t ransactions, if any, in which the respondent was
and may still have been concerned and to receive such monies
and to pay the same to the credit of the trust account(s).
5.3 To ascertain from the respondent’s accounting records the
names of all persons on whos e account the respondent appears
to hold or to have received trust monies (hereinafter referred to
as trust creditors) and to call upon the respondent to furnish him,
within 30 (thirty) days of the date of service of this order or such
further period as he may agree to in writing, with the names,
addresses and amounts due to all trust creditors.
5.4 To call upon such trust creditors to furnish such proof,
information and/or affidavits as he may require to enable him,
acting in consultation with, and subject to the requirements of
the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to
determine whether any such trust creditor has claim in respect
of monies in the trust account(s) of the respondent and, if so, the
amount of such claim.
5.5 To admit or reject, i n whole or in part, subject to the approval of
the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, the
claims of any such trust creditor or creditors, without prejudice to
such trust creditor’s or creditors’ right of access to the civil
courts.
5.6 Havin g determined the amounts which, he considers are lawfully
due to trust creditors, to pay such claims in full but subject
always to the approval of the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund
Board of Control.
5.7 In the event of there being any surplus in the trus t account(s) of
the respondent after payment of the admitted claims of all trust
creditors in full, to utilise such surplus to settle or reduce (as the
case may be), firstly, any claim of the fund in terms of section
86(5) of Act No 28 of 2014 in respect o f any interest therein
referred to and, secondly, without prejudice to the rights of the
creditors or the respondent, the costs, fees and expenses
referred to in paragraph 13 of this order, or such portion thereof
as has not already been separately paid by the respondent to
the Legal Practice Council, and, if there is any balance left after
payment in full of all such claims, costs, fees and expenses, to
pay such balance, subject to the approval of the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to the respondent,
if he is solvent, or, if the respondent is insolvent, to the trustee(s)
if the respondent’s insolvent estate.
5.8 In the event of there being insufficient trust monies in the trust
banking account(s) of the respondent, in accordance with the
available documentation and information, to pay in full the
claims of trust creditors who have lodged claims for repayment
and whose claims have been approved, to distribute the credit
balance(s) which may be available in the trust banking
account(s) among st the trust creditors alternatively to pay the
balance to the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund.
5.9 Subject to the approval of the chairman of the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to appoint
nominees or representatives and/or consult wi th and/or engage
the services of legal practitioners, counsel, accountants and/or
any other persons, where considered necessary, to assist him in
carrying out his duties as curator; and
5.10 To render from time to time, as curator, returns to the Legal
Practit ioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control showing how the
trust account(s) of the respondent has been dealt with, until
such time as the board notifies him that he may regard his
duties as curator as terminated.

6. The respondent is immediately upon service upon him of this order ,
ordered to deliver the account ing records, files and documents
containing particulars and information relating to the following to the
curator bonis :

6.1 any monies received, held or paid by the respondent for or on
account of any person while practising as a legal practitioner;
6.2 any monies invested by the respondent in terms of section 86(3)
and/or section 86(4) of Act No 28 of 2014;
6.3 any interest on monies so invested which was paid over or
credited to the respondent;
6.4 any estate of a deceased person or an insolvent estate or an
estate under curatorship administered by the respondent
whether as executor or trustee or curator or on behal f of the
executor, trustee or curator;
6.5 any insolvent estate administrated by the respondent as trustee
or on behalf of the trustee in terms of the Insolvency Act, No 24
of 1936;
6.6 any trust administered by the respondent as trustee or on behalf
of the truste e in terms of the Trust Properties Control Act, No 57
of 1988;
6.7 any company liquidated in terms of the provisions of the
Companies Act, no 61 of 1973 read together with the provisions
of the Companies Act, no 71 of 2008, administered by the
respondent as or on behalf of the liquidator;
6.8 any close corporation liquidated in terms of the Close
Corporations Act, 69 or 1984, administered by the respondent
as or on behalf of the liquidator.

7 Should the respondent fail to comply with the provisions of the
preceding p aragraph of this order on service thereof upon him or after
a return by the person entrusted with the service thereof that he has
been unable to effect service thereof on the respondent (as the case
may be), the sheriff for the district in which such acco unting records,
records, files and documents are, be empowered and directed to
search for and to take possession thereof wherever they may be and to
deliver them to such curator.

8 The curator shall be entitled to:

8.1 hand over to the person entitled thereto al l such records, files
and documents provided that a satisfactory written undertaking
has been received from such persons to pay any amount, either
determined on taxation or by agreement, in respect of fees and
disbursements due to the firm;
8.2 require from th e persons referred to in paragraph 9.1 to provide
any such documentation or information which he may consider
relevant in respect of a claim or possible or anticipated claim,
against his and/or the respondents and/or the respondents’
clients and/or fund in respect of money and/or other property
entrusted to the respondents provided that any person entitled
thereto shall be granted reasonable access thereto and shall be
permitted to make copes thereof;
8.3 publish this order or an abridge version thereof in ay n ewspaper
he considers appropriate; and 9.4 wind -up of the respondent’s
practice.

9 The respondent is hereby removed from the office as:

9.1 executor of any estate of which the respondent has been
appointed in terms of section 54(1)(a)(v) of the Administration of
Estates Act, no 66 of 1965 or the estate of any other person
referred to in section 72(1);
9.2 curator or guardian of any minor or other person’s property in
terms of section 72(1) read with section 54(1)(a)(v) and section
85 of the Administration of Estates Act, No 66 of 1965;
9.3 trustee of any insolvent estate in terms of section 59 of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936;
9.4 liquidator of any company in terms of section 379(2) read with
379(e) of the Companies Act, no 61 or 1973 and read together
with the provisions of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008;
9.5 trustee of any trust in terms of section 20(1) of the Trust
Property Control Act, No 57 of 1988;
9.6 liquidator of any close corporation appointed in terms of section
74 of the Close Corporation Act, No 69 of 1984; and
9.7 administrator appointed in terms of Section 74 of the Magistrate
Court Act, No 32 of 1944.

10 If there are any trust funds available , the respondent within 6 (six)
months after having been requested to do so by the curator, or within
such longer period as the curator may agree to in writing, shall satisfy
the curator, by means of the submission of taxed bills of costs or
otherwise, of t he amount of the fees and disbursements due to the
respondent in respect of his former practice, and should he fail to do
so, he shall not be entitled to recover such fees and disbursements
from the curator without prejudice, however, to such rights (if an y) as
he may have against the trust creditor(s) concerned for payment or
recovery thereof.

11 A certificate issued by a director of the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity
Fund shall constitute prima facie proof of the curator’s costs and that
the registrar be authorised to issue a writ of execution on the strength
of such certificate in order to collect the curator’s costs.

12 The respondent is hereby ordered :

12.1 to pay, in terms of section 87(2) of Act No. 28 of 2014, the
reasonable costs of the inspect ion of the accounting records of
the respondent;
12.2 to pay the reasonable fees of the auditor engaged by applicant;
12.3 to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator,
including traveling time.

13 The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant ’s costs o f the
application on an attorney and client scale.

JUDGMENT
The matter was heard in open court and the ju dgment was prepared and author ed by
the j udge whose name is reflected herein and is handed down electronicall y by
circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on Caselines. The date fo r hand -down is deemed to be
15 May 2025 .

DAVIS , J (with K HUMALO J (Ms) concurring)

Introduction

[1] On 21 June 2018 a predecessor of the Legal Practice Council (the LPC),
being in this case the Law Society of the Northern Provinces, (the LSNP) launched
an application for the striking of the respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys. By
way of an interim order, this C ourt suspended the respondent from practice on 7
February 2020. The respondent, however continued to practice, which resulted in an
application for contempt of court. The LPC, continuing with the original application,
as supplemented over time, sought an order striking the respondent from the rolls of
legal practitioner s and the removal of his name from the roll of attorneys.

[2] The above facts and numerous attempts at appealing the suspension order ,
together with further allegations of offending conduct, resulted in a protracted
litigation history of some seven years. All in all, more than 4 500 pages of affidavits
and documents had to be traversed.

[3] At the hearing of this matter, the respondent employed Adv Mteto to present
legal argument and rais e certain points in limine on his behalf. Regarding the merits ,
the respondent conducted his own defence in person . This resulted in protracted
and length y argument , sometimes interspersed with attempts at presenting
inadmissible evidence from the bar, further rendering a hearing of this matter
extremely difficult .

[4] We shall deal with all of the above as succinctly as possible, start ing with the
procedural history . Thereafter we shall deal w ith the points in limine , before
proceeding with the evidence and the evaluation thereof.

Procedural history

[5] At all relevant times the respondent has practiced as the sole proprietor of an
attorney’s firm. The LSNP initially launched an urgent application on 21 June 2018 ,
set down for hea ring on Tuesda y 17 July 201 8. The principal bas es relied on w ere
that the r espondent was practicing without a Fidelity Fund certificate and that his
trust account was in deficit.

[6] The answerin g affidavit was delivered on Thursday 12 July 2018, giving the
LSNP no time to reply in time for the papers to be ready for hearing. In add ition, the
respondent launched an application to strike certain parts of the founding papers.
This was only done on 16 July 2018. Consequently the matter was struck off the
urgent roll.

[7] On 7 December 2018 the LSNP, in terms of the transitional provision s
contained in the Legal Practice Act1, which had come into operation on 1 November
2018, delivered a supplementary founding affidavit as a result of further offending
conduct of the respondent which had come to its notice. These included complaints
by clients of the respondent received since the previous date of set -down.

[8] On 4 April 2019 the LPC delivered its replying affidavit.

[9] Hereafter the matter was set down for hearing on 21 November 2019. Shortly
before the hearing, further applications in terms of Rule 6(5)(e) for the leave to file
further affidavits were delivered by the respondent on 28 October 2019 and 20
November 2019.

[10] On 7 February 2020 Rabie J and Avv akoumides AJ rule d that, once the
further affidavits were al lowed , the LPC should be afforded the opportunity to
respond thereto. The matter was as a result thereof postponed but, in the meantime
the respondent was suspended from practice and a curator bonis was appointed to
take charge of his practice.


1 28 of 2015.
[11] The respondent thereafter lodged an application on 11 February 2020 for
leave to appeal his suspension and continued to practice. He also alleged that he
did not understand the person tasked with the execution of the suspension order to
actually take over his practice or to hand it over to the curator after service thereof by
the sheriff especially since the lodged application for leave to appeal was pending.

[12] The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs on the scale as
between attorney a nd client on 1 7 April 2020. The respondent’s subsequent petition
to the Supreme Court of Appeal was dismissed on 24 July 2010 and his application
for reconsideration was refused by the President of that court on 1 October 2020. A
subsequent application for leave to appeal was similarly dismissed by the
Consti tutional Court on 10 February 2021. The respondent then interpreted Rule
11(1) of that court’s rules to the effect that he was entitled to a reconsideration of that
refusal. His purported application in this regard was also refused on 31 March 2021.

[13] In the meantime and pursuant to the further answering affidavits delivered as
mentioned in par agraph 10 above, the LPC had delivered supplementary affidavit s
on 20 February 2020.

[14] Yet again, the respondent on 25 March 2022 launched an application in terms
of Rule 6 (15) to strike out parts of the LPC’s affidavits.

[15] On 1 June 2020, pursuant to further complaints, the LPC delivered a second
supplementary foun ding affidavit, to which the respondent delivered his answer on
28 September 2020. The LPC replied by 5 October 2020 and the matter was set
down for hearing on 12 November 2020.

[16] Again, shortly before the hearing, the respondent took a further step. This
was in the form of a subpoena duces t ecum , delivered on 3 November 2020. A
further application was also delivered on 6 November 2020 in terms of Rule 6(5)(e).
This prompted the LPC to deliver a notice of an irregula r step in terms of Rule 30A
on 10 November 2020. The result was that the matter was postponed sine die on 12
November 2020 with costs reserved.

[17] Subsequent to the exchange of yet a further supplementary founding affidavit
on 22 April 2021, a supplementary answ ering affidavit on 11 May 2021 and a third
supplementary founding a ffidavit on 14 May 2021, a supplementary answering
affidavit was delivered on 17 May 2021 . As a consequence, the matter was yet
again postponed on 20 May 2021. This was done by Van der Westhuizen and
Strydom JJ, with the for mer volunteering to case -manage the matter.

[18] At a case management meeting held before Van der Westhuizen J on 9 June
2021, at which the respondent was represented by a senior counsel, the idea was
floated that the matter might have to be referred for the hearing of oral evidence .
Pursuant to this, an application in terms of Rule 6(5)(g) and further affidavits were
exchanged on 18 June 2021 (by the respondent), 9 July 2021 (the LPC) and 28 July
2021 (the respondent).

[19] The LPC also subsequently brough t alleg ations of yet further misconduct on
the part of the respondent to the court’s attention by way of supplementary affidavits
delivered on 21 July 2021 and 13 September 2022.

[20] An application for discovery in term s of Rule 35(12) was made by the
respondent on 6 April 2023 and responde d to by the LPC on 9 April 2023.

[21] In May 2023, an application for the substitution of the curator was launched.
This was opposed by the respondent.

[22] Pursuant to further case management, this time by Van der Schyff, J on 14
June 2023, yet further affidavits were exchanged. This involved late answering
affidavits by the respondent (together with an application for condonation) in
response to the LPC’s supplementary founding affidavits. These answering
affidavits were delivered on 21 J uly 2023 and replied to by 23 August 2023.

[23] On 5 December 2023 the application for the substitution of the curator bonis
was granted.

[24] On 25 September 2023 Makhoba J granted a judgment in respect of the
application for a finding of contempt of court due to the fact that the respondent had
continued practicing despite having been suspended. The respondent was found to
have been in contemp t of the order of 7 February 2020 and sentenced to 12 months
imprisonment, suspended for 3 months on condition that the suspension order be
complied with. This involved the handing over of all the files of the respondent’s
practice.

[25] After leave to appeal the above order has been refused, the respondent
petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal on 18 November 2024. This petition was
ultimately unsuccessful.

[26] The matter was thereafter initially set down for hearing on 1 August 2024
before it eventually came be fore us on 19 and 20 November 2024.

[27] In the meantime, the respondent also featured in two matters in the
Johannesburg seat of this Division regarding the dismissal of two of his employees.
We shall deal with the contents of the judgment in respect of these matters during
the evaluation of the respondent ’s conduct later.

[28] Following the approach adopted during the case management meetings and,
in order to provide as full as possible ventilation of all the issues, all the affidavits
filed of record, including those in respect of which condonation had been sought due
to the late delivery of such affidavits, were accepted by us. There can therefore be
no room for argument that the respondent had not been fully accommodated in
giving his version s of events.

The p oints in limine

[29] Adv Mteto had been briefed by the respondent to raise a number of points in
limine . In the heads of argument, the respondent objected to the LPC having
delivered supplementary affidavits from time to time , accusing them of moving the
goal post s. He also objected to the matter having proceeded to court with out a prior
disciplinary hearing having been held. It was also argued that there were irresoluble --
dispute s of fact which could only b e resolved by the hearing of oral evidence . In
addition, Adv Mteto in oral argument sought to attac k the contempt of court finding
as well as an ancillary judgment granted against the respondent in the Labour Court.
We shall deal with these points as succinctly as possible hereunder.

The supplementary affidavits delivered by the LSNP and the LPC

[30] The respondent ’s objection to the delivery of the supplementary affidavits is
unfounded. The LPC and its predecessor, due to its oversight role of the legal
profession, w ere obliged to place furth er evidence of possible misconduct by a legal
practitioner before the Court. Due to the sui generis nature of the proceedings, no
leave or condonation for the delivery of such affidavit s evincing possible misconduct ,
was necessary2.

A prior disciplinary hearing ?

[31] The Supreme Court of Appeal had settled this question in respect of one of
the LPC ’s predecessor in Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Morobadi3 as
follows: “ in general it is correct that the Council may proceed with the application for
the str iking off of the practitioner or for his or her suspension without pursuing a
forma l charge before a disciplinary committee if, in its opinion, having regard to the
nature of the charges, a practitioner is no longer considered to be a fit and proper
person ”.

[32] This principle has also recently found application in LPC applications of this
nature4. This point in limine therefore also has no merit.

The contempt of court finding

[33] The point in limine regarding this issue was dilatory in nature. It was to the
effect that the respondent’s alleged contempt for this court cannot be considered as

2 South African Legal Practice Council v Ntsie (52311/19) [2022] ZAGPPHC (8 March 2022) at par 6.
3 (1151/2017) [2018] ZASCA 185 (11 December 2018) at par [25] .
4 See SALPC v Berkowitz (35116/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 836 (15 August 2024) at paras [15] – [18].
an element of misconduct, while the judgment whereby he had been found in
contempt was still the subject of an appeal. The facts regarding the status of the
judgment is that Makhoba J had granted the contempt order on 24 September 2024
and refused leav e to appeal on 4 November 2024. A day before the matter currently
under consideration came before us, a petition for the requisite leave was delivered
at the registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

[34] Irrespective of whether the actual order sanctioning the respondent’s
contempt of court is suspended or not, the LPC relied on the actual conduct of the
respondent. It is found that the dilatory point therefore finds no application. We will
consider the actual conduct herein later.

Factual dispute?

[35] The LPC argue d that there were sufficient common cause facts or facts to
which the respondent has offered no controverting facts so as to create a “real”5
factual dispute, that the question of whether offending cond uct had been establ ished
or not, can be decided without reverting to oral evidence. As will be indicated
hereunder, we are of the view that the LPC is correct and that this “point” should not
be acceded to.

The test

[36] Before proceeding with the evaluation of the evidence, it is apposite to remind
the parties and the readers of this judgment of the applicable test by which the
evidence and the respondent’s conduct are to be measured.

[37] It is trite tha t applications for the suspension or striking off of a legal
practitioner involves a three -stage enquiry. The first stage is determining whether
the alleged offending conduct had been established on a preponderance of
probabilities. This is a factual enq uiry. The second stage is to determine whether
the practitioner is fit and proper to continue to practice. This is a discretionary

5 See Wightm an t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd 2008 (3) SA 372 (SCA) at paras [11] – [13].
exercise. The third stage is to determine what sanction should be imposed and
whether an order of suspension from practice would suffice or whether the
practitioner should be struck off6.

The evidence regarding the alleged offending conduct

[38] The first aspect relating to offending conduct which stands uncontroverted on
the papers, is the fact that the respondent has practised without a Fidelity Fund
certificate for the following periods: 1 January 2017 to 7 March 2017, 1 January 2018
to 20 Febr uary 2018 and, more significantly, from 1 January 2019 to 13 April 2021.

[39] Not one of the above periods of time are disputed, but the respondent kept
blaming other people and circumstances for his own failure s. He even blamed the
LPC for not having granted him “condonation” for not practicing without a Fidelity
Fund certificate. There is no provision for such “condonation” in either the Legal
Practice Act7 (the LPA) or the preceding legislation .

[40] Section 84(1) of the LPA is peremptory in this regard. Moreover, practising
without a Fidelity Fund certificate, places trust creditors and members of the public at
risk. Practicing without a Fidelity Fund certificate has repeatedly been held by our
courts to constitute serious misconduct8.

[41] In respect of the contempt of court issue, even if one were to ignore the fact
that the contempt order itself may be subject to an appeal regarding the
respondent’s conviction and sentence, it stands uncontroverted th at the respondent
did not comply with the terms of the suspension order when he was under an
obligation to do so and when his attempts to appeal that order finally ran out of
options . Par 1.6 thereof compelled the respondent to h and over to the curator ad
litem his “ accounting records, files and documents containing particulars and

6 Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Magami 2010 (1) SA 186 (SCA) at par 4 and Summerly v
Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA) at par 2.
7 28 of 2014.
8 Law Society of the T ransvaal v Machaka (No2) 1998 (4) SA 413 (T); Law Society of the Northern
Provinces v Mamotho 2003 (6) SA 467 (SCA); De Freitas v Society of Adv ocates of Natal 2001 (3) SA
750 (SCA) paras 11 and 14 and Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Adams 2013 (2) SACR 480
(WCC).
information relating to … any moneys received, held or paid by the respondent for or
on account of any person while practicing as an attorney … ”.

[42] On the respondent’s own version, he only handed over files “selected” by him
and then only copies thereof. The reason why all files had to be handed over was
twofold: the first is that the respondent, while being suspended, could not act as an
attorney an d had no cause to retain the files of clients and secondly, so that the
curator could take control of all files where fund s may have either been
misappropriated or might still be due to trust creditors. These considerations were
frustrated by the responde nt in direct contravention of a court order.

The respondent’s books of account and handling of his trust account

[43] At the instance of the LSNP, Mr Vincent F aris has conducted interviews with
the respondent and his bookkeeper, Mr Maake. He has also conducted an extensive
investigation of the respondents’ books of account and the handling of the trust
account.

[44] During the interviews, Mr Faris was informed that the respondent’s practice
used the “Caseware” computer software program. According to Mr Faris, this
program was not one dedicated and designed for legal practices.

[45] The respondent dispute d the above opinion , but be that as it may, the
investigation revealed that transfers from trust to business banking accounts were
made in globular or arbitrary, rounded off -figures rather than actual calculated
amounts .

[46] An examination of the ledger accounts further indicate d that, although
financial dat a had been adequately narrated therein, the accounts were not balanced
and balance listings were not extracted in the manner prescribed in Rule 69.7.1 of
the “old” Rules or Rule 35.14.1 of the “new” Rules9.


9 The “old” Rules refer to those published in GG 7164 of 1 August 1980 and the “new” Ru les refer to
those which came into effect on 1 March 2016 per GG 39740 of February 2016
[47] An example of how a globular amount of R 400 000,00 , narrated as “fees”,
were debited directly against the trust accounts, was as follows

Account number and name Amounts
6[...] Mokoena TP 103 895.83
6[...]2 Mphahlele RN 109 327.96
6[...]3 Mnisi NJ 186776.21
400 000.00

[48] Examinations of the client trust balances also revealed that some accounts
reflected debit balances, indicating trust shortages. This was caused by payment
having been made from the trust banking account without sufficient funds availa ble
on credit to justify such payments. Such debit balances were afterwards rectified
when funds were received from the RAF.

[49] An examination of the trust bank statements and the returned paid trust
cheques revealed that trust cheques were often issued as “ bearer” and/or “cash”.
Many of the encashed cheques had been deposited in the business banking
account. Even where clients did not have banking accounts, the procedures
provided for in the Rules had not been followed10.

[50] Based on the interviews conducted, the inspection of the respondent’s books
and the source documents for the bookkeeping entries, Mr Faris indicated that the
following contraventions had taken place:

“10.3.1 Section 78(1) of the Act in that It has failed to hold and keep
sufficient monies in its Trust banking account to cover its
obligations to Trust creditors as dealt with mor e fully in
paragraph 8 above;
10.3.2 Section 78 (1) of the Act in that it failed to deposit Trust monies
into the Trust banking account as dealt with ma re fully in
paragraph 7.3 above;

10 Rules 69.6 and 35.13.15.1 respectively.
10.3.3 Section 78(4) read together with Section 78( 6)(d) of the Act in
that it has failed to keep proper accounting records as required
by the sub -sections as dealt with generally herein:
10.3.4 The appropriate provisions of Rule 68.1 of the Old Rule (Rule
35.5 of the New Rules) for the earns reason as mentioned in
paragraph 10.3.3 above ;
10.3.5 Rule 68.7 of the Old Rules (Rule 35.11 of the New Rules), in
that it has failed to account to the complainants within the time
and in the manner prescribed by the Rule as set out more fully
in paragraph 6 above;
10.3.6 Rule 89.1 of the Old Rules (Rule 35.13 .47.1.5 of the New
Rules) for the same reason as mentioned in paragraph 10.3.2
above ;
10.3.7 Rule 69.3. 1 of the O ld Rules (Rule 35.13.8 of the New Rules) in
that it failed to hold and keep su fficient monies in its Trust
banking account to cover its obligations t o Trust creditors for the
same reason as mentioned in paragraph 10 .3.2 above;
10.3.8 Rule 69.3 .2 of the Old Rules (Rule 35.13.9 of the New Rules) in
that the accounts of clients were in debit as set out more fully in
paragraphs 5.11 and 7 above ;
10.3.9 Rule 69.7 of the Old Rules (Rule 35 .14.1 of the New Rules) in
that it has failed to extract lists of b alances at regular quarterly
intervals as required by the Rule ;
10.3.10 Rule 70.3 of the Old Rules (Rule 35.22 of the New Rules) in that
it has failed to lodge the relevant report timeously as required by
the Rules as dealt with more fully in paragraph 9 above ”.

[51] In response, the respondent indicated that he mostly conducted a contingency
practice in respect of personal injury claims. Of these, 85% are claims against the
RAF. He only opens a ledge r for a client once he receives payment from the RAF,
usually in the form of payment of a bill of costs in respect of the merits of a matter.
This, the respondent retained, in order to cover his costs.

[52] After a matter has been finalized in respect of the merits thereof, preparation
is then done to proceed in respect of quantum. The expert reports necessary for this
is funded by the respondent. The respondent explained what happened when the
quantum port ion if the matter was concluded as follows : “Once the matter is settled
quantum, this is the first time that some form of income is received by the client. The
large majority of cases are done on a contingency fee basis , which entitles me to
claim 25% of the claim or double the taxed bill of costs, whichever is the lesser. In
most large claims I am entitled to claim 25% of the award that has been granted ”.

[53] The respondent however continue d with his explanation later in his affidavit as
follows: “ At this st age an entry is made into the client’s ledger account and that
reflected in the entry is the claim as a credit balance and I am entitled to 25% of the
claim as part of the contingency fee agreement. Over and above the 25% I am also
entitled to the costs a nd disbursements. The matter is only finalized once the bill of
costs in regard to the quantum, has either been settled or determined by the Taxing
Master. Once I have been awarded my costs, then only is the file finalized with the
client ”.

[54] Despite accus ing Mr Faris of not understanding the Caseware software user
by the respondent, he “took heed” of Mr Faris’ comments and changed his
bookkeeping system to an “MS Excel Template”.

[55] In respect of the example of the R400 000.00 globular fee referred to in
paragraph 47 above, the respondent provided an explanation. It was this: he
received an amount of R1 400 000.00 from the RAF in respect of Mr Mnisi’s claim
into his trust account. He then “… realised that I would be enti tled to 2 5% of this
amount, namely R350 000.000 . I approached the transfer of R400 000.00 as follows
…”. He then explained that bills had on taxation been agreed on in favour of PT
Mokoena in the sum of R105 510.22 and in favour of RN Mphahlele in the sum of
R109 327.96. He then “… made an error and believed that TP Mokoena would be
entitled to a transfer of R103 895.83 and consequently I took this figure into
account ”. He then took the amount in favour of RN Mphahlele also into account “…
into calculati ng the R400 000.00 ”.

[56] The respondents’ answer not only discloses contraventions of the Rules, but
is also indicative of his inadequate bookkeeping. What should happen, so the
deponent for the LSNP explained in reply, is that expenses incurred and fees earn ed
during the course of a matter, even in respect of the merits of a claim, must be
debited against a specific client’s business ledger account. This the respondent d id
not do so. These expenses may only be recovered from funds received in the
respondent ’s trust banking account and credited to that same client ’s trust ledge r
account (by way of a transfer). The Act and the Rules provide for this system of
bookkeeping so as to ensure that one client ’s funds are not used to pay for another
client’s expenses (or, in this case, fees).

[57] The failure of the respondent to adhere to these principles and the failure to
distinguish between trust account and business account transactions, amount to
contraventions of Rules 68.3 and 53.7 respectively.

[58] The respondent subsequently employed an outside auditor to prepare a report
in order to meet the criticisms expressed by Mr Faris. Mr Muller’s objective, in his
report, was to show that the respondent did not have deficits in his trust account. In
order t o achieve this, Mr Muller had to “re -do” some of the respondent’s trust
ledgers. These attempts fell short of the target and one of the prime examples
thereof , is the matter of the respondent’s client Mr Ngwepe.

[59] Mr Muller’s reconstruction of the trust led ger of Mr Ngwepe looked as follows
(after he had “reviewed” it, to use his own words):

Date Transaction
details Dt Cr Balance
Amount Amount amount
25 Aug 2016 Magtape Credit 4 944 286.25 4 944 286.24
Fees 25% 1 236 216.01 3 708 070.24
VAT on fees 173 070.24 3 535 000.00
26 May 2017 Ngwepe PM 35 000.00 3 500 000.00
26 May 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 3 000 000.00
29 May 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 2 500 000.00
02 June 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 2 000 000.00
19 June 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 1 500 000.00
29 June 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 1 000 000.00
02 July 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 500 000.00
13 Julie 2017 Ngwepe PM 500 000.00 nil

[60] This accounting version does not reflect the reality. What happened was that
the respondent had indeed received R4 944 286 .25 from the RAF in settlement of Mr
Ngwepe’s claim. The respondent thereafter borrowed (o n his own version) R3 535
000.00 from Mr Ngwepe . This amount should then have been debited to the trust
account, but it was not. The original trust ledger at the time of Mr Faris’
investigation, however, showed a debit balance of R3 142 355.77. The respondent
then repaid his loan from Mr Ngwepe in i nstallments, using trust cheques. These
installments are reflected in the rounded figures shown in the above entries.

[61] Muller ignored the respondent’s version of a loan and treated the repayments
as payments from the originally received amount. Even if th is (factually incorrect)
version w as to be accepted, then the respondent paid his client the capital of his
claim in instalment s over a period of two months, thereby also contravening the
Rules.

[62] Furthermore, even if one were to accept the respondent’s crit icism of Mr Faris’
report, then, or his own version, there were trust deficits from time to time. I refer to
only two instances, the first in June 2016 and the second in July 2016.

[63] As at June 2016 there was a deficit of at least R230 229.65, illustrated a s
follows:

Trust liability R Respondent’s
version R
Maneli R131 567.00 Not disputed R131 567.00
Musanda R143 000.00 Not disputed R143 000.00
Mudau R375 000.00 Alleges that
balance should
be: R0
Mokwebo R425 472.83 Alleges that
balance should
be: R370 076.83
Nkuta R1 256 537.00 Alleges that
balance should
be: R1 008 232.55
Total R2 331 576.83 Total R1 652 876.38
Trust funds in
bank -R1 422 646.73 -R1 422 646.73
Minimum trust
deficit R908 930.10 Minimum trust
deficit on
respondent’s
version R30 299.65

[64] As at July 2017, if we accept the respondent’s version, there was a trust
deficit of at least R648 821.59:

Trust liability R Respondent’s
version R
Myeki R495 300.00 Alleges that
balance should
be: R0

Ngunda R379 341.46 Not disputed R379 341.46
Chauke R975 000.00 Not disputed R975 000.00
Mahtathini R600 000.00 Not disputed R600 000.00
Mokoenaa R1 560 419.64 Not disputed R1 560 419.64
Mboka R1 363 678.39 Not disputed R1 363 678.39
Kgabo R600 000.00 Alleges that
should be: R0
Total R5 973 739.49 Total R4 878 439.49
Trust funds in
bank -R4 229 617.90 -R4 229 617.90
Minimum trust
deficit R1 744 121.59 Minimum trust
deficit on
respondent’s
version R648 821.59

[65] There were various other instances of trust debit balances, which the
respondent has admitted in a later letter11.

[66] Rules 35.13.8 and 35.13.10 required the respondent to report these trust
deficits to the LSNP, which he never did.

[67] The initial papers were sufficient to have Avvakoumides AJ and Rabie J to
conclude on 7 February 2020, that the respondent ha d to be suspended from
practice.

[68] The subsequently delivered supplementary founding affidavits, disclosed
numerous further instances of offending conduct, both having occurred before the
respondent’s suspension and thereafter. The se related to numerous complaints by
clients of overreaching, non -accounting, non -performance of mandates and touting.

[69] I have already earlier referred to the number of supplementary affidavits
exchanged between the parties and it would unduly burden this jud gment to deal
with all the allegations in the various sets of affidavits individually. I shall therefore
deal with the further complaints thematically.

Overreaching

[70] The overreaching in question does not relate to overcharging in the ordinary
sense, but i n abusing the terms of Contingency Fee Agreements (CFA’s) and the
provisions of the Contingency Fees Act12.

11 The letter is dated 15 February 2019 and refers to 14 trust account having debit balances.

[71] The above provisions were contravened by the respondent often simply
charging and deducting 25% of the capital amounts received by him on behalf of his
clients, being the maximum amount recoverable by him, without calculating whether
his fees plus 100% success fee are lower or not. The respondents, in addition to this
failure, would then retain 100% of the party and party costs paid by the RAF,
inclusive of fees and disbursements.

[72] The above practice continued even after Faris investigation and is apparent
from the respondents’ ledger accounts, even when “redone” by him after the fact.

[73] One of the many examples of this is, for instance, the matter of t he
respondent’s client M.E. Lehodi. The “redone ” ledger looks as follows:

[74] The above indicates the following: 25% of the capital of R3 273 395.85
received equals R818 348.96. This is the maximum amount of fees which the
respondent would have been entitled to in terms of the relevant CFA . He, however,
debited R500 00.00 on 1 March 2016 and another R20 000.00 on 4 March 2016 as
“Fees + VAT”. Then after having paid the client R2 340 600.00 (in installments) he
debited a further R300 000.00 on 13 Mar ch 2016 and R112 795 .85 on 23 March

12 66 of 1997.
941 Lehodi ME sr11825
RAF payment 11/19/2015 AJ 3 273 395.85 - 3 273 395.85 -
Closing balance 2/28/2016 Opening 3 273 395,85 -
Opning balance 3/1/2016 Closing 3 273 395,85 -
Fees + VAT (LehodiME) 3/1/2016 AJ 500 000.00 2 773 395,85 -
Fees + VAT (LehodiME) 3/4/2016 AJ 20 000.00 2 742 795,85 -
Cheque 2578LehodiME/LinconSL 3/4/2016 GL 10 600.00 2 762 795,85 -
Cheque 2577LehodiME/LinconSL11403 3/8/2016 GL 330 000.00 2 412 795,85 -
Cheque 2573LehodiME/LinconSL11403 3/8/2016 GL 500 000.00 1 912 795,85 -
Cheque 2574LehodiME/LinconSL11404 3/8/2016 GL 500 000.00 1 412 795,85 -
Cheque 2575LehodiME/LinconSL11403 3/8/2016 GL 500 000.00 912 795,85 -
Cheque 2576LehodiME/LinconSL11403 3/8/2016 GL 500 000.00 412 795,85 -
Fees + VAT (LehodiME) 3/11/2016 AJ 300 000.00 112 795,85 -
Fees + VAT (LehodiME) 3/23/2016 AJ 112 795.85 0,00
Change 3 273 395.85 3 273 395.85 - 0,00
Close 0,00
RAF cost payment 1/25/2019 AJ 219 992.25 - 219 992.25 -
Fees and disbursements 2/1/2019 GL 219 992.25 0,00
2016, both debits labelled as “Fees + VAT”. Thereafter, when he received the
amount of R219 992.25 as the “RAF Cost payment” on 25 January 2019, he debit ed
that on 1 February 2019 as “Fees and Disbursements .” This mean s that the
respondent has debited R932 795.85 as fees and a further R219 992.25 as fees and
disbursements , totaling R1 152 788.10 . According to the respondent’s explanation ,
the fee of R818 348 exclud ed the disbursements which he had incurred. He argued
that he was therefore entitled to additionally retain the fees and disbursement
amount paid by the RAF . He persisted with this claim without distinguishing the
portion of fees included in the RAF payment , from the portion relating to
disbursements. He also failed to deal with or explai n sufficiently whether part of his
“merits investigators’ fees” were actually fees which he had claimed or not. The
further difficulty with both his explanation to the court and his accounting to his client,
was that there were no invoices produced which supported the disbursements
claimed and neither could or did he furnish any particularity enabling the client or the
court to determine whether double the fees were less or more than 25% of the
capital payable to the cl ient.

[75] Even if one were to ignore for the m oment the dispute as to whether a
practitioner is, in calculating the 100% success fee, to include or exclude VAT on
fees, what the respondent was simply doing, was appropriating 25% of the client’s
capital, and adding VAT thereon (R818 348.96 plus 14%VAT). This is then in
addition to the retention of the fees portion contained in the RAF costs payment.

[76] One can easily understand why clients have complained to th e LSNP that the
respondent had never explained to them his fee structure or his accounting to them.

Touting

[77] In total, the LSNP and the LPC have received 19 complaints from clients,
complaining that the respondent had touted mandates from then an d even obta ined
their particulars and proceeded with claims against the RAF without having been
instructed by the clients. The complaints were from clients Mthembu, Sehati, Lebelo,
Phalane, Mpane, Letsoalo, Mkwanayi, Motaung, Sibitsi, Lerikara, Khemisi, Sibeko,
Ndlazi, Majopa and Khumalo.

[78] Apart from a bald de nials, the respondent sought to distance himself from
these complaints by attacking the RAF’s investigators when they investigated and
uncovered some of the instances of touting.

[79] In total, the RAF referred to ni ne affidavits from respondent’s clients to the
LSNP/LPC. Of these, three clients specifically identified “merits investigators”
utilized by the respondent as the persons who had approached them. One example
of such an affidavit, is the following:

“I MAKHOSANDILE SOLOMON NTMELA declare under oath in English:
1
I am a male, I/D: 8 [...] ………., employed as pick & packer at Avlern cables. I
reside at 1 [...] L[...] Court, S [...] Str, Actonvile, Benoni with telephone number
0[...]…….
2
On today’s date I was app roached by BJ Venter of the RAF forensic
department regain claims I lodged against the RAF.
3
On 2013/04/07 I was involved in an accident in Actonville area as a
pedestrian and sustained serious injuries as a result of this accident. I was
admitted to Tem bisa hospital for further treatment for a period of
approximately two and a half months.
4
Around August 0f 2013 I approached the RAF representative at Tembisa
hospital office one Dimakatso with the intention of lodging a claim against the
RAF as a result of injuries sustained in above mentioned accident. I provided
Dimakatso with all requested documentation and she assisted me in lodging a
claim with the RAF as a direct claimant. Venter showed me page 8 of the
RAF1 claim form originating from claim file with link number 3410883 where
the “ Signature of the Claimant” is to be made and I can confirm that it is my
signature as claimant thereon (MSN1).
5
Venter showed me the following documentation originating from the claim with
link number 3557216 as lodged by M A Selota attorneys and I was asked to
comment thereon:
Covering letter dated 10th April 2014 originating from M A Selota attorneys to
the RAF Menlyn indicating that this firm is lodging a claim on my behalf: I
have no knowledge of this alleged representation by this firm and did not
instruct them to act on my behalf. My name MAKHOSANDILE is also spelt
wrongly as MAKHASAZAN A (MSN2) .
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY form signed in Kempton Park, undated
giving M A Selota attorney to the RAF providing mandate to act on and lodge
a claim on my behalf: I have no knowledge of this document allegedly singed
in Kempton Park and it is not m y signature appearing thereon. The witnesses
that signed this document are also unknown to me. My name
MAKHOSANDILE is also spelt wrongly as MAKHOSANA (MSN3).
CONSENT form signed in Kempton Park undated, giving Selota Attorneys
authority to obtain all me dical records relating to this accident from hospital s.
I have no knowledge of this document allegedly signed in Kempton Park and
it is not my signature appearing thereon. The witnesses that signed this
documents are also unknown to me. My name MAKHOSAN DILE is also spelt
wrongly as MAKHOSANA (MSN4).
Copy of my I/D issued 1986/07/12: it is my identity document, but have no
knowledge as to how M A Selota attorneys came to be in possession thereof.
The same originally certified copy of my I/D is lodged on my direct claim. As
far as I can recall I provided Dimakatso with my original I/D on lodgment of the
direct claim and she made a copy of it (MSN5).
Medical assessment completed by a Dr V Jovannovic of Lynwood Pretor ia
who allegedly assessed me on 2014/03/ 28 and completed the medical report
on the RAF1 form page 9 to 12 lodged by M A Selota attorneys: I was never
examined by this doctor as alleged thereon. M name MAKHOSANDILE is
also spelt wrongly as MAKHASANA on page 9 (MSN6).
I was also shown copies of s everal medical records in my name originating
from Tembisa hospital on this claim file and have no knowledge as to how
Selota obtained these records.
6
Around beginning of May 2015 I deposed to an affidavit at SPS Actonville
after being informed of the all eged representation of M A Selota attorneys
cancelling the alleged mandate and provided it to Dimakatso at Tembisa
hospital for forwarding.
7
I know and understand the contents of this declaration.
I have no objection to taking the prescribed oath.
I consider the oath to be binding on my conscience ”.

[80] The respondent, rather than dealing with the seriousness of the allegations,
accused the RAF of conducting a witch -hunt against him, accused the forensic
investigator of impropriety in commissioning the af fidavit and alleg ed that these
complaints were not actual complaints made by disgruntled clients, but complaints
instigated by RAF forensic investigators .

[81] Touting even through the “agency of another” constitutes breaches of Rules
89(1)13, 43(1) and 49.1714, 12.1, 18.10 and 18.2215. It has always been viewed in a
serious light by our Courts16.

Failure to account and delayed payments to clients

[82] There are several complaints included in the papers that illustrate the
respondent's delayed payment of trust funds and his failure to account for trust
funds. The De Broglio and Sewdas complaints already discussed above provide
clear illustration of the r espondent doing so.

[83] An attorney is obliged to pay any amount due to a client within a reasonable
time17. The Rules also oblige a practitioner to account fully to its client i n writing

13 Of the “old” Rules.
14 Of the “new” Rules.
15 Of the Code of Conduct for All Legal Practitioners, Candidate Legal Practitioners and Legal Entities.
16 See De Villiers v Mcintyre NO 1921 AD 425 at 429 and Cirota v Law Society, Transvaal 1979 (1)
SA 172 (A).
17 Rules for the Attorneys’ Professions, Rule 35.12.
within a reasonable time after the performance or earlier termination of any
mandate18. Each account must contain:

83.1 details of all amounts received by it in connection with the
matter concerned, appropriately explained;
83.2 particulars of all disbursements and other payments made by it
in connection with the matter;
83.3 all fees and other charges charged to or raised against the
client and, where any fee represents an agreed fee, a
statement that such fee was agreed upon and the amount so
agreed; and
83.4 the amount due to or by the client.

[84] In the com plaint b y P G Morudu, also discussed above, the respondent
received the capital award for general damages in the amount of R280 000.00 on 18
May 2018. The respondent contends that he cou ld not account to Morudu until he
received the costs after 28 November 2018. There is no reason that the respondent
could not account to Morudu prior this. The respondent merely elected not to do so,
resulting in the complaint.

[85] In the com plaint b y T Mukwani Attorne ys on behalf of Buthelezi, an amount of
R963 309.00 was awarded to Ramolotja (Buthelezi's biological son) during February
2017. These funds were paid to the respondent on 17 August 2017. At the time, the
respondent acted under the instru ction of Ramolotja's mother, who instructed the
creation of a trust. The respondent debited a contingency fee from these funds
(when it was recorded in the Court order that there was no contingency fee
agreement) and paid an amount of R722 482.00 into an A BSA account pending
registration of the trust. Ramolotja's mother subsequently passed away on 26
November 2017 and Buthelezi engaged with the respondent thereafter.

[86] Buthelezi's engagements with the respondent resulted in him terminating the
respondent's m andate on 21 February 2018 and, on 26 February 2018, demanding

18 Rule 68.7 of th e “old” Rules was applicable at the time. The “new” Rules have the same iteration of
this requirement.
the transfer of the funds held on behalf of Ramolotja within two days. In his response
the following day the respondent inter alia indicated: “we confirm that we are not
going to act further in this matter as per the termination of mandate ” and “we further
see no need to recall the moneys from ABSA until legal process has been finalised ”.

[87] The respondent nevertheless proceeded to form and register the trust without
mandate or authority. The respo ndent signed the trust deed on 12 March 2018,
ABSA Trust only consented to administering the trust on 25 April 2018, and the
Master's letter of authority was issued on 31 May 2018.

[88] During March 2018 an action was issued on behalf of Ramolotja for the
repayment of the funds due to him. On 4 September 2019 an order was made
against the respondent and the respondent, inter alia, for repayment of these funds
and the establishment of a new trust for the benefit of Ramolotja. The respondent
has unsuccessfully a ttempted to rescind this order, judgment being handed down on
21 August 2020.

[89] The Court inter alia found that:

89.1 There was considerable merit in the contentions that the respondent
deliberately formed the trust to justify his continued failure to make the
funds available;
89.2 The respondent did not advance a sustainable explanation for his
failure to recall the funds fro m ABSA once his mandate was
terminated ;
89.3 The respondent took it upon himself, without mandate, to decide what
was best for Ramolotja and what to do with his monies and
proceeded unilaterally even after service of summons on 5 April 2018 .

[90] The high -water mark of the respondent's answer is to attempt to justify his
conduct under the auspices that he did so in Ramolotja ’s interests. This is itself a
concession that he delayed the payment of the trust funds. However, at no stage did
the respondent make this asser tion in his correspondence addressed to Buthelezi's
attorneys. His justification can be rejected for the same reasons as it was by the
honourable Gilbert AJ. The respondent acted without mandate and he was
dishonest in doing so.

[91] In the Ma gopa co mplaint t he respondent received payment of the capital
award of R270 000.00 on 7 February 2017 and the costs of R152 099.98 on 16
February 2017. On 5 September 2017, when the respondent's mandate was
terminated, he had still not accounted to nor paid Magopa. The re spondent did not
account to Magopa (although he appears to be of the view that a bill of costs is
accounting) and paid Magopa ’s funds to him on 26 March 2018, more than a year
after their receipt.

[92] In the Mathibela claim lod ged with the fidelit y fund, partially discussed above
under overreaching, it is not certain exactly when the capital award was paid to the
respondent but it was certainly paid prior to the first payment of costs, during 2013.
The respondent only paid Mathibela her funds in Jun e 2014, does not offer
explanation for the delay, and prepared his statement of account after a delay of
several years, on 21 February 2017.

[93] In the com plaint b y SB Ndlazi, dated 23 January 2019, the respondent was
mandated in a claim against PRASA. Ndlazi complained of the respondent's failure
to account, to deal properly with his instructions, and to account to him. The mandate
was subject to a contingency fee agreement. The claim was settled and the capital
award, R264 372.00, was paid into the responden t’s trust bank account on 15
October 2018. The respondent did not pay any funds to Ndlazi. He alleges he could
not do so without first receiving the costs. There is no merit in this contention. As will
be demonstrated, the respondent simply chose to delay the payment and accounting
to Ndlazi.

[94] The respondent later paid Ndlazi an interim payment in the amount of R132
186.00 on 8 April 2019, six months after his receipt of her funds, under the premise
that he had not received the taxed costs. The amount was calculated deducting his
contingency fee and the disbursements. There is no reason why this could not have
been done in the first place.

[95] The taxed costs in the amount of R86 211.37, were however actually paid to
the respondent on 28 February 2019 i.e prior to his interim payment to Ndlazi. The
respondent alleges that he only became aware of his receipt of the taxed costs in
June 2019. Even affording the respondent the benefit of the doubt, there is no
explanation for the respondent taking a further three mo nths to account to Ndlazi on
10 September 2019.

[96] In the com plaint b y BB Mashiloane, dated 7 November 2019, the respondent
received the capital award for general damages amounting to R900 000.00 on 24
October 2019. The client was adamant in her complaint th at the matter was
contingency fee based and that the respondent was to charge 25% of the capital
award. At the time of the complaint, the respondent was willing to pay Mashiloane an
amount of R431 000.00. Mashiloane patently had no idea how this amount was
determined.

[97] The respondent summarily allege d that there was no contingency fee
agreement without addressing the obvious discrepancy with the complaint nor
explaining the basis for his mandate, and describes the amount paid to Mashiloane
as an interim pay ment after deducting his provision for his attorney and client fees
and disbursements. On 14 January 2020 the respondent received the taxed costs in
the amount of R223 780.06 and paid an amount of R675 000.00 to Mashiloane on
17 January 2020. The respondent has still not properly accounted to Mashiloane,
incorrectly contending that he does not have to do so yet.

[98] In similar fashion, there were also complaints by other attorneys that the
respondent had delayed making payment to them after his mandate had been
terminated or to assist or to respond to them regarding his erstwhile clients. There
were complaints by De Broglio attorneys, Neihaus McMalon Inc, Oosthuizen & Steyn
attorneys, Riette Oosthuizen attorneys and Ndhima attorneys. He also failed to pay
Adv. Ronnie Maepa fees due to him for mor than three years.

[99] All these complaints were fully supported by substant iating documents but
treated by the respondent with either disdain or only superficially. The respondent
could also offer no cogent reasons why he did not hand over client files to new
attorneys, once his mandate had been terminated, this led to further c omplaints by
colleagues, such as Moss & Associates and Mangxola Attorneys.

Breaches of duties to a court in proceedings of this nature

[100] The LPC has contended that the respondent has breached his duties to a
court in proceedings of this nature.

[101] Our Courts ha ve repeatedly expressed themselves on the conduct required of
practitioners in proceedings of this nature. An approach to the proceedings contrary
to this is itself unprofessional conduct and a separate, substantive ground for a
practitioner ’s removal from the roll or suspension from practise. The following
principles inter alia apply:

101.1 When a legal practitioner receives an application for his suspension
or striking, he should realize that the time for telling the truth has
arrived19;
101.2 A pract itioner must from the outset declare the relevant facts fully
and openly and not allow the truth to emerge gradually. The
practitioner should raise defences in a manner that evince complete
honesty and integrity20;
101.3 From the nature of disciplinary proceedi ngs, it follows that the legal
practitioner concerned is expected to co -operate and provide where
necessary information to place the full facts before the court, to
enable the court to make a correct decision. Broad denials and
obstructionism have no place in disciplinary proceedings21;
101.4 Where allegations and evidence are presented against a legal
practitioner, they cannot simply be brushed aside, the legal
practitioner concerned is expected to respond meaningfully to them
and to furnish a proper explanatio n22;

19 Kekana v Society of Advocates of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 649 (SCA) 656 D.
20 Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Sonntag 2012 (1) Sa 372 (SCA) 380 C – I.
21 Prokureursorde van Transvaal v Kleynhans (supra) at 853 G – H.
22 Hepple v Law Society of the Northen Provinces 2014 JDR 1078 (SCA) at par 9.
101.5 A legal practitioner has a duty to co -operate and to be completely
transparent by furnishing the Court with all the necessary information
so that the full facts are placed before the Court to enable it to make
a correct and just decision23;
101.6 A legal practitioner should not, instead of dealing with the issues,
launch an attack on the Council, accuse the accuser and seek to
break down his/her controlling body. It has become common
occurrence to do so, it is itself unprofessional conduct and a strategy
that the courts cannot countenance24; and
101.7 As a matter of principle, a legal practitioner who is dishonest under
oath in defending himself in disciplinary proceedings cannot
complain if his perjury is held against him when the question arises
whether he is a fit and proper person to continue practising25.

[102] The respondent's answers to the allegations against him are consistent with
the creation of narratives instead of dealing with the allegations against him and
providing full and frank disclosures to the Court. The respondent has also
persistently raised unmeritorious technical defences to avoid accounting for his
conduct:

102.1 The respondent raised various technical arguments alleging the
violation of his right to a fair trial;
102.2 The respondent has consistently sought to rely on arguing that
evidence is “inadmissible hearsay evidence ”;
102.3 The respondent has challenged the authority of the deponent to the
supplementary founding affidavits;
102.4 The respondent has challenged the touting complaints under the
auspices that they are not under oath ;
102.5 The respondent steadfastly relies on the baseless and disingenuous
defence that the court orde r of 7 February 2020 is “incomplete ”;

23 The South African Legal Practice Council v Bobotyana 2020 JDR 2148 (ECG) at par 63.
24 Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Mogami & Others 2010 (1) SA 186 (SCA) at 195 – 196,
par 26.
25 Kekana v Society of Advocates of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 649 (SCA) 655H.
102.6 The respondent consistently takes unwarranted issue with him being
called upon to answer to complaints in the present proceedings that
have not been referred to him previously.

[103] The respondent has also accused the LPC’ s attorneys, without any
foundation, of having “undertaken fraudulent activities”, of being “desperate” to justify
disbursements which never occurred and by delaying matters intentionally to use the
respondent as a scapegoat.

[104] Most telling of the respondent ’s misconduct towards the court, was his failure
to ha nd over all his books of acc ount and ledgers in terms of his suspension order,
and his presenting false allegations to this court under oath.

[105] The LPC summed up the last mentioned perjury as follows: In an affidavit
deposed to on 2 March 2021 and filed with this Court under case number
10869/2021, the respondent made several false allegations under oath, including the
following:

105.1 The respondent informed the Honourable Court that he was in
possession of a fidelity fund certificate for 2021. He did so in
circumstances where he was not in pos session of such certificate
and where he was fully aware thereof;
105.2 The respondent stated he was in possession of fidelity fund
certificates during the period 2008 to 2018. The respondent however
practised without being in possession of fidelity fund certif icates
during the periods 1 January 2008 to 20 November 2008, 1 January
2017 to 7 March 2017 and 1 January 2018 to 20 February 2018 and
he was fully aware thereof;
105.3 The respondent informed the Court, with reference to his suspension
from practising as an a ttorney, that an appeal process is still
underway. He did so in circumstances where the Constitutional
Court had already dismissed his application for leave to appeal, on
10 February 2021 and whilst no appeal or application for leave to
appeal were in exis tence; and
105.4 The respondent further alleged that he was practising as an attorney
in accordance with the provisions of the LPA. He was practising in
contravention of Section 84(1) of the LPA and he was fully aware
thereof .

[106] In supplementary heads of argument filed on behalf of the respondent,
composed by senior counsel, a suspension from practice (with certain conditions)
was proposed as an appropriate sanction. This was mooted, should this court find
that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to “presently” continue to
practice, as a “timeously raise(d) plea”. Rehabilitation was further argued as a
motivation for the acceptance of the proposed sanction.

[107] The above proposal, by its nature, implies that offending conduct has taken
place. This much is confirmed by a submission in those heads of argument that it
“… is clear from the papers that the Achilles heel of the respondent was his
bookkeeping … ”.

[108] Quite apart from the concessions made by the respondent’s senior counsel on
his behalf, we are satisfied that, on the evidence presented by the LSNP and the
LPC which the respondent could not properly refute26 or, in some instances even
meet sufficiently to raise a real dispute27, offending conduct had been established.
There instances of of fending conduct, however, went f ar beyond the concessions
made about inferior bookkeeping.

[109] We find that the following offending conduct and breaches of dut y have been
established on the part of the respondent:

- A failure to keep proper books of account28;
- A failure to correctly debit fees29;
- A failure to distinguish between trust and business account transactions30;

26 In the manner contemplated in Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another
2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).
27 As described in Soffiantini v Mould 1956 (4) SA 150 (E) at 154E -H.
28 Contravention of Rule 35.5.
29 Contravention of Rule 35.13.14.
- A failure to extract lists of balances of trust creditors and funds held in his
trust account regularly31;
- Allowing debit balances o n his trust account and not reporting it32;
- Failure to make payments timeously33;
- Failures to account to client and to retain their capital amount34;
- The failures to attend to clients’ matters and to respond to letters from their
new attorneys35;
- Overreach ing and contravening the Contingency Fees Act36;
- Touting37;
- Practising without a Fidelity Fund Certificate.
- Improper conduct by making false statements during court proceedings.

Fit and proper

[110] Once the offending conduct has been established we are obliged to consider
whether the respondent is still a fit and proper person to practice law. This entails
weighing up the conduct of the respondent against the conduct expected of a legal
practitioner who had taken the oath to truly and honestly demean himself as (in this
case) an attorney38.

[111] When the Court admits an attorney to the profession, he is put in a position to
conduct matters of trust with the public. He occupies a position of great confiden ce
and power and the Court is entitled to demand a very high standard of honour from
him in the profession. The law exacts from him uberrima fides where he acts as
agent for others; that is the highest possible degree of good faith39.


30 Contravention of Rule 35.7.
31 Contravention of Rules 35.14.1 and 35.14.3.
32 Contravention of Rules 35.13.8 and 35.13.10 as well as Rules 35.13.8 and 35.13.11.
33 See also Selota Attorneys v ONR and Others (2018/11026) [2020] ZAGPJHC 232; [2020] 4 All SA
569 (GP) (21 August 2020).
34 LSNP v Mabunda 2019 JDR 2042 (MN).
35 Incorporat ed Law Society, Transvaal v Visse and Others 1958 (4) SA 115 (T).
36 TM obo MM v MEC for Health Mpumalanga 2023 (3) SA 173 (M….).
37 Contravention of Rules 43(1) and 49.17.
38 See: Prokureursonde van Transvaal v Kleyhans 1995 (1) SA 839 (T) at 851 E -F.
39 Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal v Visse and Others; incorporated Law Society Transvaal v
Viljoen (supra) at 131 D - G.
[112] It is a fundamental duty of every practising attorney to ensure that the books
of the firm are properly kept and that there are sufficient funds at all times to meet
the trust account claims40. The keeping of proper accounting records underpins the
legisla ture's endeavours to protect the interests of the public, failure by an attorney to
do so is a serious contravention41.

[113] An attorney ’s duty in regard to the preservation of trust money is a
fundamental, positive and unqualified duty. Neither negligence nor wilfulness is an
element of a breach of such duty42. Where trust money is paid to an attorney it is
his/her duty to keep it in his/her possession and to use it for no other purpose than
that of the trust. It is inherent in such a trust that the attorney sh ould at all times have
available liquid funds in an equivalent amount. The very essence of a trust is the
absence of risk. It is imperative that trust money in the possession of an attorney
should be available to his/her client the instant it becomes payab le. Trust money is
generally payable before and not after demand43.

[114] We find that the respondent’s conduct did not measure up to the standard of
an honest and diligent attorney. His failures and repeated breaches of conduct, over
a substantial period of ti me and affecting numerous clients, render him unfit to
practice as a member of a respected and honorable profession.

Appropriate sanction

[115] Having determined that the respondent’s conduct resulted therein that he is
no longer a fit and proper legal practitio ner, we have to determine the appropriate
sanction.

[116] In the supplementary heads of argument referred to earlier, senior counsel
urged this court to exercise mercy. An argument was advanced that, although
numerous clients may have suffered at the hands of r espondent, thousands of others

40 Incorporated Law Society (OFS) v V 1960 (3) SA 887 (O) at 890C.
41 Holmes v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Another Law Society of the Cape of Good
Hope v Holmes 2006 (2) SA 139 139 (C) at 152B – F.
42 Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal v Behrman 1977 (1) SA 904 (T) at 905 H.
43 See: Law Society, Transvaal v Matth ews (supra) at 394; Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal v
Visse and Others ; Incorporated Law Society Transvaal v Viljoen (supra) at 118 F – H.
have benefited from his practice. He took on work on a contingency fee basis,
advanced the costs of expenses and disbursements necessary to prove client’s
claims and did so in circumstances where clients would not otherwise have been
able to advance their cases.

[117] The supplementary heads of argument alleged tha t the respondent was no
“wilful” in his conduct. This submission, insofar as it may have intended to imply that
the respondent’s conduct was simply negligent bookkeeping, is not supported by the
facts. The payment of trust funds were purposely and not in advertently delayed.
The borrowing of trust funds from at least one client, also indicated that the
respondent had, at least from time to time, been in need of funds and used a client
as an interest -free source, the accounting regarding this loan was only incorrectly
done, this could only have been done intentionally.

[118] The manner in which the overreaching took place also displayed a conscious
approach, namely simply taking 25% (plus VAT) from clients and keeping whatever
additional fees the RAF paid as part of party an 15d party costs. The seriousness of
this unlawful practice is exacerbated by the numerous instances in which the
respondent then omitted to either account to his clients or to explain the fees
retained by him to them. The evidence indicate a pattern of wrongdoing.

[119] The argument that the court was faced with two conflicting versions of e xperts
regarding the status of the respondent’s trust accounts and whether there were
deficits or not, is also without foundation. As indicated earlier, the res pondent’s
expert’s ex post facto attempt at rectifying the respondent’s books, on evidence
presented, could not displace the objective facts. The fact is simply that there were
trust deficits from time to time. This means that trust fund s belonging to cli ents ha ve
been misappropriated by th e respondents , whether to pay disbursements or to pay
either clients or to be taken as fees. It is trite that such conduct is viewed in the most
extreme light by our courts.

[120] There is also a more disturbing feature of th e respondent’s conduct. He
appears not to have appreciated the seriousness of his serial breaches of his duties
and obligations. Each allegation is either avoided or the case of the breach is ---
blamed on someone else (including the LPC). This shows a lack of insight in the
duties and standards of conduct expected from a legal practitioner.

[121] This lack of insight is further illustrated by the following: in the supplementary
heads of argument the following w as said about the respondents attitude displayed
in his papers towards the LPC and its attorneys: “The respondent has requested
myself [the senior counsel] to express his remorse for criticizing the Applicant in his
Opposing Affidavit and objecting to evidence on the basis that it is of a hearsay
nature. The Respondent informed me that he did not intend to be obstructi ve. He
will be present at the hearing to apologies in person should he be allowed to do so.
He sincerely wishes to “come clean” in this respect of this aspect … ”.

[122] When the matter came before us, not only were the senior counsel and the
proposed apologies absent, but the respondent re -launched a verbal attack on the
LSNP, the LPC and their attorneys.

[123] In oral argument further, despite reiterating the unlawful application of the
provi sions of the CFA by describing how he simply deducted 25% of the capital
amounts received on behalf of his clients , as his fees (and, in some instances,
returning those fees which formed part of the party and party costs paid by the RAF),
the respondent st ill maintained that none of his clients suffered any prejudice.

[124] The respondent refused to consider whether the abovementioned practice
resulted in overreaching and kept justifying his position, despite the provisions of the
CFA to the contrary. The only e vidence that he may have been entitled to 25% of
the Capital in instances where that may ha been less than double his fees, were not
located in attorney and client bills, but in accounts rendered to clients. There were,
however, few and far between and in respect of some clients, he conceded that
those who had complained “may not have been given a statement”.

[125] In respect of the issue of touting, which the respondent denied, he explained
that he employed ad hoc merits investigators. These investigators are paid a fixed
amount per matter and they also assist in obtaining hospital and police records. The
respondent, however, also stated that if these investigators “ … meet a potential
client, they refer the client to me. If they were to refer the client to so meone else,
they are then not honest with me … ”.

[126] Insofar as the RAF’s investigators have obt ained affidavits from clients, the
contents of which go further than the respondent’s exculpatory version, the
respondent labelled all those affidavits as “fraudule nt”.

[127] In respect of complaints by clients that he had not paid them or not paid then
timeously, the respondent conceded the facts, but claimed that the clients had
“rushed to the Law Society” before he could pay them.

[128] The respondent, in dealing with the serious allegations against him, in
maintaining a pattern of responses whereby he always blamed someone else for his
transgressions, displayed a lack of acceptance of accountability and lack of insight.
He even went so far as to claim that Mr Faris had not “understood” his accounting
system and that “all” the shortcomings identified in his trust ledgers “had been
addressed”.

[129] The respondent conceded that overreaching amount to an attorney stealing
from his own client, but claimed that if this had been done without intention, then that
was mere “inadvertent” conduct.

[130] We were, after the dismissal of the points in limine which Adv Mteto had been
briefed to raise on behalf of the respondent, urged by her to display mercy and t o
find that the respondent’s conduct and his transgressions can be corrected by way of
mentorship.

[131] Had the respondent taken steps to remedy the shortcomings in his financial
management of his clients’ affairs and his trust account during the period that he had
continued to practice since his suspension or had he displayed insight into his
transgressions and taken responsibility for it (as argued by his erstwhile senior
counsel), one could have considered Adv. Mteto’s plea as a possible appropriate
sanction .

[132] However, when one takes the totality of transgressions into account, this court
would be failing in its duty were we not to find that the cumulative effect of the
offending conduct demands that the respondent be struck of the roll of practitioners.

[133] For the reasons we imposed the sanction contained in the order set out at the
commencement of this judgment.

Order

[134] In the premises, an order is granted in the following terms:

1. The respondent, Mamolatelo Alfred Selota is struck from the roll of
legal practitioners of this Court and the Legal Practice Council is
directed to remove his name from the roll of attorneys.

2. The respondent is ordered to immediately surrender and deliver to the
Registrar of Court his previous certificate of enrolment as an attorney
of this Court.

3. In the event of the respondent failing to comply with the terms of
paragraph 2 above within one week from the date of service of this
order, the sheriff of the relevant district is authorised and direc ted to
take possession of the certificate and hand it to the Registrar.

4. The respondent is prohibited from handling or operating on the trust
accounts as detailed in paragraph 5 hereof, from date of services of
this order.

5. Ignatius Wilhelm Briel, the Dire ctor of the Gauteng Provincial Office of
the applicant, is appointed as curator bonis (curator) to administer and
control the trust accounts of the respondents, including accounts
relating to insolvent and deceased estates and any deceased estate
and any estate under curatorship connected with the respondent’s
practice as legal practitione r and including, also, the separate banking
accounts opened and kept by respondent at a bank in the Republic of
South Africa in terms of section 86(1) & (2) of Act No 28 of 2014 and/or
any separate savings or interest -bearing accounts as contemplated by
section 86(3) and/or section 86(4) of Act No. 28 of 2014, in which
monies from such trust banking accounts have been invested by virtue
of the provisions of the said sub -section or in which monies in any
manner have been deposited or credited (the said accou nts being
hereafter referred to as the trust accounts), with the following powers
and duties:

5.1 Immediately to take possession of the respondent’s accounting
records, records, files and documents as referred to in
paragraph 7 and subject to the approval of the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control (hereinafter referred
to as the fund) to sign all forms and generally to operate upon
the trust account(s), but only to such extent and for such
purpose as may be necessary to bring to completion cur rent
transactions in which the respondents was acting at the date of
this order.

5.2 Subject to the approval and control of the Legal Practitioners’
Fidelity Fund Board of Control and where monies had been paid
incorrectly and unlawfully from the undermentioned trust
accounts, to recover and receive and, if necessary in the
interests of persons having lawful claims upon the trust
account(s) and/or against the respondents in respect of monies
held, received and/or invested by the respondents in term s of
section 86(1) & (2) and/or section 86(3) and/or section 86(4) of
Act No 28 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as trust monies), to
take any legal proceedings which may be necessary for the
recovery of money which may be due to such persons in respect
of incomplete transactions, if any, in which the respondent was
and may still have been concerned and to receive such monies
and to pay the same to the credit of the trust account(s).

5.3 To ascertain from the respondent’s accounting records the
names of all pe rsons on whose account the respondent appears
to hold or to have received trust monies (hereinafter referred to
as trust creditors) and to call upon the respondent to furnish him,
within 30 (thirty) days of the date of service of this order or such
further period as he may agree to in writing, with the names,
addresses and amounts due to all trust creditors.

5.4 To call upon such trust creditors to furnish such proof,
information and/or affidavits as he may require to enable him,
acting in consultation with, a nd subject to the requirements of
the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to
determine whether any such trust creditor has claim in respect
of monies in the trust account(s) of the respondent and, if so, the
amount of such claim.

5.5 To admit or reject, in whole or in part, subject to the approval of
the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, the
claims of any such trust creditor or creditors, without prejudice to
such trust creditor’s or creditors’ right of access to the civil
courts.

5.6 Having determined the amounts which, he considers are lawfully
due to trust creditors, to pay such claims in full but subject
always to the approval of the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund
Board of Control.

5.7 In the event of there being any surplu s in the trust account(s) of
the respondent after payment of the admitted claims of all trust
creditors in full, to utilise such surplus to settle or reduce (as the
case may be), firstly, any claim of the fund in terms of section
86(5) of Act No 28 of 2014 in respect of any interest therein
referred to and, secondly, without prejudice to the rights of the
creditors or the respondent, the costs, fees and expenses
referred to in paragraph 13 of this order, or such portion thereof
as has not already been separ ately paid by the respondent to
the Legal Practice Council, and, if there is any balance left after
payment in full of all such claims, costs, fees and expenses, to
pay such balance, subject to the approval of the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board o f Control, to the respondent,
if he is solvent, or, if the respondent is insolvent, to the trustee(s)
if the respondent’s insolvent estate.

5.8 In the event of there being insufficient trust monies in the trust
banking account(s) of the respondent, in accorda nce with the
available documentation and information, to pay in full the
claims of trust creditors who have lodged claims for repayment
and whose claims have been approved, to distribute the credit
balance(s) which may be available in the trust banking
account(s) amongst the trust creditors alternatively to pay the
balance to the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund.

5.9 Subject to the approval of the chairman of the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to appoint
nominees or representatives and/ or consult with and/or engage
the services of legal practitioners, counsel, accountants and/or
any other persons, where considered necessary, to assist him in
carrying out his duties as curator; and

5.10 To render from time to time, as curator, returns to the Legal
Practitioners’ Fidelity Fund Board of Control showing how the
trust account(s) of the respondent has been dealt with, until
such time as the board notifies him that he may regard his
duties as curator as terminated.

6. The respondent is immediately upon service upon him of this order
deliver the account ing records, files and documents containing
particulars and information relating to the following to the curator bonis :

6.1 any monies received, held or paid by the respondent for or on
account of any person while practising as a legal practitioner;

6.2 any monies invested by the respondent in terms of section 86(3)
and/or section 86(4) of Act No 28 of 2014;

6.3 any interest on monies so invested which was paid over or
credited to the respondent;

6.4 any estate of a deceased person or an insolvent estate or an
estate under curatorship administered by the respondent
whether as executor or trustee or curator or on beha lf of the
executor, trustee or curator;

6.5 any insolvent estate administrated by the respondent as trustee
or on behalf of the trustee in terms of the Insolvency Act, No 24
of 1936;

6.6 any trust administered by the respondent as trustee or on behalf
of the tru stee in terms of the Trust Properties Control Act, No 57
of 1988;

6.7 any company liquidated in terms of the provisions of the
Companies Act, no 61 of 1973 read together with the provisions
of the Companies Act, no 71 of 2008, administered by the
respondent a s or on behalf of the liquidator;

6.8 any close corporation liquidated in terms of the Close
Corporations Act, 69 or 1984, administered by the respondent
as or on behalf of the liquidator.

7. Should the respondent fail to comply with the provisions of the
prece ding paragraph of this order on service thereof upon him or after
a return by the person entrusted with the service thereof that he has
been unable to effect service thereof on the respondent (as the case
may be), the sheriff for the district in which suc h accounting records,
records, files and documents are, be empowered and directed to
search for and to take possession thereof wherever they may be and to
deliver them to such curator.

8. The curator shall be entitled to:

8.1 hand over to the person entitled thereto all such records, files
and documents provided that a satisfactory written undertaking
has been received from such persons to pay any amount, either
determined on taxation or by agreement, in respect of fees and
disbursements due to the firm;

8.2 require from the persons referred to in paragraph 9.1 to provide
any such documentation or information which he may consider
relevant in respect of a claim or possible or anticipated claim,
against his and/or the respondents an d/or the respondents’
clients and/or fund in respect of money and/or other property
entrusted to the respondents provided that any person entitled
thereto shall be granted reasonable access thereto and shall be
permitted to make copes thereof;

8.3 publish thi s order or an abridge version thereof in ay newspaper
he considers appropriate; and 9.4 wind -up of the respondent’s
practice.

9. The respondent is hereby removed from the office as:

9.1 executor of any estate of which the respondent has been
appointed in terms of section 54(1)(a)(v) of the Administration of
Estates Act, no 66 of 1965 or the estate of any other person
referred to in section 72(1);

9.2 curator or guardian of any minor or other person’s property in
terms of section 72(1) read with section 54(1)(a)(v) and section
85 of the Administration of Estates Act, No 66 of 1965;

9.3 trustee of any insolvent estate in terms of section 59 of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936;

9.4 liquidator of any company in terms of section 379(2) read with
379(e) of the Companies Act, no 61 or 1973 and read together
with the provisions of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008;

9.5 trustee of any trust in terms of section 20(1) of the Trust
Property Control Act, No 57 of 1988;

9.6 liquidator of any close corporation appointed in terms of section
74 of the Close Corporation Act, No 69 of 1984; and

9.7 administrator appointed in terms of Se ction 74 of the Magistrate
Court Act, No 32 of 1944.

10. If there are any trust funds available , the respondent shall within 6 (six)
months after having been requested to do so by the curator, or within
such longer period as the curator may agree to in writin g, satisfy the
curator, by means of the submission of taxed bills of costs or
otherwise, of the amount of the fees and disbursements due to the
respondent in respect of his former practice, and should he fail to do
so, he shall not be entitled to recover s uch fees and disbursements
from the curator without prejudice, however, to such rights (if any) as
he may have against the trust creditor(s) concerned for payment or
recovery thereof.

11. A certificate issued by a director of the Legal Practitioners’ Fidelity
Fund shall constitute prima facie proof of the curator’s costs and that
the registrar be authorised to issue a writ of execution on the strength
of such certificate in order to collect the curator’s costs .

12. The respondent is hereby ordered to :

12.1 pay, in terms of section 87(2) of Act No. 28 of 2014, the
reasonable costs of the inspection of the accounting records of
the respondent;

12.2 pay the reasonable fees of the auditor engaged by applicant;

12.3 pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator, including
traveling time.

13. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant ’s costs o f the
application on an attorney and client scale.


____________________ __
N DAVIS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria

I agree and it is so ordered.

___________________ ______
N V KHUMALO
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria


Date of Hearing: 19 & 20 November 2024
Judgment delivered : 15 May 2025

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant : Mr R Stocker
Attorney for the Applicant : Rooth & Wessels Inc , Pretoria.

For the Respondent : Adv N S Mteto together with
Respondent in person
Attorney for the Respondent : Rammutla -at-Law Inc, Pretoria