IN THE HIG H COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISIO N, CAPE TOWN )
Case number : 14851 /2024
In the matter between :
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, A DIVISION OF
FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED Plaintiff
and
GAIL ROUX Defendant
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON 19 MAY 2025
VAN ZYL AJ :
Introduction
1. On 2 July 2024 the plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant for the
repayment of various sums lent and advanced to the defendant pursuant to the
conclusion of three credit agreement over the period 2014 to 2021. The amounts
claimed fall within the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court.
2. The defendant is a lay litigant who refers to herself as “i-Am : Gail : a politically
status corrected living soul, Suv’eran, beneficiary who is existing on land and soil
of the unincorporated de jure South Africa and therefore not in your [this Court’s]
jurisdiction ”. She has conducted the litigation in a colourful manner.
3. The defendant has not pleaded to the action (she assured me that she has no
intention of pleading since she is not an animal), but has brought an application
for the transfer of the action from this Court to the Wellington Magistrates’ Court.
Since the la unch of that interlocutory application, she has sought further relief,
namely that the action be set aside on the basis (amongst others) that this Court
has no jurisdiction over her, and that the action is based on a fraud.
The application to transfer the action proceedings
4. The defendant’s grounds for seeking the transfer of the action are that she is a
pensioner, “existing” nearer to the Wellington Mag istrates’ Court than to this
Court. A transfer of the matter to Wellington will thus save time and cost s,
especially as the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim falls within the jurisdiction of the
magistrates’ court.
5. These is merit in these submissions, but the transfer of the action is not solely up
to this Court. Rule 39(22) of the Uniform Rules of Court , which regulates the
transfer of matters from superior courts to the magistrates’ court, requires
consent by, and agreement betwee n the parties to have the matter so
transferred. It provides as follows:
“By consent the parties to a trial shall be entitled, at any time, before trial, on
written application to a judge through the registrar, to have the cause
transferred to the magistr ate’s court: Provided that the matter is one within the
jurisdiction of the latter court whether by way of consent or otherwise. ”
6. This Court may not transfer the proceedings in the absence of agreement to that
effect . It is obliged to determine matters t hat fall within its jurisdiction, and it has
no inherent power to exercise a discretion to decline to hear such a matter on the
ground that another court (for example, a magistrate’s court) has concurrent
jurisdiction.1 In PT v LT and another2 this Court held as follows:
“ … I am unaware of the existence of an inherent jurisdiction in the High Courts to
transfer proceedings competently instituted before them to other jurisdictions ….
The magistrates' courts are creatures of statute, and procee dings in those courts
fall to be instituted and prosecuted in accordance with the relevant statutory
provisions. The same considerations apply to proceedings in the maintenance
courts. A High Court has no jurisdiction, outside the applicable statutory
frameworks, in proceedings instituted before it to cause those proceedings to
continue in another court. Subject to the applicable statutory provisions, it is for a
claimant to determine in which court of competent jurisdiction to institute and
prosecute proce edings. ”
7. The plaintiff is domin us litis in the action and, as such, may elect in which court to
institute proceedings, provided that such court has the necessary jurisdiction to
hear the matter. In the present case, the credit agreements in question enti tle
the plaintiff to choose whether to proceed in the High Court or the magistrates’
court. The plaintiff does not consent to the transfer of the action. The action is
properly before this Court, which enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the
Wellington M agistrates’ Court. The plaintiff has not abused the process of this
Court, and seeks costs only on the magistrates’ courts’ scale.
8. The application to transfer the action must therefore be refused.
The application to set aside the action proceedings
9. The defendant indicates that she has realized that the action – and, it seems,
virtually all aspects of her life – has its origins in a fraud. The exact nature of the
defendant’s argument is oblique. One of the elements of the alleged fraud is that
she d oes not recognize her surname, it having been foisted upon her at birth by
1 See the discussion in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and others v Mpongo and others
2021 (6) SA 403 (SCA) paras 15 -62. An application for leave to appeal against the SCA’s
decision was dismissed by the Constitutional Court in South African Human Rights
Commission v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and others 2023 (3) SA 36 (CC).
2 2012 (2) SA 623 (WCC) at 630 fn. 13.
her parents and the government in big brother fashion. There are other aspects
to the fraud, set out in detail in various affirmations (she does not do affidavits) ,
and supported b y a variety of case law and extracts from miscellaneous items of
legislation (in particular from the United States ) seemingly sourced from the
internet. I could go down the well but it is not necessary to do so.
10. The defendant was adamant that she does not recognize the jurisdiction of this
Court (which, according to her, is an administrative tribunal, it not having served
a judicial function since 1789) because she did not sign a contract with the Court.
The Court, moreover, has no jurisdiction over livin g persons, but only over
corporations. This is based on the defendant’s interpretation of the definition of
“person ” in the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957:
“’person' includes -
(a) any divisional council, municipal council, village management board, or
like authority;
(b) any company incorporated or registered as such under any law;
(c) any body of persons corporate or unincorporate…”
11. This definition does not refer to natural persons – so the argument goes. The
defendant is therefore in fact not before the Cour t. Nevertheless, she submitted
that this Court could set aside the action because she ha s paid the money now
claimed by the plaintiff, and does not owe it anything.
12. It seems to me that this is a matter that should properly be dealt with by the
defendant in a plea to the action. The action itself is not before me for
determination, and the defence raised – that the amount claimed has already
been repaid – is a matter for the trial court. There is, out of all of the information
placed before me and the wi de-ranging submissions made by the defendant, no
proper basis for the setting aside of the action.
Costs
13. The defendant argues that the plaintiff should bear the costs of these
proceedings because, on her argument, the action should never have been
instituted. The plaintiff’s view is that costs should be costs in the cause.
14. I am inclined to follow the plaintiff’s suggestion. I am not determining the action.
What served before me were two narrow issues, namely whether the action
proceedings should be transferred to another court and, on the further relief
sought by the defendant, whether the action should be set aside for the reasons
given by the defendant. I have found against the defendant on both scores, but
her circumstances are unique. The a ction will continue , and the trial court will be
best placed to determine the question of costs overall.3
Order
In the circumstances, I grant the following orders :
15. The defendant’s application for the setting aside of the action under case number
14851/2024 is refused.
16. The defendant’s application for the transfer of the action proceedings under case
number 14851/2024 f rom this Court to the Wellington Magistrates’ Court is
refused .
17. The costs of th ese proceedings will be costs in the cause.
____________________
P. S. VAN ZYL
Acting judge of the High Court
Appearances:
3 See Levin v Corrigan [2020] ZAGPJHC 68 (16 April 2020) paras 26 -27.
The defendant in person
For the plaintiff : Mr P. S. Smit, instructed by Ismail and
Dahya Attorneys