IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MTHATHA)
CASE NO: 1552/2013
In the matter between:
ZWELIVELILE MANDLE LIZWE DALIBHUNGA MANDELA Applicant
and
MAKAZIWE PUMLA MANDELA & 16 OTHERS Respondents
__________________________________________________________________
TAXATION REVIEW JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________
RUSI J
[1] On 03 July 2013, the applicant in this review successfully opposed an application
for the rescission of th is Court’s order which it made in a burial dispute.1 When the
rescission application was brought, counsel on brief for the review applicant (as the first
respondent in those proceedings ), was instructed by Randall Titus & Associates
(Randall Attorneys), a firm of attorneys situated in Cape Town. The first respondent in
this review was the applicant in that rescission application.
1 The order refusing rescission was made in the j udgement of LP Pakade A DJP (as he then was) under
case number 1552/13, delivered on 03 July 2013.
[2] On 16 February 2023, Zilwa Attorn eys, a firm of attorneys situated in Mthatha,
filed a notice in terms of Uniform Rule 70(3B) , of its intention to tax a bill of costs on an
attorney and client scale (the bill of costs or the bill ). The basis of the bill was that Zilwa
Attorneys performed professional work as local correspondent attorneys for Randall
Attorneys at the request of one Mr Gary Colin Jansen (Mr Jansen) who was employed
as a consultant a t Randall Attorneys . Randal l Attorneys and Mr Jansen objected to the
bill of costs .
[3] The bill of costs contain ed 34 item s which relate d to the alleged professional
services that Zilwa Attorneys rendered on behalf of Randall Attorneys as local
correspondent attorneys. In item 24 of the bill, Zilwa Attorneys claimed R426.00 for
preparing a memorandum for counsel, and R426.00 in item 25 for preparing counsel’s
brief.
[4] On 19 February 2024 the Taxing Mistress appended her allocatur to the bill,
amounting to R190 059.03. Of this amount, the total of R75 549.03 (including VAT)
entailed the fees and disbursements claimed by Zilwa Attorneys for the services
allegedly rendered by them as the local correspondent attorneys .
[5] Subsequent to the Taxing Mistress’ allocatur , Randall Attorneys required her, by
notice in terms of Rule 48(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court, to state a case for the
decision of a judge regarding her ruling at taxation , that Randall Attorneys is liable for
the bill of costs ; as well as for the various items of the bill that she al lowed . On 22 April
2024 the Taxing Mistress supplied her stated case to the parties in accordance with
Rule 48(3) .
[6] Zilwa Attorneys and Mr Jansen subsequently filed their respective written
submissions as envisaged in Rule 48(5)(a). The Taxing Mistress filed her report in
terms of Rule 48(5)(b) on 20 August 2024. This application served before me during
September 2024 for review in terms of Rule 48 (5)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Court .
[7] When the file was placed before me, it was disorderly, and the papers were not
indexed and paginated. The history of the contested bill of costs was not readily
discernible from the papers filed in the review . Even though t he overarching contention
by Zilwa Attorneys was that the bill related to their attorn ey and client costs following a
mandate to act as correspondent attorneys for Randall Attorneys , there was no
indication ex facie the papers filed of record , of information from which I would be able
to glean such a mandate .
[8] On 17 September 2024, I iss ued a directive in terms of Rule 48(6) requesting the
Taxing Mistress to provide the order of court that she gave effect to in making the
decision sought to be reviewed. It was pursuant to this directive that the Taxing Mistress
filed further information p rovided by Zilwa Attorneys in which it was explained that the
bill of costs was drawn after Randall Attorneys requested that the statement of account
presented by Zilwa Attorneys be placed before the Taxing Mistress . No further
submissions were made by any of the parties after the receipt of the information
provided by Zilwa Attorneys.
The t axation proceedings
[9] At the taxation proceedings, Randall Attorneys was represented by Mr Potelwa ,
Zilwa Attorneys by Mr Zilwa , and Mr Jansen by Mr Mvulana of Mvulana Attorneys . From
the stated case submitted by the Taxing Mistress, it is apparent that the disputants of
the bill of costs only made submissions regarding the issue of liability for the fees
claimed by Zilwa Attorneys . They indicated that they would ma ke no submissions
regarding the rest of the items on the bill . In this regard, Randall Attorneys contented
themselves with the notice of objection.
The objection to the bill of costs
[10] The review applicant filed its notice of objection on 27 February 2023 (the notice
of objection). Items 1 and 2 of the bill were objected to on the ground that they are not
recognized tariff items, alternatively, that they were not reasonably necessary. In
respect of items 3 to 34, the applicant raised the following generic grounds of objection:
(i) The items do not follow the tariff, alternatively, they are not recognized
tariff items.
(ii) It does not appear from the bill that the work claimed was actually done.
(iii) There are no fil e notes to justify the time claimed.
(iv) The action taken was not necessary and proper.
(v) The action and contention s are not supported by any file notes.
(vi) It is unclear whether the work performed was occasioned by over caution,
negligence or mistake .
(vii) The attorney’s excessive telephonic dialogue was unnecessary and/or
unreasonable. Further and/or alternatively there are no file notes to
support the telephone calls.
[11] Items 24 and 25 were objected t o on the ground that they constituted an
unnecessary duplication of costs and that R426.00 falls to be disallowed.
[12] In disputing the existence of a mandate to Zilwa Attorneys to act as local
correspondent attorneys , Randall Attorneys relied on Malcolm Lyons & Munro v Abro
and Another ,2 stating that since no evidence of a valid mandate was produced in the
sense that the items were not specifically authorized, the Taxing Mistress erred in ruling
that they were liable for the fees claimed by Zilwa Attorneys for alleged services
rendered as correspondent attorneys.
[13] Randall Attorneys further contend ed that there was no court order attached to the
bill and therefore, the Taxing Mistress was in no position to determi ne whether the bill
2 [1991] 4 All SA 244 (W).
followed a court order. They further contended that counsel’s invoice was not attached
to the bill, and the disbursements claimed were not supported by vouchers.
[18] Mr Jansen’s objection to the bill was twofold – in the first instance he stated that
he never gave mandate to Zilwa Attorneys to perform any services for him and on his
behalf. Furthermore, he has never been a director or a partner at Randall Attorneys,
never received moneys from the third respondent in the main application and never
gave indemnity to Mr Titus of Randall Attorneys in respect of any payment received
from the third respondent in the main application or any party.
The notice to state a case
[19] In the notice requiring the taxing mistress to state a case as envisaged in
Uniform Rule 48(1), Randall Attorneys make the f ollowing assertions:
(a) The Taxing Mistress mero motu made the ruling that they are liable for the
fees claimed by Zilwa Attorneys for the professional services that the latter
allegedly rendered, and disbursements incurred notwithstanding that she
was no t a judge or she did not sit as a court of law.
(b) Each one of the items that are set out in the notice of objection were
objected to at the taxation, alternatively, they were allowed by the taxing
mistress mero motu .
[20] The Taxing Mistress was further required in the notice to state a case, to include
a finding of fact that she made regarding the items that were objected to, or which she
allowed mero motu and which facts Randall Attorneys intended to challenge on the
grounds stated in the notice of objection. She was further required to state any finding of
fact that she made regarding the decision to tax the bill without having regard to the
objections contained in the notice of objection.
The Taxing Mistress ’ stated case
[21] In her stated case, t he Taxing Mistress states that it is incorrect that she mero
motu made a ruling that Randall Attorneys is liable for the fees claimed by Zilwa
Attorneys in the bill of costs. According to her, after the parties asked her to make a
ruling on the issue of liability, sh e called for evidence of the services that Zilwa
Attorneys allegedly rendered as correspondent attorneys on behalf of Randall Attorneys
and such evidence was provided to her. The parties extensively argued the issue of
liability for the fees claimed in the bill of costs. As regards the rest of the contended
items in the bill of costs, the parties indicated that they stood by the objections they
respectively filed.
[22] As far as the disputed items of the bill of costs are concerned, she states that no
oral submissions were made at taxation, the parties having stated that they would stand
by the respective notices of objections. She consequently made her ruling having had
full regard to what was set out in the notices of objections filed by the disputants.
[23] The Taxing Mistress lists the following reasons as her basis for not upholding the
objections filed in respect of items in the bill of costs. On perusal of the file , she was
satisfied that the work that Randall Attorneys disputed was actually done. Th is was a
high-profile matter which attracted a lot of attention and was brought as an urgent
application. She was satisfied that it was a complex matter. During argument she was
advised that the applicant in that application telephonically consulted with Zilwa
attorneys and counsel for the drawing of the urgent application papers. Sh e was further
advised that Mr Jansen who represented Randall Attorneys had never set foot in
Mthatha during consultation with the client, drawing of papers and appearance in court.
He was also consulted telephonically. For these reasons and considering tha t the main
attorneys were based in Cape town, the number of calls was justified in the
circumstances. They were not unreasonable, unnecessary or excessive.
[24] She goes on to state that in as much as the file notes would be of assistance,
she did not con sider them necessary in the light of the documentary evidence that she
was supplied with coupled to the fact that the parties elected not to make any oral
submissions on the disputed items.
[25] Regarding items 24 and 25, she did not consider them to be t he same thing and
thus a duplication of work . For the purposes of determining liability for the
disbursements, she considered the documentary evidence that she was supplied with
which included counsel’s invoice.
The general principles of taxation
[26] The Taxing Mistress derives her powers to tax bills of costs for professional work
done by an attorney from Rule 70(1) which reads:
‘the taxing master shall be competent to tax any bill of costs for services actually
rendered by an attorney in his capacity a s such in connection with litigious work
and such bill shall be taxed subject to the provisions of subrule (5), in accordance
with the provisions of the appended tariff: Provided that the taxing master shall
not tax costs in instances where some other offi cer is empowered so to do.’
[27] Uniform Rule 70(3) sets out the taxing master’s duty and discretion during
taxation in the following terms:
‘[T]he Taxing Master shall, on every taxation, allow all such costs, charges and
expenses as appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment
of justice or for defending the rights of any party, but save as against the party
who incurred the sam e, no costs shall be allowed which appear to the Taxing
Master to have been incurred or increased through over -caution, negligence or
mistake, or by payment of a special fee to an advocate, or special charges and
expenses to witnesses or to other persons o r by other unusual expenses.”3
3 See also, Mouton v Martine 1968 (4) SA 738 (T) at 742 .
[28] It is trite that on review, the court will interfere with the decision of the taxing
master/mistress where it finds that he/she has not exercised his/her discretion properly.
It has been held that this will be the case where the taxing master/mistress was
actuated by some improper motive; did not apply his/her mind to the matter; has
disregarded factors or princi ples which were proper for him/her to consider, or
considered others which were improper for him/her to consider; acted upon wrong
principles or wrongly interpreted rules of law; or gave a ruling which no reasonable
person would have given .4
[29] Learned author AC Cilliers5 says of the taxing master’s discretion:
“The discretion vested in a Taxing Master is to allow (all) costs, charges and
expenses as appear to him to have been necessary or proper, not those which
may objectively attain such qualities. His opinion must relate to all costs
reasonably incurred by the litigant, which imports a value judgment as to what is
reasonable. Moreover, the words ‘reasonable’ and ‘in the opinion of the Taxing
Master’ that occurred in the tariff appended to rule 70 im ported a judgment not
referable to objectively ascertainable qualities in the items of a bill in question.
The discretion to decide what costs have been necessarily or properly incurred is
given to the Taxing Master and not to the court.”
[30] The discretion given to the taxing mistress requires of her to bring an objective
mind to bear upon the task of taxation. In this regard, the taxing mistress must properly
consider and assess all the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the particu lar
item concerned, and the circumstances of the case as whole at the time that step listed
in a particular item was taken. In City of Cape Town v Arun Property Development (Pty)
Ltd6 it was held :
4 Preller v Jordaan and Another 1957 (3) SA 201 at 203C -D.
5 AC Cilliers, Law of Cost 3rd Edition, 1997 – Issue 28: 13.03.
6 2009 (5) SA 227 (C) 232 .
‘[17] The taxing master has discretion to allow, reduce or reject items in a bill of costs.
She must exercise this discretion judicially in the sense that she must act reasonably,
justly and on the basis of sound principles with due regard to all the circumstances of
the case. Where the discretion is not so exerc ised, her decision will be subject to
review. In addition, even where she has exercised her discretion properly, a court on
review will be entitled to interfere where her decision is based on a misconception as to
the facts and circumstances or as to the p ractice of the court. ’
[31] In Ocean Commodities Inc & Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd & Others ,7 Rabie
CJ re -stated the test to be that the Court will not interfere with a ruling made by the
Taxing Master in every case where its view of the matter in dispute differs from that of
the Taxing Master, but only when it is satisfied that the Taxing Master’s view of the
matter differs so materially from its own that it should be held to vitiate his ruling.
The submissions by Zilwa Attorneys
[32] In their wri tten submissions to the stated case supplied by the Taxing Mistress,
Zilwa Attorneys contend s that the review is ill -founded, based on a wrong premise and
an abuse of the process of court. They further state that the contention by Randall
Attorneys that th e taxing mistress mero motu decided the issue of liability for the bill of
costs is without any basis . They emphasize that the parties agreed during taxation that
the issue to be decided by her was that of liability for the bill. Zilwa Attorneys further
states that since this was not a party and party bill of costs, the Taxing Mistress, in any
event, had the powers to determine liability for the attorney and client costs.
[33] It is further contended by Zilwa Attorneys that it is equally incorrect that the
Taxing Mistress mero motu allowed the items in the bill of costs whereas both parties
requested her to use her discretion, with Randal Attorneys and Mr Jansen having
indicated that they stood by their respective objections that were filed of record. The
7 1984 (3) SA 15 (A) at 8F -G; see also JD van Niekerk en Genote Ing v Administrateur, Transvaal 1994
(1) SA 595 (A); Legal and General assurance Society Ltd v Lieberum NO and Another 1968 1 SA 473A at
478G.
parties, so the submission continued, took the risk of not making any oral submissions
before the Taxing Mistress . Therefore, contends Zilwa Attorneys, it is not available to
Randall Attorneys to complain after the Taxing Mistress made findings that are not in
their favour.
Mr Jansen’s submissions
[34] The initial ground on which Mr Jansen objected to the bill of costs, namely that
he never gave mandate to Zilwa Attorneys did not form part of the written submissions
filed on his behalf in response to the stated case of the Taxing Mistress.
[35] It was instead submitted on behalf of Mr Jansen that the Taxing Mistress
correctly ruled that Randall Attorneys is liable for the bill of costs. Furthermore, so the
submission goes, the Taxing Mistress’ ruling on the issue of liability for the bill of costs
followed a full consideration of arguments that were made and documents that were
placed before her. Therefore, so the argument continu es, it is incorrect to suggest that
the Taxing Mistress made the ruling mero motu .
[36] No written submissions were filed by Randall Attorneys pursuant to the stated
case supplied by the taxing mistress.
Discussion
[37] The bill was taxed on an attorney and client basis . The starting point ought to be
that the tariff which is applicable in t he case of party and party taxation is not binding
upon an attorney who claims fees under an attorney and client bill. However, the party
and party tariff will be taken as a guide where there is no express or implied agreement
to authorize higher charges .8
8 Oshry and Lazar v Taxing Master and Another 1947 (1) SA 657 (T) at 660; Udwin v Cross 1962 (2) SA
291 (T) , at 293 A -B; Joubert Civil Procedure and Costs LAWSA, 2nd edition, Volume 3 Part 2 (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths), p281 para 409.
[38] It is instructive to re -state the principles enunciated in Ben McDonald Inc v
Rudolph9 where it was held that ‘such costs are taxed according to the tariff, but are
generous where there is some leeway. Items not in the tariff may be included and so
may amounts which would be reduced on taxation on a party and party basis.’10
[39] For convenien ce, I will deal with the contentions made by Randall Attorneys as
set out in the objection under the rubrics of the competence of the Taxing Mi stress to
make the disputed ruling on liability for the bill and costs, and the correctness of the
Taxing Mistress’ exercise of her discretion , respectively .
The competence of the taxing master to rule on liability for costs
[40] As regards the contention that the Taxing Mistress usurped the function of a
judge or court and fixed liability for costs where there was no court order to that effect,
regard must be had to the provisions of Rule 70(8) which are as follows:
‘Where, in th e opinion of the taxing master, more than one attorney has
necessarily been engaged in the performance of any of the services covered by
the tariff, each such attorney shall be entitled to be remunerated on the basis set
out in the tariff for the work nece ssarily done by him.’
[41] There was no bar in the Taxing Mistress making a determination on the costs
claimed by Zilwa Attorneys despite the fact that there was no court order in which they
were specifically awarded. It was a matter for her determination whether in the present
case the costs claimed could be awarded. I am fortified in this view by the dictum of
Seligson AJ in Friedrich Kling v Continental Jewellery Manufacturers11 where it was
stated that it is certainly not the function of the court making the cost order to make a
9 1997 (4) SA 252 (T) ; see also Cambridge Plan AG v Cambridge Diet (Pty) Ltd & others 1990 (2) SA 574
(T) and Aircraft Completions Centre (Pty) Ltd v Rossou w & others 2004 (1) SA 123 (W).
10 Id at 257G – 258F.
11 1993 (3) SA 76 (CPD); see also Hills and others v Taxing Master and another 1975 (1) SA 856 (D) at
865A -B; cf Stuart -Lamb v Stuart -Lam 1997(3) SA 140 (E) at 144E -G and the authorities referred to
therein.
determination on the implications of performance of services by either a litigant’s out -of-
town attorney or by an attorney practicing at the seat of the court. This, said t he court,
was a matter to be determined by the Taxing Master in the exercise of the discretion
given by Rule 70(8).12
[42] Randall Attorney’s contention that the Taxing Mistress usurped the judge’s or
court’s function of awarding costs when she ruled that they are liable for the costs
claimed by Zilwa Attorneys cannot be sustained.
Did the Taxing master correctly exercise her discretion?
[43] Randall Attorneys make s a three faceted contention in this regard. Firstly, they
contend that Zilwa attorneys had n o valid mandate in that the serv ices they performed
were not specifically authorized, the costs and disbursements were not agreed to, and
for this reason they were not entitled to the fees they claim ed. T herefore, the Taxing
Mistress erred in finding that Randall Attorneys was liable for the fees so claimed.
Secondly, the fees and disbursements claimed by Zilwa Attorneys were not supported
by vouchers, and there were no file notes. Thirdly, the costs claimed are not recognized
by the tariff or were not reasonably incurred.
[44] The reliance on Malcom Lyons is misplaced. In that case, one of the issues
before Kriegler J was whether the special power of attorney on which the attorneys
relied in their bill of costs for claiming fees for t he extra work alleged to have been done
by them, covered such extra work, and whether the Taxing Master was correct in
disallowing the amount claimed in the bill of costs. The learned Judge found that since
there was no specific mandate in the power of att orney for the work that the attorney
claimed to have done, and in light of the factors that the Taxing Master considered
pertain ing to whether such work was necessary at all, his discretion in disallowing the
amount claimed in that regard was correctly exe rcised.
12 Id, at 88D -G.
[45] There does not appear , in the present case, to be any pertinent denial in the
objection filed by Randall Attorneys of the fact that Zilwa Attorneys was at all requested
by Jansen to perform work as a correspondent attorney for Randall Attorneys. That
being said, the Taxing Mistress called for evidence that would satisfy her that such an
instruction was indeed given to Zilwa Attorneys on behalf of Randall Attorneys . Such
evidence was provided to her. The case of Malcom is no authority for the contention of
Randall Attorneys in the present matter for it is distinguishable on the facts .
[46] Furthermore, i n her stated ca se, the Taxing Mistress gives summary of her ruling
from which it appears that both parties at the taxation proceedings made their
contentions on the issue of Zilwa Attorneys’ mandate or instructions to act as local
correspondent attorneys . It is indeed rather confounding that a contention is made that
the Taxing Mistress mero motu made a finding that Zilwa Attorneys were appointed as
correspondent Attorneys by or on behalf of Randall Attorneys. I find no grounds on
which to falter the decision of the taxing mistress on the issue of liability for the costs
claimed .
[47] That there were no file notes to support the fees is of no consequence when
regard is had to the fact that the Taxing Meistress called for documentary evidence of
the work done which included counsel’s invoice. Randall Attorneys do es not dispute that
such evidence was provided during taxation. Having received the evidence , the Taxing
Mistress proceeded to make her determination based on it. This she was allowed to do
in terms of Rule 70(2) which provides:
‘At the taxation of any bill of costs the taxing master may call for such books,
documents, papers or accounts as in his opinion are necessar y to enable him
properly to determine any matter arising from such taxation.’
[48] It was the duty of the Taxing Mistress, after all, to demand proof to her
satisfaction that the services for which payment is demanded have actually been
rendered . And, as held in Gluckman v Winter and Another , in this regard, the taxing
master must consider such evidence as may be reasonably necessary in order to
determine whet her a probability exists that the services were actually rendered.13
[49] On the score of the reasonableness of the costs incurred by Zilwa Attorneys, it is
instructive to state that i n Van Rooyen v Commercial Union Assurance Company of SA
Ltd14 it was held that what an honest, experienced and capable practitioner would
consider what is reasonable in relation to a claim or defence, bearing in mind the
requirement of efficient practice and the exigencies of litigation, should be taken into
account by the taxing master.
[50] The Maxing Mistress had regard to the nature of the case and the fact that
Randall’s Attorneys was situated in Cape Town, the fact that it was submitted to her that
Mr Jansen himself had never physically attended consultations with the client . She also
had regard to the correspondents’ evaluation of the matter when such consultations
were held. This she would have done in order to gain an appreciation of what would be
reasonable in the circumstances. Having done so, she found that the t elephonic
consultation for the duration stated and the amount allowed were reasonable.
[51] It bears mentioning , with regards to item 24 and 25 that there is, at least to my
mind, a distinction between the drawing of a memorandum and preparation of the brief.
In a memorandum the legal practitioner provides, inter alia, an analysis of legal
principles and authorities, and their application to the facts of the case at hand. Randall
Attorney s’ objection that one of the two items ought to have been disallowed is
misplaced. A brief is an instruction to counsel to perform specific work. Its preparation
entails the collation of the information, documents and papers necessary for the
prosecution of the proceedings. I am unable to agree with th e contention that item 24
and 25 entailed a duplication of work.
13 1931 AD 449 at 450; Lubbe v Borman 1938 CPD 211; Maasdorp and Smit v Sullivan 1964 (4) SA 2 (E)
at 2H -3A.
14 1983 (2) SA 465 (O) at 468.
[52] I have no reason to interfere with the Taxing Mistress’ exercise of the discretion
vested in her in allowing the items that she allowed . It has not been shown that she was
actuated by some improper motive; did not apply her mind to the matter; disregarded
factors or principles which were proper for her to consider or considered others which
were improper for her to consider; acted upon wr ong principles or wrongly interpreted
rules of law; or gave a ruling which no reasonable person would have given.
[53] I must lastly deal with the contention made by Zilwa Attorneys and on behalf of
Mr Jansen that the contentions made by the review applicant on the Taxing Mistress’
stated case were not made at the taxation proceedings. This much is confirmed by the
Taxing Mistress in her stated case. A review is not an extra opportunity to a taxation
hearing . As hel d in Daywine Properties (Pty) Ltd v Murphy and Another ,15 if a party
opposing the taxation party who opposes taxation fails to object when before the
Taxing Master, he cannot thereafter invoke the review taxation procedure provided by
Rule 48 in a belated attempt to attack items which the Taxing Master allowed.16
[54] No effort appears to have been m ade during taxation, by the representative of
Randall Attorneys , to make oral submissions or submit information that would support
their objections to the items in the bill of costs. In fact, the Taxi ng Mistress’ stated case
makes it abundantly clear that during taxation, the parties knowingly opted to forego
their right to make oral submissions of the cont ested items. In the case of Randall
Attorneys, this election was made in the face of generic grounds of objection s that were
raised in respect of it ems 3 to 34 . It is not open to Randal Attorneys to make the
contention they make on review when they were not made before the Taxing Mistress.
[55] I make the finding that contrary to what the applicant contends, the Taxing
Mistress did not act mero mot u in any of the findings she made. She applied her mind to
the submissions made to her and documents presented to support those submissions. I
15 1991(3) SA 216 (D).
16 Id, at 218E -F.
have no basis to find, either, that she was “clearly wrong.” There are no reasons for this
Court to interfere with her exercise of her discretion. The application for review must fail .
[56] In the result, I make the following order:
1. The review is dismissed, with costs.
__________________
L. RUSI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Delivered on 22 April 2025
For the applicant: Randall Titus & Associates
c/o Potelwa & Co, Mthatha
For the respondent s: Zilwa Attorneys, Mthatha