IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU -NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
Case no: D8746 /2024
In the matter between:
MELUSI CHRISTOPHER NTULI PLAINTIFF
and
THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND INNOVATIONS DEFENDANT
Coram : Mossop J
Heard : 14 May 2025
Delivered : 14 May 2025
ORDER
The following order is granted :
1. The application for summary judgment is refused.
2. The defendant is given leave to defend the action.
3. The costs are reserved for decision by the trial court.
JUDGMENT
MOSSOP J :
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Introduction
[1] This is an ex tempore judgment.
[2] The plaintiff applies for summary judgment against the defendant. His
particulars of claim are comprised of four separate claims , which , when totalled
together , demand payment from the defendant of damages in the amount of R27
billion. As may be expected, t he defendant denies that he is entitled to th at judgment
and seeks leave to defend the action .
[3] The file of papers that comprise the plaintiff’s claim for summary judgment
runs to some 921 pages , contained in eight separate volumes. The plaintiff has
prepared his own papers and appears in person to move for summary judgment.1
The papers are properly typed and paginated but were initially improperly bound and
secured , although a partial attempt has been made by the plaintiff to remedy this.
Uniform rule 32(1)
[4] The Uniform Rules of Court clearly explain under what circumstances a
plaintiff may claim summary judgment. The applicable rule is rule 32(1) , and it reads
as follows:
‘(1) The plaintiff may, after the defendant has delivered a plea, apply to court for summary
judgment on each of such claims in the summons as is only -
(a) on a liquid document;
(b) for a liquidated amount in money;
(c) for delivery of specified movable property; or
(d) for ejectment,
together with any claim for interest and costs.’
Summary judgment
[5] Summary judgment is often viewed as a drastic remedy because it may result
in a defendant being deprived of the opportunity to present his defence at a trial. If it
is granted, the action proceeds no further. One of the reason s for summary judgment
1 There is an other application in the court file , confusingly entitled ‘Opposed application for leave to
oppose the applicant’s rule 30 application ’.
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was explained by Navsa J A in Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla
Zek Joint Ventur e when he observed that the procedure :2
‘… was intended to prevent sham defences from defeating the rights of parties by delay, and
at the same time causing great loss to plaintiffs who were endeavouring to enforce their
rights.’
[6] However, Navsa JA presciently went on to remark that:
‘Having regard to its purpose and its proper application, summary judgment proceedings
only hold terrors and are “drastic” for a defendant who has no defence.’3
[7] From the provisions of Uniform rule 32(1) , it is therefore apparent that not
every claim brought by a plaintiff can legitimately lead to an application for summary
judgment. The judgment being claimed must be capable of being classified under
one of the four categories prescribed by the rule. If it is incapable of such
classification , summary judgment cannot be granted, and the matter must proceed to
trial.
[8] Before assessing the merits of the application, it is proper to say something
about the plaintiff ’s claim.
The plaintiff’s pleaded case
[9] It is, in truth, no easy thing to summarise the plaintiff’s claim. As mentioned at
the commencement of this judgment , the plaintiff drew the particulars of claim
himself and he confirmed before me this morning when the matter was called that he
has no training in the law. That, unfortunately, is reflected in the quality of the
pleadings and in his understanding of the law . In saying this, I do not mean to be
disrespectful to the plaintiff but mean to simply record the fact that it is palpably
obvious that he has ventured into an area that he is not qualified to enter.
[10] The particulars of claim are not excessively long , nor unacceptably short , and
cover 12 typed pages. But i n attempting to describe what his case is about, the
2 Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture [2009] ZASCA 23; 2009 (5)
SA 1 (SCA) para 31 (Joob Joob Investments ).
3 Ibid para 33.
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plaintiff has liberally made use of jargon and acronyms, whose meaning is not
sufficiently explained, and which makes reading and comprehension difficult.
[11] What the claim is about is, perhaps , best explained by the plaintiff ’s affidavit in
support of his application for summary judgment , where he states the following:
‘The claims are based on the unconstitutionality, illegality, marketing and infringement of the
intellectual property rights (IPRS) due to the Respondents Grassroots Innovation Program
(GIP).’
[12] The plaintiff’s claim appears to revolve around two devices, namely a
‘chargeless electric engine’ (the electric engine) and a ‘PSDC motor’ (the PSDC
motor) (collectively referred to as ‘the devices ’). If I correctly understand the
particulars of claim, i t appears that he lays claim to having invented the devices .
While I can appreciate from the particulars of claim what the electric engine may
conceivably be (based entirely upon the words used to describe it) , I have no idea
what the PSDC motor is . Its nature is never described by the plaintiff, nor does he
explain what the acronym ‘PSDC’ means .
[13] It appears that the plaintiff holds intellectual property rights to the devices, and
that the defendant has accepted the use of these devices in to its programme called
the ‘Grassroots Innovation Programme ’ (GIP). I do not understand what the GIP is,
for it has also not been explained. In acting as the defendant allegedly has, it is
claimed by the plaintiff that his intellectual property rights have suffered reputational
damages. I make no comment on whether an intellectual property right has a
reputation and , if so, whether it can sustain reputational damages.
[14] The plaintiff’s claim for payment of the amount of R27 billion is comprised of
the following claims mentioned here in summary :
(a) The first claim asserts that the GIP is unconstitutional. Th e result of this is:
‘… plaintiff’s IPRs’ have a damaged reputation and have suffered as in the Sum (sic) of R5
billions (sic)’;
(b) The second claim alleges that the defendant had ‘no legal grounds of using
the IPRs’ and therefore :
‘… the plaintiff’s IPRs have a damaged reputation and suffered a loss in the Sum of R2
billions (sic)’;
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(c) The third claim seems to allege that the defendant was not entitled to
promote the electric engine through the GIP because, confusingly :
‘[t]here had never been a Chargeless Electric Engine’s development that … was ready for
the market’.
As a consequence, it is again alleged that:
‘… the plaintiff’s IPRs have been damaged reputation (sic) and have suffered damage in the
Sum of R10 billions (sic)’; and
(d) The final claim is that the intellectual property rights that allegedly existed in
respect of the PSDC motor were infringed by the defendant and resulted in the
destruction of its development and thus:
‘… the Plaintiff’s IPRs have been damaged reputation and has suffered damages in the Sum
of R10 billions (sic).’
[15] From this whistle -stop tour through the plaintiff’s claim, it is clear that he seeks
unliquidated damages from the defendant. His claim consequently does not fit into
any of the categories prescribed by Uniform rule 32(1). A claim is liquidated if it is
fixed either by agreement or by an order of court or is capable of swift and easy
computa tion.4 There is no such agreement in this instance on the amounts claimed
by the plaintiff, nor have the amount s been determined by a court. The claims
obviously cannot easily be computed either. Indeed, it is impossible to calculate how
the amounts claimed have been arrived at, as no details have been pleaded as to
how the amounts claimed have been calcul ated. Those amounts simply appear in
the prayer to the particulars of claim for the first time. In SA Fire and Accident
Insurance Co Ltd v Hickman ,5 the court , although dealing with an application for
default judgment , addressed the issue of liquidated claims as follows:
‘In the present case, the amount of the claim in issue manifestly cannot be calculated today:
it will only emerge after debate of the account has been concluded. It is true that the claim
itself is specific enough: but then so is a claim for damages, which , by common consent,
constitutes an unliquidated claim.’
This matter does not, however, offer the security of being based upon a claim that is
specific and well -drafted.
4 Kleynhans v Van der Westhuizen NO 1970 (2) SA 742 (A) at 750A -B; First National Bank of SA Ltd
v Myburgh and another 2002 (4) SA 176 (C) at 181 F.
5 SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Hickman 1955 (2) SA 131 (C) at 133 A.
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[16] The procedure through which s ummary judgment is claimed may therefore not
be invoked where a claim is not liquidated. As the Supreme Court of Appeal stated in
Economic Freedom Fighters and others v Manuel :6
‘Summary judgment proceedings, regulated by Uniform Rule 32, are limited to claims based
on a liquid document, a liquidated amount in money, the delivery of specified movable
property, and ejectment. It is not a remedy available in respect of claims for unliquidated
damages. ’
[17] As the plaintiff’s claim does not fall into any of the categories contemplated in
Uniform rule 32(1) , the claim has obviously bleak prospects of succeeding. Indeed,
with the appreciation of the true nature of the claim comes the obvious realisation
that the summary judgment application has reached the end of its short life.
The defendant’s defence
[18] I briefly consider some of the defendant’s defences solely to point out other
difficulties that the plaintiff has with his claim.
[19] The fact that the plaintiff’s claim is not a liquidated claim was the first point
raised by the defendant. But there are several other equally valid objections to the
granting of summary judgment. In fact, there are ten such objections, but I mention
only three here:
(a) This court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the matter as the defendant, on the
plaintiff’s own version, is a government department based i n Pretoria , Gauteng
outside the area of jurisdiction of this court ;
(b) There has been the non-joinder of the relevant minister in control of the
defendant ; and
(c) There has been noncompliance with the provisions of the Institution of Legal
Proceedings against certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002 .
[20] The defences raised by the defendant are properly raised and pleaded , are
bona fide, and cannot simply be considered to have been conjured up purely for the
purpose of delaying the inevitable judgment that the plaintiff believes must come his
6 Economic Freedom Fighters and others v Manuel [2020] ZASCA 172 ; 2021 (3) SA 425 (SCA)
para 92.
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way. The application for summary judgment , therefore , holds none of the terrors for
the defendant alluded to by Navsa J A in Joob Joob Investments .
Conclusion
[21] Summary judgment cannot be granted in this matter .
[22] The legal position has , unfortunately, been misconceived by the plaintiff, who
would be well -advised to obtain specialist legal assistance as the action proceeds .
As pointed out above when briefly considering the further defences raised by the
defendant, the plaintiff may reasonably anticipate further difficulties in his path as this
matter unfold s. It seems to me that it would be beneficial for him if he acquire s legal
advice to help him deal with the difficulties that he is inevitably going to face. I f he
cannot afford such assistance, I have arranged for my registrar to provide him with
the local address of Legal Aid South Africa once the court rises .
[23] But, as for this application, the usual order must be granted when summary
judgment is refused.
Order
[24] I accordingly grant the following order:
1. The application for summary judgment is refused.
2. The defendant is given leave to defend the action.
3. The costs are reserved for decision by the trial court.
_____________________________
MOSSOP J
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CASE INFORMATION
Counsel for the plaintiff : In person
Counsel for the defendant : Mr Janse van Rensburg
Instructed by: The State Attorney
6th Floor, Metlife Building
391 Anton Lembede Street
Durban