THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA , JOHANNESBURG
Not reportable
Case Number : JR 1238/23
In the matter between:
SPRINGS CAR WHOLESALERS
t/a NO FINANCE CARS (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
AZWIHANGWISI OBAD RANGOLO First respondent
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION Second respondent
MATOME VICTOR SEHUNANE, N.O. Third r espondent
Heard: 3 December 2024
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties and/or their legal representatives by email. The date and time for handing- down is deemed 10h00 on 27 January 2025.
JUDGMENT
2
VENTER, AJ
Introduction.
[1] This is an opposed review application wherein the applicant ( SCW) seeks to
review an arbitration award dated 29 May 2023. In the arbitration award, t he third
respondent ( the Commissioner ) found that the dismissal of the first respondent
(Rangolo) was substantively unfair. The Commissioner ordered S CW to pay 12
months compensation in the amount of R126 000.00 and no order as to costs. The
review is launched in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act
1 (the LRA).
The point in limine .
[2] Rangolo’s attorneys raised a point in limine in the answering affidavit . It was
alleged that the review application is deemed withdrawn on account of a
contravention of the previous practice manual. Paragraph 11.2.2 thereof provided
that the records in a review application must be filed within 60 -days after the record
was made available. Rangolo alleged that by his calculation the 60-days lapsed on
9 October 2023 and as such, absent any explanation for such lateness, the review is
deemed withdrawn. [3] Ancillary to the above, Rangolo also alleged that on account of SCW not
being able to provide the name of the person who in actual fact confirmed receipt of
the transmission of the record, SCW falls foul of paragraph 14.1.5 of the same
practice manual. [4] When this matter was called, there was only an appearance on behalf of
SCW . The court file indicates that the set -down notice was sent to all parties around
23 October 2024. The email confirmation report attached to the court file i ndicates
that the set -down notice was also served on the following email addresses, namely
O[…], m[…] and g[…].
1 66 of 1995 (as amended) .
3
[5] There is no return mail on the aforesaid. To that extent I readily accepted that
there was proper service. However, I was not prepared to proceed in default . Prior to
standing the matter down the representatives for SCW were requested to try and
contact Rangolo and or his attorneys.
[6] At the same time Adv Moll (for SCW) provided me with heads of argument
that were filed on behalf of Rangolo. The matter then stood down, premised on the
possibility that Rangolo’s legal representatives may not have received the set -down
notice, hence their non- appearance.
[7] When the matter was recalled, Adv Moll made the following submissions from
the bar, namely that he and his attorney had made attempts to contact Mitti
Attorneys and during a conversation with an employee of Mitti Attorneys they were advised that Rangolo had in fact passed away earlier this year, that Mitti Attorneys has withdrawn as attorneys of record and no longer acts for Rangolo and the attorney who was dealing with this matter was not available. There was no notice of
withdrawal on the court file. I was also advised from the b ar that numerous attempts
were made to contact the attorney who was dealing with this file to no avail.
[8] I adopted a practical approach. I indicated to Adv Moll that I would deal with
the matter as if it remained opposed, since there was an answering affidavit before
court, as well as comprehensive heads of argument.
[9] Considering the above, I then proceeded to decide the point in limine and
once that was done, I proceeded to deal with the review application. I indicated to
Adv Moll that I would reserve judgment and compare his submissions to that
contained in the answering affidavit read with Rangolo’s heads of argument.
[10] The point in limine was then dealt with. The facts were readily apparent in the
papers. The submissions made by Adv Moll demonstrated that the record (including
the transcript ) was served on 13 October 2023. Duly calculating the 60- days as
starting around 21 July 2023, it is obvious that the entire record was communicated
within the 60- days period. Differently seen, there was substantial compliance with
the service requirement, i.e. within 60-days which essentially then left this court to
consider whether the absence of an individual’s name in an affidavit of service would
4
then retrospectively invalidate service , and to that effect, cause the review to lapse. I
held the view that the previous practice manual cannot be interpreted as such. It was
clear to me that there was substantial compliance with service within the 60- days.
Had there not been such service, then the point would have gained mileage, but, as
indicated, there was service of the record.
[11] I proceeded to find that the review application was not deemed withdrawn.
[12] This meant that the answering affidavit was filed outside of the dies provided
for in the previous rule 7A(9). I prompted Adv Moll to reconsider the opposition to the
late introduction of the answering affidavit and after him being so instructed, I was
advised that SCW would waive the opposition to the answering affidavit being filed
late. Thus, the matter then proceeded on the basis that the review was alive and that
I would consider the answering affidavit. The facts .
[13] SCW is in the business of selling motor vehicles. Rangolo was employed as a
mechanic around 25 November 2015. Rangolo held this position until his dismissal
on 7 March 2023 when Rangolo was arrested by the South African Police Service
(SAPS) along with two of his colleagues . The reason why these three employees
were arrested was on account of them being apprehended whilst in possession of or
in close proximity to three new motor vehicle tyres , belonging to SCW . The SAPS
contacted SCW, who arrived at the scene and it was explained to SCW that the employees were caught loading tyres into the boot of a vehicle that belonged to a
fellow employee by the name of Ismai l.
[14] Thereafter Rangolo was placed on a precautionary suspension and around
2 March 2023 he was issued with a notice to attend a disciplinary enquiry. The
charges read as follows: -
“1. Gross dishonesty and misconduct in that:
1.1 The unlawful misappropriation of company property for your
personal benefit and gain as reflected per Annexure B1 and B4.”
5
[15] Subsequent to the disciplinary hearing, Rangolo was found guilty of the
allegations and was dismissed, whereafter he proceeded to refer an alleged unfair
dismissal dispute to the second respondent. The arbitrat ion.
[16] At arbitration Rangolo’s defence was that on 23 March 2023 and during
lunchtime he went on lunch with Ismai l. They travelled in Ismai l’s car. Upon passing
security with Isma il’s car they drove down Elizabeth Street and whilst in Elizabeth
Street another employee, namely Elvis, was found standing beside the road, and he had three tyres in his possession.
[17] Elvis flagged Isma il down . They had a discussion . Rangolo says that he,
despite being a passenger in Ismael’s vehicle, did not hear what was said. The next moment the SAPS arrived on the scene and all three of them were arrested. Rangolo denied that he was involved in the theft of the tyres and he testified that
when Elvis flagged down Ismai l, the tyres were on the pavement. Rangolo thus
denied guilt .
[18] The Commissioner devoted four paragraphs in his analysis of the evidence
and argument to the finding that Rangolo was not guilty of the offence. The only two paragraphs that really deal with the Commissioner’s consideration of the facts and
argument are paragraphs 11 and 12 of the arbitration award.
The Commissioner’s reasoning.
[19] The Commissioner was of the view that what must be determined is whether
Rangolo was also involved and/or was part of the removal of the three tyres
belonging to SCW. In other words, a plain reading of paragraph 11 of the award
indicates that the Commissioner concerned himself with whether or not Rangolo was in any way involved or was in any way part of the removal of the employer’s property. The Commissioner found that SCW failed to present any persuasive or convincing evidence that he was.
6
[20] SCW introduced Mr Ragheeb Rahman ( Ragheeb) in support of its case and
the Commissioner found that his evidence did not assist him (the Commissioner) at
all. In paragraph 12 of the award the Commissioner said that:
“I understood the predicament of Ragheeb, as he would not have known as to who, where and how the plan was hatched to remove the tyres hence his
answers to the pertinent questions posed by the Applicant’s representative was that ‘I don’t know’.”
[21] The Commissioner thus discounted the evidence of Ragheeb, and for that
matter SCW, and found that Rangolo really was just at the wrong place at the wrong time.
The review .
[22] SCW advances three grounds or review. It firstly complains that the
Commissioner disregarded circumstantial evidence, that he failed to draw the most probable inference from the proven facts and to that extent that he committed a material error in law and/or misconceived the nature of the enquiry pertaining to the assessment of the evidence. [23] Adv Moll submitted that primarily its case is based on circumstantial evidence.
[24] The second ground advanced on behalf of SCW was aimed at the calculation
of compensation awarded by the Commissioner, i.e. 12 months. SCW argued that
awarding 12 months’ compensation boils down to a punishment and that the Commissioner speculated in a number of respects in reaching the remedy granted in favour of Rangolo. The third ground of review was not vigorously pursued. It centre d
around the Commissioner allowing a few leading questions. I dispose of this ground at this stage by finding that it does not in itself carry sufficient weight to persuade me
that the arbitration suffers from a procedural or reviewable taint.
[25] In considering the answering affidavit, it is quite clear that Rangolo opposed
all the grounds of review. Rangolo contends that there was no evidence supporting
any of the allegations against him and that there is no basis to review and set aside
7
the arbitration award. Rangolo also contended that SCW’s failure to call the SAPS to
testify on its behalf should weigh against it. In argument Rangolo says that SCW
does not have any evidence that he stole the tyres and equally reminded this Court
that SCW failed to open the case with the SAPS against Rangolo.
[26] Rangolo further argues that SCW has essentially fabricated a version that he
stole tyres and that the alleged events remain unproven and were not corroborated.
[27] Rangolo further said in his argument that there is a duty on a Commissioner
to properly determine the evidence, which means that an arbitrator should assess all witnesses, documents and the probabilities of a case. Invariably this then leads one to the review test. The review test is trite.
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[28] The provisions of section 145(2)(a)(i)- (iii) of the LRA are suffused with the
reasonability standard.
[29] A review Court asks itself the following question: Is the decision reached by
the Commissioner one that a reasonable decision- maker could not reach?
3 This
Court recently summarised the review test and its application as follows: -
“[25] In sum, applying the correct review test has a logical chronology. First,
it must be determined if there is a failure or error on the part of the arbitrator.
Second, and where there is such a failure or error, it must be shown that the outcome arrived at by the arbitrator was unreasonable, based on all the
evidence and issues before the arbitrator, even if it may be for different
reasons or on different grounds as those referred to by the arbitrator .”
4
[30] In the well -known matter of Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others5 Van Niekerk J
(as he then was) said the following: -
2 Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC).
3 Sidumo (supra) at paragraph 110; Fidelity Cash Management v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC).
4 Fidelity Cash Management v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others
(supra ) at paragraph 102.
5 (2010) 31 ILJ 452 (LC).
8
“[17] In summary, s 145 requires that the outcome of CCMA arbitration
proceedings (as represented by the commissioner’s decision) must fall within
a band of reasonableness, but this must not preclude this court from scrutinising the process in terms of which the decision was made. If a commissioner fails to take material evidence into account, or has regard to evidence that is irrelevant, or the commissioner commits some other misconduct or gross irregularity during the proceedings under review and that party is likely to be prejudiced as a consequence, the commissioner’s decision is liable to be set aside regardless of the result of the proceedings or whether on the basis of the record of the proceedings, that result is nonetheless capable of justification.”
[31] It is quite clear that in respect of the aforesaid there is no requirement in the
review test that a singular or dominant finding must prevail. The reference to a “… band of reasonableness…” clearly indicates that there is a span of findings that
could be made on the same set of facts and may be reached by various arbitrators.
Grounds of review .
Ground 1: Evidence tendered was circumstantial (not direct)
[32] This matter involved some circumstantial evidence. In deciding this ground of
review, I consider the recent judgment Mapyane v SA Police Service and Others
6
where the Labour Appeal Court said the following:
“[46] In Khambule v National Union of Mineworkers and Others the LAC reiterated that a reviewing court should not defer to the reasoning of a commissioner as ‘the reasoning of a commissioner is no guiding light in determining whether the decision or more particularly the ‘order’ handed down is reasonable’, but must consider all the evidence led at the arbitration and in
the light of that evidence determine whether the award is one which any
commissioner in the position of the commissioner, who determined the
arbitration, could reasonably make. If the answer is in the positive, then there
must be no interference with the award.” (Emphasis added)
6 (2024) 45 ILJ 564 (LC).
9
[33] Circumstantial evidence often forms an important part of arbitration
proceedings before commissioners, duly considering the informal nature within which
these proceedings are conducted. Once circumstantial evidence becomes readily
apparent in the proceedings, then – as in this case - an arbitrator is required to draw
inferences. This is so as witnesses may not have made direct assertions to any of the facts that are adduced or which come into play . For obvious reasons the
inferences that are being drawn must comply with the rules of logic.
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[34] It is also a well-known legal principle that in civil proceedings (and equally so
during statutory arbitrations) if an inference is drawn or sought to be drawn, that inference must also then be consistent with all the facts that were proven during the proceedings . Those facts are not required to point to the only inference. It is
sufficient that “the most probable inference” is drawn from these facts.
8 A singular or
dominant inference falls outside the scope of the civil test.
[35] Having said that, it then becomes quite clear that a trier of fact, such as the
Commissioner in this instance, during his assessment, evaluation and consideration
of circumstantial evidence should at least pay consideration to the cumulative effect of this evidence. This is so as in evaluating circumstantial evidence, the weight does not necessarily pertain to each individual portion of the evidence, but the
combination which that evidence would have in its entirety.
9
[36] In argument Adv Moll referred me to paragraph 11 of the arbitration award
where he contended that the Commissioner correctly determined that the question to be answered in this matter is whether Rangolo was involved in or part of the removal
of the tyres belonging to SCW. Having considered the transcript, it readily becomes
clear that both parties, on occasion either did not challenge evidence, or present ed a
sparse version. There are portions of Ragheeb’s and Rangolo’s evidence which are
not grappled with by the Commissioner in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the arbitration
award. This is quite normal and does not automatically upset the evidence cart.
7 R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202 - 203.
8 Govan v Skidmore 1952 (1) SA 732 (N) 735; MaCleod v Rens 1997 (3) SA 1039 (E).
9 SA Nylon Printers (Pty) Ltd v Davids [1998] 2 BLLR 135 (LAC) at 136G.
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[37] Amongst others is the evidence of Ragheeb where he during cross -
examination testified that the loading of tyres into a vehicle’s boot, at the back of the
business, ought to have raised suspicion. In addition, during his cross -examination it
was also put to him that Elvis has on occasion told Rangolo that SCW from time to time “gives him stuff” . That version was denied by Ragheeb. Ragheeb further on that
score testified that he would not know anything about giving Elvis any stuff and he
reminded the Commissioner that the tyres that were found were brand new and not second- hand.
[38] This evidence was not denied during Ragheeb’s further cross -examination. A
further portion of important evidence was Ragheeb’s testimony on how SAPS knew that employees were stealing, to which he answered that Elvis was on the wall and that the stolen tyres were “… coming over the wall and that is when the vehicle was
on site” .
[39] This information was equally not interrogated by the Commissioner. N o
evidence was introduced by Rangolo confirming that Elvis had indeed been provided
with three brand new tyres . No documentation to that extent was submitted during
the arbitration and neither was Ragheeb confronted with such documentation either. Elvis was not called to verify this version.
[40] Rangolo testified that when Ismail stopped his vehicle, beside the road, Elvis
was going to load the tyres which at that stage were on the pavement. Rangolo testified that the tyres at the time of their arrest were still on the pavement. The arbitration bundle contains several photographs where SAPS was involved and the photograph marked “B1” on page 20 reveals that three tyres were in actual fact in
the boot of Ismail’s vehicle, contrary to what was testified to by Rangolo. [41] During his evidence in chief Rangolo testified that Elvis was a cleaner, who
did maintenance and related chores. Significantly he testified that “… most of the time he was asking this stuff and he just lend the money for transport and all those stuff and we give him whatever we can give him…” . This version was not put to
Ragheeb during his cross -examination. The record is replete with similar examples.
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[42] It readily became apparent during Rangolo’s cross -examination that the vexed
merchandise did not leave the premises of SCW in the ordinary fashion as proposed
to Ragheeb. The transcript reveals that during the cross -examination of Rangolo a
rudimentary illustration of the surrounding area was drawn on a piece of paper and concessions were made by Rangolo as to the layout of the surrounding area. Rangolo admitted under cross -examination that if any merchandise is provided to an
employee, then there is a procedure that must be followed to remove the item from the premises. What is absent in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the arbitration award is any attempt by the Commissioner to interrogate these portions of evidence which clearly indicate that any merchandise that is removed from the employer’s premises must first of all be brought to the attention of the employer and in this instance the evidence clearly indicates that the three tyres were unlawfully removed. Logic dictates that legally obtained merchandise would then pass through the front gate, so to speak, which did not happen in this case. The inescapable conclusion is then that the tyres were stolen. I get the impression that the Commissioner at least
appreciated that.
[43] One question, however, must be answered. Did Rangolo – despite being in
Ismael’s vehicle - act in accordance with the charge sheet? I pause to add that I was
not able to find evidence that Rangolo assisted Elvis. [44] Thus, having considered the aforesaid, I return to the question posed by the
Commissioner : Whether Rangolo was involved in or was part of the removal of the
three tyres belonging to the A pplicant along with his finding in paragraph 12 that
Ragheeb finds himself in a predicament as he (Ragheeb) would not know where and
how the plan was hatched to remove the tyres . The charges do not revolve around
how and where the plan was hatched. [45] I have quoted the charges already.
[46] The facts then largely pivot around what transpired when Rangolo and Ismael
were accosted by Elvis by the roadside. I have already indicated that at this stage,
the tyres were misappropriated and were in the possession of Elvis. In other words,
from the evidence presented at arbitration, one comfortably reaches the conclusion that the three tyres were unlawfully removed, by Elvis . That then leaves a
12
consideration whether the Commissioner could reasonably conclude that Rangolo
was not part of the removal of the tyres. There is no evidence of what Rangolo did in the yard.
[47] The Commissioner was not, in my view incorrect in finding that Rangolo was
not involved in the removal of the tyres. At best, the circumstantial evidence only points to Elvis removing the tyres. The Commissioner cannot be faulted for finding that Ragheed’s evidence did not assist him in determining whether Rangolo was part of the plan and eventual removal either. Ragheed’s evidence was not able to establish that fact.
[48] However, the removal is not the concern raised in the evidence. Thus despite
what I have set out in the preceding paragraphs and to the extent that certain portions of t he evidence w ere not cross -examined and duly considering what was
said or not said by the two witnesses, I hold the view that what the Commissioner dealt with in paragraph 11 is supported by the evidence and is thus a conclusion
which a Commissioner, reasonably applying his/her mind to that evidence could
reach.
[49] As far as interrogating paragraph 12 of the arbitration award, it appears that
the thrust of the Commissioner’s thinking centred around Rangolo being in the vehicle at the time when their travel intersected with Elvis standing beside the road. I agree with the Commissioner’s finding that Rangolo’s evidence as to how it came about that he was in the vehicle was not disputed and that he was at the scene when arrested by SAPS and at that time he was in the presence of Elvis and Ismail, is certainly supported by the evidence.
[50] Rangolo disputed the allegations and denied that he was involved in the
misappropriation of SCW’s property and prior to the arbitration commencing, his representatives stated that his case would be that he was at the wrong place at the wrong time.
[51] I consider the following evidence , namely, that when Elvis indicated to Ismail
that he (Ismail) should stop, Elvis was already in possession of the tyres and at that stage Rangolo was in the vehicle with Isma il and moments later the SAPS pounced
13
on them. I proceed to fully quote Ragheeb’s cross -examination which allowed the
Commissioner to find that his version on the score was not able to countervail
Rangolo’s evidence: -
“MS NTSOANE: And I’m going to put a further version not you in saying the
applicant is further saying, ‘as we were on our way to lunch, we get stopped by Elvis who says can I come with you to lunch’. Can you comment or dispute that? MR RAHMAN: No, I cannot comment on that.”
[52] If anything were to trigger a suspicion, it is Ragheeb’s evidence that Rangolo
ought to have known that something is wrong, meaning that by “… loading tyres into
a boot and one of the guys at the back of the business, would he not have known that there was something wrong…” . And that is the sum total of the evidence
supporting the allegation that Rangolo was involved. What I do consider is the onus
and what a person in Rangolo’s position would say, other than what his version was
at the time of the arbitration.
[53] A similar situation arose in the case of DHL Supply Chain (Pty) Ltd v De Beer
N.O. and Others
10 in a case where the employer dismissed a number of employees
on the basis of them having failed a polygraph examination and where the case was to a large extent premised on the existence of circumstantial evidence. The employees in that case persisted with their plea of not guilty and ultimately the LAC ended up dismissing DHL’s appeal . It said that: -
“[15] Furthermore, the notion that they offered no real challenge to the facts adduced by the appellant and that this warrants an adverse inference is illogical. An innocent person in the position of the two respondents could be
expected to do no more than deny guilt and express ignorance about how and
why it occurred. Significantly, despite the ostensible best efforts of DHL itself,
the means of misappropriation remain unknown and precisely when it occurred in the chain of handling could not be established. The proof that the
respondents had the opportunity to steal is valueless without more and it
10 (2014) 35 ILJ 2379 (LAC).
14
could never be a burden on them to offer alternative theories for the
misappropriation in order to achieve exoneration.” (Emphasis added)
[54] The finding that there was no evidence that implicated Rangolo, premised on
the circumstances is not out of kilter with the review test.
[55] SCW also argued that no evidence was presented that Rangolo is 57 years
old or that his employment prospects are slim. As for Rangolo’s age I have
considered a few documents. The SAPS 14A form refers to Rangolo’s identity number. It captures that he was born in 1966. His identity number also appears on
the LRA Form 7.11, and at the part where he was required to indicate how old he was, he wrote 57. His age appears on his Salary Schedule, his UI -19 Form, and t his
is also confirmed in his certificate of service. The Commissioner , considering a
catalogue of the information before him, could reasonably assess Rangolo’s age.
While the Commissioner does not say where he obtained that information, it cannot be gainsaid that it was before him, one way or the other.
[56] This then leaves me to consider whether the award of 12 months
compensation was unreasonable. Rangolo sought maximum compensation. If a
dismissal is found to be substantively unfair, then section 193(2) requires the primary
remedy of reinstatement, unless any of the elements described in section 193(2)(a) -
(d) are present. The Commissioner avoided the primary remedy, on account of
Rangolo seeking maximum compensation. The Commissioner at paragraph 13
stated that Rangolo is unemployed, that Rangolo does not have an income and that
his prospects of employment are slim. [57] Section 193(1)(c) of the LRA provides for compensation to be paid to a
dismissed employee. Section 194 provides for the limits of compensation.
Compensation in the case of a substantive unfair dismissal amounts to an attempt to redeem the income or salary loss suffered by the affected employee.
[58] Whilst I accept that Rangolo was at the time 57 years old, it is equally true
that he was a mechanic. In other words, he was not an unskilled labourer, and the possibility of him being able to secure employment was not remote. He had not yet
reached pensionable age. The granting of compensation in terms of section 194 of
15
the LRA involves a value judgment, and such compensation awarded must be just
and equitable. There is no motivation by the Commissioner on how he concludes that 12 months compensation is appropriate. His award on that score is thus not reasoned, just n or equitable. The mere asking for maximum compensation does not
equate to granting that requested amount.
[59] In conclusion and j ust to be clear: The circumstantial evidence assessment in
this case, cannot extend to Rangolo being linked to the removal of the tyres , even
less its planning. That left the Commissioner with Rangolo’s presence in the car. I
hold the view that the circumstantial evidence cannot be considered in a manner that results in an overly elastic application, aiming to bring Rangolo within the domain of paragraph 47.5 of the Applicant’s heads of argument.
[60] Given the aforesaid, I hold the view that the finding by the Commissioner on
the merits of the dismissal is not unreasonable and his conclusion ( apart from the
remedy) falls within a band of decisions that could be reached on the evidence,
considering that circumstantial evidence. Doing so allowed for an obvious inference,
logically achieved, namely that Rangolo was not part of the removal . Merely being in
the vehicle is not circumstantially sufficient to implicate him . The result is that the
finding that Rangolo’s dismissal was substantively unfair, remains.
[61] In the premise, the following order is made.
Order
1. The review application is hereby dismissed in regards to the finding
on the substantive fairness of the dismissal of Aswihang wisi Rangolo but
upheld in regard to the award of compensation.
2. Paragraph 15(b) of the arbitration award under case number
GAJB6741 -23, made by Commissioner Mr Matome Victor Sehunane dated 29
May 2023 is reviewed and substituted with the following:
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“The Respondent ( Springs Car Wholesalers t/a No Finance Cars) is
ordered to pay the Applicant ( Aswihangwisi Rangolo) an amount of 5
months compensation calculated as follows: 5 x R10,500 = R 52,500”.
3. There is no order as to costs.
F. Venter
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the applicant : Adv P Moll
Instructed by : Raees Chothia Attorneys
For the first respondent : No appearance.